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Metaphysics and ethics are two distinct fields in academic philosophy. The object 
of metaphysics is what is, while the object of ethics is what ought to be. 
Necessitarianism is a modal doctrine that appears to obliterate this neat 
distinction. For it is commonly assumed that ought (at least under normal 
circumstances) implies can. But if necessitarianism is true then I can only do what 
I actually do. Hence what I ought to do becomes limited to what I in fact do. This 
is one widespread way of construing the danger that necessitarianism poses for 
ethics. There is, however, another way in which this collapse of what is with what 
ought to be can be construed. One could think of what is as already being what 
ought to be, of the two being one. On this picture, everything that is, is already 
valuable.  
 
In this thesis I explore the theory that being is intrinsically valuable. I do so by 
investigating the philosophy of perfection present in the works of the early 
modern rationalist Spinoza. For in his philosophy of perfection, I argue, we find 
being and value to be perfectly aligned. Hence, my reading challenges a 
widespread interpretation, according to which (ontological) perfection is divested 
of normativity in Spinozism.  
 
The position that all being is intrinsically valuable since it is perfect may be 
thought to be incompatible with human perfectionism. For what room can there be 
for human progress toward an ideal of perfection if all that exists, is necessarily 
II 
perfect? The goal of the thesis is to respond to this question by providing a 
systematic interpretation of the metaphysics of human perfectibility in Spinoza’s 
philosophy. In order to achieve this goal, I undertake two tasks. 
 
First, I examine Spinoza’s multi-faceted philosophy of perfection. I distinguish 
between ontological and teleological perfection. Moreover, I argue that since 
Spinoza maintains that everything is perfect to the extent that it is, perfection 
shoulders the role of a transcendental within his system. In order to highlight the 
normative significance of transcendental perfection, I compare Spinoza’s thought 
with the transcendental theory of the good in Thomas Aquinas. In addition, I 
distinguish between ontological and speculative perfection. Speculative perfection 
is conscious awareness of ontological perfection.  
 
Second, I show how infinity plays an essential role in Spinoza’s ethics by 
indicating how we, by availing ourselves of this notion, are able to acquire a 
perspective on reality from which its ontological perfection may be discovered. 
On this basis, I am able to demonstrate the (relatively understudied) ethical and 
soteriological importance of Spinoza’s conception of infinity. I argue that it is 
because (a) Spinoza’s ideal of human perfection is speculative, and because (b) 
one will be able to establish the (ontological) perfection of things by deducing it 
from the divine essence only when one considers this essence absolutely infinite, 
that (c) the absolute infinity of the divine essence plays a significant role in 
Spinoza’s account of human perfection as consisting in conscious awareness of 
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Metaphysics and ethics are two distinct fields in academic philosophy. Simply 
put, the object of metaphysics is what is, while the object of ethics is what ought 
to be. Necessitarianism is a modal doctrine that appears to obliterate this neat 
distinction. For it is commonly assumed that ought (at least under normal 
circumstances) implies can. But if necessitarianism is true then I can only do what 
I actually do. Hence what I ought to do becomes limited to what I actually do. 
What is, as it were, swallows up what ought to be. This is one widespread way of 
construing the danger that necessitarianism (as indeed mere determinism) poses 
for ethics. There is, however, another way in which this collapse of what is with 
what ought to be can be construed. One could, horrendously, think of what is as 
already being what ought to be, of the two being one. On this picture, everything 
that is, is already valuable. The thought is horrendous because it appears to 
sanction all the evils ever committed, and ever to be committed, by human beings. 
But no morally sensible person would want to say that everyone, including 
murderers and rapists, has always done what ought to be done. Without 
sanctioning any such evils, I wish nonetheless to explore, in this thesis, the theory 
that being is intrinsically valuable. I will do so by investigating the philosophy of 
perfection present in the works of Baruch, or Benedictus, Spinoza. For in his 
philosophy of perfection, as I will show, we find being and value to be perfectly 
aligned in this way.  
 
It is well-known that Spinoza espoused a concept of metaphysical perfection as 
coextensive with reality. No one has articulated the metaphysical dimension of 
this theory better than Samuel Newlands. Newlands’ position on the relation 
between this metaphysical perfection and normativity is also representative of the 
state of the art. He writes: “[Spinoza’s] more contentious thesis is that perfection 
is not an intrinsically normative or moral feature of the world. […] Spinoza does 
not reject the mind-independent perfection of God, the world or particular things 
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[…]. Instead, Spinoza rejects the further association of metaphysical perfection 
with moral and normative dimensions” (2017, pp. 269-70).1 
 
One should define terms such as ‘normative’ or ‘moral' before one dismisses them 
as irrelevant for Spinoza’s theory of metaphysical perfection. As is well-known, 
the moral is but one subregion of the normative. The normative encompasses not 
only the moral (directive) dimension of what one should do, but anything 
pertaining to some kind of evaluation. There are thus two ways in which the 
normative and moral can be considered irrelevant for Spinoza’s theory of 
perfection. First, if perfection for Spinoza fails to be normative, it clearly cannot 
be moral. While I would grant Newlands that perfection is not for Spinoza a 
directive standard whereby we can evaluate the actions of human beings morally, 
I reject his idea that it is normatively neutral. To say that something is 
metaphysically perfect is to express a value judgment. On my reading of Spinoza, 
it is in virtue of this normativity that metaphysical perfection can occupy a place 
at the very heart of his doctrine of human perfection. Second, one could 
mistakenly think that because Spinoza’s concept of metaphysical perfection is not 
a standard whereby actions can be morally evaluated it is not normative at all. 
Such a reduction of the normative sphere to the exclusively moral should be 
avoided. 
 
It is to the exploration of the normative dimension of metaphysical perfection in 
Spinoza’s ethics that this thesis is devoted. The overall goal of the present thesis is 
to present a novel reading of Spinoza’s philosophy of human perfection which 
combines metaphysical and ethical elements.
2
 I will seek to achieve this goal by 
                                                 
1
 On Newland’s view (2010, pp. 67-8), metaphysical perfection is optimized harmony, 
and more specifically balance between the ontological plentitude and the parsimony Spi-
noza is committed to by 1p16 and 1p15, respectively. For similar assessments of perfec-
tion as normatively neutral in Spinoza’s philosophy, see Broad (2001); Jarrett (2014) and 
Rice (1977, p. 105). For an acknowledgement of the tension between ontological and 
normative perfection, see Schaub (1933, p. 21). 
2
 My approach is innovating (although I do not claim it is unique), because Spinoza’s 
ethics and his metaphysics are often studied in isolation. Nadler (2011, pp. xii-xiv) claims 
that only in recent years has Spinoza’s rehabilitation as a profound ethical and political 
philosopher begun. As evidence of Nadler’s assessment of the state of the art, one may 
want to mention that Bennett, in his pathbreaking study, argues that the line of support 




showing how subtle distinctions between ontological and teleological perfection, 
on the one hand, and ontological and speculative perfection, on the other, allow 
Spinoza to formulate a multifaceted, and at times seemingly paradoxical, 
philosophy of human perfection. 
 
A secondary goal of my thesis, inextricably linked with the first, is to show that it 
is Spinoza’s radical commitment to two remarkably traditional views - the 
transcendental character of perfection, on the one hand, and the analogy of the 
infinite, on the other - that allows him to articulate this complex theory of 
perfection. Achieving this goal will allow me to elucidate the place of Spinoza’s 
thought in history by showing how modern thought develops in partial continuity 
with medieval philosophy and theology.
3
 In From the Closed World to the Infinite 
Universe (1957), Alexandre Koyré advanced the historical thesis that thinkers, 
during the early modern period - whether they were philosophers, poets or 
scientists - transferred traditional divine attributes such as immensity and infinity 
from God to a physical universe that ancient and medieval cosmology had 
confined within limits. Koyré pointed out how this “destruction of the cosmos” 
implied “the discarding by scientific thought of all considerations based upon 
value - concepts, such as perfection, harmony, meaning and aim, and finally the 
utter devalorization of being, the divorce of the world of value and the world of 
facts” (1957, p. 2).4  
 
Spinoza is both an example of and a counterexample to the development 
described by Koyré. Certainly, Spinoza undertakes an infinitization of the 
                                                                                                                                     
and body are attributes of the one substance is “the only transmission of weight from the 
ethical doctrines back to the argumentative core of part 1” (1984, p. 17). Since mind/body 
parallelism is only derivatively ethical, this suggests that, on Bennett’s reading, the meta-
physical first part of the Ethics is all but ethically irrelevant.  
3
 For a note on the development of this historiography, see Nicholas Jolley (2006). In 
recent years it has been increasingly acknowledged that, rather than inventing entirely 
new concepts, early modern thinkers were, as Jolley puts it, to a great extent, inventing by 
“put[ting] new wine in old bottles” (Jolley, 2006, p. 95).  
4
 Flaubert too read Spinoza in this way. The devil is a Spinozist in La tentation de saint 
Antoine, and subscribes to doctrines such as the infinity of a universe without finality; the 
identity of God’s will with his essence and the ensuing impossibility of contingency, and 
tempts the saint to “conceive of God beyond God, being beyond being” [concevoir Dieu 
au-delà de Dieu, l'être par-dessus l'être] (1983, p. 212).  
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universe: physical extension is, for him, an infinite attribute of God. Yet, this 
infinitization of the universe is a direct result of his equation of Nature with God. 
Divine attributes are not “transferred” from God to Nature: instead, the possession 
of divine attributes by Nature simply is the possession of those attributes by God. 
But by merely stating that Spinoza identifies Nature with God, I have not yet 
answered the most interesting interpretative question. This question concerns 
whether the new conception of the cosmos as infinite and mechanistically 
operating comes to supplant God, or whether traditional divine attributes such as 
perfection come to imbue the cosmos with value. To put it in Koyré’s terms, does 
Spinoza, by identifying Nature with God, transform God into a “world of facts” or 
Nature into a “world of value”? To put the matter less tendentiously, which ratio 
of traditionally divine attributes to early modern cosmological ones are we to 
think of as characterizing the hybrid of God/Nature? The “cold” character of 
Spinoza’s God - a god certainly located beyond good and evil - has rightly 
attracted much attention in the scholarship, and that Spinoza reduced the 
explanatory role of teleology in natural philosophy is well-known. By contrast, 
the ethical consequences of Spinoza’s understanding of God have attracted far 
less attention. By arguing that the definition of God as absolutely infinite is 
harnessed by Spinoza for the purposes of designing a human perfectionism I will 
point at some of these consequences. Since ethical and soteriological 
consequences follow from Spinoza’s description of God, God-Nature is not solely 
a “world of facts” but also the realm of (some) value: perfection. This value is not 
opposed to reality. It is reality. My account of human perfection in Spinoza’s 
philosophy will thus allow for this understudied alignment of being and value to 
play a central role. 
 
In order to show the historical interest of the present interpretation - namely the 
continuity of medieval themes in Spinoza’s thought -, I include background 
sections where appropriate, where I contrast Spinoza’s philosophy primarily with 
the thought of Thomas Aquinas. The major focus will nonetheless always be on 
Spinoza’s own philosophy. The thesis does therefore not purport to make a 




The thesis is divided into a First Part comprising four chapters, an intermittent 
Discussion, a Second Part comprising three chapters, and a final Conclusion. 
While the chapters are thematically unified - a unity centered on perfection in 
Spinozism -, with the exception of the Discussion, they are all intended to have 
stand-alone value as contributions to specific issues.  
 
Below I present the themes of each Part followed by synopses of each chapter. 
 
Part I: Ontological perfection and Necessity.  
 
Chapter 1. I distinguish between teleological and ontological perfection and argue 
that ontological perfection shoulders the role of a transcendental property in 
Spinoza’s philosophy. Because all being follows necessarily from God’s nature, 
all being is perfect. Most importantly, I point out the prima facie paradoxical 
consequences of this transcendental theory of perfection for Spinoza’s ethics.  
 
Chapter 2. While the previous chapter was devoted to the thesis that all reality is 
perfection, this chapter treats the obverse relation, i.e. the thesis that no reality is 
an imperfection. I contrast Spinoza’s negation theory of imperfection with a 
privation theory of evil. While according to the latter, evil is a privative lack of 
being, for Spinoza imperfection is simply a negation of being: it is not the lack of 
some being due to the individual lacking it, since no more being or perfection is 
due to anything than that which necessarily follows from God’s nature.  
 
Chapter 3. Teleological perfection has no ontological foundation for Spinoza. In 
this chapter I argue against a constructivist reading of Spinoza’s ethics proposed 
by Charles Jarrett, in favour of an ontologically grounded ideal of human 
perfection. My thesis is that human perfection can be ontologically grounded 
since it is contemplative. In addition, I distinguish between raw ontological 
perfection - the perfection all being has, insofar as it is - and speculative 
perfection: consciously recognized ontological perfection or ontological 




Chapter 4. Since Spinoza apparently grounds the perfection of all things in the 
fact that they necessarily follow from the divine nature, Spinoza’s commitment to 
necessitarianism must be discussed. Instead of providing textual evidence for 
necessitarianism directly (a task that has already been amply fulfilled in the 
scholarship), I attack the two strongest arguments for attributing modal 
contingentism to Spinoza (due to Edwin Curley and Newlands), and argue that 
these arguments fail to establish that thesis. Interestingly, both arguments in 
favour of contingentism appeal to Spinoza’s claim that singular things have an 
infinity of causal ancestors. I present an alternative theory of contingency which 
bases only the contingent appearance of things on this infinity. Crucially, it is by 
changing one’s perspective on the infinity of causal ancestors that one can come 
to regard things as either necessary or contingent.  
 
Discussion. I assess the picture extricable from Part 1 by discussing three relations 
of grounding: (1) that of necessitarianism in the Principle of Sufficient Reason, 
(2) that of necessitarianism in divine infinity and perfection and finally, (3) the 
absence of (ontologically solid) imperfection in necessitarianism. My goal is to 
show that it is (2), the grounding of necessitarianism in divine perfection and 
infinity, that is crucial to Spinoza in the establishment of (3), i.e. the absence of 
(ontologically solid) imperfection in the world. This result is interesting because it 
shows that, as far as his theory of perfection is concerned, Spinoza’s theology - 
and more precisely his view that God is absolutely infinite - takes precedence over 
his metaphysical rationalism. Lastly, I link this picture of metaphysical perfection 
with Spinoza’s practical account of strictly human perfection. 
 
Part II: Human Perfection and the Optics of Salvation.  
 
Chapter 6. I draw on the results reached in Chapter 4 by applying the theory that a 
shift in the perspective through which one regards infinity can affect how one 
conceives of the modality of things, to my reading of Spinoza’s cognitive therapy 
of the affects. Since one becomes more perfect to the extent that one acts more, 
and since (speaking from the mental point of view) one is active to the extent that 
one’s ideas are adequate and passive to the extent that they are inadequate, to 
replace one’s inadequate idea which presents the object of one’s passion as 
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contingent with an adequate idea which presents the same object as necessary, is 
one way in which humans can increase in perfection. Unless one can intellectually 
conceive the infinity of causal ancestors behind the object of one’s passion one 
cannot consider it necessary in the way required to combat the passion. It is by 
conceiving of the infinity of the causal ancestry of modes as “qualitative” - after 
the manner of the qualitative infinity of God’s attributes - that one will be able to 
conceive this infinity intellectually rather than by the imagination’s means. But 
how can we construe the infinity of the modes after the manner of the attributes’ 
infinity? And with what right can infinity be predicated of God’s attributes in the 
first place? 
 
Chapter 7. The question just raised belongs to a family of questions all pertaining 
to the problem of religious language. For this reason, I first provide an 
introduction to that problem, thereby situating Spinoza’s philosophy within a 
broader historical context. Subsequently I attempt to answer the question, raised at 
the end of Chapter 6, of how the predication of infinity works across the contexts 
of substance, attributes and modes. Contrary to the reading of Jean-Luc Marion, I 
advance the thesis that it works analogically, but that the analogy is inverted. By 
calling the analogy inverted I mean that, while in traditional accounts of analogy 
creatures are known prior to the creator, for Spinoza our knowledge of God’s 
infinity is prior to our knowledge of the infinity of the modes, as the latter is 
deduced from the former. But how can this claim be squared with experience? 
Surely we do not know God’s infinite nature to the extent that Spinoza claims we 
do. Squaring the Spinozist claim with experience will involve invoking different 
perspectives one can adopt vis-à-vis the divine object. More specifically, the kind 
of knowledge of God we inevitably possess does not involve knowledge of God 
as God. Only by realizing that God is absolutely infinite, does one recognize in 
anything that is conceivably an attribute of God an actual attribute of God.  
 
Chapter 8. In this chapter I discuss the ultimate shift in perspective that on my 
reading is conducive to perfection in humans. This shift occurs when I come to 
know that my knowledge, qua perfection, is ultimately to be predicated of God. I 
argue that Spinoza’s third kind of knowledge consists exactly in the transformed 
reflexivity whereby I come to know under a divine guise not the object of my 
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knowledge but its subject. Such an interpretation of Spinoza’s difficult doctrines 
of the third kind of knowledge and the accompanying intellectual love of God is 
of the outmost relevance for this investigation into the Spinozist theory of 
perfection. On my reading of these doctrines, Spinoza advances a surprising ideal 
of human perfection as consisting in humans recognizing themselves to be what 
they necessarily are. 
 
Before I begin with the actual thesis, let me make a few notational points.  
 
(a) In referring to the Ethics, I adopt the shorthand where 1p7 refers to the seventh 
proposition of the first part of the Ethics. app = appendix, a = axiom, c = 
corollary, d = demonstration (when following a proposition-indicating number) or 
definition (when following a Book-indicating number), l = lemma, p = 
proposition, s = scholium.  
 
(b) In referring to Spinoza’s other works, I adopt the following standard 
abbreviations: CM = Cogitata Metaphysica (Metaphysical Thoughts); KV = Korte 
Verhandling van God, de mensch, en deszelvs welstand (Short Treatise on God, 
Man, and His Well-Being); NS = Nagelate Schriften (the 1677 Dutch translation 
of Opera posthuma); PPC = Principia Philosophiae Cartesii (Descartes’s 
Principles of Philosophy; TIE = Tractatus de intellectus emendatione (Treatise on 
the Emendation of the Intellect); and TTP = Tractatus Theologico-Politicus 
(Theological-Political Treatise). For the English translation of Spinoza’s texts, I 
refer to Edwin Curley’s editions of 1988 and 2016 (abbreviated as C or C. II, 
respectively, and immediately followed by page number). For the Latin, I consult 
Gebhardt’s critical edition (Spinoza Opera, Heidelberg: Carl Winter Verlag, 
1925).  
 
(c) In the bibliography, sources with an original publication date prior to the year 

























Transcendental Perfection in Spinoza’s Philosophy 
  
 Introduction.  
In this chapter I will show that, in spite of Spinoza’s own statements to the 
contrary, a transcendental property of being plays a crucial role in his philosophy. 
More precisely, I argue, ontological perfection plays this role. The qualification of 
perfection as ontological is necessary, since Spinoza’s use of the word ‘perfection’ 
is dual (Spinoza explicitly acknowledges this, for instance in Metaphysical 
Thoughts [henceforward CM], I, 6). Spinoza’s dual use of ‘perfection’, as 
intending, on the one hand ontological perfection, and on the other hand 
teleological perfection - a concept without ontological foundation, is well-
documented in the scholarship. However, this chapter is not merely concerned 
with formulating this difference. Instead, my twofold goal is to (i) explore the 
continuity of Spinoza’s use of ontological perfection with medieval transcendental 
thought by arguing that since it is coextensive with being (esse), perfection plays 
the role of a transcendental, and (ii), set the stage for an ethical and soteriological 
exploration of the dynamic interplay between ontological perfection (understood 
as a transcendental) and teleological perfection (understood as a universal). 
Spinoza’s position on universals has been much debated in the scholarship. This is 
justified since, as Lee Rice points out, the significance of so much of what 
Spinoza says alters depending on which approach to universals he is seen as 
adopting.
5
 Since the earliest days of Spinoza interpretation, commentators have 
                                                 
5
 Rice (1984) cites a number of topics, ranging from Spinoza’s epistemology, to the status 
of God’s attributes, and, finally, the issue of “human nature. Rice does not in this context 
mention any significant ethical implications. 
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entrenched themselves in one of two camps: either Spinoza is seen as a 
nominalist, or as a realist. Since Spinoza explicitly rejects universals, realist 
readings appropriate, as it were, some ideas which are considered adequate in 
Spinoza’s philosophy, and call these the “true” universals. Candidates for such 
true universals are the ideas we form of the attributes of God-or-Nature 
(henceforward, for textual economy, referred to as ‘God’), or the common notions 
which in the Ethics enable knowledge of the second kind.
6
 
Before entering into this discussion, it is worthwhile to ask what can be meant by 
the nominalist/realist distinction in the context of Spinoza interpretation.  
Realism is the view that abstract entities are real. Nominalism, by contrast, is the 
view that there are no abstract entities.
7
 The historical nominalism which Spinoza 
(supposedly) professed, however, was specifically concerned with denying that 
                                                 
6
 Haserot (1950) has suggested that the concepts we have of the divine attributes can 
qualify as universals. I agree with Rice (1984), that it does not seem very likely that the 
attributes are “universals.”  It should be noted, in this context, that Spinoza “inherited” 
the attribute of thought from Descartes’ cogitatio and his attribute of extension from Des-
cartes’ extension. But in a letter to Arnauld, (1903, p. 221), Descartes denied that exten-
sion and thought were something universal [universale quid], maintaining instead that 
they were each a particular nature [naturam particularem]. In the light of (1) the signifi-
cance of the attributes in Spinoza’s metaphysics and epistemology, (2) his explicit denial 
of the epistemic value of universals and (3) the conspicuous lack of a precedent in Des-
cartes, from whom he borrowed (and of course reinvented) the notion of attribute, it 
seems very unlikely that Spinoza’s attributes would qualify as universals. I cannot discuss 
this question in further detail here.  
 As for the status of universals of the common notions, the most balanced argu-
ment in the favor of such as a view is Piero di Vona (1960, parte 1). Vona argues that if 
due attention is given to 2p49s, it becomes evident that Spinoza’s criticism targets mainly 
the origin of the universals, not their nature and value (Ibid., p. 156). An epistemically 
positive value can therefore be conferred on the common notions, which for Vona is what 
makes Spinoza’s position as one “not far removed from that of moderate realism” (Ibid., 
p. 152). However, as far as I can see, it is exactly the origin of the concepts in question, 
whether universals or common notions, which determines their value. Again, this topic 
merits further discussion. 
7
 See Szabó (2005). 
 But what does it mean for there to “be” no properties (for instance)? Does it 
mean that nominalists can’t say that two roses are both the same shade of red, since the 
redness of the one rose isn’t the redness of the other? Bennett (1984, p. 39) takes nomi-
nalism to imply this, as does Haserot (1950). More specifically, on Bennett’s view, nomi-
nalism implies that we can’t have knowledge of properties at all, which effectively dis-
qualifies Spinoza’s account of the second kind of knowledge. By contrast, Rice (1984, p. 
22) following Nelson Goodman, has opined that nominalism is compatible with the exist-
ence of instantiated properties. 
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there are such abstract entities as universals.
8
  By a universal is meant that 
concept under which particulars are subsumed, such as, for instance, the genus 
‘horse’, and, as we shall see, ‘perfection’ in a certain sense of the word. In order 
for one to know Spinoza’s position on this matter, it is necessary to first adjudicate 
in what sense universals can be said to have reality or being in the first place.  
In this context, it is important to bear in mind that, for Spinoza, being admits of 
degrees. Proof of this is for instance 1p9: “The more reality or being each thing 
has, the more attributes belong to it.”  The fact that Spinoza held a notion of being 
which admitted of degrees shows that one needs to better understand Spinozist 
being, if one is to be able to shed light on the status of the universals in his 
philosophy. Perhaps, in the end, universals can be said to have being, or to be, to 
some degree. At the end of this chapter, I will show in what sense they do have 
being to some degree. Since I prefer to suspend judgment on whether Spinoza is 
rightly to be characterized as a nominalist or not until after I have undertaken this 
investigation of his ontology, I will follow Bennett (1984) in using the less 
theoretically charged term “(conceptual) minimalism” to refer to Spinoza's 
tendency not to posit abstract entities, when that can be avoided. 
The question of what being is, for Spinoza, leads us to the question of the 
transcendentals. For while the Aristotelian categories determined what (how, 
when, etc.) x is, the transcendentals concern the fact that x is, or differently put, 
they concern what x is solely in virtue of its being. Hence, an exploration of 
transcendental being in Spinoza’s philosophy will also provide an answer to the 
question of what it means to be, for Spinoza. However, the traditional 
transcendentals of being (ens), along with thing (res) and something (aliquid), are 
explicitly rejected in 2p40s1 - the locus classicus for Spinoza’s dismissal of the 
universals, and on the same grounds as the universals are rejected. This may lead 
one to assume that Spinoza’s concept of being is not thick, or at least not rendered 
thick by his subscription to any form of transcendentals. In what follows, I will 
investigate if this is the case.  
                                                 
8
 Whether ‘nominalism’ adequately captures a historical position is debatable. Pasnau 
(2011, p. 84) has claimed that ‘nominalism’ is a flawed organizing concept for the medie-
val period, since it was “not a view at all”. 
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In general, while there are historical studies devoted to Spinoza’s explicit position 
on the transcendentals in the secondary literature,
9
 an assessment of the 
consequences of this position for his ethical system is still wanting. In what 
follows, I will outline Spinoza’s position with the goal of identifying some 
inconsistency in Spinoza’s rejection of the transcendentals, which justifies an 
investigation into the remnant of a transcendental in his own philosophy. In this 
chapter I argue that, in spite of his statements to the contrary in 2p40s and CM I, 
6, Spinoza does entertain a transcendental property of being, namely ontological 
perfection. Explicating Spinoza’s concept of ontological perfection will, in turn, 
shed light on his doctrine of universals. In addition, it will pave the way for a 
deeper understanding of Spinoza’s arguably paradoxical program of ethics. 
 1.1. What is a transcendental?  
The theory of transcendental being was developed by the schoolmen of the Latin 
West during the 12th to the 17th century. According to Aristotle’s influential 
understanding of being, while the categories explicate the way things are (as a 
substance subsisting in itself, or as a quality inhering in a substance, for instance), 
being as such (being as being: to on he on) is manifested in all categories, without 
itself being subject to any categorical determination.
10
 Although the doctrine of 
the convertibility of being and some term, taken to be super-categorical after the 
manner of being (such as the good, or the one), has deep roots in Greek 
philosophy, it was scholastic authors who, in dialogue with the Latin corpus 
                                                 
9
 Vona (1960, parte 2. pp. 205-20; 1977) extensively treat Spinoza’s position on the me-
dieval doctrine of the transcendentals. Following Vona, I am familiar with two essays 
thematically devoted to the topic: Vinti (2002) and Vertucci (2002). Scribano (1990) dis-
cusses Spinoza’s position on the transcendentals in the CM. For the issue of the historical 
development of the transcendentals and the various shapes in which thinkers (mainly 
Western schoolmen) entertained the thought during this period, see Vona (1994). For a 
general overview of Spinoza’s relation to scholasticism, see Freudentahl (1887, pp. 85–
138). 
10
 For Aristotle’s influential denials that being is a category (a genus) see Metaphysics, 
Volume 1: Book 3, 998b24–29 (1933) and Posterior Analytics 92b14–15 (1960). 
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aristotelicum, elaborated a thick concept of transcendental being.
11
 As Jan Aersten 
writes: 
[The medieval authors] always refer to the same four Aristotelian 
texts: the Philosopher’s claim that ‘being’ is not a genus (in the third 
book of the Metaphysics), his discussion of the relation between being 
and one (in the fourth book of the Metaphysics), the insinuation of an 
‘ontological' conception of truth (in the second book of the 
Metaphysics), and the criticism of the Platonic Idea of the Good (in 
the Nicomachean Ethics, I, c. 4). (2012, p. 60). 
Notions other than being were called transcendental on account of their 
“transcending” all categorical determination, after the manner of being itself. 
Such transcendentals could be either simply or disjunctively “convertible with 
being” - that is, coextensional, and yet not cointensional, with the term ‘being’. (I 
will not here address the issue of disjunctive transcendentals.) 
If being as being is not limited to any specific category, then nor are the terms 
coextensional with being. The names listed as transcendental varied in different 
accounts, but invariably seem to have comprised the metaphysical good (bonum). 
Although Aquinas’s account of the transcendentals varies,
12
 the list he presents in 
De Veritate, q. 1. a. 1. resp., comprises the following six transcendentals: ens, res, 
aliquid and unum, verum, bonum.
13
 What arguments were adduced in defense of 
                                                 
11
 Bärthlein (1972) has convincingly argued that there is no textual basis on which to 
impute the doctrine of a transcendental good to Aristotle, although it probably flourished, 
in some form, in the Academy. Nonetheless the doctrine sprouted from Aristotelian roots. 
12
 The “basic texts” for Aquinas’s treatment of the transcendentals are, apart from De 
Veritate q. 1 art. 1 and q. 2 art. 21 and In I Sententiarium d. 2. q. 3 art. 3.: see Aertsen 
(1996, p. 72). 
13
 In De Veritate, q. 1, a. 1, resp. (1980, p. 1) Aquinas first writes: “Illud autem quod pri-
mo intellectus concipit quasi notissimum, et in quod conceptiones omnes resolvit, est ens, 
ut Avicenna dicit in principio suae metaphysicae. Unde oportet quod omnes aliae concep-
tiones intellectus accipiantur ex additione ad ens”. It is interesting that Aquinas’s tran-
scendental project is here delineated against the horizon of the Avicennian notion that 
“common being” (ens commune) is “first known” and, one might add, for this reason the 
proper object of metaphysics. See Chapters 1-2 in Courtine (1990) for an analysis of 
Thomist metaphysics against this Avicennian horizon. Aertsen (1996, pp. 81–84) also 
emphasizes this context.  
 When the “mode expressed” (modus expressus) by the concept adding to being is 
“general and consequent upon all being” (generalis et consequens omne ens), the concept 
in question is a transcendental. Aquinas’ taxonomy for transcendentals in (loc. cit.) is as 
follows: concepts that follow being absolutely divide into two categories: affirmative 
(thing: res), and negative (one: unum); concepts that follow being “considered in their 




the coextensionality of being with these transcendentals? Since my subsequent 
study will be devoted to Spinoza’s position on a transcendental having bearing on 
ethics, I will limit my study to the case of the transcendental good. 
 1.2. The good as a transcendental. 
In what follows, I will not present a historical survey of the concept of a 
transcendental good, but merely highlight an aspect of that doctrine that will 
prove salient in my analysis of Spinoza. This aspect is the theological and even 
(arguably) theodicial role played by the doctrine in question.  
In his influential theological opusculum De Hebdomadibus, Boethius considers 
the question of how created substances can be good in their being, although they 
are not substantial goods. If they were substantial goods they would be good 
merely in virtue of their own being, but this is the prerogative of God.
14
 
Nonetheless, if they only participate in the good, they are not good through 
themselves, and then there will be a merely accidental relation between the fact 
that created substances are, and the fact that they are good. But only that which is 
good in itself - in its being - can tend toward the good, and on Boethius’ view, all 
things manifestly tend towards the good.  
Boethius’ way of resolving this dilemma consisted in asserting that every created 
substance that is, is good insofar as it is since its existence flows from (the will of) 
the first good. Since created goods are good in themselves in virtue of standing in 
the relation of creation to the first good, they are not good simply in virtue of their 
own being, an ontological status reserved for God, yet they are nonetheless good 
in their being (that is, in the being imparted to them by God’s act of creation).
15
 In 
his Disputed Questions on Truth, q. 21, Aquinas cited, with approval, Boethius’ 
                                                                                                                                     
which distincts one being from all other things (something: aliud), and concepts which 
follow being according to the conformity of one being with another (secundum conveni-
entam unius entis ad aliud). This latter conformity takes place in the soul which alone has 
the intrinsic capacity to concur with all things, Aquinas says, referring to Aristotle’s De 
Anima, III. The soul concurs with all being in two ways, either in accordance with its 
appetitive faculty - engendering the transcendental good (bonum), or with its intellective 
faculty - engendering the transcendental true (verum).   
14
 See “How substances can be good in virtue of their existence without being absolute 
goods”, in Boethius (1973, p. 44). 
15
 Boethius (1973, pp. 44–7). 
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reasoning, which evidently derives the convertibility of good and being from 
God’s act of creation.
16
 
In essence, the incentive to treat ‘being’ and ‘good’ as transcendental terms came 
from the Judeo-Christian doctrine of God’s creation (and maintenance) of being. 
Historically the doctrine also served a polemical, and more precisely theodicial, 
purpose. It has been asserted the kind of theodicy the doctrine operates is not 
moral but metaphysical, since the goodness that is convertible with being is not 
the moral good, but the metaphysical good. This has been argued, with respect to 
Aquinas, by Davies (2011).
17
 What is the difference between these different kinds 
of good? The moral good is a concept intimately wound up with approval. We 
judge someone to be morally good when we consider them to act as they should 
act in a given situation, and we judge someone’s character to be good when it is 
disposed to do such acts. But it is far from clear that we can apply such categories 
of moral approval (or disapproval) to creatures that are fundamentally different 
from ourselves. We do not normally judge wolfs or plants by such categories. Yet, 
God is presumably more different from us than any wolf or plant. Therefore, it is 
far from clear that our moral judgments of approval and disapproval are 
applicable to him in the first place. By contrast, when we want to say that reality 
is metaphysically good, we want to assert that it stands in a certain relation to 
                                                 
16
 However, in Summa Theologicae I, q. 5, 1, and 3, Aquinas also provided an independ-
ent conceptual analysis in favor of the co-extensionality of being and good. This reason-
ing hinges on four identifications: (a) of the good with the desirable; (b) of the desirable 
with what has perfection; (c) of having perfection with having actuality; and (d) of having 
actuality with having being. I borrow this presentation of Aquinas’ argument from 
Aertsen (1985, pp. 449–70).  
 For a different analysis of the passage, see Davies (2011, p. 32). Davies construes 
the passage as an analysis of “what has to be the case [for X] to exist.”  So, in order for 
there to be a human being, “there has to be what succeeds in being human […]  In other 
words, the notion of existing is bound up with the notion of achievement or success.”  In 
order to be, there has to be something which succeeds in, or is sufficiently good at, being 
what it is. 
17
 On Davies’ (2011) reading, the “theodicy” supplied by Aquinas (and indeed, by all 
subscribing to the convertibility of being and good and the concomitant privation theory 
of evil) does not answer the question: “How can God justify himself morally from the 
evil that exists?” Yet, the theory of being and good as convertible and the privation theory 
of evil clearly yield a metaphysical answer to the question: “How can God justify himself 
from the evil that exists?” The justification is this: God, as the creator of all and only 
being, does not create evil. Thus, on Davies’ view, although this does not exonerate God 
morally, one can nonetheless speak of a theodicy, that is, of a formula which explains 
how God’s omnipotence is to be combined with the presence of evil in the world. 
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God’s goodness. To call reality good in a transcendental sense always involves 
grounding the goodness of reality in God’s goodness. Although the metaphysical 
good may not be moral, it is nonetheless clearly normative: for if being is 
metaphysically good, this should make us prone to evaluate it positively - and 
everything that has bearing on evaluation is normative - even though the 
evaluation in question need not be moral in nature. 
Yet, one may object that we do not have epistemic access to a good that is not 
fundamentally related to what is moral and that the theodicy offered by Aquinas 
(and others) by the means of the transcendentality of the good must therefore, 
pace Davies (2011), be moral, or at least stand in a meaningful relation to the 
moral good. I cannot here address this objection in depth. But a partial response is 
as follows. Although there are many examples of normativity as disconnected 
from morality,
18
 the one I think would be especially relevant in this context is the 
normativity of beauty. Perhaps the positive evaluation of being which is imposed 
upon us by its being transcendentally good is more like an aesthetic judgement 
than a moral one. This, it should be mentioned, is not a view that I attribute to 
Aquinas, but merely one way of making sense of the distinction between the 
moral and the metaphysical good. If one were to pursue this line of reasoning, 
however, additional work must be done in order to clarify the relation between the 
metaphysical good and beauty. This investigation falls outside the scope of my 
present topic. Let us for this reason return to the topic of the theodicy.  
It is understandable that the coextensionality of ‘being’ and ‘good’ should play a 
theodicial role, since the view of these terms as coextensional presupposes another 
doctrine, namely the widely accepted privation theory of evil. Aquinas, for 
instance, acknowledged this logical relation in his Disputed Questions on Truth, 
when he stated that it is possible for being and good to be convertible since evil is 
privation of being.
19
 For if being were divisible into good and evil, ‘good’ and 
                                                 
18
 The most down-to-earth example being cases of “This is a good pencil”. As Thomson 
(2008, p. 20) has remarked, items such as pencils are function-kinds, and “to be good qua 
member of one [such kind], is to be a member of [one such kind] that performs the ap-
propriate function well”. 
19
 The mutual implications of the privation theory of (metaphysical) evil and the convert-
ibility of being and good was acknowledged by Aquinas in De veritate, q. 21 a. 2 arg. 6 




‘being’ could obviously not be coextensional terms. If good is to be 
transcendental, (metaphysical) evil must be non-being.  
That the privation theory of evil, in turn, was regarded as a powerful argument in 
the defence of God’s omnipotence and goodness is testified to historically by the 
fact that in Augustine’s case, the doctrine of evil as privatio boni provided him 
with a rebuttal against the Manicheans, who conceived of good (and divine) and 
evil (and “demonic”) as two positive forces locked in combat. The doctrine was 
again coopted in Catholic polemics against the Albigensians.
20
 In essence, this 
motive - to demote evil from an ontological standing equal to that of the good - 
underpinned the doctrine of a transcendental good.  
Spinoza, as we shall see, rejected the notion of a transcendental good. Yet he put 
this rejection, along with the transcendental standing of perfection, to a theodicial 
use which, although radically different, bears surprising resemblances to the 
theological project of previous thinkers. 
 1.3. Spinoza’s position on the transcendentals. 
There are three explicit mentions of the transcendental terms in Spinoza’s oeuvre. 
I will begin with these passages, and then uncover other passages, where 
transcendentals are at work more tacitly.  
First, in the CM 1,6, Spinoza not only explicitly rejects the transcendentals unum, 
verum, bonum, but even seems to insinuate that the scholastics themselves, the 
“metaphysicians”, as he calls them, have a disingenuous or contrived belief in 
transcendentals (“for they say that every being is one, true and good, even though 
no one thinks of these things”: [quamvis nemo de iis cogitet]: C. 311). Second, in 
the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (henceforward TTP), Spinoza briefly uses an 
unidentified transcendental term as an example of a futile explanation.
21
 Third, 
                                                                                                                                     
ing words: “Praeterea, divisum non convertitur cum aliquo dividentium, sicut animal cum 
rationali. Sed ens dividitur per bonum et malum, cum multa entia mala dicantur. Ergo 
bonum et ens non convertuntur.” 
20
 Aertsen (2012, p. 112) emphasizes how polemic against the Albigensians motivated 
Philip the Chancellor in his formulation of the doctrine of a transcendental good. 
21
 “By what laws of nature was this [revelation] made? I confess I don’t know. I could 




Spinoza rejects the epistemic value of the transcendentals ens, res and aliquid in 
2p40s1 of his magnum opus, the Ethics. Taken together, these passages succeed in 
rejecting all six Thomist transcendentals: ens, res, aliquid, unum, bonum, verum.  
As 2p40s1 makes explicit, Spinoza’s rejection of transcendentals is intimately 
linked with his rejection of universals.  
For Spinoza, universals are a species of beings of reason (entia rationis). Hence, 
in order to understand Spinoza’s dismissal of the universals, we need to look more 
closely at his concept of being of reason.  
In the first chapter of the CM, Spinoza sets out to discuss which division of being 
is apt. Spinoza’s major point in this section is that since non-being is a negation of 
being, being “is badly divided into being and non-being.” In other words, non-
being is not a division within being, but the complement of being. In this section, 
he deals with three kinds of non-beings. These are: chimaeras (impossible beings, 
such as the square circle), fictitious beings (invented beings, such as the phoenix) 
and beings of reason. Beings of reason differ from chimaerae and fictions in that 
they have an important function in the regulation of our reason. Spinoza states that 
such beings are “modes of thinking” by which we “retain, explain and imagine” 
things (C. 299–300). 
The beings of reason by which we explain things are number, measure and time. 
In Letter 12, Spinoza calls these “tools of the imagination” (auxilia imaginationis: 
G IV/57-58). Spinoza would not dispute that, say, operations on numbers increase 
our knowledge of mathematics. But although this knowledge is necessary for the 
advancement of science as well as for the coordination of everyday life, Spinoza 
insists it is not ontologically solid: it does not adequately reflect what is. Our 
higher capacity for acquiring ontologically solid knowledge - a capacity Spinoza 
most often refers to as the intellect, rather than reason - does not predominate in 
scientific pursuits of this kind. So, logic, for example, which on Spinoza’s view 
deals in beings of reason used for the retainment of things, trains the memory, but 
not the intellect (C. 299). 
                                                                                                                                     
just babbling. That would be like trying to explain the form of a singular thing by some 




Universals are exactly the kinds of beings of reason we use to retain things. For 
they arise from a psychologically inevitable process in which we abstract from the 
distinctive features of individuals in order to retain only “what they all agree in” 
(2p40s1). This occurs whenever the images we want to retain exceed the capacity 
of our imagination, and so only an abstract residue is retained in their places, for 
example the concept horse or man. Since an infinite intellect, unlike a finite 
intellect, has no need for mnemotechnic devices such as universals, the idea of a 
universal is not properly speaking in God’s infinite intellect as one of its own 
intentional objects, but is rather present in the divine mind only insofar as God 
knows the mind in which the universal is formed. Therefore, God is denied 
knowledge of universals per se, as Spinoza points out in CM, II,7.  
Reasoning by the means of beings of reason, to which universals belong, while 
evidently indispensable for theoretical and practical purposes alike, does not carve 
reality at its joints and should therefore be excluded from metaphysics insofar as it 
is the science of being.
22
   
The origin of the transcendentals is no different from that of the universals, for the 
terms we call transcendentals too “arise from the fact that the human Body, being 
                                                 
22
 How can there be in human sciences modes of thought that are not paralleled by modes 
of being? Does not Spinoza’s doctrine of parallelism (“the order and connection” of ideas 
and things being identical: 2p7) require that each idea be paralleled by a thing? I cannot 
discuss this issue in detail here. 
 But even if this difficulty can be resolved, Spinoza’s classification of time, num-
ber and measure among beings of reasons still calls out for explanation. Is there no 
knowledge of time, number and measure in God’s knowledge of how finite things cause 
each other to exist? Surely there must be a conception of causal succession when God 
conceives of each thing’s existence (1p28). Since Spinoza never retracts the view that 
time, number or measure are merely aids of the imagination it would seem that we have 
to bite the bullet here. The way in which God conceives of the causal order of nature does 
not involve time, number or measure, but must, logically speaking, nonetheless comprise 
some atemporal notion of causal priority. I do thus not agree with the reading of 4p62s 
which Frankena (1977, p. 37) advances. According to Frankena, this scholium indicates 
that Spinoza thinks that “our judgments about the order of things and the connection of 
causes are imaginary rather than real”. But what is imaginary about the order and the 
connection of causes in 4p62s is not the causal order per se, but rather how it can bring 
benefit (or harm) in the present moment. It is the division of duration into past, present 
and future that is the work of the imagination, not the causal order obtaining among 




limited, is capable of forming distinctly only a certain number of images at the 
same time” (2p40s1, G. II/120). When the number of images we can clearly 
perceive is massively superseded, we form a transcendental - a universal which is 
confused to the highest degree; an attenuated abstract concept under which we 
conveniently subsume all particulars, while ignoring not only the small 
differences (parvulas differentias) which characterize the particulars, but even 
more coarse-grained generalizations such as horse or man.  
This is the standard understanding of Spinoza’s dismissal of universals and 
transcendentals. It is certainly correct. However, in order to give a coherent 
interpretation of the position of the transcendentals which Spinoza’s system 
deploys - not only his professed views in 2p40s1 - it is necessary to take into 
account four difficulties that problematize the straightforward picture that is 
immediately apparent from the surface of the text. The first three difficulties I will 
mention pose problems for readers who deny Spinoza’s subscription to any 
transcendental, and therefore favor my interpretation. In contrast, the fourth 
difficulty poses a challenge for my investigation, but a challenge which I believe 
can be overcome.   
First, in the place of the Latin “terms called transcendentals” [Termini 
transcendentales dicti] the margin text of the NS
23
 has Supratransedentales, not 
transcendentals. However, the implications of this alternative have not been fully 
drawn in secondary literature.
24
 Let us begin with clarifying the notion of a 
supertranscendental. While transcendental terms apply to everything that is, 
insofar as it is, the range of the supertranscendentals extends beyond the realm of 
what has being. Normally, the range of the supertranscendentals was regarded as 
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 The Nagelate Schriften (NS) is the Dutch manuscripts of Spinoza’s works. The Dutch 
term which the margin text glosses as ‘Supratransedentales’ is ‘overklimmende’.  
24
 Yet, as Vona (1960, parte 2, pp. 87–94) has pointed out, it is vital to know which kind 
of term is under attack here.    
25
For a fuller account of which terms the class of supertranscendentals were taken to 
comprise, see Doyle (2012).  
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On my view, it is significant that the terms Spinoza uses as examples of 
transcendentals (ens, res, aliquid) in 2p40s1 can be construed as 
supertranscendentals. This would not be the case if Spinoza had used the good 
(bonum) as an example of a transcendental to be dismissed.  
For in abstracting from the specific characteristics of any particular, we will come 
to think of it as a being, as a thing, or as something. Consider the example of 
something. While it is the case that for any thought, there is something which the 
thought intends (although that something does not necessarily have extramental 
existence), it is clearly not true of any object of thought, rendered maximally 
formal by the process of abstraction, that it is necessarily good. In other words, 
the alternative reading of the NS exists because it is equally possible to dismiss 
the transcendentals and the supertranscendentals as structural (transcendental in 
the Kantian sense of the word) features of any thought, robbed of the small 
differences of the real particular as well as more coarse-grained generalizations 
that will allow a finite mind to retain an abstract residue of the particular in 
question. If it is true that such abstractions can never truly render reality then 
‘being’, ‘thing’ and ‘something’, can all be dismissed on the same grounds as the 
universals. 
This does not prove, however, that transcendentals that are not so easily 
confounded with supertranscendentals as ens, res, and aliquid, are not 
coextensional with being. In particular, the thought of a metaphysical good is 
certainly not reached by the process of successive abstraction of thought content. 
This shows that transcendentals is not straightforwardly rejected in 2p40s1. For 
being is rejected - on minimalist grounds - as a most confused and general notion 
only when it is considered to be being in general, the substratum that you reach by 
successively abstracting layers of meaningful content from a thought. But hereby 
the being particular to some concrete thing is not rejected.  
Of course, Spinoza rejects the other transcendentals (unum, verum, bonum) in the 
early text CM, I, 6.
26
 These transcendentals could not be confused with 
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 Emanuela Scribano's (1990, p. 31) comparison with Suárez is illuminating; for Suárez 




supertranscendentals. However, in this chapter I will suggest that in spite of this 
passage, Spinoza, in his Ethics, nonetheless subscribes to at least one 
transcendental property of (concrete) being: perfection.  
Second, it is to be expected of a philosopher who considers ‘being’ to be an 
extremely confused generalization, that she should deal as little as possible with 
the notion of being and put it to zero use in her metaphysics. For instance, 
analytical ontologists who are critical of any mismatch between ontology and 
quantification, do not employ a thick concept of being systematically in their own 
philosophies. Instead of speaking of what being is, they might speak, as does 
Quine, of the beings there are, of what there is. Nor was Spinoza obliged by his 
time to enlist the concept of being in his system; it appears that contemporary 
corpuscularians (such as Hobbes or Gassendi) did not. And yet, in spite of 2p40s1, 
Spinoza puts the notion of being to use in his metaphysics; he amply uses not only 
ens, but also esse, and even (once) essendi. As 1p24c shows, Spinoza finds it 
meaningful to speak of what is true of being across the board irrespective of the 
small differences that individuate particular beings (in this corollary, Spinoza 
states that God is the “cause of the being [esse] of things”). This has bearing on 
the first point made. Spinoza can, with impunity, use a term he rejects in 2p40s1, 
namely being, because he uses it in a concrete, rather than in an abstract sense.  
Consider that in 1p30, Spinoza interestingly mentions what seems to be a 
cognitive imperative. He says: “The actual intellect, whether finite or infinite, 
must comprehend [comprehendere debet] God’s attributes and God’s affections, 
and nothing else”. If ‘comprehension’ is here interpreted to mean ‘adequate 
knowledge’, the following picture emerges. For Spinoza, adequate knowledge 
supervenes on being in the sense that we cannot have adequate knowledge about 
anything apart from what really is; we cannot genuinely grasp something unless 
there is something there for us to grasp. But the only things there are are God and 
his modes. Since Spinoza can help himself to the term ‘being’ in order to 
explicate his metaphysics (the point just made), this indicates that ‘being’ can be 
                                                                                                                                     
three transcendentals are not (for Suárez) beings of reason, even though one is a negation 
and good and truth are (extrinsic) relations of the being in question to the will and to the 
intellect, respectively. Such a position Spinoza would deem untenable. 
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used concretely to denote the being of what there is, i.e. the being of God and his 
modes. Unlike the being we arrive at by successively abstracting content from the 
thought of something, when predicated of substance or its modes, being is 
ontologically solid.  
Third, Spinoza regards being or reality as coextensional with an intensionally 
different term, perfection (see, for instance, 1p11s; 2p5; 2d6; 2p43s and 4Pref). 
These passages clearly indicate that for Spinoza there is at least one predicate that 
is true of what is, insofar as it is. Nothing else is necessary for a philosophy to 
entertain a transcendental property of being. If Spinoza treats being as convertible 
with another term, he is by definition inquiring into the “affections” or “passions” 
of being, and, it would seem, engaging in a version of the Scholastic metaphysical 
praxis which he repudiated in the CM. 
Fourth, as we have stated, transcendental terms are terms which are coextensive 
(if not cointensional) with being. Just as being runs through all the categories of 
things, so do transcendental terms such as the metaphysical good. When Aquinas 
paradigmatically denies that being is a genus,
27
 he enables for the transcendental 
terms (defined as terms coextensional with being) to have a similar super-generic 
character. Goodness is not restricted to one category but is to be found in all the 
categories specified by Aristotle, as well as in the being not subjected to the 
categories - that is, in the being of God.  
In the preface to the fourth part of the Ethics, by contrast, Spinoza makes the 
following remark: “for we are accustomed to refer all individuals in Nature to one 
genus, which is called the most general, i.e., to the notion of being” (C. 545). 
This is problematic, for, as we have seen, the notion of a transcendental good 
depends on the notion of transcendental being: being which “transcends” the 
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 As he does in in SCG I, cap. 25, n. 6 (1975, p. 127), in the following words: “If being 
were a genus we should have to find a difference through which to contract it to a species. 
But no difference shares in the genus in such a way that the genus is included in the no-
tion of the difference, for thus the genus would be included twice in the definition of the 
species. Rather, the difference is outside what is understood in the nature ot the genus. 
But there can be nothing that is outside that which is understood by being, if being is 
included in the concept of the things of which it is predicated. Thus, being cannot be con-
tracted by any difference. Being is, therefore, not a genus.” 
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categories. If being is a genus, however, then it is clearly not super-generic in 
nature, nor can the transcendentals be defined, in this framework, as terms that 
“transcend” - that is, indiscriminately run through and (in the case of God’s super-
categorical being) beyond all the categories.
28
 Is this remark of Spinoza’s an 
objection to the project I am about to undertake? I cannot attack the problem in 
detail here, but I will outline two lines of defense, (a) and (b), to the effect that I 
think I can go on with the investigation anyway.  
(a) The statement in question is a cursory remark on how we are wont to speak of 
being as the most general genus, under which all things fall. The text does not 
commit Spinoza to this view. (b) Being might be generic for Spinoza without this 
dealing a fatal blow to my project. For substance monism entails that all being 
ultimately belongs in the member of one category, in the one member of the 
category substance. The being of modes is just the being of this one substance, 
modified somehow. It may be that, on Spinoza’s view, being no longer runs 
through all the categories, but is instead concentrated in one member of one 
category, namely that of substance. Yet, even if being is taken as an ultimately 
intracategorical concept, this does not alter all that much: any name that is 
coextensional, but not cointensional, with being, can still be called a 
transcendental within this framework.  
In what follows I will investigate the fate of the most ethically relevant 
transcendental, namely that of the good, in Spinoza’s philosophy.  
 1.4. Spinoza’s rejection of the good as a transcendental. 
Spinoza officially demotes the good from its position as a transcendental in CM I, 
6. But that the good should not be able to play the role of a transcendental in 
Spinoza’s philosophy is apparent from his entire oeuvre. For nowhere in the 
Spinozist corpus is the good glossed as a term convertible with being, or evil, 
relatedly, as the objective privation of some good that is due to the thing in 
question. 
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 This “commonality” is in itself a complex issue. Aquinas, for instance, distinguished 
between a commonality of being on the basis of predication [per praedicationem] and 
causality [per causalitatem]. See Courtine (1990, pp. 44–7).  
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Indeed, Spinoza’s writings on good and evil make it clear why the good must be 
dethroned in this way. For Spinoza, as is well known, is critical of what one could 
call the hegemony of the good which had dominated the history of Western 
philosophy. He denies that the values of good and evil have any solid 
metaphysical foundation, and, as a result, the kind of convertibility with being that 
would make either good (simply) or both good and evil (disjunctively) 
transcendental terms. Rather than reflecting what really is, good and evil are 
“beings of reason” or “modes of thinking” (KV, C. 53). In the Ethics, Spinoza 
more disparagingly calls them “modes of imagining” (1app). As such they fail to 
characterize reality.  
Traditionally (for instance in the argument of Boethius surveyed above), the 
appetite for the good inherent in “all things” was explained by reference to their 
being good. For Spinoza, no such explanation is at hand. This means that he must 
chart a different genealogy for our appetite for what appears good. This is 
accomplished in 4d1 and 4d2, where Spinoza champions a subjectivist 
understanding of good and evil, according to which good and evil are subjective 
judgments of utility and disutility, respectively. 
Thus Spinoza not only rejects a foundation for the good in the fabric of reality, but 
he also, relatedly, rejects that the good qua good exerts any special psychological 
motivational force on humans. On the contrary, Spinoza asserts, “we neither strive 
for, nor will, neither want, nor desire anything because we judge it to be good; on 
the contrary, we judge something to be good because we strive for it, will it, want 
it, and desire it” (3p9s). While the philosophical tradition spearheaded by Aquinas 
had taken Aristotle’s definition of the good as that which everyone desires to 
mean that fundamentally, we desire something because we find it good,
29
 Spinoza 
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In De Malo, q. 1. art. 1, resp. 61 (2001), Aquinas relies on the synonymity of the good 
and the desirable to design an explanation for why the ultimately desirable is also the 
creator of all things: “[…] since the desirable moves desire, and the first cause of move-
ment is necessarily unmoved, the first and universal efficient cause is necessarily itself 
the first and universal desirable thing, that is, the first and universal good, which produces 
all things because of the love of its very self [appetitum sui ipsius].” 
 The identity of good and desirable is also to be found in for example, Descartes 
and Duns Scotus, who both regard the will as naturally inclined towards the good – to-
wards the good and the true in the case of Descartes, and towards happiness (affectio 




inverted the causality that, Aquinas and others attributed to Aristotle’s definition: 
rather than desiring something because it is good, Spinoza maintained that we find 
something good because we desire it. 
Not only did Spinoza subvert this definition by subscribing to it in a radical way, 
he also maintained that the standard way of defining our appetite as naturally 
tending towards the good had had disastrous consequences. For the delusional 
belief in finality, which, on Spinoza’s view, corrupts theology and anthropology 
alike (as he explains in the Appendix to the first part of the Ethics), stems from the 
original error which consists in our dislodging of the good from our desire, in the 
illusion that we want it on account of its goodness. First, we fool ourselves that 
we act on account of the good as such, and then, we ascribe, by the dubiously 
applied intellectual tool of analogy, the same teleological character to the activity 
of God. But that God should act on account of some end other than himself is all 
but blasphemous to Spinoza. 
As a consequence, it would be expected that Spinoza should deny that the good 
could be an absolute value whose promotion could be inculcated categorically in 
humans. That is, it would seem that if the values of good and evil were only 
functions of the relative usefulness of things, people and circumstances to some 
specific subject (as Spinoza asserts in 4d1 and 4d2), it would be very unlikely for 
there to be any universally commendable good. (It being unlikely is not the same 
as it being impossible, of course).  
Surprisingly, perhaps, while Spinoza initially recognizes that at different times, 
different courses of action are to be recommended to different people - such as 
music being “good for the melancholy, bad for the one who is mourning, and 
neither good nor bad to the one who is deaf” (4Pref), in the end, he nonetheless 
promotes a highest good (summum bonum) relative to the mind: “Knowledge of 
God is the Mind’s greatest good; its greatest virtue is to know God” (4p28). This 
knowledge gives rise to an intellectual love of God (5p33). 
                                                                                                                                     
160). Here I cannot even pretend to give the long marriage of the good and desire or will 
the full background the topic deserves.  
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On the one hand, Spinoza thus presents what appears to be an entirely relativistic 
theory of the good. On the other hand, he promotes a universal highest good for 
the mind. In order for these two viewpoints to be reconciled in one ethical system, 
Spinoza evidently needs a theory of human beings such that the highest good must 
be maximally useful for everyone, regardless of their circumstances. Differently 
put, there must be some desire or need, common to all, that intellectual love of 
God best satisfies.  
Spinoza explains the desire for knowledge, and ultimately intellectual love of, 
God uniquely satisfies in his difficult conatus-doctrine. According to the conatus-
doctrine, each of us, indeed everything, inevitably strives after perseveration in 
being: “Each thing, as far as it can by its own power [quantum in se est], strives to 
persevere in its being [esse]” (3p6).30 It is this striving (conatus) after being that 
knowledge of God best satisfies. 
The question to be asked is why our essential desire aims at being in the first 
place. What is so good about being, if being is not intrinsically good? In the 
philosophical tradition which preceded Spinoza, the good served a twofold role in 
explaining the striving of all beings. The orientation of what is towards the good 
was explained by the fact that all being was considered good, and the desirability 
of what all things strived after was explained by its being good (indeed, the 
supreme good rather than the transcendental good - but this need not concern us 
now). Since Spinoza has effectively abandoned both these approaches, he owes us 
an explanation as to why we should want being. What accounts for the normative 
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 It is no accident that Spinoza uses the same expression (in quantum in se est), as the 
one which Descartes, in his Principles, formulated his version of the law of inertia: “Pri-
ma lex naturae: quod unaquaeque res, quantum in se est, semper in eodem statu perse-
veret; sicque quod semel movetur, semper moveri pergat" (1905, vol. 8, p. 62). Spinoza 
wants to formulate a law of mental inertia.  
31
 Andrew Youpa (2009, pp. 242–57) has suggested that the good, for Spinoza, is eternity. 
Clearly eternity maximizes one’s being. But on account of what should one want maximal 




 1.5. Ontological versus teleological perfection. 
I believe that the answer to the question of what accounts for the normative force 
of being in Spinoza’s philosophy is to be found in his, remarkably traditional, 
transcendental doctrine of perfection. Being is worthy of pursuit since it is 
coextensional with perfection. In this, Spinoza’s account is no different than that 
of Aquinas’s. Yet, Spinoza breaks with tradition in that even if we genuinely strive 
after persevering in being (esse), as the conatus-doctrine specifies, we do not 
thereby strive after the good: for the good as such has no intrinsic connection with 
being. Instead we strive after what is good - that is useful for us - in our pursuit to 
maximally persevere in our being, that is, in our perfection. Since knowledge of 
God is categorically prescribed it means that it alone best serves this purpose. 
At this point, it must be acknowledged that there is textual evidence against my 
reading of transcendental perfection in Spinozism. Most notably, in the Preface to 
the fourth part of the Ethics, Spinoza assimilates the concepts of perfection and 
imperfection to the concepts of good and evil. In this preface, the genealogy of the 
concepts of perfection and imperfection is traced. Initially, we used ‘imperfection’ 
only of what we knew with certainty did not live up to its standard - such as an 
incomplete house, where we knew what the intended model was.  
 
But, after men began to form universal ideas, and devise models of 
houses, buildings, towers, etc., and to prefer some models of things to 
others, it came about that each one called perfect what he saw agreed 
with the universal idea he had formed of this kind of thing, and 
imperfect, what he saw agreed less with the model he had conceived, 
even though its maker thought he had entirely finished it (4app).  
On this understanding, perfection is as it were in the eyes of the beholder. Such 
perfection lacks ontological ground. Let us call this notion teleological perfection. 
It is important to realize that Spinoza’s readiness to dismantle the adequacy of our 
judgments of teleological perfection and imperfection, and good and evil, can be 
traced back to his criticism of universals. If there is no universal man or stone that 
we can take as a model for our assessment of individual specimens, we cannot 
properly uphold a standard for how they must be in order not to be considered 
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deprived of their due perfections. For Spinoza, the teleologically perfect and 
imperfect are, like good and evil, merely comparative terms by which humans 
assess the satisfaction of their standards. This becomes evident when, using the 
stock example of a man who is overcome by his “appetite for sensual pleasure” 
instead of acting in accordance with reason, Spinoza suggests that “we compare 
his present appetite with that which is in the pious, or with that which he had at 
another time” (Letter 21 to Blijenbergh, C. 377). The standard against which we 
evaluate his action is the universal of moral perfection that we have formed by 
generalizing how people we judge pious act. Thus, Spinoza contends that evil 
functions as a relative concept by the means of which we explain to what extent 
human behavior lives up to the universal of teleological (moral) perfection. 
 
Elsewhere, however, Spinoza equates perfection and reality. Consider, for instance 
2d6: “By reality and perfection I understand the same thing.” Since the 
consequences of this equation are needed at earlier junctures, however, this 
definition is anticipated in the first part as well: “Perfection, therefore, does not 
take away the existence of a thing, but on the contrary asserts it. But imperfection 
takes it away” (1p11s). Indeed, at structurally crucial junctures - such as in 1p16d 
- Spinoza seems to anticipate that perfection is convertible with being, or reality - 
that is, that something has perfection to the very extent that it has being.  
1p16 and its demonstration is the passage where Spinoza intends to show how 
everything follows with necessity from the divine nature. Within the Ethics, the 
deductive progeny of 1p16 speaks for itself, as any index of references to claims 
in Spinoza’s Ethics will show. It is clearly one of the propositions at the core of 
the Ethics’ argumentative structure. As far as I can see, this proposition depends 
on the following three premises: (1) Spinoza’s understanding of the (essential) 
properties of things as being deducible from their essences. He formulates this 
presupposition in the following words: “This Proposition must be plain to anyone, 
provided he attends to the fact that the intellect infers from the given definition of 
any thing a number of properties that really do follow necessarily from it (i.e., 
from the essence of the thing”) (Emphasis added.), Spinoza considers good 
definitions as being genetic (and more exactly, as stating the “proximate cause” of 
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the thing: TIE [96] C. 39).
32
 The Euclidean rule for constructing a circle “as the 
figure that is described by any line of which one end is fixed and the other 
moveable” (TIE [96] C. 40) is on Spinoza’s view an example of a definition of a 
thing such that its essential properties are all deducible from it.
33
 However, when 
real things (rather than geometrical entities) are defined, the properties deducible 
from them are exactly the ones that their essences have the power to cause.
34
 (2) 
The definition of God in 1d6, and (3) “that [the intellect] infers more properties 
the more definition of the thing expresses reality, i.e. the more reality the essence 
of the thing involves.” If it can be assumed that (at least genuine, and presumably 
intrinsic) properties are perfections, then it is plain that the claim that being and 
perfection always co-vary is already implied by the third premise. 
Be that as it may. In 1p11s and 2d6, it becomes patent that for Spinoza being is 
co-extensional with perfection. For the perfection Spinoza refers to in these 
passages is clearly ontological: it consists in the reality of something, where the 
ascription of reality is in no way implied to be constituted by its relation to a 
beholder. For instance, it is not a matter of perspective whether God or my 
favourite singer enjoys most being, or perfection.  
There is no other way of squaring these two incompatible uses of the word 
‘perfection’, except by a clear-cut distinction between ontological and teleological 
perfection in Spinoza, where only the former is convertible with being. Things are 
not more or less ontologically “perfect […] because they are of use to, or are 
incompatible with, human nature”, although this is exactly what makes them more 
or less teleologically perfect (1app, II/83).
35
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 While Spinoza in TIE does not consider the definition of God to state his cause, he later 
(in Letter 60) came to consider any essential definition of God as being genetic or causal 
(Melamed [2013b, 109]).  
33
 In a recent paper Carriero (2019)  has commented on how Spinoza models his notion of 
(good) essential definitions upon “Euclidean construction procedures”. “Spinoza’s Three 
Kinds of Cognition: Imagination, Understanding, and Definition and Essence in the 
Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect”.  
34
 For a detailed study of Spinoza’s doctrine of causally efficacious essences, see Viljanen 
(2011).  
35
 My proposal can be contrasted with the following assessment due to Rice (1977, p. 
105): “On Spinoza's own terms there can be no bifurcation of perfection into metaphysi-




It is customary to think of perfection as a concept defined at least partially 
teleologically - indeed, the etymology of the word invites us to do so.
36
 By the 
means of his distinction, Spinoza effectively breaks with a conception according 
to which (ontological) perfection is defined at least in part teleologically, as a state 
that sets in when something has reached its proper end. While teleological 
perfection is said to obtain when we judge that something has reached its end or 
met its standard, ontological perfection is not a function of the judgments of finite 
creatures. But what, then, is ontological perfection predicated on? The answer to 
this question should ideally provide us with the resources of explaining what sets 
ontological perfection apart from the transcendentals Spinoza criticizes elsewhere. 
In 1p33, Spinoza states that God’s production of things (“modes”) is necessitated 
by his nature. It is in a scholium to the proposition in question, that Spinoza infers 
that the transcendental of (ontological) perfection is true of all being because it 
results from God’s nature: “things have been produced by God with the highest 
perfection, since they have followed necessarily from a given most perfect nature” 
(1p33s2: Emphasis added; cf. 1app[II, 80]).
37
  Just as, on the Boethian view, 
everything was considered good insofar as it had being, since its being flowed 
from the first good, so on Spinoza’s view, any being which follows necessarily 
from God’s nature has ontological perfection. And so does all being. Of course, 
the property in the Spinozist case is not the good, but (ontological) perfection; 
                                                                                                                                     
cal debate by having Spinoza answer what Thomson (2008), following work by Peter 
Geach (1967), has called the Goodness Thesis. There can be a property, goodness, such 
that all good things share in it, only if goodness is a predicative, rather than an attributive 
property. On Spinoza’s view, teleological perfection is attributive, but ontological perfec-
tion is arguably predicative.  
36
 I am not claiming that this common conception represents tradition. Aquinas’s doctrine 
of perfection is, for example, clearly causal. Aquinas’s dictum that causes - also efficient 
causes - act insofar as they are perfect [inquantum perfectum] shows that his understand-
ing of perfection is not exclusively teleological. The difference between Spinoza, on the 
one hand, and a tradition here represented by Aquinas, on the other, is that perfection 
lacks entirely the teleological dimension which Aquinas outlines in, for example., ST I, q. 
5, art. 1 and art. 3 (1980b, pp. 190-191). I thank Igor Agostini for raising this issue.  
37
“Most perfect” here, I take to be synonymous with “supremely perfect”, a locution Spi-
noza uses elsewhere. It should be emphasized that, in Spinoza’s work, only the absolutely 
infinite being, God, is called “supremely perfect” (summe perfectus) tout court (the 
phrase occurs in KV, II, Ch. 18; CM II, 2; Letter 2, Letter 60 and in the Ethics in 1p11d. It 
may also be inferred that Spinoza thinks of God as supremely perfect from 1p33s2). 
God’s attributes, by contrast, are not normally called supremely perfect tout court, but 
supremely perfect in their kind (in suo genere). See, for instance, Letter 11.  
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nonetheless, Spinoza argues in a way remarkably similar to Boethius (and 
Aquinas, to the extent that he endorsed Boethius’ reasoning). This is striking, 
given the often-emphasized revolutionary character of Spinoza’s philosophy. 
Yet, while there is remarkable structural similarity, the content of Spinoza’s 
proposal is significantly different from that of the Boethian tradition. Whereas, 
traditionally, the goodness of things is rooted in the goodness of the creator, on 
Spinoza’s view, the perfection of things is rooted in the perfection of the divine 
nature. But what is this nature?  
Importantly, Spinoza claims that God’s nature is identical with his (causal) power 
(1p34). Spinoza’s understanding of causality is univocal. More precisely, God 
causes modes not only in the same sense but also by the very same activity as that 
by which modes cause each other (see 1p25).
38
 It is for this reason, I take it, that 
God’s causal power - that is, his nature - is expressed by the modes (1p36d). Yet, 
since the causal activity among God’s modes is hierarchically structured, some 
modes are themselves less causally efficacious than others. This does not imperil 
their ontological perfection, however. For Aquinas (at one stage of his intellectual 
development, at least), divine goodness is better represented by the whole of 
creation than by any individual creature.
39
 For Spinoza, by contrast, the greatest 
perfection is the one possessed by God’s nature/power, but that power is exercised 
(rather than being merely represented) by beings whose respective powers are 
capable of producing any number of effects ranging between the minuscule, 
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 This prima facie contradicts Spinoza’s theory that God only causes modes immanently, 
not transitively. But ‘God’ is here a shorthand for ‘God, insofar as he is not considered to 
be modified by any finite mode’. Thus understood, the inconsistency is avoided.  
39
 See ST, I, q. 47, art. 1 (2011, p. 489-490) and Ibid., q. 48, art. 2, co. For a brief com-
ment on this “balance between diversity and unity”, see Pruss (2011, p. 284).  
 For Leibniz, similarly, perfection is the greatest quantity of essence or the great-
est possible number of compossible beings. In an early text, Leibniz calls it “the principle 
of harmony among things; that is, that the greatest amount of essence that can exist, does 
exist” (1992). For yet another formulation of this principle see “On the ultimate origina-
tion of things”, where Leibniz states that “[p]erfection or degree of essence (through 
which the greatest number of things are compossible) is the principle of existence” (2001, 
p. 34). Of course, Leibniz’s technical definition of metaphysical perfection and its evolu-
tion through time is a topic that falls well outside the scope of this paper. Newlands 
(2010) has compared the theories of perfection in Spinoza and Leibniz. Here as elsewhere 
(e.g. 2017, pp. 269-70), Newlands treats metaphysical perfection as without any norma-
tive significance, and in this respect his reading differs from mine.  
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hardly perceptible ones, to the ones on a cosmic scale. In both cases, metaphysical 
perfection is a kind of tradeoff between infinity and finitude. Just as for Aquinas 
every individual need not evince supreme goodness in order for creation as a 
whole to be good, so for Spinoza each individual being need not enjoy the greatest 
imaginable causal power, only the one possible given the causal structure in which 
it is embedded. It is the structure as a whole which manifests God’s supreme 
perfection. Yet, to belong to this pattern each being must make a minimal 
contribution, that is, every real being must have at least one effect. Spinoza states 
this explicitly in the last proposition of the first part of the Ethics: 
Nothing exists from whose nature some effect does not follow. Dem: 
Whatever exists expresses the nature, or essence of God in a certain and 
determinate way (by 25C), that is. (by P34), whatever exists expresses in a 
certain and determinate way the power of God, which is the cause of all 
things. So (by P16), from [NS: everything that exists] some effect must 
follow, q.e.d.  
It is God’s infinitely efficacious nature which explains why perfection is 
predicated transcendentally of all that is, insofar as it is. Everything that is, is 
perfect, because everything that is necessarily acts as a cause, and the activity 
whereby it so acts is the very same thing as God’s nature but expressed in “given 
conditioned manner” (for the latter phrase, see 3p6d). God’s nature and power are 
one and the same thing. And since it is infinite, that nature/power instantiates 
perfection maximally. By each carrying out some, but not all, of God’s acts, all 
beings participate in this perfection. 
Whereas subjective perfection arises from universals where too many images 
coagulate together to engender a blurred “super-image” (the idea, say of a perfect 
body), the idea of ontological perfection is engendered by an adequate idea of 
God’s absolutely infinite nature, as equaling his infinite productivity. This 
explains why the idea of ontological perfection, although it is an idea of what is 
common to all that is, can still be adequate. Its genealogy is not the same as that 
of universals, since it does not arise from an imaginative overload, but from the 





 1.6. Ethical consequences. 
  
Let us summarize the results reached so far. Reality, or being, is convertible with 
ontological perfection and with causal efficacy. Of course, all individuals are not 
equally causally efficacious, but since Spinoza’s theory accommodates a gradation 
of being, this is not problematic. Greater reality/perfection will be proportional to 
greater causal efficacy. But as long as something has at least one effect, it is real 
and ontologically perfect.  
Do universals in general, and the idea of teleological perfection in particular, exert 
some effect? If they do, they are, to that extent, real and perfect. Certainly, for 
Spinoza, universals considered in themselves, in abstraction from the (causally 
determined) concatenation of ideas in which they occur, do not correspond to any 
real extramental particular (or “singular thing”). In this sense, Spinoza is clearly a 
nominalist.  
Yet, whether adequate or inadequate, for Spinoza, ideas qua modes will have to 
result in (mental) effects which are also mirrored in extension, in virtue of 
parallelism. (Parallelism is, roughly speaking, the doctrine that to every idea, there 
corresponds an extended mode. Spinoza endorses this view in 2p7.)
40
 Although 
we would fail to map the idea of a universal to any specific singular thing in 
extension, the idea itself nonetheless exerts some causal influence, in that at least 
one idea must follow from it. Thus, to the extent that we allow that there is such a 
thing as transcendentally predicated ontological perfection, and that it has the 
characteristic of being convertible with causal efficacy, ideas of teleological 
perfection are ontologically perfect, and therefore they have being. While there is 
nothing that ideas of universals are of, the ideas themselves are perfect to the 
degree that they have being. 
This results in some rarely noted, highly interesting consequences for Spinoza’s 
ethical thinking.  
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Melamed (2013a) has convincingly shown that in 2p7 and its scholium Spinoza defends 
not one, but two, different parallelisms, but presently only the one between ideas and 
extended modes is of interest.  
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Just as God’s nature is the same as his power, so for human beings, their nature 
and causal power is the same. This power Spinoza also refers to in terms of virtue 
(4d8; 4p20). Unlike God, humans are finite and composite, and so they may fail to 
exert their power. The reality or perfection of a thing will be proportional to the 
causality it does exert. If we consider the causal efficacy of human minds that 
think conventionally in the terms of universals, their causality will be explained at 
least partially by these universals. For instance, the fact that Lucy is motivated by 
the thought of a teleologically perfect body is the reason why she has plastic 
surgery done. But let us say Lucy, a highly impressionable reader, has read the 
Ethics, and now becomes more interested in ontological perfection. Without going 
into the details of Spinoza’s theory of how affects are to be played out against 
other affects therapeutically (outlined in 4p7), let us say that in Lucy’s mind, the 
concept of ontological perfection is now accompanied by a stronger affect than 
that of teleological perfection. Then she realizes that the causal efficacy of 
anything is necessarily perfect, since it is a partial manifestation of God’s 
necessary efficacy. If Lucy truly embraces ontological perfection as what is most 
worthy of pursuit, will she not then be bound to affirm whatever causality she is 
already necessitated to exert, even if this causality is partially explained by 
universals? Will she not be compelled to say that, whatever limited power or 
virtue I have, it is real insofar as I strive to remain in being, even if I strive to do 
so with all my false beliefs and distorted views? Will she not be compelled to 
affirm the ontological perfection of her (inadequate) idea of teleological. 
perfection, which had some reality and hence some ontological perfection in that 
it was causally efficacious, after all?
41
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A related problem is whether the striving of our inadequate ideas is part of the striving 
that characterizes us essentially. This problem is related to whether the Spinozist conatus 
is striving to maintain in actual or formal essence. Perhaps an interpretation of Spinoza 
can be given according to which the formal essences of things contain only affirmations 
(albeit not an absolute affirmation, unless they are God), and therefore only activity and 
consequently only adequate ideas. In this case, it is the actual, but not the formal, essence 
that Spinoza defines in 3p3d (“The first thing that constitutes the essence of the mind is 
nothing else but the idea of the body actually existing [2p11 and 2p13], which idea is 
composed of other ideas (2p15), of which some are adequate (2p38c) while others are 
inadequate (2p29c; cf. 3p9d.) 
 If, by contrast, the conatus that characterizes us essentially is striving to maintain 




The question can be put more suggestively in this way: What kind of effects will 
the idea of ontological perfection result in? If it has no effects, then the idea of 
ontological perfection is itself not real or (ontologically) perfect (although it can 
of course still be teleologically perfect). If we grant that it has some effect, 
however, the effect should ideally be ethically perfecting. For how can human 
perfection be better construed, in Spinoza, than by the means of the fading away 
of the now redundant model of teleological perfection, as we tune in to the 
ontological perfection of reality itself, of all reality insofar as it is, in some way, 
God? If the thought of ontological perfection is ethically perfecting, however, then 
we can only aggrandize our perfection by realizing that everything is already 
perfect. But to cultivate an intellectual relation - perhaps one of contemplation - to 
what is always already necessarily perfect seems to be an astonishingly passive 
triumph. Since I reserve the discussion of this problem for subsequent chapters, I 
will be content to have noted the intriguing ethical consequence which arises from 
Spinoza’s dual account of perfection here.  
 Conclusion: A Spinozist theodicy.  
I will conclude by suggesting that after the manner of a transcendental good, 
Spinoza’s transcendental perfection, even in the absence of a metaphysical good, 
plays a theological, and even theodicial, role. Traditionally, predicating goodness 
transcendentally of all being fulfilled the theological purpose of exonerating God 
as the creator of what is, only insofar as it is, and hence the creator of good, only 
insofar as it is good. Simply put, if there is evil (and evidence seems to suggest 
this), it was not directly created by God, and thus God cannot be blamed for the 
existence of evil. By contrast, predicating ontological perfection transcendentally 
serves the purpose of exonerating a different kind of God. God is innocent of 
creating evils and other inconveniences for us, not because, ultimately, he only 
creates good, but because he is necessarily infinitely productive, more suggestive 
of a kind of senseless, mad, unstoppable, omnipresent machine - a juggernaut of 
                                                                                                                                     
the essence that we have, so that in order to acquire more perfection, we must (somehow) 
alter our essences.  
 For an ontological explication of the difference between actual and formal es-
sence in Spinoza’s oeuvre, see Mogens Laerke (2017). The ethical and as it were soterio-
logical impacts of this difference have yet to be explored.  
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creativity engendering maximal reality-perfection everywhere - than of the 
anthropocentric divinities Spinoza criticizes men for worshipping.  
In the Appendix to the first part of the Ethics, Spinoza spells out his aversion to 
anthropomorphism and its distinct manner of reflecting through the category of 
finality. Judgments concerning the ends of things are often rooted not in 
knowledge, but in the prejudice of we who make these judgments, the prejudice 
that inclines us to think that all things are governed by appetites similar to ours, 
appetites of which we don’t even know the causes. Spinoza’s substitution of the 
good with ontological perfection furnishes us with a way of conceiving God 
without modeling his action on how we (wrongly, perhaps) understand our own, 
as taking place on account of an end. God acts necessarily from his nature, and 
since this nature is absolutely infinite its activity results in all and only perfection. 
These perfections may not be perfect in the eyes of the human beholder, but this 
does not make them any less perfect, ontologically speaking. Such is Spinoza’s 








Chapter 2  
 




In the previous chapter, I investigated the objective side of reality: ontological 
perfection which, as a transcendental, is coextensive with reality. By contrast, in 
this chapter I will focus on that which objectively is not. Whereas I, in the 
previous chapter, focused on the the thesis that all perfection is reality, the present 
chapter is concerned with the logical obverse of that thesis, namely that no 
imperfection is a reality. Indeed, for Spinoza, evil is imperfection and thus lacks 
reality. The goal of this chapter is to understand Spinoza’s notion of evil and 
thereby identify the kind of human perfection which his system admits. 
Of course, Spinoza was not the first to espouse such a theory of evil; the concept 
of evil as lack of being is rooted in Greek philosophy, was subsequently 
elaborated by Augustine and diffused throughout the history of medieval thought. 
In this chapter, I will highlight what is particular about Spinoza’s notion of evil as 
imperfection. I will do so by the means of comparing Spinoza’s negation theory of 
evil with Aquinas’s privation theory of evil. 
First, I will explain the rationale of undertaking the present investigation by 
situating it in a contemporary debate. Second, I will determine the ontological and 
axiological standing of evil in Spinoza’s philosophy by comparing it to what I 
take to be a paradigmatic privation theory of evil, namely the one expounded by 
Thomas Aquinas in his Disputed Questions on Evil. Third, I will discuss the 
consequences of Spinoza’s position for his ethical thinking at large, in particular 
as concerns the status of his ideal of human perfection. Last, I will conclude by 
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revisiting the allegedly paradoxical character of Spinoza’s ideal of human 
perfection. 
 2.1. Contemporary context. 
A theodicy is generally conceived of as a way of reconciling three (seemingly or 
genuinely) contradictory claims: (a) there is (a beneficent) God, (b) God is 
omnipotent and (c) there is evil.
42
 What would Spinoza respond to the problem 
that this triad of theses supposedly poses? Spinoza clearly believes in the 
existence of God, although he would reject that God is beneficent in the sense that 
he acts for the sake of what is good. On Spinoza's view, God does not act for the 
sake of goods external to himself. If (b) is to mean that God can do anything he 
wants, Spinoza would object to it, but if it can be interpreted so as to mean that 
God can, and indeed must, do anything which follows from his infinitely powerful 
nature, then Spinoza clearly endorses (b) as well. In Chapter 1 it became evident, 
however, that Spinoza does not believe in (c), for he denies that there “is” any evil 
over and above human ways of imagining things according to subjective standards 
of moral perfection. Evil, like the good, is a universal. On Spinoza’s view, there is 
therefore no real property which our concept of evil picks out. Instead, evil is 
reduced to the status of a mere “mode of imagining” (1app). However, any idea of 
evil is nonetheless real insofar as it is (somehow) causally efficacious (see 1p36). 
Given that (c) - the statement that there is evil, and the possibility that the 
existence of evil poses problems for the existence of God -, has gained momentum 
on the contemporary philosophical scene, this investigation of Spinoza is of 
particular relevance. 
Whether a contemporary philosopher is formulating a deductive or an evidential 
argument against the existence of God from the existence of evil, the argument is 
predicated on the existence of evil as such, and this premise is not called into 
question. (The former is an argument in deductive form that attempts to establish 
that the existence of God is logically incompatible with the existence of evil. The 
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 Indeed, Paul Ricoeur asserts that one doesn’t have the right to speak of a theodicy, ab-
sent a consistent response to these three propositions; an apologetic goal and a systematic 
method (1986, pp. 38-9). 
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latter argument - the evidential one - does not seek to demonstrate that their co-
existence is provably impossible, but only the weaker claim that it is highly 
unlikely.) While there is awareness that throughout much of the history of Western 
philosophy, evil was metaphysically considered as privation, contemporary 
authors often see this position as trivializing the reality of evil. One example of 
this is Fred Alford’s dismissal of the position; by referring to one passage in one 
text by Aquinas’s hand, Alford (2005, 50) entirely dismisses Aquinas’s treatment 
of evil as equally or more trivializing than he takes Augustine’s position to be. In 
his own words: 
 Augustine appears content with this answer, reflecting no further, 
even as he seems to sense that his answer is inadequate, that he 
has crossed a threshold of moral possibility (the love of  
destruction for its own sake) but is unable to go further. Aquinas 
does not go half as far.
43
 
However, Alford’s analysis of the privation theory of evil is inadequate in that it 
assumes that once evil is metaphysically seen as privation, evil in moral matters 
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 The context of Alford’s assessment of these Catholic philosophers is his dismissal of 
Hanna Arendt’s shift on the topic of evil. While she, in the On the Origins of Totalitarian-
ism endorsed radical evil, her subsequent assessment of evil as “banal” (in her writings on 
the trial of Eichmann) seems to abandon that stance. Alford is critical of this move, which 
he considers as a retreat to a purported trivialization of evil. Thus, on Alford’s view, the 
least trivializing take on evil is to picture it as done for the sake of evil. But we rarely find 
that evil is perpetrated for its own sake. The Germans who implemented Nazism usually 
had an agenda other than that of being evil. Primo Levi’s notes from his time in a Nazist 
concentration camp contain many penetrating insights about human nature. In the Appen-
dix to these notes, he wrote that although “monsters [by which he means exactly people 
carrying out evil for the sake of evil] exist, they are too few to be truly dangerous; most 
dangerous are the common men, functionaries ready to believe and obey without discus-
sion” (Levi 2005, p. 176). Judging by Levi’s notes, it appears that rather than doing the 
evil for its own sake, it is the disinterested and coldly calculating attitude of the Germans 
toward their fellow human beings that made them allies of evil (e.g. 2005, p. 95). 
 We usually do not perpetrate the evil for the sake of being evil, and part of what 
is so horrific with evil is how it can be realized by human beings, including Nazis, intend-
ing the good. Evil for the sake of evil - evil conceptualized in the way which Alfrod judg-
es most “deep” - is only to be found in acts of pure sadism (subtracting from the hedonic 
good of pleasure involved in sadism) that is widely portrayed by Hollywood villains. 
 I do not know why, in contemporary ethics, philosophers focus so much on gratu-
itous torture committed by pure sadism and so little on how people such as Nazis or polit-
ical or religious terrorists, none of whom consider themselves evil, are able to carry out 
evils for the sake of what is, from their perverted perspectives, good. Perhaps it is because 
we too conceive ourselves as acting for the sake of the good, and we do not want to admit 
this commonality with evildoers - for then the apparent good for which we act may prove 
to be a perverted one, and our acts as a consequence evil.  
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cannot be “something positive”. This is, from the view of the history of 
philosophy, a gross over-simplification.
44
 Likewise, in his introduction to The 
Evidential Argument from Evil, Daniel Howard-Snyder dismisses off-hand a 
privative account of metaphysical evil as an “exceedingly unreasonable” position 
- apparently assuming that a privative account of metaphysical evil automatically 
leads to a trivialization of the moral evil we witness in the world.
45
 
Yet Aquinas’s philosophy of evil aims exactly at the combination of a robust or 
positive account of evil in moral matters with a metaphysical privation theory of 
evil.
46
 While Aquinas held that evil metaphysically speaking was a privation he 
still sought to construe a robust theory of moral evil. What is potentially 
worrisome in this theory is therefore not that Aquinas defines evil with privation 
tout court. The worry that faces Aquinas’s account is instead how one is to explain 
the relation between metaphysical and moral evil. To explain how metaphysical 
evil as privation grounds moral evil without recourse to religious devices such as 
the story of the fall is a challenging task. In this chapter I will not be concerned 
with defending systematically the grounding relation of moral evil in 
metaphysical evil on the part of Aquinas, although defenders of his view are 
probably in need of a solid account of this relation.
47
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 Kent insightfully comments that one reason why we easily consider medieval writers as 
trivializing evil is because we tend to emphasize different kinds of evil. While contempo-
rary discourse on evil is focalizing almost singularly on the evil the innocent suffer at the 
hands of the cruel, medieval authors were more interested in the infernal evil that each 
person can inflict on herself by sinning. As Kent (2007, p. 279) writes: “The damage we 
do to others in torturing or killing them pales by comparison with the evil we do to our 
own souls.” 
45
 “Of course, anyone modestly acquainted with medieval philosophy will tell you that 
the proposition that evil exists is not an essential part of theism. Perhaps Mackie just 
meant to voice his conviction that it is exceedingly unreasonable for a theist to deny that 
evil exists, which seems quite right” (Howard-Snyder 1996, p. xix). 
46
 See, for instance, Reichberg (2002). 
47
 Since modern formal ontologists in general reject the position that being is convertible 
only with the good, some have construed being as convertible with the disjunction good, 
evil or indifferent rather than only with good, for example Woleński (2007, p. 372). While 
taking the disjunction of values as transcendental in the sense of collectively exhaustive 
of being has the benefit of being more readily formalizable than the original claim of the 
convertibility of being and good, this step also empties the doctrine of the transcendental 
good of its theological meaning and normative force. It should be recalled that the Scho-




In this chapter my aim is instead to present contemporary commentators who 
equate the metaphysical conception of evil as privation with a trivialization of evil 
in moral matters with the perhaps unique historical philosophy in which these 
positions do in fact coalesce — where evil is regarded as privation (or, to be 
exact, as negation) and this metaphysical position is the basis for an error theory 
of evil in moral matters. This notable exception to the philosophical mainstream 
of the West — in which evil in moral matters was seriously pondered, at the same 
time as a metaphysical understanding of evil as privation was maintained — 
occurs in Spinoza’s philosophy. Spinoza’s philosophy can at least in theory 
provide contemporary defenders of evil with the material their own thinking 
(antagonistically) needs. Expounding Spinoza’s position on evil is the same as 
supplying contemporary polemics with a historically adequate target. By 
juxtaposing Spinoza’s account with that of Aquinas, I will show how Spinoza’s 
metaphysics of evil, unlike Aquinas’s, does indeed explain away the phenomenon 
we call evil. 
 2.2. Aquinas and Spinoza.  
 2.2.1. Aquinas and Spinoza on the metaphysics of evil. 
The question to be explored is whether Spinoza’s joint move of retaining 
perfection as a transcendental while rejecting the good, has significant 
consequences for his ethical thinking. In order to begin formulating an answer to 
this question, I will compare Spinoza’s negation theory of evil with a traditional 
account of evil as privation, aiming to establish wherein the ethically significant 
differences between these theories consist. More precisely, I will contrast 
Spinoza’s view with the one Thomas Aquinas puts forth in his disputed questions 
De Malo. While thoughts on the topic of evil and providence pervade Aquinas’s 
writings (reflection on these topics are to be found in, for example, ST, SCG, as 
well as in his commentaries on Job and the Pauline epistles) I choose this text 
because of its thematic simplicity and the clarity of its exposition. In this chapter I 
will therefore not expound the development of Aquinas’s thinking on evil, nor 
                                                                                                                                     
creation, i.e. to the notion that all things “flow” from the first good and for this very rea-
son are good insofar as they are. This is plausible only given the premise of a first good. 
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provide a systematic interpretation based on the entirety of his works. The goal is 
instead to, by means of a comparison, highlight what is peculiar about Spinoza’s 
privative (or more accurately, negative) theory of being. 
According to Aquinas, God is the cause of all and only being, and since being and 
good are convertible, of all and only good. This raises the difficulty of how evil 
comes to be, as it is ontologically impossible for it to have being. At the outset of 
De Malo, Aquinas sets out to demonstrate that evil does not come to be, and that it 
is this falling short of being that we label as evil: “evil is indeed in things, 
although as a privation and not as an entity” (De Malo, q. 1, art. 1, ad. 20 [2001, 
p. 69]). However, something may be a privation of good in two respects: it may be 
evil simpliciter, as when something is “deprived of a particular good that is 
required [ex debito] for its perfection”, or evil secundum quid, as when a thing is 
“deprived of something that is required for the perfection of something else, but 
not for its own perfection” (De Malo, q. 1, art. 1, ad. 1, [2001 p. 63]). The former 
privation could be called intrinsic, since it deprives something of that which is due 
to its perfection, the latter extrinsic or relational, since it is a privation we ascribe 
to something when we consider what would be due to its perfection, were it 
something else. The examples Aquinas supplies of evil are sickness in an animal - 
being deprivation of the health that is required for the perfection of normal 
functioning -, and fire being deprived of “the form of water”. The following 
examples would be equally illustrative: a man deprived of sight and a stone 
deprived of sight (De Malo, 1. art. 3. q. 13 [2001, p. 83]). 
Interestingly, this is also the example Spinoza supplies when elucidating the 
concept of privation for his correspondent Blijenbergh (in Letter 21). Spinoza’s 
correspondence with Blijenbergh (from winter, 1664, to spring, 1665) is 
noteworthy, since it is the only extant set of texts in which Spinoza extensively 
discusses the nature of evil. Blijenbergh first launches the correspondence in 
December 1664 (Letter 18), having read Spinoza’s Treatise on Descartes’s 
Principles (henceforward PPC) as well as its appendix, the CM. As the intellectual 
exchange between the two strangers unfolds, Spinoza grows more and more 
frustrated with Blijenbergh and in the end, terminates the correspondence. 
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Blijenbergh is commonly, and unjustly, depicted as a near-idiot in the literature.
48
 
As Gilles Deleuze has pointed out in his essay on the topic, however, “[although 
Blijenbergh] does not know the Ethics, […] he raises one question after another, 
questions that go to the heart of Spinozism; he forces Spinoza […] to isolate a 
very strange conception of evil” (1988, pp. 30-1). Moreover, Blijenbergh does not 
oppose this “strange conception of evil” on exclusively dogmatic grounds: on the 
contrary, some of his ideas are philosophically interesting in their own right.
49
 
At the outset of their correspondence, as Blijenbergh inquires into the status of 
evil, Spinoza’s response is artfully traditional: he states that evil is “nothing 
positive” (echoing Aquinas’ position that evil is not something [aliquid] in q. 1. 
art. 1). Spinoza also restates the Thomist distinction between what is evil 
“absolutely” and what is evil “according to something else”, calling the former a 
privation and the latter a negation: “So Privation is nothing but denying 
something of a thing which we judge to pertain to its Nature and Negation nothing 
but denying something of a thing because it does not pertain to its nature” (Letter 
21, C. p 378).  
 
However, whereas Aquinas believes that this distinction between different kinds 
of lacks captures a way in which they are really different, Spinoza does not share 
this belief. Instead, without denying that the distinction plays an important role in 
the psychology of human beings, he significantly disposes of it in his 
metaphysics. This point is conveyed by how Spinoza construes the difference 
between a man deprived of sight and a stone deprived of sight. We say of the man 
that he is: 
                                                 
48
 A case in point is Curley, who, empathizing with Spinoza, writes “Blijenbergh is a tedi-
ous fellow, obscure, repetitious and slow to see the point” (C. 349). 
49
 The very first question Blijenbergh raises, whether God is not ultimately responsible 
for inclining the will to good and evil alike, is one example of his originality. In raising 
this question Blijenbergh shows his dissatisfaction with the traditional construal of evil as 
non-being, and also disputes that God can be coherently thought of as causing the act, but 
not the act’s being evil (Letter 18, C. 356). Both of these positions, to which Spinoza 
subscribes, are more representative of the late Scholastic tradition at large than Blijen-
bergh’s views. In fact, Blijenbergh seems to here anticipate some of the points in Leib-
niz’s text “The Author of Sin”: “Car de dire que Dieu n’est pas l’auteur du peché, par ce 
qu’il n’est pas auteur d’une privation : quoyque il puisse estre appellé auteur de tout ce 




deprived of sight, because we easily imagine him as seeing, whether 
this imagination arises from the fact that we compare him with others 
who see, or his present state with his past, when he used to see. And 
when we consider this man in this way, by comparing his nature with 
that of others or with his own past nature, then we affirm that seeing 
pertains to his nature, and for that reason we say that he is deprived of 
it. But when we consider God’s decree, and his nature, we can no 
more affirm of that man than of a Stone, that he is deprived of vision. 
For at that time vision no more pertains to that man without 
contradiction than it does to the stone, since nothing more pertains to 
that man, and is his, than what the Divine intellect and will attribute 
to him. (Letter 21, C. 377). 
 
The privation we usually care about, and label as evil, is of course not privation of 
just any perfection, but what Aquinas calls “privation of a required perfection” 
(privatio debite perfectionis) (Aquinas, 2001: q. 1. art. 2 resp. [2001, pp. 75-6]). 
In Letter 21, Spinoza, in contrast, poignantly denies that we can make adequate 
judgments of which negations qualify as privations of a due perfection. For, 
strictly speaking, there is no such thing as privation of the reality that is due to a 
thing. For nothing more, Spinoza stresses, is due to anything than what 
necessarily follows from God’s nature, and as a consequence, is. For Spinoza, 
there is no ontological difference whereby privations of due goods and mere 
negations differ. We just label something as a privation of a due perfection when 
our expectations of how things ought to be are sufficiently offended. Of course, 
we may not explicitly label evils as privations of due goods. That we consider 
evils as privations is nonetheless implied by our sense of indignation and outrage 
at something’s being deprived of a good which was its due share. 
Let us compare this with Aquinas’s application of the example of the blind stone. 
Since sight is not due to the perfection of a stone, “no evil results” from the 
stone’s lack of sight (De Malo q. 1. art. 3. q. 13 [2001, p. 83]). In the same way, 
when Spinoza states that for the blind man, since sight is not part and parcel of his 
perfection now, the man’s condition isn’t properly called evil, although there is a 
negation of sight in the man. By the same principle no accident of nature, no 
monstrosity, no disaster, could properly speaking qualify as evil. Spinoza allows 
that we suffer from circumstances we would label as evils but denies that they can 




Aquinas holds that only being is and is good, and since lacks of being have no 
causal power, the good must cause the lack of being that is evil. The good cannot 
cause the evil by somehow aiming at it, since only the good is desirable and can 
function as end in a causal process. (Aquinas’s Aristotelian theory of final 
causality is extensive and encompasses also things to which we would 
ascribe no intentionality.) Instead, good things either cause the evil by accident or 
else evil results from a deficient good. When evil occurs naturally - to use 
Aquinas’ example, when deficient semen causes a monster, the deficiency in the 
good can always ultimately be traced back to a perfection, for example a mutation 
in the semen that is a positive reality (De Malo, q. 1. art. 3. resp. [2001 p. 87]). 
The consumption of the child by the wolf is aiming at what is good for the wolf 
(nourishment) but accidentally causes the death of the child, and so on. Thus, 
natural evils are always ultimately produced when something good accidentally 
causes evil.  
 
Although Spinoza does not, as I explained in the previous chapter, consider being 
and good coextensive, he agrees with Aquinas that only being is, and that since 
negations have no causal power, what is must cause whatever reality there is in 
the phenomena we call evil. This is clear from Spinoza’s casual remark that that 
“through which things are said to be determined to produce an effect must be 
something positive [quid positivum] (as is known through itself)” (1p26d). 
However, even though the causal interactions of beings eventually lead to 
negations (the negation of the life of the child as it is consumed by the wolf), none 
of these negations can, properly speaking, be called privations of goods that are 
due to the thing in question.  
 
Aquinas’s distinction between what is evil simpliciter (which corresponds to what 
Spinoza calls a privation) and what is evil secundum quid (corresponding to what 
Spinoza calls a negation) relies on an optimism vis-à-vis the epistemic value of 
the teleological judgment which Spinoza does not share. In other words, the 
distinction relies on the premise that humans have the capacity to distinguish 
what, apart from perfection itself - i.e., the raw being it necessarily has - is due to 
an individual. Since, however, all concepts of any perfections that are not 
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convertible with being are inadequate, we have no such capacity. Here Spinoza’s 
distinction between ontological and teleological (and thus merely subjective) 
perfection comes into play. 
 
It should be recalled that evil, considered as a non-being, is a universal. But it is a 
kind of non-being different from that of a chimaera (such as the square circle). 
While the latter is a merely verbal being of no consequence to us, the former 
shoulders an important role in our day-to-day reasoning. For evil functions as a 
relative concept by the means of which we explain to what extent human behavior 
lives up to the universal of subjective perfection. Evil is a being of reason that 
consists of two inseparable steps: we judge something’s status as good or evil by 
comparing it to a standard. Spinoza construes evil as an explanatory concept 
which is adduced in the absence of proper understanding. For neither the good nor 
the evil which we predicate of x, nor the teleological standard against which we 
ordinarily hold x, have being as such. More exactly, while there is some physical 
process which corresponds to the formation of the notion in our minds, there is 
nothing in reality that these concepts pick out.  
 
In sum, by calling evil a being of reason, Spinoza implies that it is a comparative 
concept that captures the superficial aspects of human existence but fails to 
capture anything at all about what really is, and what is thus ontologically perfect 
insofar as it is. For, as Spinoza puts it in rather traditional terms in Letter 21, 
“[w]e cannot [impute evil to the man overcome by sensual appetite] if we attend 
to the nature of the Divine decree and intellect, for in that regard the better 
appetite no more pertains to that man’s nature at that time than it does to the 
Nature of the Devil, or a stone” (C. 377-8). Privations of due goods are in the eyes 
of the human beholder, whereas in reality, there are only negations of perfections 
that were not due when they did not occur, since they were not then necessitated 
by God’s nature. Properly speaking, only a privation of a due good would be a 
real evil, but no such evils exist. But like others beings of reason, the inadequate 
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notion of evil may still prove useful for the coordination of human society.
50
 Yet, 
when we ascribe reality to evil, as Blijenbergh insists on doing, we are 
committing what for Spinoza, as for Parmenides
51
 would be an intellectual sin, 
namely that of imagining a non-being to be a real being. 
 
What does it mean that our ideas of (hypostasized) good and evil are inadequate? 
An image is a confused idea, an idea which is not formed by the activity of the 
intellect, but by the imagination’s being affected by external bodies (see 2p17s). 
Spinoza’s favorite example of an image is the distance of the sun, which he says 
appears to be around 200 feet above us. In 4p1s - the first proposition in the Part 
on Human Bondage - Spinoza emphasizes that we continue to imagine the sun to 
be 200 feet away, even after we come to know that our image of the sun’s distance 
does not correctly represent its real position.
52
 Since an adequate idea of the sun’s 
position in space will not change the way our body is affected by the body of the 
sun, an adequate idea will not free us from the image. 
 
Just as we cannot rid ourselves of our image of the sun being 200 feet away by 
acquiring adequate knowledge of astronomy, so, I would like to submit, we may 
not be able to rid ourselves of the impression that one thing is intrinsically good 
and the other intrinsically evil. But just as we can know the sun’s true distance 
from the earth while nonetheless retaining the impression that it is much closer, 
we can also continue to use the words ‘good’ and ‘evil', perfectly aware that they 
are always relative to a standard, and nonetheless continue to experience some 
phenomena as being evil as such. The analogy with the sun is not perfect; the sun 
will appear to be at a certain distance away from the earth because of the way our 
sensual apparatus is wired. Things will appear to be possessed of intrinsic 
qualities of good and evil not merely because of the way our senses are affected, 
but more specifically because we compare them to universal standards. While we 
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example (along with other passages) shows that, on Spinoza’s theory of knowledge, 
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may not be physically necessitated to do so, we are culturally conditioned to 
compare things and events to standards in a way that seems nearly as inevitable. 
 
Spinoza himself employs words such as ‘good’ and ‘evil' without postulating a 
metaphysical good or a metaphysical evil. In 4d1 and 4d2 Spinoza defines good 
and evil as what is useful and useless to us, construing the human individual as the 
most reliable standard. Yet all utility is also defined in relation to an end. In the 
context of human psychology, this end is called appetite: “By the end for the sake 
of which we do something is called appetite” (4d7), or desire.53 By being aware of 
the ontological status of good and evil, that is, linguistically put, by being aware 
of the fact that ‘good’ and ‘evil' are terms which are always relative to a certain 
standard, supplied by a given desire, we become less inclined to ascribe reality or 
perfection to ideas of what is good, or evil, as such. 
 
But since we are continuously subject to the flow of images from which we 
abstract our teleological notions of perfection, it seems that on Spinoza’s view, we 
cannot help perceiving intrinsic good and evil in the world. Yet, merely 
entertaining the impression that something is evil as such does not in and of itself 
make us epistemically blameworthy, for we are only irrational to the extent that 
we act upon our images in the belief that they are true, not to the extent that we 
imagine. As Spinoza puts it in 4p1s: “[Images] are not contrary to the true, and 
they do not disappear in its presence”. Spinoza would acknowledge the 
appearance of evil. Nonetheless, he clearly devalues the ontological status of that 
evil. For it simply is not an objective property of things. 
 
When we imagine non-beings to have being, we are imagining them without the 
corrective device of an adequate idea, supplied to us by the intellect, which 
enables us to entertain an image without believing it to adequately represent 
reality. (On my reading of Spinoza, the corrective idea that will enable us to move 
beyond good and evil is that of ontological perfection.) When we imagine the 
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positive existence of a negation (such as positive or radical evil), we thereby 
transform useful regulative concepts into fictions, non-beings we imagine to have 
being. This latter offence against ontology we perpetuate habitually, the reason 
being that “[images] arise from the ideas of real beings so immediately that they 
are quite easily confused with them by those who do not pay very close attention” 
(C. 301), or so Spinoza suggests. 
 
 2.2.2. Aquinas and Spinoza on moral evil and deep blame. 
 
While Spinoza’s equation of nature with God may already induce one to accept 
that natural evils are wrongly called privations of due goods, since nothing can 
happen in nature that is not part of God’s infinitely complex self-causation, one 
may wonder what consequences this has for Spinoza’s moral theory, and the 
specific kind of evil that is brought about by humans. In what follows, I will 
illuminate the moral dimension of Spinoza’s theory of evil by comparing it to 
Aquinas’s theory of moral evil. This is of interest since, as we have seen, Aquinas 
too subscribed to a privative account of evil. However, Aquinas’s privative 
account of evil did not prevent him from construing moral evil as something 
positive. I will suggest that it is Spinoza’s rejection of an ontological grounding 
for the difference between negation and privation that leads him to pursue an 
account of moral evil that is radically different from that of Aquinas. 
 
For Aquinas, the category of moral evil comprises sin in moral matters and moral 
wrong (malum culpae). This evil differs from natural evils and divine punishment 
in that, whereas these latter are ultimately caused by God, God does not cause 
moral evil (q. 1. art. 5. co. [2001, p. 113]). How then is moral evil to be explained, 
on Aquinas’ account? 
 
The causation of moral evil conforms to the pattern in which, either, a deficient 
good causes evil or a good causes evil accidentally (i.e., willing the evil under an 
aspect of good), but differs in that the good that is specified as cause is the will 
(voluntas: q. 1. art. 3. co. [2001 p. 87]). Man is free since his will has the power 
“to acquiesce or not acquiesce” (recipere vel non recipere), that is, the will has the 
capacity to make a free choice (liberum arbitrium). According to Aquinas, the will 
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has this power for the reason that in practical deliberation, it is not determined to 
opt for any given choice. 
Moral evil thus differs from natural evil (and divine punishment) insofar as it has 
the human will as a cause, and more precisely the human will in its capacity of 
disposing freely among choices. Strictly speaking, willing is not free, since, as 
Pasnau helpfully explains, “willing […] is the desire for ultimate ends, and the 
ultimate end is necessitated” - it is blessedness or, as Pasnau (2002, p. 219) 
translates it, happiness (beatitudo). But it is still the will's capacity to dispose 
freely among choices in rational deliberation that accounts for moral 
responsibility, and in this way, Aquinas can attribute moral wrong to individuals 
possessing this limited freedom - not a freedom for choosing our ends, as Pasnau 
points out, but a freedom for choosing the means to these ends. Therefore, the free 
choice of our will is the feature in virtue of which we can be held responsible: it is 
because moral evil resides in this free choice, that humans can be held 
accountable for their deeds, words and desires, in ways that we do not hold natural 
phenomena accountable. Whereas natural evils are mere privations, Aquinas 
therefore contends that moral evil is something positive (aliquid positive) (q. 2. a. 
11. ad 13; see also q. 1. a. 1. ad 2), by which I take him something genuinely 
opposed to a good in which we could have chosen to acquiesce instead. The good 
which we should always choose to acquiesce in is the supreme good.
54
 
But why, it may be asked, is the will deficient in the first place? Surely the 
deficiency of the will must have a cause, either natural - like the mutation that 
insofar as it was “perfect” (i.e., real) brought about a deficiency in the semen, or 
supernatural (if God directly would weaken one’s will). This raises the universal 
question that Galen Strawson has called the Basic Argument. Strawson provides 
many formulations of the argument, the most scholastically sounding, and here 
stylistically most fitting, being this one: “True self-determination is impossible 
because it requires the actual completion of an infinite series of choices of 
principles of choice” (1994, p. 7). We make choices on the basis of principles we 
have, but if we wish to choose these principles, we must also choose the principles 
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on the basis of which we choose the first-mentioned principles, and so on. But this 
is impossible. Since we can only be fully morally responsible for our choices if 
we have chosen the principles on the basis of which we make our choices, we are 
not fully morally responsible. Instead of being so chosen, the “principles” in 
question are, for example, the outcome of hereditary or cultural factors, result 
from events in early childhood, and so on. Aquinas dismisses this argument - 
indeed, in order to hold the deficient will accountable for its deficiency, he must 
dismiss it. Thus, he states that we need not, or should not, (non oportet) “look for 
another cause of this deficiency, and so we do not need to make an infinite 
regress” (q. 1. art 3. ad. 6. p. 89.). 
But why does Aquinas believe this to be the case? To my mind, there are, at least 
in theory, two possible replies. While one shows more fidelity to the text, the other 
is equally interesting. For this reason, I will state both, and then discuss Spinoza’s 
position in the light of these responses. 
It seems to me that Aquinas contradicts himself when he states that (a) “in 
voluntary things, the cause of the evil is that sin is deficient will, and that 
deficiency, as conceived prior to sin, does not have the aspect either of moral 
wrong or of punishment” (q. 1. art. 3. ad. 6, p. 89), although he subsequently in 
ad. 12 states that (b): “The very deficiency of the will consists of moral wrong, 
just as the deficiency of the intellect consists of ignorance […] Therefore, the 
deficiency of the will does not excuse one from wrongdoing, just as the deficiency 
of the intellect does not prevent ignorance” (p. 91). While both are replies to the 
objections following after the answer, and therefore should both represent 
Aquinas’ view, it is evident that only (a) correctly conveys Aquinas’ actual view. 
The first citation (a) supports the reading that is most consistent with the overall 
response in q. 1. art. 3, namely that there is a prior disposition of the will which 
explains the actuality of sin but which is not as such blameworthy. Such a view 
raises the question why we are not blameworthy for our dispositions, but only for 
our choices. Perhaps, it is possible for us not to be blameworthy for being 
disposed in certain ways if dispositions alone do not determine the way our will is 
inclined: if, to speak in Strawson’s terms, the “principles” of our choices (desires 
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Differently put, if our prior disposition (principles, desires and so on, which we 
did not choose in the first place) do not wholly determine our choices, then we can 
be held responsible for choices without being responsible for “principles of 
choices”. And, as we have seen, Aquinas denies that the will is wholly determined 
by its prior dispositions: “For granted that emotions fetter reason, an evil choice 
necessarily results, but the will retains the power to resist the fettering of reason” 
(Emphasis added) (q. 3. p. 291). 
The will retains a principal freedom in the face of desires and the value judgments 
these express, since the will is not even determined to choose what we judge to be 
good. Just as the intellect is not “compelled to assent to conclusions” of 
arguments if it does not perceive the truth of the premises, so the will is not 
“necessarily moved to anything that does not even seem to have a necessary 
connection with happiness [beatitudine] which is naturally willed”. Moreover, 
even in the case of what has a necessary connection with happiness (God), “this 
necessary connection is not fully evident to humans in this life” (q. 3 art. 3. resp. 
pp. 235-7). The will is not necessarily moved towards lesser goods than God, nor 
even, in this life, towards God, and so it retains the capacity to resist the desire of 
any good. Even though desires and dispositional features of our characters may, 
and do, incline the will, we are not wholly under their sway, simply because our 
powers of rational evaluation are deficient. If, by contrast, we could always 
infallibly discern the relation of various goods to the ultimate good of blessedness, 
we would in most cases not enjoy any freedom of choice.
56
 
The other citation (b) appears to object to the view that a deficient will excuses an 
agent. Aquinas’s response to the opinion that the deficiency of the will can excuse 
the sinner, is here that just as the deficiency of the intellect consists in ignorance, 
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so does the deficiency of the will consist in the evil of moral wrong (q. 1, art. 2, 
ad. 12, p. 91). Deficient will is, thus construed, moral wrong itself, and already 
blamable as such, regardless of what determined it to be thus. Read this way, 
Aquinas’s position would echo a tragic insight which has been brought to bear on 
contemporary ethics in the works of philosophers like Martha Nussbaum.
57
 
Literary works, especially Greek tragedy, seem to suggest that the categories of 
blame and guilt are not always coextensive, and that human beings, by accident 
alone, may find themselves blameable without being guilty for bringing about 
their situation.
58
 Such an understanding of blameworthiness denies that it is 
necessary for one to be strictly responsible for one’s actions in order for blame to 
accrue to them. Basing one’s reading on (b) alone (i.e. q. 1. art. 3. ad. 12), 
Aquinas’ position that moral wrong consists in a deficient will would likewise 
allow external factors to determine our will to be deficient, while maintaining that 
the agent is nonetheless blameworthy for having been determined to will in this 
way. However, as already stated, Aquinas maintains that in practical deliberation, 
one is not determined to choose a certain good, for the reason that no good 
appears necessarily connected with blessedness to humans in this life. Therefore, 
the will cannot be wholly determined to any choice. 
In any case, Aquinas safeguards morality by making the will the locus of praise 
and blame. In the first (and genuinely Thomist) scenario, the will is the locus of 
praise and blame since the will is free to choose among the reasons that will 
ultimately incline it. In the second, and less Thomist, tragic scenario, the will is 
the locus of praise and blame even if it has been caused to be inclined in a certain 
way by factors beyond its control. Generally, the locus of praise and blame will 
naturally also be the locus of ethical perfection, and so philosophers who consider 
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the will as that locus will present perfection of the will as the chief locus of moral 
perfection in the human being. 
It is interesting that, on the first Thomist model (a), the source of our freedom of 
choice and our evil actions have the same root: both stem from our incapacity to 
infallibly recognize what is good for us. It is this incapacity that makes room for 
some indeterminacy in which the will can exercise its freedom of choice. By 
contrast, Spinoza would deny that we can become ethically perfect by choosing 
freely among alternative options that incline our will differently. Such a strategy is 
impossible given his account of human psychology. 
Significantly, Spinoza does not believe that the will has freedom of choice. The 
error of finality which, on his view, has poisoned theology and natural science 
alike, stems from our belief in a fictitious free will (1app). We always ask after the 
final cause or purpose behind someone’s act. We say that Orestes killed 
Clytamnestra because he wanted to avenge his father. We are content with this 
answer and do not probe further into the endless series of causes behind this 
choice, but that contentedness only indicates our intellectual sloth, not that the 
(alleged) purpose of the act was really its ultimate cause. 
The reason why we cannot even in principle arrive at a free will as we list the 
causes behind an act, is that for Spinoza there simply is no such (rational and 
appetitive) faculty as the one Aquinas calls the will. Interestingly, in the Ethics, 
there is strictly speaking no will at all, neither divine nor human. The will is to the 
set of disparate volitions what the concept of human being is to all the members of 
the human species, namely a generalization, a mere universal (see 2p48 for this 
point).  
Moreover, in 2p49d, Spinoza sets out to demonstrate that any volition of ours - 
that is, any affirmation or negation - takes place already at the level of intellectual 
judgment, or as he puts it, at the level of ideas. In Spinoza’s words, there is in the 
mind “no volition […] except that which the idea involves insofar as it is an idea” 
(2p49). A volition is here understood as an affirmation or a negation, whereas an 
idea, according to Spinoza’s theory, is the mind’s active intention of the ideatum. 
Spinoza’s point is that the mental act which we call an idea always contains its 
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own affirmation or negation - there is no further volitional element superadded to 
it. One corollary of this is that “the singular volitions and ideas are one and the 
same” (2p49c). 
There is thus no room for indeterminacy that can assert itself between the reasons 
that incline the will, on the one hand, and the will itself, on the other. All of the 
reasons that incline the will are already themselves acts of will. These volitions 
are modes and as such causally determined (see 1p32d for the claim that all modes 
are determined). Therefore, the will - in the sense of the faculty that executes a 
free choice among reasons - cannot, insofar as it is ultimately undetermined, be 
the locus of perfection advocated by Spinoza. Hence Spinoza rejects (a), the 
argument that dispositions are not blamable since they do not determine the will. 
Does Spinoza, then, accept the tragic possibility we extracted from q. 1, art. 2, ad. 
12 (but which Aquinas himself does not entertain), namely that (b) we may be 
held morally responsible (in the sense of being blame- or praiseworthy) even for 
an inclination of the will that stems from factors over which we wield no 
conscious control? That is, is there a kind of blame that accrues to God or to 
ourselves even if the will is determined or even necessitated? It must be noted that 
this would be a different kind of blame from the one Spinoza criticizes in 1app, 
where he only targets the notion of blame that presupposes freedom of will. Tragic 
blame, by contrast, is compatible both with freedom and its absence. For tragic 
blame occurs when someone is blameworthy in spite of the fact that he or she 
could not have done otherwise. 
In Letters 75 and 78, Spinoza assesses the issue whether morality is compromised 
by his view that all things are necessary. Spinoza states that the “inevitable 
necessity” he builds on “does not destroy either divine or human laws” (Letter 75, 
C. p. 471), that is, he asserts that his system preserves whatever notion of moral 
responsibility is necessary for us to (want to continue to) abide by these laws. 
Whether or not Spinoza’s system is in fact necessitarian is an issue I cannot 
undertake to discuss here.
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consequences that worry Oldenburg follow from determinism alone.
60
 They are 
right in this, at least on the incompatibilist assumption that moral responsibility 
requires counterfactual freedom (i.e. the freedom to act otherwise than one in facts 
acts). For if one grants this assumption, then even determinism must break the 
back of morality. Spinoza provides us with two responses to this worry. (In 
subsequent chapters, I will advance the bolder thesis that, for Spinoza, 
necessitarianism is not only compatible with human perfection: it is the 
fundament of human perfection.) 
First, that blessedness or wretchedness follow inevitably does not make the good 
of blessedness less desirable or the evil of wretchedness more terrifying (Letter 
75, C. II. 471). That is, he disputes that the fact that someone sins inevitably 
renders the sin less appalling. This is an answer to those who may think that basic 
moral attitudes of approval and disapproval may be destroyed by determinism (or, 
for that matter, necessitarianism).  
Second, that we are determined to do good or bad does not mean that punishment 
and reward are useless. Spinoza adduces rabies as a case in point: “Someone who 
is crazy because of a dog’s bite is indeed to be excused; nevertheless, he is rightly 
suffocated” (Letter 78, C. II. 480). Punishment and wretchedness are appropriate 
in two different ways. First, punishment and reward are appropriately distributed 
by society; the wicked are thereby contained, controlled or destroyed, and the 
good promoted. Second, blessedness and wretchedness are appropriately 
                                                                                                                                     
why. In their modal thinking, early modern philosophers such as Spinoza and Leibniz rely 
upon the theological device of creation. More specifically, if God could have created the 
world in any other way than he does indeed create it, there is another possible world. 
Otherwise, there is no such world, and the actual world is the only possible one. There is 
abundant evidence that Spinoza throughout his philosophical career held that God could 
not “create” the “world” in any other way than he actually creates “it” - or, in terms that 
are faithful to Spinoza’s mature viewpoint, that he could not cause himself in any other 
way than he does actually cause himself. Don Garrett (1991, p. 195) helpfully lists all 
passages in the first part of the Ethics where Spinoza states that “all things - clearly in-
cluding finite modes - must follow from the necessity of the divine nature”. These pas-
sages are: 1p16; 1p17; 1p26d; 1p33d and 1p33s. For an earlier letter pointing in the same 
direction, see Letter 54 to Hugo Boxel (1654). However, the exact nature of Spinoza’s 
modal thinking remains a widely debated issue. For a refutation of two arguments for 
contingency in Spinozism, see Chapter 4. 
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 Curley and Walski (1999). However, I do not agree with their conclusions in this paper 
for reasons to be stated in Chapter 4. 
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distributed by Nature or God, since blessedness is the natural consequence of 
virtue - indeed is “virtue itself” (5p42), and wretchedness the natural consequence 
of sinfulness, and like all causal connections in nature they too are necessary. This 
Spinoza intends as an answer to those who may suppose that if determinism (or 
necessitarianism) is true, we might as well give up on our practises of punishment 
and reward. On the contrary, he maintains, these (determined) practices have 
positive effects in society.  
One has reason to suppose that Oldenburg’s deepest worry is not hereby allayed. 
For these remarks only show that reward and punishment are appropriate, and as 
Charles Manekin (2014) has remarked before me, they need not, for that reason, 
also be adequate or deserved. Manekin uses the case of pets as an example: within 
a paternalistic model of divine justice, men may, like pets, be punished even if 
they cannot properly be held morally responsible.
61
  
Stating, as Spinoza does, that we can endorse whatever notion of responsibility is 
required for us to maintain our legal and social systems of punishment and blame, 
rewards and praise, fails to capture the deeper notion of responsibility which 
characterizes intersubjective human relations. There is a difference between 
assenting to the punishment and containment of a criminal and genuinely holding 
him blameworthy for what he has done.
62
 We have already seen that Spinoza does 
not think that his denials of freedom of will and freedom of choice preclude us 
from regulating society in accordance with traditional laws. Be that as it may. One 
may still wonder what Spinoza’s denial of freedom means for the deeper notion of 
moral responsibility, the one that we only credit people with when we regard them 
as persons? Can such a deep notion of blame accrue to human beings or to God, 
on Spinoza’s view, or is this notion, as Oldenburg maintains, destroyed by his 
denial of freedom? 
In Letter 75, Spinoza is (as he subsequently explains in Letter 78) concerned with 
exculpating God. God cannot be blamed for having made men worse than he 
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 Manekin (2014) discusses this problem in the context of the determinist tradition in 
medieval Jewish philosophy. 
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 Strawson (1982) has drawn attention to exactly this difference, which he calls the dif-
ference between “objective” and “participant” attitudes. 
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could have, for he could not have made them otherwise, acting from the necessity 
of his nature. Hence, the reason why we cannot blame God for having made us 
worse than he could have is simply that he actually could not have made us better. 
This is a theodicy that proceeds from necessitarianism. Necessitarianism suffices 
to show the impossibility of imputing some kind of moral imperfection to God. 
But if humans are necessitated to the same extent as God, then what about them? 
Are we then not also ultimately without fault? If God is to be considered 
blameless since he could not have done otherwise, should we also not be 
considered blameless in doing what we cannot but do?  
In the same letter, Spinoza addresses this question. Here, he states that “the only 
reason men are inexcusable before God is that they are in his power as clay is in 
the power of the potter, who, of the same mass, makes some vessels for honor, 
and others for dishonor” (C. II. 471, cf. Romans 9:18-24). Spinoza, with 
characteristic heartlessness, appeals to the same trope that Omar Khayyam uses to 
dismantle divine justice in Rubaiyat, but with the opposite end in view (unless he 
is being ironic). Oldenberg’s indignation at this matches Khayyam’s in intensity if 
not in eloquence, for he holds that, if Spinoza’s model is correct, “men are for that 
reason completely excusable because they are in God’s power” (Letter 77, C. II. 
479).
63
 In response to this, Spinoza significantly concedes Oldenberg’s point, 
namely that men can be held excusable since they are necessitated to do what they 
do, but again opposes Oldenberg’s claim that this excusability poses any threat to 
divine or human laws. 
Thus, it seems, that if blame, in the adequate or deep sense, is one of virtue’s 
sinews (as Oldenburg maintains) Spinoza does indeed cut it. The reason why we 
can neither blame God nor humans is interestingly rooted in necessitarianism. 
This point is very important. From the fact that God could not have been any 
different, it follows that we simply cannot consistently demand that he or his 
modes should be different in any way.  
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Cf. Rubaiyat: “What! from his helpless Creature be repaid 
Pure Gold for what he lent us dross-allay‘d; 
Sue for a Debt we never did contract, 
And cannot answer? — Oh, the sorry trade!” (Fitz Gerald’s translation, 1905). 
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God is, on Spinoza’s view, exculpated, since he acts from necessity alone. 
Humans rightly (i) suffer the consequences of this necessity, whether they are 
vessels made for honor or dishonor. In other words, humans are “inexcusable 
before God” (Letter 75) - a statement Spinoza glosses as the claim that “no one 
can reproach God because he has given him a weak nature or a mind lacking in 
power” (Letter 78, C. II. 480). Yet humans are to be held accountable before each 
other for the evil they commit, in the sense that we rightly (ii) abhor the bad and 
and esteem the good. For example, Nero is to be blamed for being “ungrateful, 
without compassion and disobedient”, while Orestes is not, or at least less, 
blameworthy for committing the same crime (Letter 23 to Blijenbergh, C. 388).
64
 
I have emphasized the word rightly above, because it is here being used in two 
different senses. In the first case, it is right that humans should suffer the 
consequences of God’s infinite perfection, since God’s nature is necessarily like 
that. I phrase it in this way to emphasize that there is an axiological dimension to 
God’s ontological perfection. On my reading, Spinoza’s reasoning is as follows: It 
is objectively right that only what necessarily happens ever happens since only 
that is, in its own way, an expression of infinite ontological perfection. Only when 
under the sway of human, all too human, ways of judging things do we object to 
nature by comparing it with our categories of subjective perfection or 
imperfection. Only then do we think that we are in position to blame God for what 
is telologically imperfect. 
But by which standard do we then rightly abhor the bad and esteem the good (ii)? 
By the very subjective standard which Spinoza thinks is inapplicable to the deep-
structure of reality. Even though such appraisals are useful and indeed 
indispensable for the regulation of society, these judgments can, since they 
operate with beings of reasons, never truly capture reality.  
It turns out, that in the end Spinoza rejects (b) as well. That is, he rejects the view 
that the will can be blameworthy for willing poorly, even if it is determined to do 
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 It is significant that, for Spinoza, the act of matricide, insofar as it is activity and ex-
presses reality, consists only in perfection; the blame that accrues to Nero does so because 
of the negation of “gratefulness, compassion and disobedience” that he exhibits in com-
mitting the act. Likewise, Aquinas holds that “acts of sin come from God, but that sin 
does not” (q. 3. art. 2. resp. p. 239).  
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so. More precisely, if the blameworthiness that is to accrue to us for our evil 
dispositions, regardless of how those first arose, is to be meant in a deep sense, 
then we are not to be blamed for these dispositions. We are only prudentially to 
hold ourselves and others accountable for them, in order to control what is 
relatively bad for ourselves and for society. 
This is clearly an error theory of evil. The ethical implications of this view are far 
more extreme than those of the privation theory of metaphysical evil, which in 
recent accounts has been accused of being insufficient in the face of modern evils. 
For according to Spinoza’s theory of evil, evil is not even a privation, it is, as it 
were, less. Evil is a mere negation that the human mind distorts into a privation, 
by using the comparative devices of beings of reasons. Next, I will suggest that 
for Spinoza, someone cannot make progress on her way to perfection, unless she 
can disentangle herself from this habitual confusion where the perhaps indelible 
image of evil is taken as a gauge for the existence of evil. 
 2.3. Ethical significance.  
 2.3.1. The locus of human perfection in Spinoza’s thought.  
In general, the locus of praise and blame will also be the locus of ethical 
perfection. If one is praised or blamed for willing well or poorly, then one should 
perfect one’s will. Certainly, this does not seamlessly apply to Aquinas’ view, for 
whom “ignorance can be a voluntary sin” (2001, q. 3, art. 7, ad. 9, p. 273). But for 
Aquinas, some praise and blame (in the deep sense) certainly befall us on account 
of our choices. In contrast, since Spinoza denies that we are possessed of anything 
along the lines of a free choice, he also denies that any praise or blame, in the 
deep sense, can accrue to us on account of the choices we make. As we have seen, 
Spinoza does not take this to mean that we should give up on our social praxes of 
praise and blame. We should go on punishing and praising people on solely 
consequentialist grounds, without believing that there is an objective property 
such as evil in the subject we prudentially judge to merit punishment. Presumably, 
such a cold attitude becomes easier to adopt when we realize that the halo of evil, 
which we naturally see surrounding people like terrorists or imperialist invaders, 
fails to do justice to the particulars in question. 
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Nonetheless, Spinoza is very preoccupied with ethics, as the title of his chef 
d’oeuvre clearly indicates. Moreover, he is concerned with ethical perfection. But 
if his ideal of the greatest possible human perfection is to have any ontological 
foundation, it must be articulable independently of moral concepts such as what is 
good, evil, teleologically perfect or imperfect. Spinoza’s ideal of ethical perfection 
cannot be based on these concepts without itself lacking in ontological foundation. 
The assumption that an ideal of human perfection must have an ontological 
foundation is not beyond questioning. Could human perfection not be something 
artful and genuinely false?
65
 Perhaps Spinoza could subscribe to a way of 
conceptualizing human perfection as ultimately subjectively construed, but as 
nonetheless worthy of pursuit. For Spinoza evidently holds that we can only 
efficiently organize society by co-opting beings of reason and beings of the 
imagination, concepts that fail to capture items or structures in reality, for instance 
concepts such as good and evil. Given this human dependence on judgments that 
are metaphysically groundless, but nonetheless of extreme consequence in our 
life, would it not be plausible that the perfection our psychological constitution 
allows us to pursue, is merely subjective and not at all ontologically grounded? 
Are we not creatures whose motivations are most often swayed by judgments of 
good and evil, and the teleologically perfect and imperfect? 
However, as far as Spinoza’s ideal of human perfection is concerned, the contrary 
is the case. In the following chapter, I will present in greater detail the reasons 
why human perfection, according to Spinoza, is to be measured by solid 
ontological standards. For present purposes, it is enough to bear in mind that for 
Spinoza, as for Aquinas, human perfection consists in blessedness. “If joy consists 
in the passage to a greater perfection, blessedness [beatitudo] must surely consist 
in the fact that the Mind is endowed with perfection itself” (5p33s), Spinoza 
writes. The mind is endowed with this perfection through the third kind of 
knowledge (5p27d). No matter how such knowledge is to be understood exactly 
(for my interpretation, see Chapter 8), it is clear that, as a bare minumum, 
necessary but far from sufficient condition, it must qualify as knowledge. But 
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what can qualify as knowledge? According to Spinoza, a knowing intellect should 
comprehend nothing but God’s attributes and his modes (see 1p30). Hypostasized 
evil - evil thought of as an objective property inherent in things - is not such a 
mode (or a mode of a mode), and so cannot be truly comprehended by an intellect. 
It can thus not possibly be an object for the kind of knowledge wherein our 
intellectual perfection consists. 
In spite of the fact that cognition or intellection are not always in contemporary 
philosophy considered as morally charged activities, they are nonetheless for 
Spinoza deeply ethical, in the sense that they are the activities anyone pursuing 
perfection ought to pursue. Since knowledge is for Spinoza the most “perfecting” 
activity humans can engage in, and since true knowledge is about what really is, 
such knowledge is to be distinguished from all explanations in terms of good and 
evil. Differently put, Spinoza’s cognitive ideal of human perfection is articulated 
beyond the horizon of good and evil. 
The conclusion I am here drawing may appear to be too bold and not sufficiently 
supported by the relevant Spinozist texts. Yet, there is textual support that on 
Spinoza’s view, faith in assessments of good and evil (whether these assessments 
be of natural phenomena, of humans or God) are not only tangential, but even 
harmful, to perfection. (It is not necessary to emphasize how much Spinoza’s 
view, in this regard, differs from the mainstream Western philosophical tradition.) 
In one passage, Spinoza explicitly states that the mind that lingers on universals 
cannot make the kind of epistemic progress that matters for perfection (TIE C. 
41). But it follows already from the classification of good and evil that on 
Spinoza’s view everyday moral judgments trade in universals, i.e. in abstract 
models exemplifying subjective perfection and imperfection, or good and bad. 
The judgments that constitute the fabric of our everyday morality are dispensed 
with once human perfection - blessedness - is realized, Spinoza suggests. 
Thus, in order to be blessed, we have to cease to judge things in terms of good and 
evil. This does not mean that things will not appear as good and evil to us - they 
might. Yet, we can withhold assent to these ideas when they are accompanied by 
other ideas - ideas of the actual ontological status of good and evil, for instance. 
 
65 
To summarize what we have so far, Spinoza’s ideal of human perfection - 
blessedness - is contemplative rather than active, in the sense that its locus is the 
intellect, and not the free will, understood as something which can act 
independently of how we are disposed through our ideas and desires. It is true that 
Spinoza considers the highest good of the mind to consist in our active knowledge 
(cognitio) of God (4p28). (Spinoza uses cognitio, a word with active connotations, 
signifying our cognition or grasping of God.) This does not mean, however, that 
God is good, apart from insofar as knowledge of him is useful for us in our 
striving after realizing our perfection or being. 
 2.3.2. The paradox of Spinoza’s theory of human perfection revisited. 
How are we to know or contemplate things in order to be blessed? I will only 
focus on one aspect of this question here, one that will allow us to return to the 
paradox stated at the end of the previous chapter. 
Interestingly, Spinoza prescribes contemplation of things as they follow from God 
as the kind of knowledge most conducive to perfection. More specifically, it is 
intuitive knowledge of how finite things are inscribed in Nature, and thereby 
necessitated, which Spinoza explicitly calls the third kind of knowledge: “This 
kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate idea of the absolute essence of 
certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things” 
(2p40s, cf. 5p25d). Everything that follows from the absolute nature of some 
attribute of God’s is necessary (see 1p21: Spinoza writes ‘eternal', but eternity is a 
modal concept for Spinoza, and more precisely, a kind of necessary existence: see 
1d8). 
For this reason, whatever it means exactly to “proceed from an adequate idea” of 
divine attributes to “adequate knowledge of the essence of things”, it is clear that 
it involves at least that we consider the essences of things as necessarily being the 
way they are. It is thus from this third kind of knowledge of things as necessary 
that intellectual love of God arises (5p32c). Since love of God is the ultimate kind 
of perfection, human nature achieves its ultimate perfection in the contemplation 
of things as necessary. This, however, has rarely noted prima facie paradoxical 
consequences for Spinoza’s ideal of human perfection. For one thing, if the third 
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kind of knowledge involves realizing the necessity of things, then it seems that 
insofar as one knows oneself by the third kind of knowledge, one knows oneself 
and one’s knowledge to be necessary. But if oneself and one’s mental state are 
already necessitated, then how can one call this ideal of perfection normatively 
enjoined? 
As far as I can see, only one response can accommodate at once Spinoza’s 
necessitarianism, the third kind of knowledge which realizes the truth of this 
necessitarianism in the case of individual essences, and the normative dimension 
of perfection. According to this response, human perfection consists in realizing 
that you (as everything else) are what you should be, namely what you necessarily 
are. Spinoza speaks of the human essence as strivings (conatus). According to a 
plausible understanding of the relevant passages, the conatus-doctrine does not 
merely state that we, and indeed all things, strive after merely maintaining our 





But, if the highest kind of perfection consists in the third kind of knowledge, then 
when one oneself is the object of that knowledge, one must realize that any degree 
of perfection/reality/being one has is necessitated. 
One’s striving obliges one to become more: to gain in perfection or being. But as a 
human being one gains most in being by obtaining the third kind of knowledge. 
The paradox can, then, be articulated as follows: one only becomes what one’s 
striving dictates one should be when one realizes that one already is what one 
strives to become.  
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 Many readings of Spinoza’s conatus align the concept with Nietzsche’s doctrine of a 
will to power - thus rejecting Nietzsche’s own critique of Spinoza. For Nietzsche himself 
tended to identify Spinoza’s conatus with self-preservation rather than self-expansion, 
whereas Spinoza’s actual doctrine is arguably closer to Nietzsche’s than the latter himself 
cares to admit (possibly because of his reliance on Kuno Fischer’s work). This advocacy 
of the Spinoza-Nietzsche alliance with respect to the importance of power as necessarily 
expanding and self-outpouring is in Wurzer (1975), Yovel (1999), and Pethick (2015, p. 
65). As far as I can see, Spinoza and Nietzsche diverge not so much on the issue of self-
expansion as on the possibility of self-diminution: a topic I will here set aside. 
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 One could perhaps enlist Spinoza’s highly technical distinction between formal and 
actual essence here, arguing that the conatus-doctrine specifies that we strive after becom-
ing in existence what we are in our formal, rather than in our actual, essences. However, 
since Spinoza does not couch his own doctrine in these terms, I will not do so, either. I 
think a simpler reading also makes for a deeper one, in this case. 
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The apparent paradox is to be explained as follows. One is already necessitated by 
God or Nature, whether one realizes this or not. In TIE [13] (C. 10-11), Spinoza 
writes that a perfect human nature is characterized by “knowledge of the union 
that the mind has with the whole of Nature”. On my reading, this means that the 
mind already has a union of with the whole of Nature, and that a human being is 
considered perfect when it achieves occurrent knowledge of this union. Thus 
understood, the perfection of human nature consists in a way of regarding reality 
that does not, as such, alter external reality. But the realization is nonetheless 
transformative.  
Nothing in reality is changed by the cessation of the illusory existence of good 
and evil. It may be objected that if the content - the ideas - entertained by some 
mind changes, then surely reality changes. For the mind is a part of reality. But, 
crucially, and as I will discuss in more detail in Chapter 4, inadequacy is for 
Spinoza negation of reality, and more specifically, the negation of some true and 
adequate idea (or some aspect of such an idea). Crucially, that idea, which the 
inadequate idea negates, is already entertained by God - this claim I will 
introduce in Chapter 3. Thus, what does not change by humans shedding their 
inadequate ideas is the sum total of reality. Nonetheless, it makes much 
difference, for a mind, if God’s adequate ideas are being thought by it. Nature 
remains the same in the sense that it always remains equally real overall, but the 
human self is deeply transformed when it contemplates itself in the absence of 
beings of reason, in the way it must do if it is ever to claim the third kind of 
knowledge. 
 Conclusion: The status of Spinoza’s ideal of perfection. 
What kind of ethics follows from Spinoza’s ideal of human perfection? 
 
Because Spinoza presents an account of the good as the end product of desire, and 
a conatus-doctrine which obliges each thing to seek to persevere in “being” (esse: 





 Yet, any morality of prudence would be ultimately practical. But 
the ultimate ideal of perfection which Spinoza advances in the Ethics is not 
practical, and hence not even ethical by our contemporary standards. It is instead 
intellectual.
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 This way of putting the matter is tendentious, however. It is more 
accurate to state that the intellectual pursuit of love of God is, for Spinoza, more 
ethical than common morality, since it is the pursuit of the only good that has 
solid metaphysical founding: true knowledge of God and of things as being in 
him. For Spinoza insists that: “The mind conceives nothing under a species of 
eternity except insofar as it conceives its body’s essence under a species of 
eternity […] that is […] except insofar as it is eternal” (5p31d). But how can 
modes aspire to eternity, when eternity is defined as the kind of necessary 
existence peculiar to substance (see 1d8)? I cannot here answer this question in 
full. But it is clear that modes can only be regarded as enjoying eternity or 
necessary existence when they are seen as necessitated by God. God, in turn, can 
only be regarded as necessitating things when contemplated as absolutely infinite 
(consult the demonstration of 1p16). Human perfection consists in the 
contemplation of this divine necessitation, and since common sense morality is in 
opposition to that contemplation, such morality may even impede our ethical 
progress. This impractical vision of human perfectibility may be unpalatable for 
perfectionists who deny the existence of an object worthy of a contemplation at 
the summit of human perfection, but it is nonetheless the ideal Spinoza embraces 
in the Ethics.  
 
Previously, we saw that the intellectual ideal of the third kind of knowledge, when 
combined with necessitarianism, gave rise to an apparent paradox at the heart of 
Spinoza’s ethics. The problem remains whether it can be consistently maintained 
that our perfection consists in acknowledging the perfection we have regardless of 
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 For instance, Melamed (2011, pp. 158-9) contends that: “Spinoza’s ‘moral theory’ is 
essentially nothing but a theory of prudence. It begins with a clear egoistic foundation 
and proceeds to show that a prudent egoist would in many respects behave in a way that 
would be judged righteous by common morality, and that he would adopt characteristics 
that fit the common understanding of virtue”. 
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 Recent scholars have emphasized how Spinoza’s intellectual ideal of perfection is 
tributary to the philosophies of medieval Jewish rationalists such as Gersonides and 
Maimonides. Placing Spinoza in this intellectual context helps elucidate his ideal of per-
fection. See for example, Ravven (2014) and Nadler (2014). 
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whether we acknowledge it or not. Before adjudicating this problem, however, it 
is necessary to first substantiate my claim that Spinoza’s cognitive ideal of human 
perfection is indeed based on reality, and not on some human fiction. This will be 










Knowledge of God in Spinoza’s Ontological Account of Human Perfection 
 
 Introduction.  
 
In previous chapters, I explored the ethical consequences of Spinoza’s dual use of 
the word ‘perfection’, distinguishing between an ontologically solid concept of 
perfection, and subjective perfection, which (together with subjective 
imperfection, and good and evil) lacks ontological grounding. If Spinoza’s ideal 
of human perfection is ontological, it should ultimately be described in terms 
which do not appeal to what is (subjectively) perfect, imperfect, good or evil. But 
I have not yet shown that Spinoza’s ideal of human perfection is ontologically 
solid in the relevant sense. This will be my task in this chapter. In subsequent 
chapters, the most important result of this chapter will be readdressed and refined. 
What is that result? It is that, on my reading, Spinoza’s ideal of human perfection 
is ontological rather than subjective because it is contemplative. More precisely, 
contemplating or understanding maximizes one’s reality or perfection. In this 
chapter I will present two features of Spinoza’s epistemology, both of which 
concern his understanding of ideas, with the purpose of showing how these 
features allow for Spinoza’s ideal of human perfection to be a form of intellectual 
participation in God’s perfection.  
 
As previously discussed, Spinoza uses ‘perfection’ in two senses - as a 
teleological notion established on subjective and anthropocentric standards in 
4app, and in an “objective” ontological sense, as at least extensionally identical 
with reality or being (see 1p11s; 1p16d and 2d6). This latter a-teleological (but 
theological) perfection is attributed to the world in 1p33s2 and Letter 36. Because 
of this ambiguous usage of the word ‘perfection’, the following question naturally 
arises: is Spinoza’s ideal of human perfection at least partially ontological or is it 
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altogether teleological and thus merely subjective? Differently put, does Spinoza’s 
ideal of human perfection have any ontological grounding?  
 
It is fairly evident that for Spinoza, human beings possess maximal perfection 
through their knowledge of God - consider, for instance, the demonstration of 
proposition 5p27, where Spinoza states that “he who knows things through [the 
knowledge of God or the third kind of knowledge] passes to the summit of human 
perfection” (cf. TTP IV). Because of passages in this vein, it is clear that for 
Spinoza, human perfection is achieved through knowledge of God/Nature, an 
absolutely infinite being. There are at least two different ways in which 
knowledge can be an increase in reality on the part of the knower. Knowledge can 
be an increase in reality, if we really become more causally powerful by 
entertaining the idea of God - perhaps because it inspires in us a superior affect. I 
will deal with how love of God is superior to other mental states in this way in 
Chapter 8. Knowledge can also be an increase in reality if the object of knowledge 
has a surplus of reality in which the subject of knowledge could come to share. 
But, how is it possible, by merely having an idea, to participate in the ontological 
perfection of the object the idea intends? In this chapter I will argue that it is 




The chapter is structured as follows: (3.1) I situate my reading in the 
contemporary landscape of Spinoza studies by showing how it answers a puzzle 
outlined by Jarrett (2014); (3.2) I suggest that the ideal of perfection which 
Spinoza advances in the Ethics is predicated on solid metaphysical foundations. 
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 Koistinen (1998) has suggested that for Spinoza, the objects of truths are not the same 
as what the truths are about. On Koistinen’s proposal, I may know a truth about, for in-
stance, a rabbit persisting in time, but the object of that truth is an eternally existing prop-
osition. Koistinen’s distinction may pose a problem for my theory of Spinozist perfection, 
since the mind should be perfected by its own objects (what is “in it”) rather than by the 
object the idea is about. For this reason, Koistinen’s interpretation of the objects of ideas 
as being eternal propositions may not be compatible with my claims in this chapter. But 
nor do they appear to be compatible with Spinoza’s texts. For example, if the object of 
my idea of my body is merely some proposition - for example the proposition that my 
body exists at such and such times - then the mind’s eternity would come down to the 
eternity of that proposition. But this clearly can’t be the prospect of eternity that Spinoza 
is so enthusiastic about in Part 5 of the Ethics. I confess that this does not amount to a 
refutation of Koistinen’s view.  
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This is not a very controversial claim in Spinoza studies, but in making this 
suggestion, I hope to disentangle Spinoza’s notions of perfection and goodness in 
such a way that the subsequent discussion can be carried out with greater clarity. 
(3.3) I advance the bolder interpretative claim that it is because Spinoza’s ideal of 
human perfection is contemplative that there can be solid metaphysical grounds 
for the perfection such an ideal proposes. More precisely, my claim is that it is 
thanks to Spinoza’s theory of ideas that knowledge of God perfects the mind. The 
relevant features of Spinoza’s theory of ideas are: (3.3.1) the sameness of the 
(formal) reality of the thing and the (objective) reality of an adequate idea 
intending that thing; and (3.3.2) the sameness of any volition (i.e. affirmation or 
negation) toward an idea and aspects of that very idea. (3.4) I discuss the 
consequences of Spinoza’s understanding of ideas for the ontological status of his 
ideal of human perfection. Finally (3.5), I conclude the chapter by answering 
Jarrett. 
 
 3.1. Human perfection and knowledge of God. 
 
Spinoza’s ambiguous use of the word perfection - one the one hand, as co-
extensional with reality, and on the other hand, as a being of reason, naturally 
invites a debate about the status of the perfection of the model (exemplar) Spinoza 
sets for human nature in Pref4, in the following words: 
 
 But though this is so [i.e. although our concepts of good, evil, perfection 
and imperfection do not capture reality as it is], still we must retain these 
words. For because we desire to form an idea of man, as a model of human 
nature which we may look to, it will be useful to us to retain these same 
words with the meaning I have indicated. In what follows, therefore, I 
shall understand by good what we know certainly is a means by which we 
may approach nearer and nearer to the model of human nature that we set 
before ourselves. By evil, what we certainly know prevents us from 
becoming like that model. Next, we shall say that men are more perfect or 
imperfect, insofar as they approach more or less near to this model. 
 
The debate about the nature of the model Spinoza speaks of in this passage is still 
ongoing in the scholarship. Instead of supplying a summary of all positions, I will 
outline the chief difficulties. Then I will state how my reading presents an answer 
 
73 
to one of these difficulties - to address all of them is a task beyond the scope of 
the present chapter. 
 
Is the model of human nature which Spinoza advances a universal - and therefore 
an inadequate idea - or is it an adequate idea? As we have seen, universals are for 
Spinoza confused and inadequate ideas. As Spinoza’s aetiology of universals in 
the 2p40s is intended to show, such notions cannot be about real beings. For they 
are merely the products of the limitations of the human memory, a kind of 
mnemotechnics which enables us to retain and refer to a collection of items 
without paying attention to all the small differences that qualify each particular as 
it really is.
71
 Even before the Ethics, Spinoza gave voice to similar views. His 
position on universals appears remarkably consistent throughout his career. See 
for instance KV, I, VI, C. 87, where he writes: “[Aristotle’s followers] say that 
God has no knowledge of particular and transient things, but only of the general, 
which, in their opinion, are imperishable. We have, however, rightly considered 
this to be due to their ignorance. For it is precisely the particular things, and they 




If human nature is itself a universal, then any idea we form of it will be 
inadequate. One way of approaching the question of the status of Spinoza’s model 
for human nature therefore consists in adjudicating whether human nature is a 
universal or not. Diane Steinberg (1984) has argued that for Spinoza, humankind 
                                                 
71
 Spinoza should not be read as making the claim that since no individuals can be exactly 
alike in all respects, there can be no adequate universals. Plausibly, two birds can be non-
black in exactly the same respect, although they are red in different ways. However, the 
absence of black in the birds is a negative property, and thus not a genuine (natural or 
real) one. Whenever genuine (positive) properties are instantiated, it might be argued, 
they are so in different ways. However, I do not see Spinoza’s point about universals as 
depending upon the claim that all instantiated universals (all tropes) are distinct in ways 
other than their spatiotemporal location. His point is rather that when we think of the 
redness of this bird and the redness of that bird under one rubric, what we think about is 
not a real being, but an abstraction we make on the basis of our memory and sensual im-
pressions. 
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 That God’s predestination extends to the species but not to the individual specimen is 
exactly Maimonides’ view with respect to the non-human animals. It therefore seems to 
me plausible that Spinoza includes Maimonides among “Aristotle’s followers”.  
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is an individual, and human nature the essence of this individual.
73
 Although I find 
Steinberg’s reasoning promising, I cannot here provide any discussion of 




Moving on to the model itself, there are two principal questions, one of which will 
be my concern in what follows. First, there is the exegetical question: does the 
model Spinoza speaks of in 4pref correspond to the notion of the “free man” he 





The second, related, question concerns what human perfection is, for Spinoza. 
 
One traditional (Aristotelian) feature of Spinoza’s thinking about human 
excellence, is that the highest good within the reach of human beings is the 
exertion of reason: “In this life, therefore, it is especially useful to perfect, as far 
as we can, our intellect, or reason. In this one thing consists man’s highest 
happiness or blessedness” (4app) However, “perfecting the intellect”, for Spinoza, 
“is nothing but understanding God” (4app). And the mind’s highest good is 
explicitly specified as knowing a privileged object of knowledge, namely, God, in 
4p28. In spite of these explicit statements, specification is still needed. The 
question I will deal with in this chapter is how exactly the good of theological 
knowledge is related to human perfection. On the reading I advance, there is a 
strong ontological foundation for the (highest) perfection of the human being in 
the perfection of its divine object of contemplation. 
 
This is contrary to an interpretation recently put forth by Jarrett. According to 
Jarrett’s interesting reading, the good, as Spinoza defines it, is not “naturalistic” or 
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 This seems consistent, given that the principle of individuation which Spinoza offers in 
the Ethics is a constant ratio of motion and rest (2lemma3), a criterion which humankind 
can at least principally be construed as meeting.  
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 For more discussion of Spinoza’s use of the generic term ‘man’, and whether it 
(dis)qualifies as a universal term or not, see Haserot (1950, pp. 487-489) and Hübner 
(2014).  
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 See Youpa (2010) and Jarrett (2014, pp. 57-85) for two partially overlapping lists of 
references to the debate of the status of the free man in Spinoza’s TIE and Ethics. 
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“realistic”, since it “is defined as what brings us closer to our ideal”. As Jarrett 
puts it: 
 
 Spinoza’s metaethics, regarding at least ‘good’ and ‘bad’ (or 
‘evil'), is thus constructivist, because it maintains that these terms 
are applicable only in relation to a constructed, or invented, 
concept of an ideal person (‘man’). Whether, after the 
construction, we should say that these terms express ‘natural 
properties’ or ’real properties’ (or relations) is perhaps 
conceivable, and while we might suppose this to be so, I will 
argue that Spinoza rejects it. His own view is that his 
constructivism is incompatible with metaethical naturalism and 
with metaethical realism. (2014, p 59). 
 
 Jarrett’s reasoning is that since (i) the good is defined in instrumental terms, and 
(ii) Spinoza’s ideal of human perfection does not correspond to any real (or 
natural) property, (iii) the good also does not correspond to any such property. 
Hence Spinoza’s meta-ethics is constructivist vis-à-vis the good. While I agree 
with Jarrett about (i), I disagree about (ii) and hence (iii) does not, on my reading, 
follow on these grounds. In this chapter I will attack (ii), arguing that Spinoza’s 
ideal of human perfection is indeed predicated on solid ontological grounds, and 
also show how this can be the case.  
 
Let me first note the reason that leads Jarrett to accept (ii). Jarrett acknowledges 
that there is such a thing as ontological perfection, but, like many commentators, 
he disputes that it can be relevant for human perfection. The reason why is that, 
according to Jarrett’s reading of Spinoza, ontological perfection, or reality, is 
normatively neutral: 
 
 Is ‘perfection’, understood as reality, an ‘ethical term’? No, or at 
least not always. For Spinoza explicitly holds in Letter 23 that 
stealing and donating to charity may  be equally perfect. (He seems 
equally willing to say the same about murder and donating to 
charity.) Nothing that is real, he maintains, is imperfect (2014, p. 70). 
 
In a similar vein, Broad (2001, pp. 15-16) construes Spinoza’s ethics as separable 
from the topic of knowledge of God. Such a separation is only justifiable on the 
assumption made by Jarrett, that is, on the assumption that human perfection is 




Of course, if there is only one kind of ontologically solid perfection, and it is 
assumed to be normatively neutral, then any ideal of human perfection with some 
normative force must involve a fundamentally different kind of perfection. But it 
seems to me that Jarrett is assuming that because a certain perfection is 
coextensive with reality, it must be normatively neutral. But why must reality be 
normatively neutral?  
 
It is certainly the case that in contemporary philosophy the concepts of being or 
reality are generally devoid of normative connotations.
76
 This contemporary 
intuition was not always in vogue. A few examples to the contrary are sufficient to 
indicate this. First, as previously discussed, in the doctrine of transcendentals 
(transcendentia), medieval philosophers developed a thick theory of being as 
convertible with the one, the true and the good. The transcendental good which 
characterizes all that is, insofar as it is, is not normatively neutral. The fact that 
good is predicated transcendentally of all that is testified, in the eyes of the 
medievals, to the supreme goodness of the creator of all being, God. Consider for 
instance Augustine’s influential dictum that “Since God is good, we are, and 
insofar as we are, we are good” (quia Deus est bonus, nos sumus et inquantum 
sumus, boni sumus). The description of being as good because of God’s being, is 
certainly normative in that it enjoins a certain positive evaluation of being, or, if 
you prefer, a certain pro-attitude towards being. Second, before Spinoza, in 
several significant traditions, fullness of being, whether it be through the 
contemplation of what truly is (Plato’s ideas) or the singularly most real being 
(ens realissimum), was considered to have a normative pull on creatures 
characterized by a more limited form of being.  
 
An objection against establishing any parallel between Spinoza and the historical 
cases I have mentioned, would be that normative concepts (whether we are talking 
about perfection or goodness) presuppose some kind of purposiveness. Someone 
or something must be able to be swayed by the good; someone or something must 
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 There are, of course, exceptions in contemporary metaphysics too, such as the axi-
archism of Leslie (1979). 
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be able to choose the good on account of their finding it good. But Spinoza, 
according to the mainstream reading at least, attempted to rid philosophy of the 
explanatory model of final causality. I will not adjudicate the extent to which there 
is still room for finality in the human realm here.
77
 Let me note, instead, that the 
objection just stated presupposes that all normative concepts are inherently 
directive. Perhaps the objector even assumes that any norm sets down standards 
for what we should do, provided that we could have done otherwise. Yet, any 
ethics Spinoza can propose must be compatible with the absence of contrafactual 
freedom, that is, compatible with the absence of a freedom to act otherwise than 
one in fact acts. On the alternative reading I advance, Spinoza’s project is to 
articulate an ethics based on evaluative rather than directive normativity. If ethics 
is evaluative rather than directive then the role of values need not to be that of 
motivators or reasons inclining a will that has a freedom to do otherwise. Ethics 
can then instead be about rightly estimating the values of things - even, it may be 
argued, if we do so inevitably.  
 
My point is, in short, that I can see no reason for entirely removing Spinoza’s 
notion of ontological perfection from the ethical realm unless one begs the 
question of what we should take this realm to be. In spite of what slogans such as 
‘ought implies can’ may lead one to believe, one has yet to exactly define that 
realm. If ethics is equated with the question of how we ought to act, then it is not 
immediately evident how ontological perfection/reality can be ethically relevant. 
If, however, ethics is equated with the question of what is worth contemplating (if 
the highest good is contemplative), then the significance of ontological perfection 
for ethical theory becomes readily apparent. For that which is most perfect should 
be most worthy of contemplation. It is, in other words, a question of our outlook 
deciding what is ethical.
78
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 It is certainly the case that God, for Spinoza, does not act on account of any good ex-
ternal to his nature (1app). The question is whether this is also true of finite creatures. For 
a challenge of the mainstream reading, according to which the situation of finite creatures 
is no more describable in teleological terms than that of God, see Don Garrett (1999).  
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 Although philosophers often treat the difference between metaphysics and ethics as a 
matter of course, the difference fluctuates with cultural and linguistic parameters. In his 
pathbreaking work on Daoist thought, Hansen (1996), for example, emphasizes how the 





On my reading, if Spinoza’s ideal of human perfection can be ontological rather 
than subjective, this is because, for Spinoza, the ideal in question is cognitive. 
Contemplating or understanding that which is most perfect maximizes one’s 
reality or perfection. This explains why it is the case that when an (ideal) person 
obtains knowledge of God, she attains the ideal limit of human perfection. 
Because Jarrett (2014, pp 63-9) denies that ontological perfection is ethically 
relevant, he does not provide any such explanation in his justification of Spinoza’s 
model. In other words, he does not explain what it is that makes knowledge of 
God supremely conducive to perfection in humans. That the reading I propose can 
offer such an explanation should make it worthy of consideration. 
 
Interestingly, if it is true that for Spinoza the highest good is 
contemplative/cognitive, then his epistemology is his moral psychology. More 
clearly put, epistemological conditions will determine one’s ethical progress. In 
this chapter I will present two features of Spinoza’s epistemology-cum-moral 
psychology, both of which concern his understanding of ideas, with the purpose of 
showing how these features allow for a grounding of human perfection in God’s 
supreme perfection. 
 
 3.2. Necessarily self-communicating ontological perfection. 
 
 3.2.1. Ontological perfection and love of God. 
 
Surprising terminological equivalences abound in the Ethics and are often 
signaled by Spinoza’s usage of explicative sive, meaning “or, equivalently…” or 
“or, better yet…”. One, which I have already discussed at some length, is the 
equivalence between perfection and reality. Another is the equivalence between 
essence and causal power. God’s ontological perfection/reality, essence, and 
causal power, are all, at least extensionally speaking, one and the same thing. 
 
                                                                                                                                     
ative mood of Chinese verbs may have contributed to the view, persistent in Chinese phi-
losophy, that all (human) language is normative in nature. 
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For human beings, too, essence is co-extensional with causal power (see 4p20).
79
 
Spinoza calls this non-absolute, non-infinite causal power virtue (4d8). Human 
essence and human causal power/virtue is the same thing just like the divine 
essence and power are the same thing. Yet, there are crucial differences between 
divine essence/power, on the one hand, and human essence/power, on the other. 
One noteworthy difference between God’s causality and the causality finite things 
exert is that only finite things can be hampered with from without and prevented 
from causing effects that their essences would, ceteris paribus, result in. The 
reasoning is nonetheless structurally the same as in God’s case: one’s ontological 
perfection and one’s essence are proportional, and since one’s causal power is 
proportional to one’s essence, one’s causal power and one’s ontological perfection 
are proportional too. 
 
On Jarrett’s reading, it should be noted, neither ‘ontological perfection’ nor 
‘human virtue’, which is co-extensional with the former, would qualify as ethical 
terms. Nonetheless, ‘the good’ is an ethical term for Jarrett, since it is on the basis 
of this term that he construes Spinoza’s meta-ethics as constructivist. If, however, 
it can be shown that for Spinoza the highest good is defined as such only because 
it alone is most conducive to one’s ontological perfection, then either ontological 
perfection is “ethical” or (alternatively) the good is not. Let us therefore analyze 
the link between ontological perfection and the highest good. 
 
The fundamental elements in Spinoza’s account of the inner lives of humans are 
affects. Affects arise when the mind’s power of thinking changes (3p11). 
According to Spinoza’s doctrine of mind-body identity, all such changes in the 
mind’s power of thinking are also changes in the body’s power of acting (see 
again 3p11). The body’s power of acting and the mind’s power of thinking is the 
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An issue is whether Spinoza can consistently maintain that one’s essence is power, and 
more precisely the power whereby one brings about the effects that characterize one’s 
essence. There seems to be something wrong with this definition. One solution that would 
perhaps work is a bifurcation of essence, such that one’s actual essence is power, and 
more precisely the power whereby one brings about the effects that characterize one’s 
formal essence. Although such a reading is probably compatible Spinoza’s definition of 




same virtue, the same power of actually bringing about the effects that stem from 
one’s essence but conceived under different attributes. Since, for Spinoza, one’s 
power of acting is one’s causal power, by reflecting changes in one’s causal 
power, affects reflect changes in one’s ontological perfection. For causal power 
and perfection are proportional to each other. 
 
According to the system of affects Spinoza elaborates in the third part of his 
Ethics, three affects are primary: joy, sadness and desire. Whereas the affect of joy 
occurs when we pass from a lesser perfection to a greater, the affect of sadness 
occurs when we pass from greater to lesser perfection (3p57d). On Spinoza’s 
view, “[w]e strive to promote the occurrence of anything which we imagine to be 
conducive to joy and to avoid or destroy whatever we imagine is contrary to it or 
will be conducive to sadness” (3p28). Regardless of how this striving manifests 
itself (i.e., as “appetite, will, desire or impulse”) Spinoza counts any human 




Since power and perfection is the same thing (4p20), transitions in perfection are 
transitions in power. This, however, does not mean that in having a certain affect 
we are thereby consciously aware of its being a transition in power. Listening to 
Monteverdi’s “L'Orfeo” may inspire an affect of joy in me, but this does not mean 
that I, in virtue of having this affect, am also consciously aware of having passed 
from a lesser to a greater power of acting. Affects can therefore be said to be two-
faced: whereas transition in power is the metaphysical aspect of an affect, joy, 
sadness, desire (etc.) are the phenomenal aspect of the affect. 
 
We have seen that Spinoza describes the summit of human perfection as mental 
activity, that the mind’s perfection consists in understanding, and that our highest 
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 One consequence of Spinoza’s view is that desire after the destruction of the self for its 
own sake (a drive somewhat akin to what Freud called primary masochism) is metaphysi-
cally impossible. For it is not possible for us to rejoice in any form of loss of power as 
such. Although this problem has, to my knowledge at least, never been raised in the sec-
ondary literature, it seems to pose some problems for the plausibility of Spinoza’s view 
given human psychology. At the very least, Spinoza’s theory of the affects is untenable if 
one accepts the Freudian view that the erotic and the thanatian are closely connected and 
at times confounded. For reasons of scope, I cannot pursue this line of inquiry here. 
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good is knowledge of God (4p28). Moreover, Spinoza maintains, from the third 
kind of knowledge of God, love invariably follows, the intellectual love of God 
(5p32; 5p33). Love is defined as a species of Joy (Def.of.Aff.[VI]). However, love 
of God is not exactly joy. For while joy, as we have seen, consists in a transition in 
ontological perfection, love of God does not involve any transition in one’s 
ontological perfection. Spinoza cautions the reader who would take him at his 
words in 5p33s: 
 
 Although this [intellectual] love toward God has had no beginning 
[by 5p33] it still has all the perfections of Love, just as if it had 
come to be (as we feigned in 5p32c). There is no difference here, 
except that the Mind has had eternally the same perfection which, 
in our fiction, now came to it, and that it is accompanied by the idea 
of God as an eternal cause. If Joy then consists in the passage to a 
greater perfection, blessedness must surely consist in the fact that 
the Mind is endowed with perfection itself (5p33s: Emphasis 
added). 
 
Let me unpack this statement a little. Love of God consists in an eternal 
perfection. This means a perfection the mind cannot but have. The “fiction” 
Spinoza speaks of is thus that this perfection would arise in a mind at any given 
point in time. Contrary to this fiction, on Spinoza’s view, we are always eternally 
perfect. But how can this be? Our perfection (blessedness, freedom) consists in 
love of God. But this love is a certain mental state that accompanies an idea of 
“God as an eternal cause”. Certainly, we do not always entertain this idea? 
Certainly, there are people now that do not think of God in this way? How can 
Spinoza then maintain that the human mind “eternally ha[s] the perfection” which 
consists in love of God? 
 
If Spinoza is to be able to maintain that the mind eternally has the perfection of an 
idea of God, accompanied by the mode of thought which is love, he needs to 
maintain that this idea can perfect our mind even when we are unaware of it. But 
in order to be an idea that as it were perfects our minds from within, must not the 
idea in question be consciously entertained? It would be strange if our ethical 
perfection consisted in an idea being suppressed in some corner of our 
subconscious. In order for an idea to perfect a mind, it may be surmised, that idea 
must be actively entertained. However, it is evident that the idea in question is not 
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actively entertained by each human mind. So how can it then perfect the mind that 
it is in?  One possible solution to this conundrum that I would here like to propose 
is that the idea is sufficiently attended to by God’s intellect. Yet the idea cannot at 
any time be entirely absent from the human mind, for how then could the human 
mind be eternally endowed with the perfection that the idea confers upon it? In 
order for the mind to always possess the perfection the idea confers upon it, the 
idea must evidently always be in the human mind. But it is apparent - it is a datum 
of experience - that not everyone is conscious of God “as an eternal cause” or 
conscious of the love that supposedly accompanies this idea. Hence, it does not 
follow simply from an idea’s being in a mind (and even perfecting a mind) that 
the mind the idea is in actively or even consciously intends it. A mind can be 
perfected by subconsciously entertaining an idea as long as it is actively 





For most, the go-to theory about the status of our latent ideas would be that they 
are stored in some subconscious deposit (from where they can, perhaps deviously, 
affect our occurrent ideas, and thus our courses of action). For Spinoza, by 
contrast, it appears to be the case that our latent and true ideas are indeed 
consciously entertained, if not by us then by God. God’s intellect is our 
subconscious deposit of truth. While I cannot here resolve the difficulties this 
doctrine involves, it is important to note that God entertains our latent ideas, if 
they are true and adequate. (I will return to whether this theory of latency is 
consistent with other Spinozist doctrines shortly.)  
 
We are thus, on this reading, eternally perfected by an idea of which we are not 
always consciously aware. In response to the difficulty of squaring the eternal and 
the transitional (allegedly fictional) aspects of love of God, I would like to 
propose that the human mind’s change consists in beginning to attend, in time, to 
something that is eternally present to it. There is, I suggest, a transition involved 
in love of God, and this transition consists in becoming aware of one’s idea of 
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 Alanen (2011, p. 15) has previously brought attention to the ambiguities surrounding 
the subject of representation that beset Spinoza’s philosophy of mind. 
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God, an idea which is however always present whether one is conscious of it or 
not. Love of God is a summit of perfection that humans have already reached, and 
yet they do not necessarily know that they have reached it. There is thus room for 
some improvement in this regard. Presently, I am interested in the following 
question: why is the idea which love of God necessarily accompanies always in 
the mind in such a way that human beings can participate in the perfection of 
God?  
 
Before I analyze how Spinoza’s theory of ideas makes this possible, allow me to 
briefly comment on the development of the Spinozist good.  
 
 3.2.2. A good that communicates itself. 
 
In his early text TIE, Spinoza asks whether there is an object which invariably 
inspires an affect of joy: 
 
 After experience had taught me that all things which regularly 
occur in ordinary life are empty and futile, and I saw that all the 
things which are the cause or object of my fear had nothing of good 
or bad in themselves, except insofar as my mind was moved by 
them, I resolved at last to try to find out whether there was anything 
 which would be the true good, capable of communicating itself 
[communicabile sui], and which would alone affect the mind, all 
others being rejected, - whether there was something which, once 
found and acquired, would continuously give me the greatest joy 
[laetitia], to eternity (C. 7, G. II/6). 
 
It may be useful to note that Spinoza’s description of a true good in TIE is 
twofold. On the one hand, a true good (it may be inferred from this passage) is 
true because it, unlike the “empty and futile things” which we normally pursue, is 
good “in itself”. That is, a good worthy of its name must not be a good that is 
construed as such because of the way it affects the mind. On the other hand, it is 
not enough for there to exist a “true good”. The true good must also be capable of 
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communicating itself (communicabile sui).
82
 Let me comment on these two 
conditions in turn. 
 
In TIE, as we have seen, Spinoza seems to assert that the true good should be non-
relational - that is, it should not be constituted as good because of the way it 
affects the mind, but rather intrinsically good, or good in itself. By contrast, in the 
Ethics, Spinoza seems to have abandoned his search after a non-relational good. 
In this text, Spinoza instead defines the good in subjectivist terms as what is most 
useful to some agent (3p9s). All agents (indeed, all things) invariably strive after 
preserving their being (3p7, Cf. TIE C. 9).
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 Being [esse] is co-extensional with 
ontological perfection (see 1p10s: realitatem sive esse). The highest good is 
therefore what is most useful for the preservation, and arguably the enhancement, 
of our ontological perfection. Ontological perfection or reality is, by contrast, not 
instrumentally defined. That is, on my reading, because it is valuable in itself. It is 
indeed since being is valuable in itself that it can be the case that “[n]o one strives 
to preserve his being for the sake of anything else” (4p25).  
It has been asserted that Spinoza’s subjectivist view of the good is difficult to 
square with his doctrine of a highest good.
84
 However, although this might be 
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 The expression Spinoza employs here - bonum communicabile sui - has rich roots in 
the philosophical tradition. Consider for instance the equivalent dictum bonum est com-
municativum sui, accepted by Thomas Aquinas and originating in Dionysius the Aeropa-
gite. 
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 It is commonly suggested that by being (esse), Spinoza does not only mean our mun-
dane existence, which would render his conatus-doctrine incompatible with passages such 
as 4p72d, where the free man would rather die than be insincere. For such a reading, see 
for instance, Nadler (2015); Lebuffe (2005), does not deny that Spinoza means this, but 
argues that the self-preservation of esse nonetheless generally implies the preservation of 
one’s mundane existence. 
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 Lebuffe’s reading thus presents, and proposes a solution, the following problem of co-
herence: “[I]t seems on the face of it that Spinoza, if he were consistent in holding that 
goods are always instrumental to self-preservation, ought to deny that there is such a 
thing as a summum bonum. He ought to hold the view that, just because all goods are 
instrumental, no goods are complete” (2005, p. 244). Lebuffe’s solution consists in a divi-
sion between intensional and extensional senses of consciousness. Humans are intension-
ally conscious of desiring knowledge of God, and therefore knowledge of God qualifies 
as the highest good. Humans are extensionally conscious of striving after persevering in 
being, and this striving accounts for their pursuit of what perseveres their being: 
knowledge of God. I agree with Lebuffe that God is the highest good simply because he 
is what best leads to perseverance in being. Yet, my approach differs from Lebuffe’s in 
that I seek out the answer to the question of why God is useful in this way in Spinoza’s 
theory of ideas. 
 
85 
true, there is nothing intrinsically incoherent about there being something that is 
uniquely most useful for humans’ preservation of being. For Spinoza, knowledge 
of God is simply what best preserves the being, or ontological perfection, of 
human beings. Importantly, the reason why perfection is to be preserved or 
enhanced is not answered by subordinating perfection to some further purpose.  
 
In short, while there is, on this reading of the Ethics, a highest good, since there is 
one good (i.e. knowledge of God) whereby our ontological perfection is 
maximized, there is no “good in itself”, no “true good”
85
: nothing that would 
qualify as good in the absence of its utility or disutility for an agent’s striving to 
persevere in her being - or, which is the same, in her ontological perfection. 
 
Let us move on to the second characteristic of the true good in TIE. In this text, 
Spinoza asserted, that the good, if it is to be worthy of our pursuit, must be 
capable of communicating itself. This is an interesting claim. Even though, in the 
TIE, the true good is supposedly intrinsically such, that is not enough. The true 
good must also be such that people can come to share in it. Since the good that 
interests Spinoza is intellectual, it is a good that we can come to share in by 
intellectual means. This Spinoza maintains not only in the TIE but also in the 
“Dialogue” of the KV, where Love, addressing the Intellect, asks:  
 
 I see, Brother, that my being and perfection depend entirely on your 
perfection, and since the perfection of the object you have conceived 
is your perfection, and mine in turn proceeds from yours, tell me, I 
beg you, whether you have conceived a supremely perfect being, 
which cannot be limited by anything else, and in which I too am 
conceived? (C. 73). 
 
The cited passage interestingly indicates that the perfection of the intellect is 
identical with the perfection of its object. It may be surmised that the perfection of 
love which “proceeds” from that of the intellect is likewise identical with the 
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 In the Ethics, Spinoza prefers the locution summum bonum to that of a true good. Per-
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most conducive to (perseveration in) being. I do not agree with Lebuffe’s equation (2005, 
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perfection of the object that the intellect conceives. It is for this reason that Love 
beseeches the Intellect to search after a “supremely perfect” object. The intellect 
can come to share in the perfection of objects it (adequately) conceives. This is 
clearly a bold view.  
 
Yet, in the Ethics, Spinoza’s view on the communicable good is even bolder than 
in his earlier texts. In this text, Spinoza advances the view that it is not only the 
case that there is a highest good which is communicable; it is also the case that a 
human being cannot be conceived unless she has the capacity to rejoice in this 
good. Spinoza makes this claim in a passage which defends the commonality of 
the highest good, and he does so in the following words: 
  
 If anybody asks, what if the highest good of those who follow after 
virtue were not common to all? Would it not thence follow that 
men who live according to the guidance of reason, that is to say 
men in so far as they agree in nature, would be contrary to one 
another? We reply that it arises from no accident, but from the 
nature itself of reason, that the highest good of man is common to 
all, in-as-much as it is deduced from the human essence itself, in so 
far as it is determined by reason, and also because man could not 
be or be conceived if he had not the power of rejoicing in this 
highest good. For it pertains to the essence of the human mind to 
have an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of 
God (4p36s, emphasis added). 
 
What does Spinoza mean by having “the power to rejoice in the highest good”? In 
the light of the preceding passages - where we saw that the participation in the 
highest good was described in intellectual terms - to rejoice in a good presumably 
means to pass to a greater perfection by intending that good as the object of one’s 
idea. And to have the power to rejoice in an eternal good partly means for the idea 
of this good to already constitute one’s ontological perfection. 
 
Here a by now familiar inconsistency reemerges. The relevant idea is eternally 
present to us and so, if its object can “communicate” its perfection to us, we must 
always possess it already. But joy is an affect and as such it signifies a transition 





Again, I believe that this difficulty is to be resolved by invoking the difference 
between an idea’s being in a mind and the same idea being consciously intended 
by that mind. In spite of the fact that an eternal idea is in one’s mind and perfects 
it from within, one does not merely in virtue of possessing the idea possess it 
consciously. To have the power to rejoice in an eternal good therefore means to be 
able to rejoice when one comes to consciously intend the idea. In order to be able 
to distinguish between these two ways in which a mind may be perfect - because 
it is what it is and because it recognizes itself as being what it is - I will call the 
latter kind of perfection speculative. Speculum means mirror, and speculative 
perfection arises when the idea that perfects a mind, whether the mind in question 
knows it or not, is indeed consciously “mirrored” in that mind.  
 
As far as I can see, knowledge of God interests Spinoza most at the moment when 
it becomes known to us - when we come to consciously intend the idea that is 
already in our mind. It is when we are consciously aware of having this (eternal) 
idea that we rejoice. Our joy is then a transition in speculative perfection: the kind 
of perfection we possess by consciously acknowledging the ontological perfection 
we already possess. 
 
Below, I will outline the features of Spinoza’s theory of ideas that are relevant for 
explaining why knowledge of God perfects a mind. I submit that the relevant 
features are the two doctrines of “sameness”: on the one hand, the sameness of the 
(formal) reality of the thing and the (objective) reality of the idea adequately 
intending that thing; and on the other hand, the sameness of any volition (e.g. an 
affirmation or a negation) toward an object and aspects of the idea that represents 
that object. The former sameness will be conducive to ontological perfection and 
the latter sameness conducive to speculative perfection. Allow me to first treat the 
reason why a mind that possesses an idea of a God is thereby automatically 






3.3. Two doctrines of sameness.  
 
 3.3.1. The sameness of formal and objective reality. 
 
According to Spinoza’s so-called doctrine of parallelism, “[t]he order and 
connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things” (2p7).86 (It 
should be noted that when Spinoza speaks of “ideas” in 2p7, he is not referring to 
the inadequate ideas of human minds, but to God’s ideas, all of which are 
adequate [2p36d].) Parallelism may appear to be an ill-chosen name, since two 
parallel things are usually not identical. By contrast, according to Spinoza, “a 
mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing but 
expressed in two ways” (2p7s). Spinoza, it seems, takes “one and the same thing” 
to imply that the idea and the thing are indeed numerically the same, but 
expressed in two profoundly different ways under the two attributes of extension 
and thought. 
 
Moreover, on Spinoza’s view, ideas and the bodily things these ideas intend have 
a number of properties which they do not, indeed cannot, share. For, on Spinoza’s 
view, mentality and physicality are both causally closed (see 2p6). This means 
that no minds can be the causes of bodily events (Spinoza would write: of other 
bodies) and likewise, no bodies the causes of mental events (Spinoza would write: 
of other ideas). And yet, a body and the idea intending that body are supposedly 
identical. This seems puzzling. How can X and Y be identical without sharing all 
their properties? By invoking the tool of intensional properties, Michael Della 
Rocca (1996) has presented an intriguing solution to this puzzle.
87
 Intensionality 
is an important topic in Spinoza research. In this chapter, however, I am not 
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 As previously noted, Melamed (2013a, p. 152) has convincingly argued that Spinoza 
espouses not one, but two, doctrines of parallelisms (parallelisms that are not even paral-
lel!), namely inter-attribute parallelism between things as conceived under different at-
tributes and parallelism between “content-ideas” and “meta-ideas” within the attribute of 
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pp. 12—42) concedes Marshall's point that Della Rocca does not motivate why some 
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strong ontological pluralism of attributes. 
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concerned with the properties which ideas and things cannot share, but rather with 
the properties they do share, their “extensional” properties. 
 
Since 2p7 asserts that the “order and connection of ideas is the same as the order 
and connection of things”, having a certain number of causes and effects is one 
example of such an “trans-attribute” property.88 By calling the property “trans-
attribute” I do not mean that it is a property that a mode can have regardless of its 
attribute: for if there were no attribute in the first place, a mode could not exert 
any causation at all. By calling it “trans-attribute” I mean, rather, that the very 
same property is possessed by the mode in question no matter under which 
attribute we choose to conceive it. Since one’s power of causing certain effects is 
the same as one’s ontological perfection/reality/being, it follows that the 
ontological perfection of a thing is identical with that of the idea which truly 
intends that thing (in the intellect of God). Indeed, Spinoza states this explicitly in 
2p13s: 
  
We cannot deny that ideas differ among themselves as the objects 
themselves do, and that one is more excellent than the other, and 
contains more reality, just as the object of the one is more excellent 
and contains more reality. 
 
For Spinoza, the ideas that are adequate in human minds are also adequate in the 
divine intellect (see again 2p36d). (I provide a more precise definition of 
adequacy in Chapter 8, section 2.2.) Regardless of whether the intellect is human 
or divine, therefore, the ontological perfection of things is “mirrored” in the ideas 
that intend them, or, to describe it non-metaphorically, the ontological perfection 
any idea enjoys is the same as the perfection of the thing it (adequately) intends. 
This is because the perfection of an idea is the same as its causal power to bring 
about those effects that stem from its essence, and this perfection is the same as 
the causal power of the thing the idea adequately intends to bring about its 
essential effects. Perfection is transcendental in that it cuts across attributes and so 
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unlike properties such as being-caused-by-something-mental or being-caused-by-
something-physical, it is not intensional. 
 
We are justified in asking what this fact about (adequate) ideas in the divine 
intellect is supposed to entail for Spinoza’s ideal of human perfection. It seems 
plausible that for Spinoza the perfection of a mind depends on the perfection of 
the various ideas that are in that mind; after all, for him, a mind is nothing over 
and above its constituent ideas.
89
 That the presence of an (adequate) idea of God 
in the set of ideas that is a mind uniquely perfects that mind most would then 
follow from God alone being the most perfect object among the ones intended by 
the ideas in question. It is important to realize that this ontological perfection is 
possessed by the mind regardless of whether the idea is latently or consciously 
entertained.  
 
 3.3.2 The sameness of any affirmation or negation of an idea and an  
  aspect  of that idea itself. 
 
Spinoza advances a bold claim in 2p49: “In the Mind there is no volition, or 
affirmation and negation, except that which the idea involves insofar as it is an 
idea.” By maintaining that our volitions are already contained in our ideas 
Spinoza departs in a crucial way from several major currents in the history of 
Western philosophy. I briefly mention two of these.  
 
Descartes is the most obvious polemical target for Spinoza’s claim that volitions 
are a subset of the ideas. Because, according to Descartes, the will extended 
beyond (indeed, infinitely beyond) the intellect, and this constituted the possibility 
of error. In his Fourth Meditation on First Philosophy, Descartes ponders how 
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 Some philosophers (e.g. Koslicki, 2013) have pointed out the need for a more fine-
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mind is grounded in the perfection of its ideas because the mind is constituted by its ide-
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follows: “An entity, Φ, is constituent dependent on an entity (or entities), Ψ, just in case 
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error is possible. He dismisses that error could come to be merely because of the 
limitations of his faculty of judgment on the grounds that error is not a mere 
negation, but rather a privation: that is, the absence of some knowledge that 
should be in him (AT VII 54-55; AT IX 43-44). Since Spinoza, in dismissing 
teleological explanation, also rejects privation (as we saw in the preceding 
chapter), he could not accept this account of error. However, the privative absence 
can obtain, on Descartes’ view, since the will extends beyond the judgment (AT 
VII 58; AT IX 46). But Spinoza would reject that the will can extend beyond what 
we cognize on the grounds that any volitional impulse is already contained in the 
idea it accompanies.  
 
Another philosophical classic against which Spinoza’s moral psychology may be 
contrasted is Plato’s account in the Republic (starting in IV.435b). Here Plato 
presents us with three sources of motivation: reason (to logistikon) which loves 
wisdom, to philosophon, “spirit” (to thumoeides) which loves honor and desire (to 
epithumetikon), which loves gain.
90
 Simply put, ethical progress of the person as a 
whole is possible for two reasons: first (a), because reason perceives what is best 
for the complex whole and second (b), because reason is in position to deploy 
spirit to conquer desire. Spinoza departs from this account by denying that there is 
any faculty of spirit that reason can deploy independently of what we desire, since 
what we desire is already decided by the ideas we form of our object of desire. 
 
Since whether we affirm or negate an idea depends completely on the idea itself, 
one could perhaps call ideas auto-affirming (or auto-denying).
91
 This, however, is 
only true for adequate ideas. Spinoza would admit that something which 
phenomenally resembles suspension of judgment may arise vis-à-vis our 
inadequate ideas. That is, an inadequate idea may be confused to such a degree 
that there may be no ground for either affirming or negating it. For Spinoza, 
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therefore, any apparent suspension of judgment results from the fact that the idea 
which is neither affirmed nor negated is confused (2p49s). 
 
Spinoza believes that truth is self-evident in the sense that that no one can doubt 
whether she has a true and adequate idea. This is the case because, for Spinoza, 
truth is a sign of itself: what we clearly and distinctly perceive, we can certainly 
know to be true, and then there is no room for doubt (see 2p43s; 2d4). Before I 
proceed to comment on this, on the face of it utterly implausible, evidentiality of 
truth, I must briefly address the question of an apparent inconsistency.  
 
In the passages just mentioned, Spinoza claims that in having true ideas, we are 
aware of having ideas. It may be thought that in claiming that self-reflexivity 
necessarily accompanies truth, Spinoza is committed to the view that there is, in 
addition to the complexes of ideas - i.e. minds, a self who can be aware of having 
true ideas.
92
 But this is not necessary. On Spinoza’s view, ideas are acts of 
cognition (and, sometimes, of volition). Why could they not also be acts of self-
cognition? Because, the objection I foresee goes, there is in that case no reason 
why the mind - the overall complex - should itself be aware of each self-cognizing 
idea. But in being a complex idea, the mind is not only identical with the body of 
which it is a mind. In virtue of the parallelism that connects ideas of ideas with 
their content-ideas within the attribute of thought, it is also identical with the idea 
of the mind, with the idea of the idea (2p21s). The idea of the mind is an idea of 
the whole complex and thus a comprehensive idea of all individual acts of 
cognition and self-cognition that are its component ideas. Although this is not 
normally how we construe selfhood or personhood, it is not impossible for an idea 
of the mind to be of all the ideas that constitute the mind, and thereby also of the 
self-cognizing ideas that thus constitute the mind. But that idea of the mind is the 
mind, and so the reflexivity of that idea should belong to the mind, too. Although 
I have not yet discussed what explains the unification of complexes of ideas as 
minds (a topic I reserve for a future paper), it appears that minds can indeed be 
capable of self-reflection without there being any self over and above ideas. Let 
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me now return to the doctrine just discussed: that of the alleged evidentiality of 
truth.  
 
That truth is evidential may seem to be an implausible thesis, to put it mildly. 
There is, in the contemporary logic of epistemology, a similar thesis, known as the 
KK-thesis. More specifically, the KK-thesis states that if one knows that p, then 
one knows that one knows that p.
93
 Of course, this is not literally what Spinoza 
says. Spinoza’s claim is rather that if one has a true idea, then one knows that it is 
true. But the similarity is nonetheless worth noting. It is widely acknowledged if 
one’s intention is to model how human beings actually reason, the KK-thesis must 
not be allowed to hold. As far as an account of human psychology goes, it is 
simply too optimistic. And, of course, the same applies to the Spinozist claim that 
truth is evidential. If truth is evidential, then, it seems, I can by sheer 
contemplation adjudicate, for any proposition p, whether it or its negation is 
true.
94
 First, I consider p. Then I consider not-p. Whichever yields the entirely 
internal “perception” of truth must be true. But clearly, human cognition does not 
operate like this at all. Although this is a most pressing problem for Spinoza’s 
theory of knowledge, it has been rather neglected in the scholarship. I cannot treat 
the implausibility of Spinoza’s view in further detail here.
95
  
                                                 
93
 See Girle (2000, ch. 12, sec. 4) for an introduction.  
94
 I thank Jamin Asay for helpful discussion on this issue. 
95
 The one coherent solution that has been proposed in the scholarship consists in claim-
ing that, for Spinoza, at least some propositions, namely those we can know to be true, 
must lack negations. Then, whenever we think that we contemplate the negation of a nec-
essarily true proposition, what we contemplate is not really a proposition. This solution 
has been elaborated by Pruss (2011, pp. 181-7). Error would, on Pruss’s “pragmatic” ac-
count of Spinoza, arise when we mistake things that are not propositions (or ideas) for 
propositions (or ideas). (Pruss allows for a certain glissement between Spinozist ideas and 
propositions that I will not take issue with presently.) Because, although Spinoza states 
that we are aware of having true ideas, he does not state that we are aware of having false 
ones. So, true propositions can be evidentially true if they do not have negations. Then 
either we can have an idea or believe in a true proposition and know it, or we can think 
that we have an idea believe a proposition and act as if we do, although in fact we do not 
have an idea or believe a proposition at all, or we can simply lack an idea or lack belief in 
a proposition, without also thinking that we do in fact have an idea or believe a proposi-
tion. Although I can come to know p and know that p is true when I know p, I cannot 
seriously contemplate non-p in order to adjudicate which is true. The problem with this 
solution is that it seems incompatible with Spinoza’s expressed view that there are or 
exist false ideas (or propositions). But closer examination of the texts reveals that the 
falsity of ideas consists exactly in lack of being: “Falsity consists in the privation of 





Another problem for Spinoza’s view is one of internal consistency. Above, I 
suggested that in order for knowledge and love of God to be eternal but yet not 
always occurrent, Spinoza needs to shield this eternal idea from the gaze of our 
conscious introspection. For Spinoza, I suggested, we have true and adequate 
latent ideas that are entertained by God. It seems that either Spinoza must grant 
that the idea of God is not eternally in us, or he must deny that we are always 
conscious of the truth of any true idea which we may have. The first option 
contradicts his explicit statement that we have this idea eternally; the second 
contradicts his theory that no one can be unaware of having a true idea when they 
do. The solution is probably to qualify Spinoza’s claim that we know our true 
ideas to be true. Plausibly, he could maintain that we know only our true and 
consciously entertained true ideas to be true. This solution invites a whole debate 
about the border between the conscious and the unconscious - for example, the 
question of what happens to the self-evidence of truth if this border is continuous - 
a debate that I for present purposes will have to set aside. I will proceed on the 
assumption that no one can be in suspense about having a true idea whenever she 
consciously entertains the true idea, but that she can fail to recognize the truth of 
her idea when she latently entertains the true idea in question, without exactly 





It is in sum evident to all minds when their consciously entertained ideas are 
adequate/true (I will omit the qualification ‘consciously’ in what follows). One 
would, as a consequence, have to explain by appeal to an independent, free will, 
the negation of ideas adequately perceived to be true, or the affirmation of ideas 
adequately perceived to be false (or, indeed, suspension of judgment concerning 
                                                                                                                                     
haps it is fair to say that for Spinoza, there are only true ideas, ideas that from a human 
perspective can be more or less distorted. Nonetheless, objectively speaking, there are no 
false ideas there for us that to entertain. This is not to say that we are not sometimes in 
error about things. We clearly often err. But when we do so, this is not because of what an 
idea is so much as because of it is not (or, as Pruss suggests) because of what is not even 
an idea proper.  
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the falsity/truth of an idea that is adequately perceived to be either). But Spinoza, 
famously, denies that there is a free will. 
 
Spinoza’s rejection of a free will is predicated on two grounds, one ground being 
metaphysical, the other as it were methodological. First, the human will cannot be 
free since it belongs to the class of things that are always compelled [coacta: 1d7], 
i.e. modes. All volitions are therefore necessary causes, never free causes (1p32). 
Second, on Spinoza’s view, there is, in metaphysical rigor, neither any will over 
and above particular volitions, nor any intellect over and above singular ideas. 
Spinoza’s reason for disposing of faculties is motivated by a regard for a kind of 
parsimony that I previously (following Bennett) called minimalism. On Spinoza’s 
view, our ’will/desire’ and ‘intellect’ are simply the universal under which we 
subsume particular acts of thinking - ideas - or willing/desiring - 
volitions/appetites (cf. 2p48s). Neither will nor intellect enjoys any independent 
reality over and above individual acts of thinking.  
 
This means that there is no higher order power by the means of which we could 
stratify our ideas and volitions. Whether or not we affirm a given idea is entirely 
due to the idea itself. If this appears counterintuitive, recall that Spinoza’s account 
does not render wonder or uncertainty impossible. It is when ideas are clear that 
we are compelled to either affirm or negate them, and it may be surmised that 
ideas are rarely that clear to us. Ideas may be confused to such a degree that we 
cannot either affirm or negate them. However, Spinoza’s account does imply that 
we cannot suspend judgment on clear ideas. (This may seem questionable: for 
instance, one might want to think that one has two sufficiently clear ideas about 
two alternative and mutually exclusive future events. Yet one does not affirm or 
negate either, perhaps because the outcome will be decided by chance. In 
Spinoza’s universe, however, causation is not probabilistic, but wholly 
deterministic, and so he would not be impressed by this particular 
counterexample.) 
 
There is something all ideas are about, for Spinoza (see 2a3). Whether or not we 
affirm an idea therefore depends entirely on how we conceive of the object the 
idea in question intends - and, it may be added, on whether this idea is entertained 
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in the conscious mode. Once we adequately and consciously conceive of 
something, we have no choice but to affirm that idea. It follows that once we 
adequately and consciously conceive of a most perfect being, we have no choice 




 3.4. Consequences for Spinoza’s ideal of human perfection. 
 
First, if an adequate idea only intended its object, but did not involve the reality of 
the object it intended, having ideas would not enrich the ontological perfection, or 
reality, of minds. But above, in 3.1, I suggested that for Spinoza, the formal reality 
of the thing, and the objective reality in the idea of that thing, are one and the 
same. Hence, it is necessary for a thing to communicate its perfection/reality to a 
mind which has an idea of that thing. By this I mean the following. The perfection 
the mind that has an adequate idea intends, is not merely a “representation” of the 
perfection the thing enjoys: it is the very perfection of the thing itself, but as 
expressed under the attribute of thought. Since perfection unfolds in the same way 
in the formal and in the objective order, the perfection of the things is the very 
same perfection as the perfection of the ideas of these things. If minds are 
perfected by means of the perfection of the ideas that are in them, it follows that 
minds “participate” in the perfection of their objects of their ideas.  
 
If having a conscious and adequate idea of something did not in itself imply that 
one affirmed or negated that thing - if, that is, suspension of judgment were 
genuinely possible, as it would be if the will extended beyond the intellect - one 
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 Lest the thesis that adequate ideas as it were affirmed themselves may seem too opti-
mistic, it should be stressed that the human mind is a complex idea (see 2p15). The ideas 
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differentiated in terms of their force. In each mind there obtains a distinct hierarchy of 
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the threshold between conscious and subconscious is to be based on the forcefulness of 
the ideas in question. In subsequent chapters, I discuss how, on Spinoza’s view, the idea 
of God can (at least momentarily) be invested with supreme force (Chapters 6 and 8).  
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could have an adequate idea of a most real thing without affirming this idea. But 
since, as I showed in 3.2, affirmation and negation follow automatically upon 
adequate ideas, an adequate idea is automatically affirmed whenever it is 
conscious. Hence, it is necessary for an adequately perceived idea of a most 
perfect thing to communicate its perfection/reality to a mind which has a 
conscious idea of that thing. For the mind that entertains the idea has no free will 
whereby it could (for instance) suspend judgment vis-à-vis the idea of God it 
adequately perceives as true. 
 
The sameness of formal and objective reality/perfection explains why God’s very 
perfection is in the idea of God. This explains why merely having this idea can 
perfect a mind, and answers the puzzle raised at the onset of this paper, i.e. why 
knowledge of God constitutes our highest possible perfection/reality. Of course, 
that the idea of God involves reality/perfection to the highest degree explains why 
it is this idea, and no other, that can make the minds that intend it partake in 
maximal perfection. The fact that there is no will that moves independently of an 
idea explains why merely having conscious knowledge of God necessarily 
perfects a mind. Once God is adequately conceived, the idea necessarily affirms 
its object. The perfection that such conscious knowledge of God involves is 
speculative. For by speculative perfection I mean consciously recognized 
ontological perfection. 
 
On this reading, Spinoza’s account of human perfection is intimately linked with 
his highly original treatment of what ideas are. One notable advantage of this 
reading is that it highlights the ethical (and soteriological) advantage Spinoza 
reaps by asserting that ideas are in themselves volitional. The notion of volitional 
ideas effectively dispenses with the notion of a free will, because there is no need 
for a will to affirm or negate what ideas themselves already affirm or negate. 
Although Spinoza himself emphasized the practical benefits he thought accrued to 
his abolition of free will by the means of the notion of volitional ideas (see e.g. in 
2p49s), the ethical or soteriological dimension of this abolition have not always 
received the attention it deserves in the secondary literature. By showing that 
Spinoza’s volitional theory of ideas plays an important role in account of how 
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human beings are perfected, I have been able to illustrate part of the practical 
significance of that doctrine. 
 
It should be acknowledged, however, that my reading is not without difficulties. 
One major difficulty is that Spinoza’s philosophy of human perfection appears to 
bifurcate once more. In previous chapters, a clear-cut distinction was drawn 
between teleological and ontological perfection. But it appears that for Spinoza, 
there is one perfection we inevitably possess - namely the one we possess merely 
in virtue of having an adequate idea of God (something which we all do, see 
2p47) -, on the one hand, and one perfection which we do not always possess - 
namely the perfection of consciously entertaining that idea of God. It is important 
to stress that we have an adequate idea of God whether we are aware of it or not. 
In a way, our minds are therefore perfected whether we know it or not. Human 
perfection thus bifurcates into the perfection we possess whether we recognize it 
or not (which, from the cognitive point of view, corresponds to the presence in our 
mind of an idea adequately intending God) and the perfection we have when we 
recognize the perfection we inevitably possess. As already mentioned, I call the 
latter kind of perfection speculative. 
 
 3.5. Response to Jarrett. 
 
According to Jarrett’s view, Spinoza’s meta-ethics is constructivist since his ideal 
of human perfection is constructed. I disagree. 
 
Spinoza’s ideal of human perfection is meant to be realistic. For it is grounded in 
the perfection of God. Spinoza himself does not doubt the reality of God and, 
since the ideal human perfection consists in maximally acknowledging this reality 
intellectually, this ideal is not constructed, but based on the very cornerstone of 
Spinoza’s theology: God’s absolute infinity and supreme perfection. This piece of 
theology is also a cornerstone in Spinoza’s conceptual edifice of human 
perfection.  
 
One result of Spinoza’s ideal of human perfection is that the maximum of human 
perfection that one can attain is proportional to the perfection that one can 
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conceive. Hence, if one were to regard Spinoza as an opportunistic moral 
philosopher - one desperate to defend at all costs a possibility for humans to 
perfect themselves -, then Spinoza, in order to safeguard the possibility of human 
perfection, would be (as it were) obliged to “construct” a maximally real being. If 
God’s necessary existence is neither self-evident nor demonstrable, then Spinoza’s 
ethics is constructivist, not because the ideal of human perfection is constructed in 
the absence of a solid ontological foundation, but because (arguably) its 
foundation, that is, God’s existence, would then be constructed to postulate that 
there is maximal perfection at all. For if there were no maximum of perfection to 
conceive, his ideal of human perfection would crumble. It should be noted that I 
do not suggest that Spinoza considered himself to have constructed a maximally 
real being - he would find this reading most perverse. However, if one denies the 
certainty Spinoza himself attributes to our knowledge of God, one may well 
consider God as constructed, and in fact constructed in such a way as to enable 
humans to gain a maximum of perfection through their knowledge of what is most 
perfect. In this sense only, Spinoza’s philosophy of human perfection could be 
considered constructivist. 
 
 Conclusion.  
 
In previous chapters I suggested that if Spinoza’s ideal of human perfection is 
ontological, it is beyond good and evil, and beyond our standards of teleological 
perfection. In this chapter I showed that Spinoza’s ideal of human perfection is 
indeed ontological and that it is ontological because it is contemplative or 
intellectual. To recapitulate my reasoning: the identity of objective and formal 
reality is what makes it necessary for one to share in the perfection of the thing of 
which one possesses an adequate idea. This feature of ideas is exactly what makes 
it the case that an idea of something perfect must communicate its ontological 
perfection to the mind that entertains the idea. The doctrine that adequate ideas are 
volitions make it necessary to affirm the idea in question and explains why 
consciously entertaining an idea of a supremely perfect thing necessarily 




Even though all minds are ontologically perfect in virtue of always possessing an 
idea of God, they are not all aware of this idea, or accordingly, of their own 
perfection: they are not all speculatively perfect. So, the question remains why not 
all minds are aware of being perfect in the way I have described. Indeed, in 
Spinoza’s view, everyone has adequate, and it would seem, conscious, knowledge 
of God (2p47). So, it seems that all humans, without exception, must know and as 
a consequence ultimately love God, and thereby be aware of having reached the 
nec plus ultra of human perfection. I will return to this difficulty in Chapter 7. But 
before I do so, it is necessary to investigate Spinoza’s modal thinking in some 
more detail. For as we saw in previous chapters, necessity and perfection are for 
Spinoza intimately connected notions and so we cannot hope to fully understand 
Spinoza’s philosophy of perfection unless we have some grasp of his modal 





Infinity and Contingency 
 
 Introduction. 
In subsequent chapters I will show how Spinoza’s modal metaphysics connects 
with his idea of philosophical self-cultivation (Chapter 6) and finally, with his 
ethics of perfectionism at large (Chapter 8). This chapter is devoted to the topic 
of Spinoza’s modal metaphysics as such.  
Spinoza’s own words seem to commit him to necessitarianism. There is textual 
evidence for attributing this view to Spinoza.
98
 Nonetheless, necessitarianism is 
a difficult position to defend. For this reason, arguments have been made to 
make room for contingency in his system. The two strongest arguments of this 
kind are Curley (1969), restated in Curley and Walski (1999), and Newlands 
(2010). Both these arguments appeal to Spinoza’s claim that all finite things are 
locked in an infinite nexus of causal relations obtaining between finite things 
(1p28). The question central to this paper is whether metaphysical contingency 
can, as these commentators claim, be derived from an infinity of causal 
ancestors.  
The goal of this chapter is twofold. First, I aim to present an alternative reading 
of the relation between infinity and Spinoza’s concept of contingency. On the 
reading I advance, while the infinity of the causal ancestry of finite things does 
not ground any objective metaphysical contingency on their part, it is one 
necessary condition which must obtain if they are to appear as contingent. The 
other necessary condition is that things must be conceivable as possibly having 
not existed. Only the concepts of things that do not owe their existence to their 
natures can be conceived of as non-instantiated. So only such things can be 
thought of as possibly having not existed. In order to distinguish this property 
from its purely modal counterpart, I will call it Spinoza-contingency, 
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henceforward S-contingency. Jointly, infinity and S-contingency explain why 
finite things can appear contingent. 
This reading, however, is only plausible if Spinoza is not a contingentist. In 
what remains of the paper, I must therefore challenge the strongest derivations 
of contingency from infinity in the literature. My second goal accordingly 
breaks down into two subgoals. First, I must indicate why Curley’s original 
proposal fails. And last, I must argue that, contrary to what Newlands suggests, 
the conceivability of things as contingent does not contribute any (ontological) 
perfection to the world. 
Before presenting the actual heart of the paper, however, it is necessary to first 
provide the background picture. 
 1. Background: the modality of the finite modes.  
According to Spinoza, there is one necessarily existing substance (1p7; cf. 
1d8): God, or Nature. Spinoza’s demonstration of 1p7 indicates that, on his 
view, the substance exists since because it is self-caused. A thing is self-caused 
when its essence involves existence. To cite the opening definition of the 
Ethics: “By cause of itself I understand that whose essence involves [involvit] 
existence, or that whose nature cannot be conceived except as existing.” The 
concept of an existence-involving essence has an impressive pedigree in the 
history of philosophy. But what does it mean?  
The statement that ‘The essence of x involves existence’ is naturally read as 
meaning that it belongs to the essence of x that it should exist; that existence is 
a feature that x has essentially. We can provisorily understand essence 
minimally, as the identity conditions of a thing: all the features a thing must 
have in order to exist as itself. 
As Bennett (1984, p 71; 2001, 123) has pointed out, this appears to cause 
trouble for Spinoza. Because, when involvement is thus understood, this leaves 
Spinoza’s reasoning open to the objection that the essences of finite things, too, 
actually “involve” existence. Regardless of whether they are self-caused or not, 
things exist essentially in all worlds where they exist. For, evidently, any thing 
whatsoever must exist if it is to be able to exist as itself. But, on Spinoza’s 
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view, the essences of things that are not self-caused do not involve existence 
(see 1p24). For this reason, if we are charitable, we are not to think that by 
claiming that the substance’s essence involves existence, Spinoza meant that 
the substance needs to exist if it is to exist as itself.  
Instead, Spinoza presumably meant that the substance’s essence involves 
existence since the substance exists necessarily in virtue of having the essence 
it has. This has the following implications. Although we can conclude for any 
thing no matter its essence that it exists essentially in any worlds where it does 
exist, Spinoza’s claim, anachronistically phrased in the terms of possible 
worlds semantics that Bennett deploys against him, would be that finite things 
are such that their existence in any world can’t be established by attending to 
their essences alone. If one doesn’t know whether x exists in any world, then 
x’s essential definition won’t offer us any help in this regard, unless the x in 
question is God. 
This understanding raises a difficult question. What does it mean to exist 
necessarily because of one’s essence? In Spinozism, things that exist 
necessarily by reason of their essence do so since their essences are necessary 
and their existence is the same as their essence (1p20). Divine simplicity and 
internal necessitation are therefore intimately connected. I cannot here engage 
directly with the problem of divine simplicity.  
However, it is to be noted that Spinoza treats the existence that is identical with 
the essence of the thing in question under the rubric of eternity (1d8). Spinoza’s 
“existentialist” understanding of eternity is important. It is customarily 
assumed that we can prefix modal operators to propositions without being 
committed to any existence: the modal operator does not carry existential 
import. Thus, it is impossible that there be a square circle but (on non-
Meinongian views, at least) this modal characteristic is not a property 
possessed by that (necessarily non-existing) circle. By contrast, according to 
1d8, only existing necessary things can be eternal. And since Spinoza’s ethical 
project is to transform the human mind by making it pay attention to things that 
really exist, rather than to the phantoms of its imagination, it should come as no 
surprise that he will generally be occupied with this ontologically committed 
kind of necessity. Since he is more occupied with things that actually exist and 
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their modal characteristics, it follows that Spinoza is more interested in what 
we today call de re modality than in the modality of truth-bearers.
99
 This 
preference of Spinoza’s will prove significant later.  
Following (1p16) or as Spinoza would also put it, flowing from the divine 
nature (see 1p17s, G. II/62: effluxisse), there are modes. Unlike the divine 
nature, modes, Spinoza maintains, are not caused by themselves, and 
accordingly, they do not have an essence which involves existence (1p24). 
Spinoza provides us with an armchair experiment that we can undertake to test 
which things fall into this category. Whenever something “can be conceived as 
not existing”, Spinoza maintains, that thing’s “essence does not involve 
existence” (1a7) and hence no such a thing can claim absolute necessity. (I will 
return to the link between conceivability and alethic modality below.)  
Modes come in two classes: infinite and finite. The set of infinite modes 
divides into two subsets: immediate and mediate infinite modes. Spinoza is 
notoriously secretive about the infinite modes. As examples of immediate 
infinite modes of thought he gives “absolutely infinite intellect”, and “motion 
and rest” of extension. As an example of a mediate infinite mode he gives “the 
face of the whole universe” of extension, without providing an example for 
thought (see Letter 64, C II. 439).
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While often interpreted as laws of nature (e.g., Curley 1969, 66-74; Bennett 
2001, 171) the exact status of the infinite modes is widely debated in the 
literature. I cannot enter this debate here: suffice it to note that whether they are 
immediate or mediate, Spinoza considers infinite modes as following directly 
from the absolute nature of God’s attributes, and for this reason, they are 
eternal. And because of the modal force Spinoza invests in eternity, this can be 
rephrased in modal terms: the infinite modes are necessary since God is 
necessary (see 1p21; 1p23). In this regard, Spinoza’s logic of modal entailment 
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 However, as Bennett (2001, 171) has pointed out, Spinoza’s identification 
of the mediate infinite mode of extension, in combination with parallelism, 
makes the corresponding mediate infinite mode in thought easy to identify: it 
should be the idea of the face of the whole universe.  
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is clear. It can be summarized as follows: something that follows from 




This chapter will be exclusively concerned with the modal status of the finite 
modes. Unlike the infinite modes, finite modes are not determined exclusively 
by God and what follows from God “absolutely”. Instead, a finite mode is 
determined, on the one hand, by divine immanent causation and on the other 
hand, by the transitive causation exerted upon finite modes by other finite 
modes. Let us recapitulate what these terms mean (Spinoza first introduces the 
distinction in KV, C. 76; in the Ethics, it is introduced in 1p18). For a mode to 
be causally determined or produced by an immanent cause means that it is 
caused by something that it inheres in. For example, since a blush inheres in a 
body and is also at least partially caused to occur by that body, a blush is at 
least partially immanently caused by the body it occurs on. Since, on Spinoza’s 
view, things inhere in God (1p15), God is their immanent cause. 
 
By contrast, transitive causation occurs when things are caused by things that 
they do not inhere in. This kind of causation is not very controversial, but 
Spinoza adds a twist to it. On his view, any transitively caused effect is caused 
by an actually infinite causal chain.  
Spinoza first presents this wild claim in 1p28:  
Every singular thing, or any thing which is finite and has a determinate 
existence, can neither exist nor be determined to produce an effect, 
unless it is determined to exist and produce an effect by another cause, 
which is also finite and has a determinate existence […] and so on, to 
infinity. 
In this proposition, Spinoza asserts that transitive causation extends infinitely a 
parte ante, so that any finite mode necessarily has an infinity of causal 
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both necessary, then q is necessary, too. That is syntactically valid in the 
weakest of standard modal logics, K. Nonetheless, many interpreters have 
been justly puzzled by this claim: how can a mode, which is not self-caused 
(1d2), be eternal, when eternity is defined (1d8) as the existing of that whose 




antecedents. While the infinite modes are determined only as it were vertically 
by God’s immanent causation, finite modes are determined horizontally as well 
as vertically, by their finite peers as well as by the infinite God they inhere in.  
Does this construal of the causation of finite things, as being both immanent 
and transitive, result in any noteworthy consequences for the modality of these 
things? Can we derive objective contingency from the infinite causal regress of 
finite peers extending behind any finite mode? (I understand by objectively 
contingent things that subclass of possible things which are not necessary.) 
Before we look at the two main derivations of objective contingency from 
infinity that have been proposed in the secondary literature, let me first present 
how infinity and contingency are related on my alternative reading of Spinoza.  
 4.2. Infinity and contingency in a necessitarian world. 
 4.2.1. Different Spinozist senses of contingency. 
On my reading of Spinoza, the infinite ancestry of finite things does not ground 
the objective contingency of these things. It does however help ground their 
subjective contingency. Let me first define the different senses of contingency 
involved. 
There is first the objective modal property existing things would have if they 
could have been otherwise. Spinoza bans such contingency entirely from 
reality in 1p29. This proposition reads: “In nature, there is nothing contingent, 
but all things have been determined from the necessity of the divine nature to 
exist and produce an effect in a certain way.” 
This ban, however, does not rule out our capacity for conceiving of things as 
contingent. As Spinoza clarifies in 1p33s:  
[A] thing is called contingent because of a defect of our knowledge. For 
if we do not know that the thing’s essence involves a contradiction, or if 
we do know very well that its essence does not involve a contradiction, 
and nevertheless can affirm nothing certainly about its existence, 
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because the order of causes is hidden from us, it can never seem to us 
either necessary or impossible. So, we call it contingent […].
102
 
On Spinoza’s view, no matter how much we consider finite things in isolation, 
we cannot get sufficient purchase on their modal profiles in order to establish 
their necessity. But why is this? More clearly put, the question is: why is it that 
attending to the essences of finite things will never allow us to establish their 
necessary existence?  
The reason why is quite straightforward. On Spinoza’s view, and I cite him: 
“the essence of the things produced by God does not involve existence” (1p24, 
cf. the foundational definitions 1d1-1d8). In a subsequent definition, Spinoza 
even proposes to call this feature of things their contingency, reserving the 
property of possibly having been otherwise for the word ‘possibility’ (4d4). He 
says: “I call singular things contingent insofar as we find nothing, when we 
attend only to their essence, which necessarily posits their existence or which 
necessarily excludes it” (4d3). It is important to stress that such “contingent” 
things are still necessary. One would perhaps want to call the property that 
Spinoza speaks of in 4d3 a kind of extrinsic necessity, for he speaks of it as the 
absence of an intrinsic cause for the necessity of the thing (the intrinsic cause 
would be the very nature of the thing). But nonetheless, to call necessity what 
Spinoza (if only occasionally) calls contingency would only risk obscuring 
matters.  
For the sake of clarity, let us instead call such things S-contingent. The 
ontological reason why things are S-contingent is that they are composed of 
essence and existence, that essence and existence are not “one” in them, as they 
are in God (1p20). If something is S-contingent, then we can, as a 
consequence, think of its essence as either instantiated or non-instantiated. 
Whereas the contingency we attribute to things on account of our ignorance of 
how they are necessitated fails to carve the world at its joints, S-contingency 
does seem to carve the world exactly at the joint which distinguishes God from 
the rest of us. For this reason, S-contingency is not merely epistemic. In other 
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 The claim that such predications of contingency are entirely due to igno-
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words, it is not merely a question of finite things being “for all we know, 
possible”. Our ignorance of the fact that they are necessitated does reveal 
something about them, although that something is not that they exist otherwise 
than necessarily. In spite of itself not being a merely subjective property, S-
contingency does nonetheless help ground the merely subjective contingency 
of things, because we can think of things as possibly not having existed only 
when we can think of their natures as not necessarily instantiated. 
I have differentiated between objective contingency and S-contingency. 
Objective contingency is the objective modal property things would have if 
they could have been otherwise and S-contingency the objective metaphysical 
property things have if their existence is not necessitated by their natures. 
Neither property is the same as the merely subjective and relational 
contingency things have when it appears to us that they could have been 
otherwise. Nonetheless, for Spinoza only S-contingent things can appear 
contingent. For Spinoza believes that it is not possible to conceive of existence-
involving-essences as not instantiated. One may wish to object to this claim. 
Surely, I can think of God as contingently existing? For example, say I think of 
God as existing because he was born by the sea. Spinoza would object that 
what I think about when I thus conceive God is God at all. If I think about 
something that does not owe its existence to its essence, I may use the name 
‘God’ to refer to that thing, but what I am thinking of is not really God at all. 
As already indicated, S-contingency stands in a relation to conceivability 
different from that of objective contingency. To be precise, conceivability 
tracks S-contingency: “If a thing can be conceived as not existing, its essence 
does not involve existence” (1a7), Spinoza writes in an axiom. 
By a short foray into Spinoza’s mereology of substance, I will back up my 
claim that although conceivability tracks S-contingency, it does not track 
objective contingency. 
On Spinoza’s view, any attribute of God is infinite and indivisible (see 1p12). 
One argument Spinoza advances for the indivisibility of extension is 
particularly interesting in this context. It reads: 
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If corporeal substance could be so divided that its parts were really 
distinct, why, then could one part not be annihilated, the rest remaining 
connected with one another as before? And why must they all be so 
fitted together that there is no vacuum? Truly, of things which are really 
distinct from one another one can be, and remain in its condition, 
without the other. Since, therefore, there is no vacuum in nature […], 
but all its parts must so concur that there is no vacuum, it follows also 
that they cannot be really distinguished, i.e., that corporal substance, 
insofar as it is a substance, cannot be divided (1p15s). 
The basic claim of the cited passage appears to be that only the absence of any 
real distinction in corporeal substance can explain that there can never be any 
vacuum. What Spinoza considered an a priori truth - namely: the absence of a 
vacuum - is only explainable by reference to another (perhaps less well-known) 
a priori truth - namely: the absence of real distinctions in nature.
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 This is, of 
course, all skeletal: Bennett (1984, p 98-9) provides a more detailed comment 
on what a vacuum would be which explains why the truth is a priori. 
But it is abundantly clear from the cited passage that the concept of a real 
distinction is modal in character: for A and B to be really distinct, it must be 
possible for them to exist independently of each other. The indivisibility of 
extension stands and falls with the impossibility of real distinctions in nature. 
And things can only be really distinguished if their co-existence is contingent. 
Although we can conceive of substance as divisible and of modes of substance 
as contingent this does not track any real divisibility on the part of the 
substance nor any real contingency on the part of its modes. But why should 
we have this ability to misconstrue substance and modes? 
Spinoza provides a psychological answer to this question. More precisely, he 
maintains that our propensity for conceiving of substance as divisible, and 
accordingly, of modes of substance as contingent, stems from our imagination 
(1p15s[V]; Letter 12, C. 201). For Spinoza the imagination is contrasted with 
reason.
104
 Let us understand reason as well as the imagination minimally: 
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of extension. 
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 This is not the place to clarify to what extent Spinoza, by embracing this 
difference relapses into a kind of ‘moralized’ faculty psychology. For a criti-
cism of this psychology, see Williams (1992). 
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reason as the sum total of all our adequate ideas and the imagination as the sum 
total of all our inadequate ideas. Although the issue is rather complex, it is 
clear, at least, that the imagination is the sole source of error. Or, more 
accurately, error arises when inadequate ideas of things based on how they 
appear are not counterbalanced by adequate ideas which show in which respect 
our perception is misguided. In Spinoza’s parlance, images, i.e. affectations of 
the body which present things as present to us, lead us to err when they are not 
counterbalanced by any adequate idea “that excludes the existence of those 
things that [our Mind] imagines to be present to it” (2p17s II/106; see also 
4p1s; 2p16c). To reuse Spinoza’s example (see 4p1s), we are not mistaken in 
perceiving the sun as being relatively close to the earth. We are only at fault if 
we lack the corrective (and occurrent) idea of its actual distance. I cannot here 
comment on whether this is a sensible account of error. Crucial for my present 
purposes is that Spinoza claims that “it depends only on the imagination that 
we regard things as contingent” (2p44c1: Emphasis added). This shows that we 
consider things contingent when they appear in this way to us and when we 
lack a corrective idea which establishes their necessity. Whereas the adequate 
idea of the sun’s true distance from the earth can be obtained from the science 
of astronomy, Spinoza presumably thought that the adequate idea which 
establishes things as necessary could be obtained through the study of 
metaphysics.  
The conceivability of contingency of things vis-à-vis each other does not prove 
that these things could genuinely have been separated. Nonetheless, that is how 
things appear. Objective contingency is, on Spinoza’s view, an imaginary 
property: a property that exists in and through the imagination alone. This does 
not mean that it is a property the appearance of which can easily be annihilated. 
Just as the sun continues to appear to be relatively close to us even after we are 
taught its actual distance from the earth, so things will perhaps always continue 
to appear contingent even after we learn that they are necessitated. Yet, Spinoza 
thinks that the conceivability of a nature as possibly not instantiated does 
indeed track some kind of objective property. To conceive of a nature as not-
instantiated is an armchair experiment we can undertake in order to test 
whether the thing is S-contingent, and when thought of in isolation, S-
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contingent things can be falsely construed as objectively contingent. In short, 
conceivability as contingent tracks the ontological composition of things that 
are not necessitated by their natures, not any objective contingency on their 
part.  
 4.2.2. Discussion: infinity as grounding the appearance of contingency. 
With these distinctions in place, I can now suggest that finite modes appear 
contingent to us for two reasons. The first root of our erroneous judgments 
attributing objective contingency to things is the S-contingency of these things. 
The second root is the infinity of the causal ancestry of all finite modes. 
If something owed its existence to its essence, that thing could not appear as 
contingent. But since only God, who is infinite, owes its existence to its 
essence, no finite things can so appear. Indeed, since we can conceive of things 
as possibly having not existed, it is clear we do not always posit their natures as 
necessarily instantiated. Since we can conceive of finite modes as possibly 
having not existed, they must be S-contingent. Yet, S-contingency is not 
enough for an appearance of contingency to arise.  
Consider once more that, on Spinoza’s view, the buck-passing of relative 
necessity does not go in a circle. It regresses backwards to infinity (1p28). If 
there were not an infinite series of causal ancestors, the first lender of relative 
necessity would not be relatively necessary at all, because there could be no 
prior thing to which it could owe its necessity. In order to be necessary, it 
would have to be absolutely necessary, and all things owing their necessity to 
it, would become necessary in the same evident way. Let us grant Spinoza that 
the universal causal order isn’t circular. Then, even if we could not arrive at the 
necessity of finite modes by analyzing their essences, if there were only a finite 
number of modes in the world, the derivation of their necessity from their 
causal ancestors would at least be humanely feasible. 
By introducing an infinite regress of causal ancestors between modes and their 
necessitating ground, Spinoza guarantees that we cannot perceive the necessity 
which these things nonetheless possess, by attending to their causes. By 
allowing for finite modes to be S-contingent he ensures that we also cannot 
spot their necessity by analyzing them. Metaphysically speaking, there is a 
 
112 
necessity by which finite things operate. But, for as long as we attend only to 
the finite things themselves, we are as it were blind to this necessity. We cannot 
establish it a posteriori by exploring chains of causes. Nor can we establish it a 
priori by analyzing essences. The necessity of things is obscured by two bridal 
veils: their S-contingency and the infinite causal ancestry of things. Arguably, 
Spinoza’s veiling move is empirically motivated: his goal is to square the 
necessitarian demands of his system with the undeniably contingent 
appearance of the things of our lived experience. If we can establish the 
necessity of things neither by studying them a priori nor a posteriori, one may 
be inclined to think that there is no way to establish their necessity at all. This 
is not so however. We can realize the necessity of things not by paying 
attention to them but to God as their necessitating ground, a cognition which 
Spinoza calls the third kind of knowledge.  
To sum up my reading, it is because singular things are both S-contingent and 
generated by an infinite succession of causes that they, on their own, don’t 
provide the information that allows us to “see” their necessity. This 
interpretation is, however, only plausible if Spinoza does not admit genuine 
contingency into the picture. But it has been argued that he is committed to 
contingentism, and that this commitment arises exactly because of his 
commitment to an infinite causal regress in 1p28. Allow me to address these 
arguments in what follows.  
 4.3. Challenging the derivation of contingency from infinity. 
4.3.1. Against the suggestion that the infinity of causal ancestors 
grounds the contingency of singular things. 
Curley (1969, p 101-104) and Curley and Walski (1999, 244 n. 7;  253) have 
asserted that from Spinoza’s understanding of the finite modes as co-
determined by, on the one hand, the divine nature and the infinite modes and on 
the other hand, their own finite peers, genuine contingency follows. The 
general idea seems to be shared by other commentators. As for instance 
Bennett (1984, p 74-75) puts it, on the basis of 1p28, finite modes appear to be 
“inevitable” given the history of the universe, but not necessary in the sense 
that they could not have been otherwise. 
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In what follows, I will focus on the first-mentioned version of Curley’s 
argument. This is because Curley and Walski too appeal to his original 
reasoning in their later paper as well, without fully stating the argument. It 
seems to me that Curley’s argument has four basic assumptions. (It should be 
noted that this list of assumptions is my own.) 
(a) Curley treats truths or the facts the truths are about as the only bearers of 
the only kind of modality he will discuss.
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(b)  There are two different kinds of necessity in Spinoza’s system, absolute 
necessity and relative necessity. The truth value of absolutely necessary 
propositions cannot vary across worlds. These are truths about God’s nature 
as it is absolutely (and what follows from it as it is absolutely). Relatively 
necessary truths are about finite modes. The finite modes are what they are in 
part because of God’s immanent causation. (Curley construes this causation 
as conformity to laws of nature: I will not here address Curley’s nomological 
interpretation of attributes and infinite modes.) So, truths about them obtain 
in part because some absolutely necessary truths obtain. But because of 
Spinoza’s view that all transitive causation regresses infinitely, relatively 
necessary truths are also conditioned by other relatively necessary truths 
about other modes. All relatively necessary truths are conditioned by some 
absolutely necessary truth about God’s nature as well as by some relatively 
necessary truth about a finite mode.  
(c) Possible worlds can be formalized as sets of truths.  
(d)  If the set of truths representing the actual world is the only self-consistent 
set, then the actual world is the only possible one. 
On the assumption that there are relatively necessary truths in the first place 
(b), can one proceed to show that these truths are contingent from an absolute 
perspective? Curley claims that one can, if these truths regress infinitely. So, he 
proceeds to derive contingency from infinity as follows. 
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 This is not to deny that for Curley things that are not truth-bearers may 
nonetheless possess modal characteristics (although he does not discuss 




Truths which are absolutely necessary could not have been otherwise, and so 
none of the sets in which these truths are negated represent possible worlds. As 
for relatively necessary truths, these are true relative to the truth of a 
conjunction. The conjuncts are (i) some absolutely necessary truth and (ii) 
some relatively necessary truth. Of course, (i) cannot be negated; (ii) however, 
can - if the relative truth in the conjunction which necessitates it, can be 
negated, and so on, to infinity. Thus, the set that can be constructed by 
successively negating relatively necessary truths would be self-consistent. Let 
us call the self-consistent set of truths that results when all relatively necessary 
conjuncts are negated the anti-world. To return to the realm of Spinoza 
interpretation, the consequence of the constructibility of the anti-world would 
be that because Spinoza embraced a view like the one expressed in 1p28, his 
philosophy is not necessitarian.  
In this chapter, (a) will be the basis on which I will challenge Curley's 
argument.  
Whereas Curley construes members of the set that make up possible worlds as 
facts true about the worlds in question, Spinoza prefers to speak of the 
necessity of things (res). Why does he do that? Things owe their necessary 
existence to their causes, and they owe it to themselves, if they are self-caused. 
But for Spinoza, as for most of his medieval predecessors,
106
 the causal relation 
whereby things are produced or created always relates concretely existing 
things. Differently put, the relata of the causal relation whereby relatively 
necessarily things are produced are concretely existing things. Spinoza’s 
preference for things as modality bearers, and as the only relata in 




Curley justifies his move in the following words: “Lacking the convenient term 
‘fact’ to serve as an ontological correlate to the term “truth”, [Spinoza] had to 
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 The view that absences as such are not causally efficacious is summarized 
in the once popular slogan ex nihilo nihil fit. Spinoza endorsed this view. See 
for instance the KV, C. 67.  
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 For example, Lin (2007, 276) construes the relata of the causal relation as 
events, not as things. 
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make do with the inconvenient term ’thing’” (1969, 89).108 However, although 
‘fact’ and ‘truth' may be more convenient for the purposes of discussing 
Spinoza’s modal thinking in contemporary terms, the translation from ‘thing’ 
to ‘fact’ is not ontologically innocent. For by substituting things for truths, 
Curley - arguably - abandons Spinoza’s ontological concept of necessity for a 
strictly logical one. Let me illustrate more precisely what I mean by this.  
If facts are the convenient ontological correlatives of truths, then if it is true 
that a thing t exists, then that t exists is a fact, and likewise, if it does not exist, 
it is a fact that it does not exist.
109
 The consequence of this is that when Curley 
negates truths/facts in order to construct the anti-world what he would obtain if 
he could finish negating could in theory contain as much reality as our world. 
For there is nothing that says that by negating truths/facts you end up with 
lesser reality.  
Spinoza, however, speaks of the modality of things (res). If what you negate 
are things, then, arguably, you will eventually end up with less reality (realitas) 
than you started off with. Before I discuss the importance of this result more in 
detail, it is worth noting why ending up with less reality than one started off 
with would be presumably be problematic for Spinoza. That is, allow me to 
briefly address the question why a world which, if it were actual, would 
contain less reality than our world, cannot be a genuine rival to this world.  
On a plausible reading the important proposition 1p16 legislates that the divine 
nature be maximally and indeed infinitely creative.
110
 1p16 reads: “From the 
necessity of the divine nature there must follow infinitely many things in 
infinitely many modes, (i.e. everything which can fall under an infinite 
intellect” (Emphasis added). Clearly, 1p16 is an attempt at deriving from the 
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 It may be noted that although Curley treats facts as the ontological corre-
lates of truths and as something that must obtain whenever there are truths, 
he does not show how they are the ontological grounds of truths. 
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 Curley’s move reflects a contemporary preference. For instance, it is be-
cause we can talk of ‘negative facts’ with greater convenience than about 
‘negative events’ (and even less ‘negative things’) that Mellor (2004) pro-
poses to construe causes and effects as facts, rather than as events. 
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 This reading is subscribed to by, for instance, Garrett (1991), Newlands 
(2010; 2017), and Steinberg (1981).  
 
116 
divine nature (whose definition - 1d6 - figures in the demonstration) an infinity 
of real things.
111
 We can call this view - that the divine essence is such that it 
must bring forth an infinite totality of finite things - Plenitude. Moreover, since 
the necessity by which Plenitude holds pertains to the divine nature it is clearly 
of the absolute kind. In other words, the world is plenary because of what God 
is absolutely, and not insofar because of the way God is modified by some 
finite mode.  
If we stick with de re modality, the anti-world (the set of things constructible 
by successive negation of the relatively necessary conjuncts necessitating the 
relatively necessary things in question) would lack things contained in the 
actual set of things. It would thus fail to comprise the totality of things in this 
world. 
In order for Spinoza to be committed to genuine contingency, a possible world 
must not only be formally constructible but also possible given the content of 
the truths - or as I prefer, the nature of the things - which are absolutely 
necessary. God, of course, is the intrinsically necessary thing par excellence. 
So, let us ask ourselves the question whether Curley’s anti-world, when seen as 
comprising propositions positing things as existing/real, could have been 
actual, given what Spinoza takes God to be. If we take seriously the demand 
for Plenitude on the part of the divine nature this seems to rule out the 
possibility of an anti-world, comprising only the negation of modes, but never 
anything positive (never any ‘reality’) to replace them with. For if we take 
seriously this demand, then the world is actual in part because it is plenary in 
the sense of containing all things. And this world could have comprised less-
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 According to previous commentators, Spinoza by ‘infinite’ either did not 
mean ‘innumerable’ (Wolf 1926, 26) or does not have to be taken as mean-
ing ‘innumerable’ since nothing in his system hinges on this (Bennett 1984, 
75). Instead, according to these commentators, Spinoza by ‘infinite attrib-
utes’ simply meant ‘all attributes’  In contrast, Melamed (most recently in 
2018) has argued that in speaking of ‘infinite attributes’, Spinoza mean to 
denote an infinite, and not a finite, totality, of attributes. Similarly, when 
Spinoza speaks of infinite modes in 1p16 and 1p17s, I understand him to 
mean an actually infinite totality of modes.  
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than-all things to the same extent that God’s nature could have been different: 
that is, less creative or less plenary.
112
 
This is not to deny that when Curley construes worlds as sets of truths or facts 
(see (a) above), either absolutely necessary or necessary in relation to other 
truths or facts, the possible world that he would obtain by successively 
negating the relatively necessary truths or facts in the conjunctions 
necessitating other relatively necessary truths or facts, could at least in 
principle contain as much reality as the actual world. In other words, Curley’s 
anti-world could, if truths are the bearers of modality, contain as much reality 
as the actual world. 
Yet, if if we stick with the Spinozist description, then each relatively necessary 
conjunct is not just any truth or fact, but a truth positing some thing as existing. 
For real things are, on Spinoza’s view, ultimately the bearers and the 
transmitters of necessity: any necessary thing owes its necessity to some thing, 
be it to another thing or to itself. Moreover, existing things, as Spinoza makes 
clear in 1p28, owe their relative necessity to other finitely existing things. If 
every relatively necessary conjunct posits something as existing, then 
whenever we negate such a conjunct, we remove some thing from the world, 
and hereby we also amputate some reality from the world. So, each truth to be 
negated is one positing a concretely existing thing causing another similarly 
existing thing.  
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 Koistinen anticipates an exegetical objection to my move, saying that: 
“perfection, rather than being a premise in an argument for necessitarianism, 
is a consequence of necessitarianism” (2003, p 294-5). I would like to make 
two responses to this potential objection. First, I am not here making an ar-
gument for necessitarianism, only questioning one specific argument for 
contingentism. Second, Koistinen (2003, p 304-5) claims that his alternative 
argument for necessitarianism is not based on perfection or infinity, but on 
the dual premise that the substance is necessarily unique and that another 
possible world would have to be grounded in the reality of another sub-
stance. However, the question is whether the substance could be unique if it 
were not also absolutely infinite. Spinoza’s demonstration of substance mon-
ism in 1p14 appears to be intimately wound up with absolute infinity, i.e. 
with the divine possession of all possible attributes. But if the substance 
could not be unique without being absolutely infinite, and if supreme perfec-
tion and absolute infinity are (for Spinoza) mutually implicatory, then I 
wonder whether Koistinen’s own argument is not also ‘perfection-based’. 
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One may want to object to this reasoning by pointing out that when absences of 
things get negated in our world, these absences do produce reality at the anti-
world. For example, there are currently no dragonflies living around this lake. 
In order to build the anti-world, we would negate these absent dragonflies: and, 
voilà, dragonflies proliferate in the anti-world. However, on Spinoza’s view, 
absences are not things, and they are in particular not things relatively 
necessitating other existing things. For Spinoza embraced the adage that there 
must be as least as much reality in the cause as in the effect (the very principle 
on which Descartes erected his ontological proof of God in the Third 
Meditation). This is clear from Spinoza’s remark that that “through which 
things are said to be determined to produce an effect must be something 
positive [quid positivum] (as is known through itself)” (1p26d).  
But there is nothing positive in absences through which absences can 
determine things to produce effects. Absences, on Spinoza’s view, are therefore 
not really causes. (This might collide with our contemporary intuitions. I do not 
claim to defend Spinoza’s theory of causation here.)  
So if we are to negate things that determine other things to produce effects (the 
very things under discussion at 1p28), then we can only negate things that 
produce absences, not realities, at the anti-world. If we, for the sake of fidelity 
to the texts, abstain from supplanting ‘thing’ with ‘fact’ (or ‘truth’), then the 
anti-world would, were it actual, inevitably lack some reality that is present in 
our world. For the anti-world can then only be built by successful negation of 
things that have reality, leading to absences at the anti-world.  
Is this observation rendered vacuous by some Cantorian results about infinite 
sets? Even after an infinity of relatively necessary conjuncts are negated, an 
infinity could still remain, thus rendering the set of the things in the anti-world 
ever co-cardinal with the set of the things in the actual world. Koistinen (2003, 
294) has observed that given that two modes systems both contain an infinity 
of modes (of the size aleph-null), it makes no sense to compare their respective 
quantities. (It should be added that Koistinen’s objection is well-placed, as 
there is no textual evidence to claim that, for Spinoza, the cardinality of things 
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in the actual world is of an infinity of a higher order that of another world we 
might want to consider as possible.)
113
 
However, according to the rules of the game Curley is playing, for a set of 
propositions to represent a world, it must be closed under valid inference. But 
unless exactly all propositions positing relatively necessary things as existing 
are negated or removed, the set of propositions that represent the anti-world 
will not be thus closed. And so, unless all relatively necessary conjuncts are 
negated, the set will not be consistent and so not represent a possible world. 
But once the super-task of negating all relatively necessary things has been 
completed, no things should remain. (It may be recalled that the reason why 
absences at this world will not be converted to things at other worlds is that 
absences are for Spinoza not links in the infinite chain introduced in 1p28.) The 
set of no things is of a cardinality smaller than that of a set of infinitely many 
things. 
Nonetheless, if an equally plenary set of things is constructible, then it would 
perhaps really be a genuine alternative to this one. Although such a set might 
be constructible, it is not by Curley’s means.
114
 Presently I have to put this 
issue aside. The goal of this chapter is not to vindicate Spinozist 
necessitarianism -  a topic amply debated elsewhere in the literature - but 
instead to present a new interpretation of the relation between infinity and 
contingency in Spinozism which is consistent with the necessitarian premise. I 
have now shown that Curley’s derivation of (objective) contingency from 
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 By contrast, such a reading could probably be made of Leibniz, because 
the infinite set of monads in the actual world is arguably of a bigger cardi-
nality than in a possible world where there is not an actual subdivision of 
matter into organic bodies. More precisely, I think the case can be made that 
for Leibniz, the infinitely complex actual subdivision of matter into organic 
bodies (each with an infinity of monads: see, for instance, Monadology § 65 
[1885]) enables the set of monads to be of a cardinality bigger than the set of 
the natural numbers. 
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 In this regard, Spinoza, mutatis mutandis, faces the same objection as 
Leibniz does in claiming that there is one unique best possible world. Can it 
be established that there is exactly one maximally plenary world? For Spino-
za, and, it appears to me, for Leibniz as well, the solution generally proposed 
is an appeal to the Principle of Sufficient Reason. For an argument deriving 
necessitarianism from the PSR, see Omri Boehm (2016, 569).  
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infinity is incompatible with other Spinozist assumptions - to wit, with de re 
modality, the causal impotence of absences and Plenitude.  
As previously seen, my alternative interpretation involves the claim that 
attributions of objective contingency are false in Spinozism but rendered 
possible by S-contingency and the infinite causal regress. Therefore I am 
obliged to defend my interpretation against the most recent and most subtle 
suggestion that such attributions are not false in Spinozism. Allow me to do so 
in what follows.  
 4.3.2. Against the proposal that conceptions of contingency  
 contribute to the perfection of the world. 
On my reading, S-contingent things are characterized by ontological 
composition and by its epistemic consequence, that is, by our capacity for 
conceiving of them as contingent or necessary. If S-contingent things make up 
an ontological category on their own, it may therefore be said that they are 
characterized by what they can be imagined to be. God can only be conceived 
of as existing and chimaeras, such as a square circle, cannot be consistently 
conceived to exist at all, as their definitions are self-contradictory. Finite 
creatures, by contrast - having some reality but not all of it - exist halfway 
between God (who has all of reality) and chimaeras (that have none); while 
they necessarily exist, they can be conceived as not existing. Indeed, in the CM 
I, 3, C. 308, Spinoza treats contingency exactly as the property of existing 
“midway between God and a chimaera”.  
Does the conceivability of things as either contingent or necessary contribute to 
the perfection of the world? (The perfection under scrutiny here is not 
teleological, but ontological, perfection, the kind of perfection which Spinoza 
treats as coextensive with reality in 2d6.) Newlands (2010) has claimed that it 
does. In this thought-provoking paper and elsewhere, Newlands argues that 
Spinoza is an anti-essentialist with respect to modality - that is, that the 
modality of things, for Spinoza, varies with how they are conceived -, and that 
conceiving of things as contingent contributes to the perfection of the world. 
Of course, to say that the subjective modality of things varies with how they 
are conceived is tautologous: a thing has the merely subjective “property” F if 
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it can be conceived as being F. It is rather obvious that things can be conceived 
as contingent. I take Newlands’ claim to be more substantial: he means that the 
objective modality of things varies with how they are conceived. 
Why would Spinoza embrace such a prima facie bizarre view? Part of the 
reasoning behind construing Spinoza as a non-essentialist which Newlands 
presents in his rich reading can be summarized follows. (It should be noted that 
this summary is mine.) P1: Spinoza embraces the Principle of Sufficient 
Reason (the PSR). P2: Spinoza derives the Principle of Plenitude (POP) from 
the PSR.
115
 P3: POP requires multiple ways of conceiving of the substance 
under different attributes, as this makes reality more plenary. Hence, C1: 
Spinoza embraces multiple ways of conceiving the substance under various 
attributes. P4: POP requires multitude ways of conceiving of modes modally in 
the same way as it requires multitude ways of conceiving of the substance 
under different attributes. Hence, C2: Spinoza embraces multitude ways of 
conceiving of modes modally. 
The premise I will take issue with is P4. However, it is helpful to first explain 
P3, in order to see whether there is the relevant symmetry between ways of 
conceiving the substance (as attributes) and ways of conceiving modes (as 
contingent or necessary) that allows both these variabilities in conceivability to 
be perfect-making features of the world, fulfilling the demands on ontological 
plenitude. If there is no such relevant symmetry, then C2 might not be justified, 
although C1 is right. 
Spinoza’s doctrine that the substance’s absolutely infinite essence is perceived 
under infinite attributes may be called the doctrine of Infinite Attributes 
Conceivability. Absolute infinity is to exist and be conceivable under infinite 
attributes, each of which is also infinite in kind (1d6). If attributes - different 
ways of conceiving the substance (1d4) - collapsed, some ways of conceiving it 
would obviously be lacking; the substance would thereby be impoverished, and 
no longer absolutely infinite. Spinoza seems to be adamant that the substance 
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 Lovejoy (1933, 155) too deduces the Spinozist deduction of the principle 
of plentitude from the principle of sufficient reason. 
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can be conceived to be infinite in infinite ways - since this testifies to the 
ontological richness (the absolute infinity) of its nature.  
To avoid any possible attribute-collapse, Spinoza (in 1p10) erects what is 
commonly called a conceptual barrier between the attributes. The fact that the 
attributes are conceptually isolated ensures that they are indeed fundamentally 
different ways of conceiving things. Since the attributes are conceptually self-
conceived, they are also causally self-conceived (this follows from 1a4 and is 
explicitly stated in 2p6). 
As Della Rocca (1996, 19)
116
 has most stringently pointed out, this results in an 
infinite semantic parallelism where causally and conceptually isolated 
explanations of things under various attributes co-exist independently of each 
other. This semantic parallelism has the noteworthy consequence that contexts 
of the form ‘… causes x’ (or ‘… is conceived through x’) are referentially 
opaque: substitutions in these contexts of co-referring terms are not truth-
preserving when the contexts in question are attribute-specific. So, for Spinoza, 
even though the idea of my body - my mind -, and my body are identical, it is 
nonetheless false to say that my body causes a mental effect caused by mind or 
that my mind causes a physical effect caused by my body. But what in 
Spinoza’s philosophy motivates this intensionality? 
On Newlands’s reading, Spinoza is willing to trade off the transparency of 
some contexts for the benefit of more perfection. To put it succinctly, by 
embracing the thesis of Infinite Attributes Conceivability and the ensuing 
semantic parallelism, Spinoza’s metaphysics gains in perfection exactly what it 
loses in extensionality. For the substance is the locus of maximum ontological 
plenitude only if it can be conceived to be infinite under an infinite amount of 
attributes. Since this seems right I agree with Newlands (2010, 73) that Infinite 
Attributes Conceivability is one “axis of plenitude”. 
Let us also grant Newlands the plausible view that the infinity of finite modes 
established in 1p16 is another such axis of plenitude. Spinoza clearly speaks in 
this way; not only does the substance “express itself” as infinite in infinite 
                                                 
116
 Since Della Rocca only discusses the attributes of Extension and 
Thought, he speaks of a duality here. 
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attributes, in each attribute it also expresses itself as an infinity of finite modes 
(for the modes as expressive of substances/attributes: see 1p36d; 3p6d and 
1p25dc). These modes are locked in an infinite causal nexus (as per 1p28). I 
agree that, given Spinoza’s metaphysical outlook, the infinite causal ancestry of 
finite things is one of the two necessary conditions for their conceivability as 
contingent (the other being their S-contingency), and I also agree that the 
infinity of their causal ancestors is a perfect-making feature of the world. But is 
it, as Newlands maintains, also the case that the ensuing variability in 
conceivability of things as either necessary or as contingent is a perfect-making 
feature of the world? 
I would like to issue a caveat here. A line is to be drawn between the way the 
thing is conceived - as contingent - and the fact that something is conceived at 
all. Of course, there is a given physical state of my body even when I am only 
imagining things, and so too, when I perceive them as contingent. Qua physical 
and mental states of human beings and as such modes of modes, imaginations 
are real even though what is imagined is not. Of course, every mode that is, is 
to the extent that it is, (ontologically) perfect (2d6), and therefore contributive 
to the overall perfect scheme of things. I do not take issue with this. Nor do I 
believe that this is Newlands’ central claim: for then he would merely have 
said that having any idea at all, whatever its content, contributes to the 
perfection of the world, not that having ideas specifically about the various 
modalities of things so contributes.  
When I deny that conceiving of things as contingent contributes to the 
perfection of the world, what I deny is specifically that the attribution of an 
objective property - namely contingency - to things, contributes anything in 
particular to the perfection of the world. I grant that in being ideas, inadequate 
ideas too contribute to some perfection in the world. But they do not so in 
virtue of what makes them inadequate. 
Indeed, it seems that the actual conception of something as contingent, as such, 
contributes nil to the perfection of the world. For the conception of something 
as contingent is always executed by the imagination alone (2p44c). And when 
left unchecked by reason the imagination brings about all and only error (see 
4p1s). And since “error consists in the privation of knowledge” (2p35s) - that is 
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in lack of objective being and hence a kind of non-being, and perfection is co-
extensive with being (2d6), error can contribute nil to the perfection of the 
world. 
Newlands (2010, 78, n. 31) deals with this objection, for his reading pivots 
around the claim that while, for Spinoza, falsity and error implies inadequacy, 
the reverse implication does not hold: inadequacy does not imply falsity and 
error. Hence, although attributions of contingency are certainly inadequate (see 
2p31c for a detailed explanation of why), they are nonetheless not false. It is, 
crucially, because our conceptions of things as contingent are not false that 
non-essentialism can be true. Because non-essentialism with regards to 
modality is exactly the view that that the objective modality of things depends 
on how they are conceived. But if things are only falsely conceived as being of 
a certain modality, then that conception can obviously not ground their being of 
such a modality. In order to motivate that the implication goes in one direction 
only, Newlands refers to several important passages in the second part of the 
Ethics, all of which fail to substantiate the hypothesis that inadequacy implies 
falsity (namely 2p11c; 2p35 and 2p49s). 
One way of refuting Newlands’ view would thus be to argue that, for Spinoza, 
inadequacy and falsity are in fact co-extensional.
117
 In this paper, I will not opt 
for this way. I will instead argue that, regardless of whether this is so or not, 
conceptions of contingency are not only inadequate but also false, on Spinoza’s 
view. To posit contingency as existing (that is, as an instantiated property) is 
false, because, for Spinoza, contingency is a being of reason, and beings of 
reason do not exist (are not instantiated).  
In defence of his reading, Newlands asks: 
 [S]urely it will be strange if some limited or partial expressions of 
substance can be involved in true predications, while no limited or 
partial expressions of modes can involve true predications. Why 
should falsity and truth work so differently for incomplete expressions 
of substance and modes? (2010, p 78, n. 31.) 
                                                 
117
 For two readings that, pace Newlands, read inadequacy and falsity as co-
extensive in Spinoza, see Della Rocca (1996, p 107-10) and Schmid (2008). 
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Providing an answer to that question would weigh in against accepting 
Newlands’ interpretation. First, it is to be noted that, since perfection and 
reality are convertible, perfect-making features must be such that also make for 
reality. On my view, so-called “true but limited expressions of substance”, e.g. 
your body and mine, and the ideas of these, can serve the purposes of plenitude 
since we are something. But things which are not real - beings of reason, say - 
contribute nil to plenitude, for there is strictly speaking no being that our 
thoughts are directly about when beings of reasons are entertained as objects of 
thought. 
What is a being of reason? One paradigmatic example is evil. For Spinoza, evil 
is an absence that our imagination hypostasizes and wrongly construes as a 
lack of a due god. It is thus not surprising to find that Spinoza elaborates on an 
answer to the question of which prima facie real properties are in metaphysical 
rigor not real properties at all, in his explication of that important notion. Let us 
therefore turn to Spinoza’s correspondence with Blijenbergh, the only extant 
set of texts where that notion is expounded at length.  
In Letter 23 (to Blijenbergh, March 1665) Spinoza indicates some of the 
properties that he considers to fall short of contributing reality/perfection to the 
world. On Spinoza’s view, God causes all and only reality/perfection. Pressed 
by Blijenbergh, Spinoza first concedes that Nero’s or Orestes’ matricides were 
perfect insofar as they were caused by God. (In Letter 23, he speaks of things 
which are real/perfect in this way as “expressing essence”.)
118
 Following 
tradition, Spinoza construes (for instance) the external act of raising the arm to 
stab someone as perfection (or as Spinoza perhaps would want to put it, 
“expressive of essence”). To have the capacity to stab as well as to actually 
execute the act of stabbing, are species of perfection, the complement of which 
is negation, whether it be incapacity or weakness. Since evil is negation, Nero’s 
                                                 
118
 In the Ethics too, essence is convertible with perfection (see 
3GenDefAff). A critic of Spinoza’s conceptual equivalencies might want to 
say that if essence is perfection, and existence perfection, then essence is 
existence, and the ontological distinction between substance and modes 
crumbles. I cannot here provide a comment on this challenge. 
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matricide was blameworthy exactly in what it did not contain of 
reality/perfection. Spinoza asks: 
 What, then, was Nero’s knavery? Nothing but this: he showed by that 
act that he was ungrateful, without compassion and disobedient. And it 
is certain that none of these things express essence. Therefore, God 
was not the cause of them [for, as Spinoza writes earlier: God is 
absolutely and really the cause [sc. only] of everything that has 
essence] (C. 388). 
Letter 23 is consistent with Spinoza’s ontological project as announced early 
on in his philosophical career. The opening section of the CM warns us against 
the philosophical dangers of dividing being into being and non-being, and it is 
clear that Spinoza always sought to maintain vigilance against non-beings 
masquerading as beings. Yet if something does not have being, it cannot have 
perfection. And, it cannot give what it itself doesn’t own, since this would 
contradict the adage (as we saw previously, embraced by Spinoza) that there 
must be at least as much perfection in the cause as in the effect. 
It remains to be shown that contingency is indeed a non-being. According to 
the list Spinoza provides in the CM, non-beings comprise beings of reason, 
beings of the imagination and chimaeras. (Spinoza is a bit ironically sticking 
with the traditional, but on his view misleading, terminology, which nominally 
elevates these non-beings to beings.) For present purposes, it is sufficient to 
focus on “Measure, Time and Number”, which are not modes of substance, but 
“modes of thinking, or rather, imagining” (Letter 12, C. 203). Interestingly, for 
Spinoza, these modes of imagining all arise because of the same reason. More 
precisely, they arise “when we conceive Quantity abstractly from Substance 
and separate Duration from the way it flows from eternal things” (Letter 12, C. 
203). According to Spinoza, we conceive an infinite quantity abstractly when 
we conceive of it as divisible. As we have seen, we can do this only by 
considering it as composed of parts that are really distinct from each other, that 
is, contingent in relation to each other and (as a consequence) separable. But 
any attribute that we conceive a substance under which admits of division is 
falsely conceived, because, as Spinoza states in 1p12: “No attribute of a 
substance can be truly conceived from which it follows that the substance can 
be divided.” Time, number and measure are all only applicable when we 
 
127 
conceive of some quantity as conceptually divisible into parts. And we 
conceive of a quantity as composed of parts by imagining it as constituted by 
contingently co-existing parts. According to this genealogy of beings of the 
imagination, they all arise when we mistakenly imagine contingency where 
there is no contingency. Unless the imagination is checked by reason, we will 
mistakenly attribute contingency to modes, and as a consequence, think of 
them as objectively temporal and measurable. For this reason, it seems 
plausible that contingency too is a being of the imagination. But as Spinoza 
points out, beings of the imagination are not beings at all, but rather non-
beings. And since perfection must be being, beings of the imagination cannot, 
as such, contribute any perfection at all.  
I submit that we could not think of modes of substance as contingent without 
falsely thinking of substance as divisible and conversely, we could not think of 
substance as divisible without thinking of its modes as contingent in relation to 
the whole. If I am right in that, for Spinoza, these two views imply each other 
and one is committed to one if one holds the other, then regardless of whether 
inadequacy implies falsity or not, we are thinking falsely of modes when we 
think of them as contingent in the same way as we think falsely of a substance 
when we imagine it as divisible. 
This is not to deny, of course, that any idea, being real, has perfection and thus 
contributes to the overall perfect scheme of things. Nor is it intended to deny 
that the conceivability of something as contingent may still follow from perfect-
making features of the world. However, I would like to claim that this 
conceivability is not itself such a feature; it is a mere side-effect of a perfect-
making feature. More precisely, it is a side-effect of the perfect-making feature 
of the universe which consists in its plenitude, that is in its being maximally 
(infinitely) populated with finite things. 
Let me sum up the difference between Newlands’ reading and mine. On 
Newlands’ reading, the conceivability of things as contingent or necessary 
makes the world more perfect than it would otherwise have been, and, given 
non-essentialism, the objective modality of the thing in question is a function 
of how it is conceived. On my reading, while there is certainly a variability in 
which subjective modality we can assign to things, the contingency we ascribe 
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to things does not reflect their objective modality. So the objective modality of 
a thing is not a function of how it is conceived. Finite modes appear contingent 
for two reasons. First, because their ontological composition makes it 
impossible for us to deduce their necessity from their essence and second, 
because their infinite production makes it impossible for us to deduce their 
necessity from their causes. But conceiving of things as contingent does not 
contribute to the perfection of the world, although the fact that there are 
conceptions at all does so contribute. 
 Conclusion. 
In this chapter, I have suggested that it is because finite things are both S-
contingent and generated by an infinite succession of causes that they, on their 
own, don’t provide the information that allows us to “see” their necessity. 
But what is the point of all these meandering distinctions? The point is, as implied 
at the onset of this chapter, ethical and, as I intend to show shortly, even 
therapeutical. Let me conclude by pointing out the practical significance of 
Spinoza’s modal metaphysics. 
The abyss separating the apparently contingent things of the world from their 
necessitating ground (God) cannot be over-bridged by reason - from the direction 
of the singular things, that is. In contrast, Spinoza maintains that with God’s 
essence as one’s point of departure, one can arrive at the necessity of things: I 
cannot here describe this process in any detail, but setting aside other difficult 
aspects of that doctrine, this is indeed what happens in the third kind of 
knowledge, in which individual essences are known to follow from God’s nature 
(2p40s2).  
Spinoza makes do without many assumptions which our “common sense” deems 
as matters of course. For instance, he denies the divisibility of infinite quantities 
and he denies that we have the power to suspend our will. But there is one datum 
of experience which Spinoza is not willing to explain away, and that is our slavery 
to passions. Slavery to passions is Spinoza’s point of departure. How is slavery to 
passions for things which are less than infinite and infinitely less real than what is 
infinitely perfect, to be explained? It would be utterly inexplicable if we were not 
victims of some grandiose illusion concerning what these things are. 
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Indeed, on Spinoza’s view, we are enslaved by passions only to the extent that we 
fall prey to inadequate ideas. For instance, we imagine the things for which we 
burn to be anything but necessary. In Chapter 6, I will explore Spinoza’s claim 
that affects toward things which we conceive of as free - thereby meaning things 
that we think of as not determined by causes other than themselves - are greater 
than all other affects, while affects toward things we regard as necessary are more 
easily curbed. Because, in spite of the fact that modes are necessary, we often 
regard them as if they were free. It is, in short, because we misconceive them as 
free that we are consumed by passions for them. 
In conclusion, Spinoza was willing to jettison the Aristotelian rejection of an 
actualized infinity because he thought could thereby safeguard the appearance of 
contingency in a world where all is necessary. And this appearance of 












A very strange picture of perfection is taking shape. In order to see that picture 
clearly, it is worthwhile to back away, for the moment being, from all historical 
connections and more detailed exegesis and instead focus more sharply on the 
relations that hold between the various claims that together form this theory of 
perfection. 
 
Before I discuss the relations just mentioned, however, it is worthwhile to first 
introduce the importance of the PSR and divine infinity and perfection in some 
more detail. I will do so by (1) indicating their respective roles in one of Spinoza’s 
arguments for God’s necessary existence in the Ethics 1p11d. In order to 
determine the role that divine infinity and perfection play in this argument, it will 
be necessary to in addition discuss Spinoza’s theory that conceivability entails 
being but not existence. However, the distinction between mere being and 
existence poses serious difficulties within the system and I do not claim that I, 
within the scope of this discussion, can solve them here. 
 
The basic picture will then be drawn by discussing four relations of grounding, 
namely (2) that of necessitarianism in the PSR, (3) that of necessitarianism in 
divine infinity and perfection and finally, (4) the absence of (ontologically solid) 
imperfection in necessitarianism. While it is arguable the PSR grounds divine 
infinity and perfection too, this relation will not be under scrutiny in this chapter. 
My present purpose is to show that it is the grounding of necessitarianism in 
divine perfection and infinity (3) that is crucial to Spinoza in the establishment of 
(4), i.e. the absence of (ontologically solid) imperfection in the world. This result 
is interesting because it shows that, as far as his theory of perfection is concerned, 
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Spinoza’s theology - and more precisely his view that God is absolutely infinite - 
takes precedence over his metaphysical rationalism. (The tension between these 
two different priorities has previously been raised by Melamed [2013a]). Lastly, 
(in section 5.5) I link this picture of metaphysical perfection with Spinoza’s 
account of strictly human perfection. Subsequent parts of the thesis will deal with 
the problem raised in the final section, namely with how a reconceptualization of 
infinity along theological lines can be integrated into Spinoza’s practical 
philosophy of self-cultivation. 
 
 5.1. The second argument for God’s necessary existence in 1p11d. 
 
Bennett’s influential reading from 1984 presents Spinoza as a metaphysical 
rationalist. Metaphysical rationalism is the name for a philosophical view that one 
obtains by endorsing the Principle of Sufficient Reason (the PSR), which Spinoza 
expresses in various passages throughout his work.
119
 Ever since Bennett’s 
contribution, readings that emphasize Spinoza’s commitment to this principle, 
have come been widely endorsed - one may even think that they now tend to 
dominate the anglophone scholarship. 
 
What is the PSR? The principle has been given various definitions. It can be 
regarded as the view that there is an answer to every why-question, or that 
there is an explanation or ground for every truth, fact or thing (this is not an 
exhaustive list). In this thesis I am not concerned with presenting the strongest 
possible version of the PSR, and so I will not present a satisfying theory of 
what exactly should ideally count as a sufficient reason (e.g. explanation or 
ground). Of course, explanation and ground are concepts philosophers still 
struggle to explicate. And whether or not one is inclined to accept the PSR may 
depend on how one understands its pivotal concept.
120
 Nonetheless I will 
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 For an overview, see the section on Spinoza in Melamed and Lin (2018). The key pas-
sages listed by Melamed and Lin (2018) are: PPC, Part 1, axiom 11; 1a2; more controver-
sially 1a3; 1p11d and 1p8s2. I here unpack one argument in 1p11d which relies on the 
PSR, without discussing or even mentioning all references to the PSR in Spinoza’s oeu-
vre.  
120
 I will just provide one example of how to (stipulatively) define explanation so as to 




follow Spinoza in speaking of the PSR as giving reasons for the existence (or 
non-existence) of things (see 1p11d). Of course, if there are sufficient reasons 
for the existence or non-existence of things, there are also sufficient reasons for 
the truths that such things exist (or fail to exist). And likewise, if there are 
sufficient reasons for the propositions that things exist or fail to exist, then it 
appears that there should be sufficient reasons for the existence or non-
existence of the things themselves as well. So the choice appears trivial. What 
is gained by sticking with Spinoza’s preferred way of speaking? By speaking 
as he does, Spinoza, I believe, is attempting to describe the way things are at a 
metaphysically fundamental level. It is because something first and foremost 
exists, that the proposition that it does so is true. For Spinoza, all our true 
knowledge must be based on reality (1p30). This claim may not appear 
original, but it is manifested in some innovative solutions. For example, in 
order for us to be able to speak coherently of things such as a merely 
constructible rectangle, Spinoza - as we will see shortly - grants that these have 
being, while denying that they exist. 
 
On Spinoza’s version of the PSR, that principle is compatible with there being no 
external reasons for the existence of necessary things. The reason why the PSR, 
thus understood, entails that there exists something that does not owe its existence 
to anything but itself, is the following. If there, ultimately, is to be a complete 
explanation for everything, the propagation of explanations must terminate 
somewhere. At the terminus of that propagation of explanations, there should be a 
                                                                                                                                     
subsumption under a generalization. The last-mentioned concept Whitaker unpacks as 
follows: “A law or a generalization is the statement of an order or pattern of uniformity, 
and a thing is subsumed under a generalization when it is shown to fit within or corre-
spond to the order or uniformity expressed in the generalization.” On the basis of this 
understanding of explanation, he argues that there cannot be any explanation for the 
whole of everything there is, the so-called universe. For a generalization always involves 
something beyond the particular. Is the ultimate explanation or the ultimately explanatory 
thing in the set of things that it explains (all truths or all things)? If it is not inside the 
universe, it is not a member of what is, and so is nothing. But if it is inside the universe, it 
is not beyond that which it explains and so cannot explain it. There are no other options 
and the options are mutually exclusive. Hence, Whitaker concludes that the question of 
why there is such a thing as the universe is unanswerable and as a consequence meaning-
less. (Needless to point out, Whitaker’s argument presupposes that this contradiction is 
not true. Graham Priest (2006 and elsewhere) argues that true contradictions arise exactly 
at the limits of explanation. Priest would consider the paradox Whitaker appeals to an 
instance of his Inclosure Schema.) 
 
133 
thing that both exists necessarily and which cannot owe its necessity to anything 
else. If it is to be explained at all, it must within itself have the resources to 
explain its own existence. It should come as no surprise, then, that the PSR is one 
of the premises on which Spinoza’s demonstration for the necessary existence of 
such a thing is predicated. Next, I will consider the second demonstration Spinoza 
provides for God’s necessary existence (1p11d).
121
 As it stands in the text, the 
PSR is but one premise in the argument for God’s necessary existence. 
 
The demonstration can be broken down as follows:  
 
P1: There is for every thing a reason for its nonexistence (or existence). 
P2: That reason must be either internal (viz. contained in the essence of the thing) 
or external.  
P3: To give a reason for the nonexistence (or existence) of something is also to 
provide the cause for the nonexistence (or existence) of that thing. 
P4: Substances cannot interact causally.  
C1: The reason for the nonexistence of a substance cannot be external (from P3; 
P4).  
P5: There is an internal reason for nonexistence only when the essence of a thing 




P6: The essence of a substance is not such that its instantiation would entail a 
contradiction.  
C2: The reason for the nonexistence of a substance cannot be internal (from P5; 
P6).  
C3: There can be no internal or external reason for the nonexistence of a 
substance - or a substance necessarily exists.  
                                                 
121
 Sometimes, Spinoza’s demonstrations in 1p11d are construed as ontological argu-
ments in favour of God’s existence. By contrast, Ruth Barcan (1993, p. 173) has argued 
that what Spinoza is concerned with demonstrating is rather the fact that God exists in the 
mode of necessity. On Barcan’s analysis of the Ethics, there are no detours via the subject 
of knowledge in any of Spinoza’s demonstrations of God’s (necessary) existence, and for 
that reason, they do not, according to her, qualify as ontological. 
122
 I owe this way of construing Spinoza’s notion of a self-contradictory essence to Lin 
(2010, p. 277). 
 
134 
P7: God is a substance.  
C4: God exists necessarily (from C3; P7).  
 
Many of these premises are far from self-evident, but to discuss all of them is a 
task that I cannot undertake here.  
 
Above, I mentioned that the PSR intuitively appears to entail the existence of 
some necessary thing, one in which all explanatory chains must ultimately 
terminate. On Spinoza’s view, such a thing is, by definition, a substance (1d3), for 
only a substance is “conceived [viz. explained] through itself”. Moreover, the 
substance is unique.
123
 If God is to be the ground of all there is, he must be that 
substance. Hence, it appears that the PSR alone, along with the definition of 
substance and the equation of God with substance, would suffice to establish 
God’s necessary existence. Interestingly, Spinoza’s reasoning is richer in premises 
than what appears to be requisite.  
 
It is especially P6 - the premise that the notion of substance is coherent - that 
appears to lead Spinoza away from such an ideologically parsimonious landscape. 
Is God’s nature really such that its instantiation would entail no contradiction, as 
P6 demands? The justification Spinoza provides for P6 seems question-begging. 
He says:  
 
 Since, then, there can be outside the divine nature, no reason, or, 
cause which takes away the divine existence, the reason will 
necessarily have to be in this nature itself, if indeed he does not 
exist. That is, his nature would involve a contradiction […] But it is 
absurd to affirm this of a Being absolutely infinite and supremely 
perfect (1p11d G. II/53).  
 
The premise that substances cannot causally interact is listed as P4 above. In his 
refutation of the possibility of external reasons for the nonexistence of substances, 
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 The demonstration for substance monism/monotheism Spinoza provides in 1p14. I 
will not deal with the details of that argument here. The PSR appears to force upon us the 
notion of one ultimate necessarily existing being, unless there can be a sufficient reason 




Spinoza is relying on the assumption that a substance in order to causally interfere 
with another substance to prevent it from existing, would have to share an 
attribute with it, which is impossible because of the ban against attribute-sharing 
substances (1p5). It is worth mentioning, however, that the same result which 
follows from that ban also follows from the absolute infinity of the substance. 
Because if the substance is absolutely infinite in such a way that there can be 
nothing outside it, its existence can evidently not be hampered with from without. 
Each of these reasons on its own provides sufficient justification for P4.  
 
But likewise, the fact that God is absolutely infinite makes it impossible for there 
to be any internal reasons for his nonexistence. The infinity of substance is thus 
also put to the task of rendering internal reasons for nonexistence impossible. As 
the citation above indicates, Spinoza cannot be said to have elaborated very much 
on how he reached that conclusion.  
 
It is to be noted that Spinoza does not say that it is a contradiction in terms to say 
of a substance, which is by definition self-conceived and thus conceived, that it is 
inconceivable. That line of reasoning would have been more readily accessible. 
Instead he says that the absurdity consists in thus construing a being supremely 
perfect and absolutely infinite.  
 
Let me first present the reason Spinoza presumably held it an absurdity that we 
should think of a supremely perfect and absolutely infinite being as non-existing. I 
would like to suggest that Spinoza thinks of inconceivability as a kind of negation, 
and more precisely, as the negation of a form of being. Spinoza’s understanding of 
infinity renders it a conceptual impossibility that there be such a negation of being 
in an absolutely infinite thing. In 1ps81, he says: 
 
 Since being finite is really, in part, a negation, and being infinite is 
an absolute affirmation of the existence of some nature, it follows 
from 1p7 [viz. the idea that it pertains to the  nature of a substance 
to exist] alone that every substance must be infinite. [NS: For if we 
assumed a finite substance, we would in part deny existence to its 




Inconceivable “things” (although perhaps they do not merit this ontological 
honorific) can have no being as objects of ideas. To have being as the object of an 
idea is to be conceivable. But Spinoza insists (indeed, his idea-mode parallelism 
obliges him to insist) that there must to every idea correspond something in the 
attributes distinct from thought. But it is absurd to think of something absolutely 
infinite as being existentially deprived of being under any attribute. That which is 
absolutely infinite must not only be but also exist under all attributes. Because to 
be absolutely infinite is to have one’s existence affirmed in every possible way, 
and all attributes, are ways of being. 
 
On my reading, Spinoza’s cited explanation of why it would be an “absurdity” to 
think of an absolutely infinite being as inconceivable presupposes only that 
conceivability involves being. Existence comes into play not because of what 
conceivability involves, but because of how absolute infinity is defined. It may be 
noted that this assumption - that everything that is conceivable has being - is 
weaker than a widespread reading of Spinoza according to which everything that 
is possible and conceivable exists, and so should be acceptable to at least all who 
accept the stronger claim. On my reading of Spinoza, whatever exists, is, but not 
all things that are need exist. Let me elucidate this further.  
 
In 2p8, Spinoza states: “The ideas of singular things, or of modes, that do not 
exist must be comprehended in God’s infinite idea in the same way as the formal 
essences of singular things, or modes, are contained in God’s attributes.” In the 
scholium Spinoza anticipates the reader’s request for an example by saying:  
 
 If anyone wishes me to explain this further by an example, I will, 
of course, not be able to give one which adequately explains what I 
speak of here, since it is unique. Still, I shall try as far as possible to 
illustrate the matter… (Emphasis added)  
 
He then proceeds to give a geometrical example of how we can construct, in a 
circle, an infinite amount of equal rectangles. It may so happen that one of the 
rectangles has been drawn and thus exists. That rectangle then has being not only 
as the possible object of an idea but also as an existent. Spinoza’s point is that the 
ideas of the other constructible but not yet existing rectangles also have being. 
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They have being because they are “contained in the idea of the circle”. We cannot 
(adequately) conceive of a circle within which infinite rectangles cannot be drawn 
by following the constructive procedure of which Spinoza speaks.
124
 It is 
interesting that Spinoza, before providing this example, indicates that it is in a 
way inexact. Why does not the case with the rectangles inscribable within a circle 
exemplify the case of inexistent (formal) essences being “contained in God’s 
attributes”? I take it that Spinoza’s example is (as he himself acknowledges) not 
an actual example for the following reason. The circle is to stand for an attribute 
of God; the constructed rectangle stands for existing things on a par with you and 
me, and the constructible but as yet nonexistent rectangles stand for things that 
have being merely insofar as their essences are contained in God’s attributes. 
 
What Spinoza provides is an analogy, because the circle is at most an existing 
thing on a par with you or me. Rectangles of certain dimensions can be 
constructed within circles of certain radii. It is the nature of the circle that 
determines the dimensions of the rectangles that can be constructed within it. But 
this is the case merely because we first postulated the circle. By comparison, 
God’s nature is primary not because we postulated it first but in a more 
fundamental way. Indeed, the way in which God is more fundamental than us 
cannot be exemplified, “since it is unique”. What then accounts for which kinds of 
things can have being as formal essences in his attributes? Since God’s attributes 
are infinite in kind, there can be no limit to the kinds of things whose formal 
essences can be contained within them. The essence of every conceivable thing is 
so contained. 
 
It may be worth noting that the view that all possibilia are actualized in existence 
and not only as beings appears to be forced upon Spinoza by Curley’s translation 
of 1p35. 1p35 reads: Quicquid concipimus in Dei potestate esse, id necessario est. 
But although Curley renders this est as ‘exists’, and although it often so 
understood in the secondary literature,
125
 it is at least not self-evident that Spinoza 
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 Curley points out that Spinoza is here citing a method from theorem 35, book III, of 
Euclid’s Elements. C. 452, n. 15. 
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 E.g. Koistinen (1998, p. 61), Omri Boehm (2016, p. 569). At least Koistinen’s reading 




is here speaking of the kind of being that we call existence. Spinoza’s 
commitment to the actualization of all conceivable things need not entail the 
existence of all conceivable things. Let us assume that human beings can conceive 
of anything whose definition is not self-contradictory. The beings that we cannot 
conceive are not even possibly beings; to this category of pseudo-entities belong 
“chimeras” such as the square circle or an object that is simultaneously red and 
green all over. Moreover, exactly the same objects belong to the category of 
things we can conceive and the category of things we can conceive to be within 
God’s power.
126
And everything whose definition is not self-refuting, that is, 
everything we can conceive to be within God’s power, is, but it need not on that 
account exist.  
 
My conjecture is thus that Spinoza occupies a position halfway between 
contemporary actualism and concretism. By actualism I mean the view that there 
are only “this-wordly actual entities”, by concretism the view that there are 
“concrete non-actual entities”.
127
 Spinoza’s view is like the concretist in that he 
acknowledges a difference between different kinds of being: to wit, between 
existence and mere being. While the concretist attributes existence to possibilia 
(albeit in universes spatiotemporally disconnected from our universe), Spinoza 
attributes being to all conceivable things.
128
 But this kind of being consists in 
being actualized in an attribute of God. So, he is like the actualist in believing 
only in things actualized in our universe: whether they be actualized through 
existence or through another kind of being. (In order to make the claim I just 
made, I relied on the assumption that God or Nature, as existing in infinite 
attributes, is one universe. This, one may object, isn’t the case: some, indeed 
most, attributes are beyond our epistemic horizon, and thus more like separate 
universes. However, I think it is more accurate to think of the Spinozist God as a 
                                                                                                                                     
noza of the view that all possibilities are actualized in existence is taken to be a conse-
quence of the PSR. 
126
 That this is indeed Spinoza’s view should not be controversial. But why does our abil-
ity to conceive things in different ways track God’s power? This question merits careful 
attention. 
127
 I borrow this way of phrasing the distinction from Pruss (2011, pp. 126-7).  
128
 If the diamond of possibility could be interpreted in terms of conceivability, then Spi-
noza would thus probably accept the iconic formula that ((Conceivably) (There is) an x 
such that x is F) entails ((There is an x) such that (conceivably) x is F).  
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multi-dimensional universe than as a multiverse. While we have no reason to 
think that anything identical with ourselves exist in separate universes, this is 
entailed by one of the parallelisms Spinoza endorses (namely the parallelism 
between modes as conceived under different attributes), and so it appears more 
accurate to think of modes as existing in one universe, but in infinitely many 
dimensions, than to think of the attributes as slicing up being into something like 
multiverses.) So, beings can, I think, on Spinoza’s view, be divided into 
necessarily actual objects (things that do not exist, but which have being as formal 
essences in some attribute of God) and necessarily actual objects that also exist. 
(Of course, a contemporary actualist would not say that, since she is most likely to 
be committed to the view that some things are contingent. But there are for 
Spinoza no contingent things.) 
 
It should be clear from 2p8 alone that something can have being as formal 
essences in an attribute of God without therefore existing. Of course, things that 
exist are also conceivable. But Spinoza’s talk of things that have being without 
therefore existing poses several, rarely noted, problems for any consistent 
interpretation of his philosophy. It is worthwhile to present some of these 
problems here.  
 
I take existence to be a certain manner of being. But what is the mark of existence, 
which singles existing things out from the ones that merely are?  
 
Spinoza is not alone in acknowledging fundamentally different modes of being. 
Taking a cue from contemporary philosophies of modality, one may perhaps wish 
to map Spinoza’s distinction between existence and being onto the contemporary 
one between actuality and existence. While actuality, for contemporary 
concretists, requires things to exist in the same spacetime as we do, existence does 
not. On a concretist understanding of possible entities, these entities exist, albeit 
non-spatiotemporally (or, more accurately, not in our spacetime).  
 




How about space? For Spinoza, extension is an attribute. Attribute parallelism 
entails that whatever is extended exists also in all of God’s other infinite 
attributes. So, things cannot exist because they are in extension as opposed to 
being in any other attribute. But perhaps their being in extension can be what 
explains their existing, even if they are also actualized in other (parallel) 
attributes? This won’t do. For if something conceived under a different attribute 
existed because it were identical with something extended, the existence of things 
that are conceived under other attributes than extension would be explained by an 
appeal to their being identical with an extended mode. This would flaunt what is 
popularly called Spinoza’s explanatory barrier between attributes, according to 
which no things conceived under different attributes can be explained by 
reference to each other (i.e. there is no cross-attribute explanation of substances or 
their modes as conceived under different attributes: see 1p10). If the mark of 
existence in a thing conceived under an attribute other than extension were that it 
was somehow parallel to something extended, then a certain feature of that thing - 
its existence - would be explainable only by reference to an attribute under which 
that thing was not presently conceived, and this appears to be an infraction against 
the explanatory self-containment of the attributes.  
 
How about time then? Perhaps existing things, unlike things that merely are but 
fail to exist, are in time. One may initially be wary about temporality being the 
mark of existence, since God exists, and yet is eternal. As we saw in the preceding 
chapter, however, Spinoza appears to discredit the property of temporality. In 
Letter 12, he insists that time is merely a tool of the imagination whereby we 
conceive of things as having duration. Temporality is therefore not, on Spinoza’s 
view, an objective property of things.  
 
But need the mark of existence be an objective property of things? Perhaps it 
could be a merely relational one. For a world to be actual, on a popular theory of 
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actuality, means for it to be ours.
129
 Spinozist existence could perhaps similarly be 
construed in relation to an observer. 
 
This suggestion would have been rejected by Spinoza. In his cosmological 
argument for God’s existence (1p11d, G. II/53), Spinoza claims that not to be able 
to exist is to lack power, while to be able to exist is to have power. What kind of 
power is Spinoza speaking of? Presumably the same kind of power that he later 
mentions in 1p36 - namely that of being able to produce effects. But the causal 
power of a thing is not normally to be established by the relation of that thing to 
an observer. Based on previous chapters, one may wish to construe the power of 
existing as consisting exactly in the power to bring about effects. But such causal 
activity co-varies with one’s perfection (5p40): arguably, one’s perfection is even 
identical with one’s causal activity. But such perfection is of the ontological, not 
the teleological stripe, and is thus not to be defined in relation to a human mind. It 
is instead a genuine property of things. 
 
It is clear from 1p36 that Spinoza takes existence to involve the causation of at 
least some effect. For this reason, it is tempting to take the causation of effects as 
the mark of existence. The reason why this solution is untenable is internal to 
Spinozism: it arises from Spinoza’s own system of equivalencies. Perfection, 
Spinoza says, co-varies with activity (5p40), by which he understands the causal 
production of effects. But perfection is defined with reality in 2d6, and reality is 
defined with being (esse) in 1p10s. Hence, if existence, but not being, is 
coextensive with the causation of effects, then being (esse) cannot be coextensive 
with itself. 
 
So far, all these prima facie plausible interpretations of Spinoza’s distinction 
between existence and mere being run counter to other doctrines he also 
maintains. What is one then to make of the distinction? In what follows I will 
gesture toward a solution, though I cannot undertake to provide a full-scale 
defence of it here.  
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 Perhaps there could be a relevant similarity between such a theory of existence and the 
indexical theory of the actuality of our world. Since, however, it turns out that for Spino-




If we return to 2p8s, the difference between the causality exerted by an existing 
rectangle and the causality exerted by a merely conceivable one is easily 
imaginable. Perhaps the existing rectangle has been constructed in the circle with 
the help of ropes tied to the ground. The rectangle can now cause someone to trip 
over them. The merely conceivable rectangle has no such power. It is in fact hard 
to think of a merely constructible rectangle as exerting any causal influence at all. 
This however does not yet show that a formal essence inscribed in an attribute of 
God is similarly powerless. For, at the very least, as the object of an idea it gives 
rise to a concatenation of ideas in God’s intellect. Nonetheless, the way in which 
things that exist operate as causes differ from the way in which things that merely 
are operate as causes. For one can, I think, distinguish between the kind of causes 
that produces a thing as existing and the kind of cause that causes it to merely be.  
 
Existence, is, on Spinoza’s view, “attributed to singular things because infinitely 
many things follow from the eternal necessity of God’s nature in infinitely many 
modes” (2p44s). Yet, not even God, from whose nature they follow, can think of 
these things as existing in abstraction from other things which cause them (ad 
infinitum: 1p28). By contrast, God need not think of what other things cause some 
thing to be formally inscribed in one of his attribute; it is enough for him to 
entertain the thought of the attribute to thereby automatically know the formal 
essences inscribed in it. It is indeed because formal essences have being only in 
virtue of being features of God’s attributes that knowledge of the attributes 
suffices to yield knowledge of these essences. On this proposal, finite existing 
things differ from things that merely are in that they operate as causes only by 
belonging to infinitely regressing chains. But how about the difference between 
things that exist and things that merely are when both are infinite? It may be 
responded that on Spinoza’s view, all absolutely infinite things we can conceive 
must also exist, and so that category of things should not confound us. This 
response, however, faces the potentially devastating problem of the infinite 
modes. Surely, we can conceive of different infinite modes than the ones that 
exist? For this reason, although it is stronger than others, this solution is also 




In this chapter, I cannot resolve the difficulties that surround Spinoza’s distinction 
between being and existence. Nonetheless, it was necessary to discuss at some 
length Spinoza’s distinctions between being and existence in order to see why 
conceivability entails being, and existence being, but being does not entail 
existence. In addition, I hope I have showed that this distinction allows Spinoza to 
say that our talk of possibilia qua merely conceivable beings (rather than modally 
speaking genuinely possible beings) is about something that has being. 
 
Let me conclude this section by drawing the relations between the necessary 
existence of God, the PSR and divine infinity and perfection. It may be surmised 
that if there is no self-explanatory thing the PSR fails. If the PSR is granted, the 
essence of the self-explanatory thing must be instantiated. But, interestingly, for 
Spinoza such a self-explanatory thing must have certain (divine) features. It must 
be infinite (in the Spinozist sense of equaling the totality), for otherwise it could 
be inconceivable (and then C2 would not follow) and it could be prevented from 
existing from without (and then C1 would not follow). In the former case, 
inconceivability entails lack of being and since all existence is being, lack of 
existence. But an absolutely infinite thing could, by definition, not lack existence. 
In the latter case, there are two reasons as to why C2 should hold. It follows 
immediately from P4, the ban against substances interfering causally with each 
other. But C2 also follows from the substance’s absolute infinity. Unless the 
substance were impervious to causal influence from without, the reason why the 
substance existed would be conditional upon another thing’s not preventing it 
from existing, and why that thing behaved in this way would in turn require an 
explanation of its own. In order to exclude that possibility, the substance must be 
such that it is impervious to causal influence from without. It is such if it is 
causally isolated from other substances (P4) as well as if it is absolutely infinite. 
A thing that is infinite in this way is also supremely perfect (1p11d). To be 
infinite, to equal the totality, to be impermeable to causal influence from without 
and to be supremely perfect appear to be co-extensive notions in Spinozism.
130
 
While God’s impermeability to external influence appears to be deducible from 
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 Lin (2010, p. 282), drawing on Curley’s and Normore’s research on Descartes, has 




the PSR, the definition of absolute infinity as existence under all conceivable 
attributes appears not to be so deducible. Perhaps it is because the PSR alone 
cannot afford the definition of God as absolutely infinite that Spinoza does not 
base his demonstration of God’s necessary existence on the PSR alone. One may 
wish to object that ultimately the definition of absolute infinity is in fact an 
immediate consequence of the PSR.
131
  In this chapter, I will not argue directly 
against this possibility: that is, I will not show that such a grounding (of absolute 
infinity in the PSR) is impossible. Instead, I intend to show that Spinoza’s 
theology, and not his metaphysical rationalism, carries the heavy weight in his 
account of transcendental perfection.  
 
 5.2. The grounding of necessitarianism in the PSR. 
 
There are two routes leading to necessitarianism available to Spinoza. One goes 
from the PSR straight to necessitarianism, the other via characterizations of God’s 
nature. In this chapter, I will suggest that the grounding of necessitarianism in 
God’s absolute infinity and supreme perfection is of most relevance for Spinoza’s 
theory of perfection, and, as a consequence, for his ethics. Let me first briefly 
introduce the familiar grounding of necessitarianism in the PSR.  
 
Many philosophers have noted that it seems nearly impossible to embrace the PSR 
without, as a side-effect, getting necessitarianism. The most influential derivation 
of necessitarianism from the PSR is due to Peter van Inwagen (1983, pp. 203-
4).
132
 His argument as to why the PSR leads to the “collapse of all modal 
distinctions” is the following. P1. Assume the PSR. P2. Assume that there are 
contingent truths. P3. There is then a conjunction of all contingent truths. C1. 
There is then a sufficient reason for this conjunction (from P1 and P3). P4. That 
reason is either necessary or contingent. P5. A contingent truth cannot be the 
sufficient reason for itself. C2. The sufficient reason for the conjunction of 
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 In this metaphysically rationalist vein, Lin (2012) has argued that although Spinoza’s 
demonstration of necessitarianism in 1p28d is theocentric on the surface, several of the 
premises in that argument are actually consequences of the PSR. 
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 Dasgupta (2016, p. 395) presents a version of the PSR according to which it just is a 
restatement of a necessitarian position.  
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contingent truths cannot be contingent, for then it is a conjunct in said 
conjunction, and would have to be the sufficient reason for itself (contradicts 
P5).
133
 C3. The sufficient reason for the conjunction of contingent truths cannot be 
necessary, because if the sufficient reason for the conjunction of all contingent 
truths is necessary, then these truths must be necessary too (contradicts P2). C4. 
The conclusion to be drawn from this impasse is that one cannot entertain the 
view that there is something such as the conjunction of all contingent truths if one 
endorses the PSR. Inwagen takes this to mean that unless we are willing to 
abandon our impression that things could have been different, we are to reject the 
PSR. He chooses to marshal this argument against the plausibility of the PSR.  
The argument has been attacked on many accounts unrelated to P1. I will not 
discuss its soundness here - but it may be surmised that P3 is the premise most 
vulnerable to attack.
134
 Let me instead point out the general strategy. Inwagen’s 
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 Inwagen’s reason as to why the conjunction cannot be contingent is slightly more 
elaborate than stated here. It reads: “It cannot be contingent, for if it were contingent, it 
would be a conjunct of P; and if it were a conjunct of P it would be entailed by P; and if it 
were entailed by P it would both entail and be entailed by P; and if it both entailed and 
were entailed by P, it would be P […]; and if S were P, then a contingent states of affairs 
would be its own sufficient reason, contrary to our second principle” (1983, p. 203). 
134
 Allow me to mention a few objections here. 
 Levey (2016) says that the assumption to be rejected, is that there is such a thing 
as all contingent truths, independently of whether there is a conjunction of them or not. 
Levey instead proposes to construe contingent truth as an indefinitely extendible notion 
and proposes a rationalism with a “tincture” of constructivism. Levey’s solution is ingen-
ious but one is left doubting whether things such as facts can be modeled after construc-
tivist solutions that deal with abstracta such as sets without positing that there is such a 
thing as their totality. We can grant that some notions are extendible in the sense that they 
can be conjured forth when we need them, without therefore enjoying independent exist-
ence when the notions in question are formally constructed, such as mathematical ones. 
But can reality really behave like this? Must not the contingent truths in which other con-
tingent truths are grounded enjoy some form of more solid being? Leaving this philo-
sophical issue aside, in the context of Spinoza’s philosophy, there is clearly such a thing 
as the totality of all apparently contingent, finite things (which Spinoza describes as the 
face of the whole universe). (Levey admittedly discusses how we can generalize about 
concepts that are indefinitely extendible in some ontologically non-committed way (see 
pp. 426-7), but for Spinoza the generalization in question is not ontologically neutral in 
this way.) Another path (mentioned by Levey but considered less convincing by him) is 
to construe contingent truths as a kind of things that cannot be gathered into one conjunc-
tion at all, being too many. Tomaszeweski (2016, pp. 265-9) has made a diagonal argu-
ment to that effect. 
 The presupposition that explanations entail their explananda has been disputed by 
Pruss (2011), who points out that stochastic explanations do not entail their explananda, 
instead they only render the explananda more likely (pp. 230-4). This move is not open to 




argument proceeds by first isolating, on the one side, all truths that are not self-
explanatory and, on the other side, the one truth which is self-explanatory. That 
truth should be self-explanatory, for otherwise it would be a member of that which 
is it supposed to explain, and it is supposed to explain the existence of what is not 
self-explanatory. The problem is that once its existence is assumed to be self-
explanatory and so necessary, it as it were infects the supposedly contingent side 
with its necessity. For how can something which ultimately depends on something 
necessary be contingent?  
 
Spinoza, as mentioned, prefers to speak of things rather than truths. But he was 
clearly aware of this kind of argument (albeit perhaps not in this sharp 
articulation). First it is to be recalled that causes are for Spinoza sufficient 
reasons. In the chapter of the KV entitled “Of God’s predestination” (KV, I, VI), 
Spinoza asks whether there could be a series of contingently existing causes 
(where the causes nonetheless necessarily bring about their effects).
135
 If 
something is contingent because its reason is contingent, the totality of such 
things would have to depend on a reason that is itself contingent. However, 
Spinoza thinks that the sole cause on which all things depend is necessary, and so 
that cannot be the case (C. 86). The reason why the ultimate reason cannot be 
contingent is implicitly afforded by the PSR. Although Spinoza does not articulate 
all the steps in the argument, in the KV, he, like Inwagen, reaches 
                                                                                                                                     
 Of course, the only thing that matters in this argument is not the plausibility of 
the premises but also the question of what exactly a sufficient reason is. Dasgupta’s take 
on the PSR - according to which it is the principle that “for every substantive fact Y there 
are some facts, the Xs, such that (i) the Xs ground Y and (ii) each one of the Xs is auton-
omous” - as well his view that essentialist facts are autonomous, are interesting philo-
sophical claims in their own right. If we construe a sufficient reason as a ground, Dasgup-
ta argues, we cannot infer from the fact that there is a sufficient reason for the whole con-
junction that this reason is also a sufficient reason for each conjunct in the conjunction 
(2016, pp. 392-3). Dasgupta provides a simple example: “if A&B, then A and B together 
ground A&B. But clearly one may hold this plausible view without holding that A and B 
together ground A. One might for example hold that A and B are each groundless and yet 
also hold that they together ground A&B.” However, to Spinoza, I take it, the inference 
from the existence of a sufficient reason for the conjunction to the the conclusion that 
there be a sufficient reason for each conjunct is not at all problematic. On his view, to the 
extent that there is a reason for the whole series of things, that reason is also, ultimately, 
the reason for the existence of each member in the series.  
135
 Spinoza calls this contingency in a divided sense. Contingency in a composite sense 
would obtain among a series of causes that necessarily exist but are contingently causes 
(C. 85).  
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necessitarianism by dividing reality into those things for whose existence there is 
supposed to be a sufficient reason and that which is supposed to act as the 
ultimate sufficient reason.  
 
 5.3. The grounding of necessitarianism in divine infinity and perfection. 
 
Above, we saw that the route leading directly to necessitarianism from the PSR 
should have been available to Spinoza. Generally, however, he reaches 
necessitarianism via a different route. He reaches that view by extracting it from 
some specific characteristics of the ultimate sufficient reason, and more 
specifically, from the perfection and infinity of God. The fact that there exist two 
alternative methods for establishing necessitarianism is noteworthy for systematic 
reasons. Their coexistence may be one of the interesting cases where two 
priorities of Spinoza’s collide: one being the PSR, the other being what Melamed 
(2013a: xvii) has described as “the priority of the infinite” - in other words, 
Spinoza’s insistence on the absolute infinity of God. The result is not an internal 
inconsistency but that one theory (necessitarianism) is embraced for what appears 
to be two different, and severally sufficient, reasons. Importantly, although 
necessitarianism is deducible from both, in his entire body of work Spinoza 
appeals mainly to the grounding of necessitarianism in God’s nature. I will 
suggest below that the reason why he does so is founded on his ethics. But since I 
have not previously introduced the equivalence between supreme perfection and 
absolute infinity, allow me to first do that at some length here.  
 
I would like to suggest that by defining God as an absolutely infinite being, 
Spinoza doesn’t wish to supplant the understanding of God as a most perfect 
being (to which he subscribed), but rather to define God more rigorously by 
pointing out what exactly supreme perfection involves. Spinoza’s definition of 
God with an infinite being was not new. Indeed, one of Spinoza’s immediate 
predecessors, Descartes, embraced a notion of God as a supremely perfect and 
infinite being (AT VII 46; AT IX 36) in his demonstration of God’s existence.
136
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 As Koyré points out in his survey of the early modern period, Descartes, as his corre-




That Spinoza’s definition does not contradict the traditional definition of God as a 
perfect being is evident from the fact that Spinoza takes his definition to imply the 
traditional one. 
 
In the Ethics, divine perfection is first introduced casually, in the second 
alternative proof for God’s necessary existence surveyed above (1p11d). As we 
saw in the previous section, Spinoza hypothesizes that if there were a cause which 
could prevent the divine nature from existing, it would have to be located either 
within or without this nature. In arguing against the first alternative, Spinoza 
wrote: “But it is absurd to affirm […] of a Being absolutely infinite and supremely 
perfect [that its nature could be such that it could prevent it from existing]”. Since 
divine perfection has previously not been discussed, Spinoza is assuming that his 
readers can see on their own why an absolutely infinite being also deserves to be 
called supremely perfect.
137
 We are thus to find justification for the deducibility of 
supreme perfection from absolute infinity in the passages that precede this 
demonstration.  
Spinoza identifies perfection with reality in 1p11s. In the light of the equivalence 
between perfection and reality, we can see why these two notions of absolute 
infinity and supreme perfection are also equivalent. It is 1p10s that allows us to 
make this connection, because here Spinoza specifies more in detail what 
maximal reality/perfection consists in. The relevant passage from this scholium 
reads: 
The more reality, or being, [each being] has the more it has 
attributes which express necessity, or eternity, and infinity. And 
consequently, there is also nothing clearer than that a being 
                                                                                                                                     
considered this attribute to be the prerogative of God, refusing to call space anything but 
indefinite. Koyré (1957, p. 124) also emphasizes the roots of Descartes’s view in tradi-
tion: “Infinity, indeed, had always been the essential character, or attribute, of God; espe-
cially since Duns Scotus, who could accept the famous Anselmian a priori proof of the 
existence of God (a proof revived by Descartes) only after he had ‘colored’ it by substitut-
ing the concept of an infinite being (ens infinitum) for the Anselmian concept of ens quo 
maius cogitari nequit”. For further discussion of the Scholastic roots of Descartes’ view, 
see Agostini (2018). 
137
 See also 2p34. The link between infinity and perfection surfaces in previous texts too. 
See for instance CM II: III (C. 319): “So only God is to be called absolutely infinite, inso-
far as we find that he really consists of infinite perfection.” 
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absolutely infinite must be defined as a being that consists of 
infinite attributes, each of which expresses a certain eternal and 
infinite essence (1p10s). 
One’s degree of perfection/reality is directly proportional to the amount and 
quality of the attributes one possesses. Therefore, a being that is most real, and 
accordingly most perfect, must possess infinite and eternal attributes. But a being 
that possesses such attributes is by definition absolutely infinite (1d6). This should 
suffice to explain how the notions are related. 
Let me now turn to a couple of passages where Spinoza deduces necessitarianism 
from God’s absolute infinity/supreme perfection. It is to be noted that this 
exposition is not meant to be exhaustive; my intention is only to point at a pattern 
in Spinoza’s reasoning about the source of the necessity of things.  
 
In the KV Spinoza first suggests that God could not have done things differently 
since he is perfect (KV, I, IV, C. 81). The same reasoning recurs in the Ethics. 
Spinoza appears to consider himself as having established the necessary being of 
things in 1p16. This is indicated by the way he comments on that proposition in 
1p17s:  
 
I think I have shown clearly enough (see P16) that from God’s 
supreme power, or infinite nature, infinitely many things in 
infinitely many modes, i.e., all things have necessarily flowed, 
or always follow, by the same necessity and in the same way as 
from the nature of a triangle it follows, from eternity to eternity, 
that its three angles are equal to two right angles.  
 
In 1p16 Spinoza claims that from the necessity of the divine nature all things 
follow. In 1p17s, he claims to have shown in 1p16 that from God’s infinite nature 
all things follow with the same necessity as from the nature of a triangle it follows 
that the sum of its interior angles is 180. Since God’s existence and nature are one 
(1p20), to follow from the necessity of God is to follow from his necessary 
existence, viz. his necessary nature. The geometrical property of the triangle 
follows (on the premise that there are no non-Euclidean geometries, which I will 
here will grant Spinoza) from the nature of the triangle, because it is not possible 
for there to be a triangle without this property. In 1p17s Spinoza claims that all 
things follow from God in the same way as the essential property of a triangle is 
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instantiated whenever a triangle exists. However we are exactly to understand the 
force by which God’s essence causes its own properties,
138
 there simply cannot be 
God’s essence without there being all things. But since God exists necessarily, all 
things are necessary too. It should not be surprising, then, that most interpreters 
consider 1p16 to be an expression of a kind of mode necessitarianism.  
 
As previously discussed (in Chapter 4), Spinoza is committed to the view that 
infinite things follow in this way from God’s nature. (Previously, I called this 
view Plenitude.) If God did not produce something because of some external 
reason, he could apparently not be absolutely infinite/supremely perfect. In 
addition, Spinoza denies that there can be some thing that such a supremely 
perfect thing can bring forth and yet does not bring forth (see for instance KV, I, 
IV, C. 81-4). But why could not an attribute be self-limiting and result in less 
being than it has the power to produce? This is not so much a consequence of the 
fact that God’s nature is absolutely infinite, as a consequence of the very fact that 
it is a nature in the first place.  
 
For Spinoza, natures or essences are self-affirming (consult the demonstration of 
3p4d). Differently put, things cannot on their own accord abstain from causing 
their essential effects. Spinoza’s view has the remarkable consequence that 
individuals can never be compelled to self-destruction by their essences (see 
4p20s). Spinoza’s claim is not only that nothing can be caused by its essence to go 
out of existence: his claim is, more precisely, that no essence can even compel the 
thing whose essence it is to pursue this goal. This seems to be a very strong 
assumption. It is not hard to think of counter-cases.  
 
According to Freud, the instinct to die is wired into the human psyche. In Beyond 
the Pleasure Principle, Freud stated this rather rhetorically in the following way: 
“If we are to take it as a truth that knows no exception that everything living dies 
for internal reasons - becomes inorganic once again, then we shall be compelled to 
say that ‘the aim of all life is death’.”
139
 Death ultimately comes to all of us, if not 
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 For an in depth reading of this difficult issue, see Viljanen (2011).  
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 Cited from Bostridge (2015, p. 114). 
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violently so because of the decay of our bodies. This biological reality is reflected 
in our subconscious in such a way that we anticipate death by longing for it. Of 
course, that psychological theory does not come equipped with predictions about 
how humans (or their counterparts) behave in other possible worlds. But one can 
at least think of a creature that is essentially such that it pursues its own 
destruction. A world in which things essentially pursue their own destruction is a 
counterexample to Spinoza’s world, where nothing can seek its own destruction 
on the basis of its essence. So why did Spinoza hold it to be impossible for a thing 




Lin provides a fast demystification of Spinoza’s view on self-affirmative 
essences. He interprets Spinoza’s talk of self-contradictory essences as meaning 
essences whose instantiation would entail a contradiction. If there were an essence 
which prevented itself from existing, its instantiation would entail that it both 
existed and not existed. Thus, according to Lin (2007, p. 277), the notion of a non-
self-affirmative essences is ruled out. Because of the distinction made previously, 
between the formal being of all conceivable things in some attribute of God and 
the existence of things such as ourselves, Lin’s view would have to be slightly 
modified to fit my account. What is ruled out by things with self-contradictory 
essential definitions is, strictly speaking, conceivability. This in turn requires 
being as a formal essence in some attribute of God, for there to be something there 
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 The impossibility of essential self-destruction is a topic that has been much debated in 
the literature, especially since Spinoza’s view seems to run counter to the intuition that it 
is possible for some of the individuals who pursue death and destruction to do so out of 
the core of their essences. Differently put, it is hard to imagine which situation is ruled 
out by Spinoza’s ban, since whether individuals self-destruct as a result of their essences 
or as a result of external factors is not in any way testable. There is also a problem of the 
consistency of Spinoza’s view, which, however, to me appears less severe than the above-
stated problem (which concerns its plausibility). For, in spite of his claim that essential 
self-destruction is impossible, Spinoza nonetheless maintains that “the free man” (homo 
liber) would rather destroy himself than be insincere (4p72d). It appears that it is indeed 
an essential feature of the free man’s (his decency) that would compel him to self-destruct 
rather than to be insincere. Many readings have been proposed to mitigate this apparent 
contradiction by arguing that one’s “true” self is not destroyed by the destruction of one’s 
“mundane existence”. See for instance Lebuffe (2005, p. 246), who construes the being 
3p9d speaks of as merely mundane existence, Don Garrett (1996), Delahunty (1985, p. 
227) and most recently Nadler (2016). I agree with Nadler that the solution to this dilem-
ma consists in interpreting the conatus as striving not after mere durational existence but 
after timeless perfection or reality. 
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for us to conceive. Since one cannot exist unless one is conceivable, however, 
inconceivability also rules out existence.  
 
Let me sum up the major upshot of this section. In 1p17s and elsewhere, Spinoza 
takes the route that goes via some property which the necessarily existing thing 
must possess - absolute infinity - and infers from that property the necessary 
being of things. In an earlier text (the KV) he avails himself of a shorter route, 
reaching necessitarianism by the PSR. 
 
There are thus two routes leading to necessitarianism. Some interpreters may wish 
to object that the route leading from divine infinity and perfection is reducible to 
the one leading from the PSR to necessitarianism, as divine infinity and perfection 
(on this reading) are themselves consequences of the PSR. But even granting that 
there is such an alternative, and shorter way, to necessitarianism one may still 
want to ask why Spinoza in the Ethics chooses to go via his characterization of the 
divine nature. In what follows, I intend to supply an answer to this question. In 
order to do so, let me now turn to the last relation of grounding.  
 
 5.4. Necessitarianism grounding the perfection of things.  
 
In 1app, G. II/80, Spinoza makes a striking assertion. He says that he has 
sufficiently shown that…  
 
… Nature has no end set before it and that all final causes are 
nothing by human fictions. For I believe I have already 
sufficiently established it, both by the foundations and causes 
from which I have shown this prejudice to have had its origin, 
and also by 1p16, 1p32c1 and c2, and all those [propositions] by 
which I have shown that all things proceed by a certain eternal 
necessity of nature, and with the greatest perfection.  
 
Things proceed by a certain eternal necessity of nature and with the greatest 
perfection. How are these claims related? Is there a hierarchy among them, such 
that things either follow necessarily because they do so with the greatest 
perfection, or follow with the greatest perfection because they do so necessarily? 




Spinoza had explicitly answered this question before the appendix, in 1p33s2, 
which I have cited earlier. 1p33 states that not only are the things that follow from 
God necessary, but also the causal sequence in which they follow from God is 
necessary and could not have been any different. Let me once more cite this 
crucial scholium:  
 
From the preceding [viz. from the necessity of things and the 
necessity of their causal order] it clearly follows that things have 
been produced by God with the highest perfection, since 
[quandoquidem] they have followed necessarily from a given 
most perfect nature (Emphasis added). 
 
It is worth noting that while the English translation admits of the possibility that 
things may follow from God’s nature perfectly without therefore themselves being 
perfect, the position of summa perfectione (much closer to res than to the 
predicate) makes a reading on which the things that follow from God are 
themselves characterized by the perfection more natural.
141
 That it is indeed the 
case that things are perfect because they follow necessarily from God and they do 
so because God is perfect is supported by other passages where Spinoza indicates 
this. Consider, for example, Spinoza’s claim that necessitarianism eliminates 
imperfection in 4app (C. 544):  
 
We see, therefore, that men are accustomed to call natural things perfect or 
imperfect more from prejudice than from true knowledge of these things. 
For we have shown in the Appendix of Part I that Nature does nothing on 
account of an end. That eternal and infinite being we call God or Nature 
acts from the same necessity from which he exists. 
 
Imperfection is eliminated by substance necessitarianism and substance 
necessitarianism holds because of the way the substance acts, not on account of 
itself, but internally necessitated by its own absolutely infinite nature.
142
 Spinoza’s 
reasoning is both interesting and hard to follow. 
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 This is not to be taken as an argument that things do not also follow from God in a 
perfect way. The passage just cited from 1app indicates that they do, for in that passage 
the phrase ‘with the greatest perfection’ is adverbial. 
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 Consider also KV, II, 18 (C. 127), where “our greatest perfection” is explicitly de-




First of all, one is entitled to ask why essential properties must share in the 
quality of the essence. It is God’s nature that is absolutely infinite and so 
supremely perfect. Why should properties that necessarily follow from it also be 
perfect? An example can illustrate that we have reason to doubt Spinoza’s 
reasoning here. Let us assume that A is an agent that from his essence brings 
about a certain effect. Perhaps A is a mind and let us stipulate that it is essential 
to minds that they be thinking. Then whenever A exists, A necessarily brings 
forth thoughts. But are his thoughts themselves thinking? This does not follow. 
 
Spinoza’s reasoning here is thus not self-evident. There are (at least) two ways of 
interpreting Spinoza’s claim that the perfection of things stems from their 
property of following necessarily from God. I hope to be able to show that the 
fastest way is in this case not the best one. 
 
Spinoza could be interpreted as asserting the hollow thought that because this is 
the only possible set of things, it is also the most possibly perfect set of things. 
This suggestion is due to Koistinen, who suggests that “[b]ecause the actual world 
is the only possible world, there is no doubt that the actual world is the most 
perfect world” (2003, p. 295). The same reasoning leads to this being the most 
possibly awkward and ballerina-like, and even imperfect, set of things, none of 
which is of any interest for Spinoza. But Spinoza is genuinely interested in 
perfection. Supreme perfection is, as we have seen, equivalent with absolute 
infinity. It is also how we define God essentially. Perfection is an essential 
property of God’s, not some random output yielded by inputting perfect for F in 
the schema ‘the only possible x is most possibly F’. To be clear, the suggestion 
that God is most perfect in the domain quantified over since he is alone in that 
domain is not mistaken, merely incomplete. It is incomplete, because while things 
are perfect because they are necessitated, they are not perfect merely because they 
are necessitated. According to Spinoza’s most important reasoning in favour of 
necessitarianism in the Ethics surveyed in the previous section, things are 
necessitated because God is absolutely infinite and supremely perfect. And God is 
essentially perfect in this way, and thus perfect in a sense entirely different from 




I would like to suggest that if one pursues the other route to necessitarianism - the 
one that goes via the PSR - the perfection of things is lost or at least obscured. Of 
course, modes will retain their necessity when they are necessarily possessed by a 
necessary being. But unless that being is supremely perfect, they will not retain 
their perfection. At least we could not then come to know their perfection by 
deducing it from the supremely perfect being. In Chapter 1 I argued that 
perfection can be construed a transcendental property since historically such 
properties were exactly those that were thought to be true of all being in virtue of 
being first and foremost true of a being that instantiated that property in a supreme 
way: God. Of course, to merely name properties that behave in this way 
‘transcendental' does not explain why they behave in this way. Why is perfection 
transcendental?  
 
In scholastic accounts of the transcendental good, things are good because they 
stand in the relation of created to their creator - God. By comparison, on 
Spinoza’s view, the grounding of the perfection of things in the perfection of God 
is more intimate. For on Spinoza’s view, God is not external to the things that he 
produces. Things produced by God simply are God modified as those things. 
Does that mean that those things are also predicable of God? I will not here 
discuss whether finite things and all of their properties can, as a matter of fact, be 
predicated of God. What is important for present purposes is that all their reality, 
or ontological perfection, can be so predicated. We can call this thesis perfection 
monism. 
 
On my reading, perfection is a transcendental property in Spinoza’s metaphysics - 
a property enjoyed by all that is to the extent that it is - for the reason that all 
being enjoyed by things is God’s being and God is supremely perfect. Of course, 
the distinction between existence and being poses a problem for this 
transcendental reading of Spinoza. Does perfection accrue only to one of these or 
to both? I think it is clear that for Spinoza, all being is perfection, regardless of 
whether it also exists or not. The question of which mode of being - existence or 
mere being - is more perfect is thornier. On the one hand, we can only claim to 
know what causation of effects means in the realm of existence. Since causation 
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of effects is, for Spinoza, co-extensional with perfection, it is tempting to read him 
as if this kind of causation is the only one that is perfect. On the other hand, 
Spinoza, in (1app G. II/80) appears to think of perfection as obtaining more the 
“closer” things are to God, i.e., the more they are directly caused by him and 
without mediating causes. For here he writes “that effect is most perfect which is 
produced immediately by God, and the more something requires intermediate 
causes to produce it, the more imperfect it is.” But it seems that things that exist 
are exactly the ones that require intermediate causes, whereas that which merely is 
does not. For example, in demonstrating the eternity of the human mind (5p23d) 
Spinoza relies on the essence of the human mind being as it were directly 
involved in an attribute of God. (It must be directly involved in such an attribute 
in order for there to be an object of the idea God has of that essence. See 1p17s: 
veritas et formalis rerum essentia ideo talis est quia talis in Dei intellectu existit 
objective.) Since, in brief, Spinoza appears to think that things are more imperfect 
the more they rely upon causes instilling themselves between the effect and God 
tout court (i.e. God as he is absolutely), and since this is corroborated by him 
locating the eternity of the mind in its formal essence rather than in this essence 
being instantiated in existence, we should abstain from construing perfection as 
reserved for what exists. Nonetheless it must be maintained that the perfection of 
existents consists in the production of effects that likewise exist. 
 
The difference between Koistinen’s reading and the transcendental one I here 
propose is that while Koistinen’s reading says that everything is most perfect 
because nothing could have been any different, my reading says that everything is 
most perfect because nothing could have been any different and the reason that 
nothing could have been any different is that God is perfect. I am not being 
difficult about this, since the grounding of necessitarianism in divine perfection or 





5.5. Perfectionism.  
 
 5.5.1. Plausibility.  
 
I have suggested that for Spinoza, the perfection of the substance bleeds through 
to its modes. For that reason, perfection is a transcendental property: it belongs to 
anything that is, insofar as it is, and it does so because it belongs in the first place 
to God. But what is the status of this perfection? It is evidently ontological, 
coextensive with reality. In addition, I suggest, contrary to a widespread 
assumption, that this ontological perfection is not axiologically neutral. In 
addition to being reality, it is also valuable. But how can something be valuable 
just in virtue of its sheer being? It may be objected that this perfection is purely 
metaphysical, that is has absolutely nothing to do with perfection as we normally 
understand that concept. 
 
Here, the parallel with the transcendental thought of the medievals is illuminating. 
Perhaps we usually think of goodness as consisting in something which has 
nothing to do with the way God is. Perhaps, for example, we think of it as 
obtaining only when people gratuitously shower us with gifts. But then our 
understanding of what goodness really is is mistaken and we better acquire a 
different approach to that concept. Real or prototypical goodness is the one God 
possesses. For this reason, our attitude to God and to creation will be transformed 
when we conceptualize goodness truly as the goodness of God, for this will allow 
us to realize that creation participates in his goodness. Likewise, I suggest, 
Spinoza’s proposal is not that we quarantine perfection within the metaphysical 
realm. On the contrary, metaphysical perfection is existentially relevant for 
Spinoza in that it can become the standard by which we evaluate things. When we 
proceed to judge the perfection of things by the perfection they possess insofar as 
they are, our evaluations are descriptive: they pick out an objective property of 
things. Not so when we judge things in the teleological manner. My proposal is 
thus that Spinoza’s program for human perfectionism consists in a reform of our 
very concept of perfection. Only by reevaluating what perfection means will one 




But, it may be objected, perfection is an ethical concept. And ethics is about what 
humans ought to do. But necessitarianism leads to the filling in of the fact/value 
gap, and the concept of what one ought to do cannot exist unless this gap remains 
intact. The familiar thought behind this reasoning is that it makes no sense to 
speak of what we ought to do unless we can do otherwise. The notion of what one 
ought to do is obliterated by the denial of contingency. Endorsing a view on 
which all things are (metaphysically) necessary leads to a conceptualization of 
reality as a dense bloc in which no space can be carved for the exertion of human 
freedom or the fulfilment of human duty. Nothing can then be valuable in the 
sense that it could serve as a motivating factor for us to do what we would 
otherwise not have done. The bonds between values and action is severed and the 
notion of values as motivators destroyed. This thread of thought has been 
convincingly put forth by by Omri Boehm (2016). He uses the collapse of what is 
with what should be as an argument against metaphysical rationalism (as the PSR 
leads to necessitarianism).
143
 It is, on Boehm’s account, worth giving up on that 
doctrine, in order to preserve intact the gulf between what is and what should be, 
so that we can retain (or conceive ourselves as retaining) our capacity to influence 
what is in the direction of what should be. (It is to be noted that the normativity 
Boehm is attempting to safeguard is directive rather than evaluative. But one 
central aspect of my interpretation of Spinoza’s theory of human perfection is that 
evaluative normativity is of greater import for human perfection than its directive 
counterpart.)  
 
Boehm is right that, in one way or another, metaphysical rationalism entails the 
collapse of what is with what should be and, to the extent that ethics is erected on 
the fundament of what one ought to do, the collapse of ethics and metaphysics. 
The question is how one is to interpret this collapse. Either one may think that the 
ought is obliterated by the is, or more generally speaking, that the realm of value 
is swallowed up by the realm of facts. This is the interpretative path chosen by 
Boehm. Alternatively, however, one may think that of what should be as suffusing 
what is, as (always already) perfecting what is from within. Then one conceives of 
                                                 
143
 Boehm is by no means the first to point this out. Incompatibilists tend to agree. For 
example, van Inwagen likewise construes determinism as the destruction of freedom and 
moral responsibility (1984). 
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things inevitably being the way they should be. In order to face this inevitable 
perfection of being one must give up on other ideas of perfection (for Spinoza, 
universals) that one holds dear: the perfection of beauty, the perfection of personal 
triumph, and so on. (Of course, in coming to value them as ontologically perfect 
one will estimate them nonetheless, but one will not estimate the value that they 
represent, but merely the fact that they are.) For this view commits one to value 
reality at all costs. I think it is because this picture of perfection is so strange and 
perhaps even terrifying that it has not been taken seriously in Spinoza studies. 
That does not mean that the idea has never entered the scene of human thought. 
Let me briefly mention two theoretically related accounts.  
 
I could not be without being myself. If I had been someone else, I would not, 
tautologously, have been me at all. Clearly, this contrafactual scenario isn’t 
coherent. But it appears that there are some properties - a certain restlessness, say 
- that I could have been, and perhaps would have been better off, without. Which 
are those properties? On a view commonly known as superessentialism, none. 
This view is often associated with Leibniz.
144
 In his intriguing text Confessio 
Philosophi, the fact that I could not have been without sinning and thus being 
condemned makes the question: “Why did God not create me such that I did not 
sin and as a consequence was not condemned?” meaningless. Had God created 
such a creature, that creature would not have been me. So, this question which on 
Leibniz’s view lies at the root of our dissatisfaction (“Why, God, did you not 




For Spinoza necessitarianism holds since God could not have done anything 
differently. This entails, of course, that God could not have produced me by any 
other means than he actually did (and continuously does) produce me: “Things 
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 See Mondadori (1985). 
145
 Leibniz (2005, p. 81): “You have persuaded me that no pretext for excusing the 
damned remains, nor do they have any reason for complaint. Nevertheless, they have 
reason to be indignant, or, more exactly, they have reason to complain, but they do not 
have anything to complain about [Emphasis added].” 
 But would it not then have been better for me not to have existed at all? My con-
jecture is that this option would have been vehemently opposed by Spinoza and Leibniz 
alike, on the basis of their alignment with value and being. 
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could have been produced by God in no other way, and in no other order than they 
have been produced” (1p33). In order for me to be produced in a different way - 
say, without the sense of sadness, the anticipation of loss, that accompanies my 
inborn restlessness - God would have to be different. I am what I am because God 
is the way he is. The Spinozist subject is thus no more entitled to the question: 
“Why, God, do I not exist differently?” than the Leibnizian subject. In this way, 
Spinoza, on my reading, shields God from the complaints creatures may raise 
against him. Necessitarianism about the manner in which finite things exist, like 
superessentialism, operates a kind of theodicy. For Spinoza thinks that the 
perfection of all that is is a consequence of its being necessarily produced. 
 
The justification of all that is, I have suggested, takes place by the elevation of all 
to the status of perfection. But this elevation is accomplished only by replacing 
one’s teleological notion of perfection with an ontological one. In this regard, 
there is a striking resemblance between Spinoza’s thought and philosophical 
tradition of the East. In Zen Buddhism, one must annihilate one's desires in order 
to enter nirvana. A logical consequence of this is that one must annihilate the 
desire after nirvana that motivates one to embrace Buddhism. Nirvana can only be 
attained when the difference between samsara and nirvana is no longer 
recognizable. Although this is a matter of my personal interpretation and a view 
that has in no way received consensus, nirvana may even be a state in which one 
has given up on the distinction between samsara and nirvana.
146
 Likewise, for 
Spinoza, human perfection is only attainable when one realizes that everything is 
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 The identity of nirvana and samsara is expressed most forcefully in Nagarjuna in Mu-
lamadhyakarika (1993, p. 59). Recently, however, Richard H. Jones (2018, p. 59) has 
objected that Nagarjuna’s explicit statements here don’t add up to this claim: “Nagarjuna 
does not state that nirvana and samsara are the same or identical, but only that they are 
not different in any way”. On Jones’ interpretation, the relations of sameness and differ-
ence can be predicated only of things that have their own nature (svabhava), which, of 
course, Nagarjuna denies that anything has. Being empty of their own natures, it does not 
make sense to say that nirvana and samsara are either different or the same. But differ-
ence and sameness can nonetheless both be negated of them, perhaps in a way analogous 
to the way having color and lacking color can both be denied of a non-existing thing (un-
less one adopts Meinongianism or noneism - the doctrine which denies that only what 
exists can have true properties). On Jones’ reading, Nagarjuna could equally well have 
said that nirvana and samsara are not the same. But he didn’t, and the fact that he didn’t is 
important. As far as I can see, Jones’ reading lacks the resources to explain why Nagarju-
na prioritizes the rejection of their difference over the rejection of their sameness. 
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already, insofar as it is, perfect. The attainment of perfection is, seemingly 
paradoxically, predicated on one’s abandonment of a familiar, but misleading, 
concept of perfection.  
 
Strange as it may be, this picture of perfection is thus not entirely unique. 
Admittedly, however, there is another challenge to this picture, based not on its 
theoretical implausibility but on its impracticability. To that topic I now turn.  
 
 5.5.2. Practicability.  
 
As we have seen, the metaphysical route goes from the absolutely infinite being, 
via necessitarianism, to the perfection of things. In addition, it is possible to 
establish necessitarianism on the fundament of the PSR alone, but a 
necessitarianism which does not substantially draw on the infinity and perfection 
of God will not lead to the transcendental perfection of things. It should be 
mentioned that it may be possible to ground the absolute infinity of God in the 
PSR - a topic tangential to my concerns in this chapter. (Even if absolute infinity 
is ultimately deducible from the PSR, this does not alter what I have argued for in 
this chapter - namely that the transcendental perfection of things is deducible from 
necessitarianism only on the basis of the absolute infinity and supreme perfection 
of God.) 
 
As far as Spinoza’s practical philosophy of human perfection is concerned, my 
suggestion is that it exactly tracks this metaphysical route. Human perfection 
consists, on my reading of Spinoza, in acknowledging the perfection of what is, in 
intellectually aligning what is with what should be. However, in order to 
distinguish between what sense of perfection I am discussing - the perfection of 
consciously recognized ontological perfection and ontological perfection tout 
court - I will invoke a distinction previously made (see Chapter 3), namely the 
one between ontological and speculative perfection. Not all ontological perfection 
is speculative to a non-divine mind M, because not all ontological perfection is 
recognized as such by M. We can become speculatively perfect by realizing the 
perfection of things. But importantly, we can realize the perfection of things only 




I believe that it is for this reason that Spinoza’s proofs of necessitarianism appeal 
to God’s infinity/perfection instead of to the PSR. Transcendental perfection is the 
enjoyment of necessary being as a consequence of being produced by a supremely 
perfect being. Only by learning how to root the being of things in God can we 
learn to discern the perfection they truly possess, and thus become speculatively 
perfect. Hence, the kind of necessitarianism that Spinoza embraces is arguably not 
the same kind of necessitarianism that contemporary metaphysicians deduce from 
the PSR. Of course, in a way, it is exactly the same. But the kind of 
necessitarianism Spinoza espouses has an evaluative consequence which 
Inwagen’s necessitarianism lacks. For from necessitarianism, Spinoza infers the 
absence of any objective imperfection in things. And attending to their ontological 
perfection leads to the speculative perfection of the mind. And the speculative 
perfection of minds, is on my reading, at the heart of Spinoza’s practical 
philosophy.  
 
Let me now specify the theoretical consequence that will be of interest to me in 
the subsequent parts of this thesis. It is because (a) Spinoza’s account of human 
perfection is speculative, and because (b) one will be able to establish the 
(ontological) perfection of things by deducing it from the divine essence only 
when one considers this essence to be infinite, that (c) the absolute infinity of the 
divine essence plays a significant role in Spinoza’s account of human perfection. 
Because it is only by conceiving God’s absolute infinity that one will be able to 
recognize the perfection of things and oneself in the manner that is necessary for 
one to become speculatively perfect. In what follows, I will show more concretely 
how conceiving of divine infinity differently will allow humans to become 
speculatively perfect.  
 
In sum, human perfection consists, on my reading, in the speculative 
acknowledgment of the perfection of what is. For this reason, the three cases of 
increases in human perfection that I will discuss in the remaining Part of this 
thesis will not involve actively manipulating what is. Instead, it will involve 
contemplating reality differently and more specifically in such a way that its 
perfection emerges before the eyes of one’s consciousness. Such changes in one’s 
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way of regarding things can be called perspectival. Thus, the cases of increases in 
human perfection I discuss will each involve a perspectival shift. I will analyze 

























In Part, I introduced Spinoza’s seemingly paradoxical view that humans can 
become more perfect by acknowledging the perfection that is necessarily theirs. 
The present chapter is devoted to one concrete application of this realization of 
necessity in the area of Spinoza’s cognitive therapy. In Chapter 5, I pointed out 
that Spinoza explicitly grounds necessitarianism not in the PSR but in the 
characterization of God as absolutely infinite. In this chapter I will discuss more 
in detail how one can conceive of things as necessary on the basis of that divine 
infinity, and how this realization of necessity is therapeutically efficacious in our 
combat against our passions.  
 
In contrast to an influential philosophical tradition represented by his predecessor 
Descartes, Spinoza maintained that “the human Mind has adequate knowledge 
[cognitionem] of God’s eternal and infinite essence” (2p47). In a key definition at 
the outset of the Ethics, Spinoza defines God as “a being absolutely infinite, i.e., a 
substance consisting of an infinity of attributes, of which each one expresses an 
eternal and infinite essence” (1d6). Since God is essentially and not merely 
nominally defined in terms of his absolute infinity, knowledge of God necessarily 
involves knowledge of infinity. Spinoza therefore held that knowledge of infinity 
is possible for humans. Scholars have suggested different historical sources upon 
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In this chapter I will not continue their research, but instead discuss Spinoza’s 
characteristic rehabilitation of the infinite as a possible object of knowledge in the 
context of his cognitive therapy, by which I will mean the “remedy for the affects 
which […] consists in true cognition of the affects” (5p4s). We acquire “clear and 
distinct understanding” (5p4s) of our passions by considering what causes them, 
or their intentional objects,
148
 in new light. This is so since, according to 
Spinoza’s Causal Axiom, “the knowledge of an effect depends upon, and 
involves, the knowledge of the cause” (1a4). Only when we ascribe a different 
causal ancestry to our passion will we be able to conceive of the passion 
differently. 
 
Edwin Curley has presented an account of how Spinoza intended this 
consideration of causes to function therapeutically. On his reading, Spinoza’s 
“cognitive therapy” consists in reconsidering the intentional object of a passion in 
its causal context. The passion, for example the hate I harbor toward any object X, 
is mitigated when I consider X to be caused by Y, which ideally redistributes 
some of my original hate toward X and makes Y fall victim of it instead. Curley 
admits that while this procedure may benefit my relationship with X, it may make 
it “harder for me to deal with Y in a constructive way” (1988, 133-4).149 But thus 
                                                 
147
 While Arview (1990) explores Spinoza’s notion of the actually infinite in the light of 
14th century scholastic accounts of the categorematic infinite, Melamed (2014) does so in 
the light of Hasdai Crescas’ rejection of the Aristotelian argument against an actually 
infinite causal regress. 
148
 For the sake of textual economy, the phrase “an idea of an affect/passion” can intend 
an idea of the intentional object of the affect/passion. 
149
 Lin is critical of this model, which he states wrongly presupposes that any intentional 
affect “is a fixed quantity to be distributed among its causes” (2009, p. 281). Lin may be 
right; however, the example he supplies does not substantiate his case. According to Lin, 
if I learn that the poisoner of my dog had an accomplice, my original hate will not be 
divided between poisoner-1 and poisoner-2. Instead I will hate twice as much, since I will 
continue to hate poisoner-1, and come to hate poisoner-2 with the same intensity. Lin’s 
example fails to illustrate his point since poisoner-1 and poisoner-2 co-cause the death of 
my dog. Instead, we ought to consider a case where poisoner-1’s poisoning of my dog is 
caused by him being poisoned by poisoner-2 with a drug that causes one to compulsively 
poison dogs. In this case it does seem likely that at least some of my original hatred for 
poisoner-1 will be redistributed to poisoner-2.  
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conceiving of how the intentional object of each passion passes the buck to its 
cause does not seem to have any therapeutically liberating potential. For such 
regression in thought only benefits my relationship with X at the cost of 
disturbing my relationship with Y; it can never even principally “destroy” (5p4s) 
the passion of which X was the initial object. It can only attenuate this passion 
indefinitely.
150
 However, in his account Curley does not address the interpretative 
possibilities that arise when the causal ancestry behind the passion in question is 
seen as an actually infinite whole instead of as a potentially infinite regression. To 
do so will be my task in this chapter. 
 
My thesis is, more precisely, that the notion of actual infinity is crucial for 
Spinoza’s cognitive therapy, since the agent engaged in therapy should proceed by 
regarding her passions or their intentional objects as necessary, and she can do so 
only when considering them as infinitely caused. My goals are, accordingly, first, 
to show the importance of necessity and freedom in Spinoza’s therapy of the 
affects. Second, I will relate how the notions of necessity, freedom and infinity are 
linked, on Spinoza’s view. Third, I will outline for the distinctions Spinoza draws 
between different perspectives on infinity. Fourth, I will relate these perspectives 
on infinity to Spinoza’s taxonomy of species of infinity in the Ethics. Hereby I 
will be able to briefly suggest one way in which we could conceive of the infinite 
causal ancestry of the finite modes that our passions intend. By completing these 
tasks, I hope I will be able to show the neglected significance the concept of 
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 It would seem that Spinoza’s therapy operates by reducing the passion to an infinites-
imal quantity. If that is so, then Spinoza in this way informally approaches a topic which 
commentators correctly interpret him as ignoring in its formal aspects. See for instance 
Brunschvig (1912), according to whom Spinoza’s lack of interest in calculus marks “the 
technical limit of Spinozism”. 
151
 Contemporary studies of Spinoza’s psychotherapy tend to neglect the notion of 
infinity. An exception is Ravven (2014) who addresses the existentially transformative 
aspect of acquiring a realization of the infinite network of causes in which agents are 
locked. While she compares Spinoza’s philosophy to that of Maimonides, I aim to 




6.1. The role of necessity in therapy. 
 
By ‘affects’ Spinoza means what we today call emotions. Spinoza’s most 
fundamental distinction between kinds of affects is drawn between active affects 
and passions. Spinoza differentiates between active and passive affects in terms of 
the ideas that cause them: active affects “follow” from adequate ideas, whereas 
passions follow from inadequate ideas (3p3; see also 3p1c). Since affects, on this 
understanding, are characterized by the ideas that cause them, they are 
fundamentally cognitive; indeed, passions are once even referred to as inadequate 
ideas tout court (Gen. Def. Aff. exp.). 
Commonly we lead lives dominated by the confused ideas of our passions - a 
condition which Spinoza calls slavery. To remedy this dismal condition, Spinoza, 
in the three last parts of his Ethics, formulates different strategies whereby our 
slavery to passions is to be undone. In 5p20s Spinoza lists five ways in which the 
Mind has “the power […] over the affects”. The first two both consist in 
knowledge of the affects and read: “I. In the knowledge itself of the affects (see 
P4S); [and] II. In the fact that [the Mind] separates the affects from the thought of 
an external cause, which we imagine confusedly (see P2 and P4S)”. Both I. and II. 
are founded on 5p4s, which implies that the empire of the passions can be swayed 
by us changing the way we think about our affects or their objects.
152
 Since 
coming to know one’s affect to be caused differently than one previously assumed 
is an instance of coming to know one’s affect, I. and II. are both ways in which 
“clear and distinct understanding” of affects is deployed therapeutically.153 In this 
chapter I will refer to the activity whereby we cure ourselves from passions by 
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 Spinoza’s cognitive therapy has been widely criticized. Lin (2009, p. 271), who calls 
5p3 “psychological alchemy” endorses Bennett’s criticism (1984, p. 336) that since we 
cannot change the causal history of an affect, we cannot convert a passion to an action. 
For a recent defense of the general plausibility of 5p3 against this objection (as well as 
against criticism from Della Rocca [2008a] and Curley [1988]) see Marshall (2012). 
153
 Throughout this chapter I speak, as Spinoza himself does in the bulk of the Ethics, as 
if we can acquire adequate ideas. However, Lebuffe (2010) has convincingly argued that 
since the deposit of adequate ideas is an eternal part of the mind, our adequate ideas 
cannot undergo any substantial change. Hence any improvement in our epistemic 
condition must consist in a decrease in our inadequate ideas in proportion to our adequate 
ideas. Although my interpretation is not incompatible with Lebuffe’s I will follow 
Spinoza’s manner of speaking here. 
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acquiring adequate ideas and/or discarding inadequate ideas about these passions 
as Spinoza’s cognitive therapy, or therapy, for short. I will not deal with the other 
strategies Spinoza mentions in 5p20 (which are not “derived” from 5p4).  
One common charge against Spinoza’s cognitive therapy is its intellectualism. 
However, it is rarely noted that this therapy is subject to the Affective Force 
Condition of 4p7.
154
 4p7 reads: “An affect cannot be restrained or taken away 
except by an affect opposite to, and stronger [fortior] than, the affect to be 
restrained” (see also 5p10d). This means that unless the adequate idea we form of 
a passion is accompanied by an affect “stronger” than the passion in question, the 
idea we have of the affect, no matter how adequate, will be inconsequential. Since 
ideas that cannot substantially transform our overall affective situation are 
therapeutically useless, we should strive to acquire ideas that are not only 
adequate but also affectively stronger than the passion to be outmaneuvered.  
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 Bennett (1984, pp. 332-3) notes that 4p7 implies that unless the realization that, say, 
jealousy is irrational is accompanied by an affect, say, of disgust and shame, the realiza-
tion of the irrationality of the affect will be therapeutically inconsequential, but dismisses 
this finding for the following reasons: 1) it sounds “unSpinozistic”; 2) it contradicts Spi-
noza’s dictum that “we shall determine by the mind’s cognition alone the remedies of the 
affects” (5Pref). 1) is no argument. As for 2), the passage from 5Pref need not be read as 
stating that affects can be cured only by the mind’s cognition - as this would contradict 
4p7 and 5p10d - but could more charitably be read as stating that Spinoza will appreciate 
the efficaciousness of his therapy in mental and not physical terms. Similarly, Lin (2009, 
p. 387) does not construe 4p7 as a condition imposed on any restraint of affects, but 
merely as one way that affects may be restrained. By contrast, Lebuffe’s elucidation of 
“affective therapy” takes 4p7 very seriously (2010, p. 17). Interestingly, Nietzsche too 
seems to have observed, in a postcard to Overbeck from 1881, that in order for 
knowledge to be transformative for Spinoza, it has to become the most “powerful affect” 
(1967-).  
 It may be added that influential interpreters such as Curley (1988, p. 128) are 
critical of Nietzsche’s interpretation of Spinoza, since for Curley’s Spinoza knowledge is 
no affect. But, I think, since the mind’s power of acting consists in understanding, and 
since the affect of joy is nothing but the phenomenal aspect of an increase in power, any 
process of coming to understand must be accompanied by joy. This can be squared with 
Lebuffe’s observation that adequate ideas are eternal by drawing a line between the eter-
nal presence of an adequate idea, on the one hand, and conscious knowledge of pos-
sessing the idea, on the other hand. That is, the joy (the transition in perfection) may re-
sult because we consciously come to know adequate ideas we already possess. Perhaps a 
criterion of force similar to 4p7 can even be applied to determine which ideas are con-
scious and which are not. Differently put, what decides whether an idea is conscious or 
not should be its force rather than its adequacy. But the force of an idea, unlike its ade-
quacy, can fluctuate relative to that of other ideas one possesses.  
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What, then, makes affects relatively strong? Spinoza maintains the “anti-
intellectualist” (or more accurately anti-evidentalist) psychological thesis that the 
hierarchy of strength among affects is not established on the basis of the veracity 
of the constituent ideas of the affects in question. For instance, an affect is not 
stronger because its constituent idea truthfully reports on what is evil or good 
(4p14d). While there may be many factors that determine the hierarchy of strength 
among affects, I will focus on the belief that Spinoza’s metaphysical system 
seems designed to engineer (see Chapter 4 and Discussion), namely that finite 
things are necessary. In 5p5, Spinoza most explicitly presents the modality we 
attribute to the intentional object of our affects as the basis on which the hierarchy 
of strength among affects is erected:  
 
An affect toward a thing we imagine to be free is greater than 
that toward a necessary thing [erga neccessariam sc. rem] (by 
IIIP49), and consequently is still greater than that toward a thing 
we imagine as possible or contingent (by IVP11). But imagining 
a thing as free can be nothing but simply imagining it while we 
are ignorant of the causes by which it has been determined to act 
(by what we have shown in IIP35S). Therefore, an affect toward 
a thing we imagine simply is, other things equal, greater than 
that toward a necessary, possible, or contingent thing. Hence, it 




Spinoza does not specify how we are to define freedom in order to be maximally 
affected by things we consider free, nor does he give a philosophical account of 
the necessity we should attribute to things in order to be minimally affected by 
them. This omission shows that whether we conceptualize the freedom of a thing 
along lines sanctioned by Spinoza’s metaphysics (i.e. as self-causation: a freedom 
which God or Nature alone enjoys) or as the freedom he rejects (i.e. freedom of 
will) we will be equally affected by the object thus conceived, as long as we think 
of it “simply”, without the mediation of thoughts of other things (see also 3p49d). 
Although freedom of will is on Spinoza’s view impossible, attribution of such 
freedom strengthens the passions we have toward creatures we wrongly consider 
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 In this passage Curley twice makes neccessariam the direct object of imaginamur. 
However, as 2p44 makes clear, we do not imagine things to be necessary, but understand 
them to be thus. Since it also not grammatically necessary to take neccessariam as the 




free in this way.
156
 As a general rule, we can manipulate the differential strength 
of our affects by considering the object of the affect to be weakened as necessary 
and the object of the affect to be strengthened as free, regardless of whether we do 




Notably, however, Spinoza insists that his cognitive therapy must proceed by 
“actions of the mind” (5p4s), and such actions are adequate ideas. 5p5 shows that 
one way in which this cognitive strategy for combatting passions can meet the 
Affective Force Condition is to proceed (i) by replacing inadequate ideas of free 
objects by ideas in which these objects are adequately considered as necessary; 





The criterion of adequacy inherent in Spinoza’s cognitive therapy redirects our 
focus from his account of the passions to his metaphysical story of the way things 
are. For if there is no agreement between the object and the way it is intended by 
the idea the idea cannot be true, and therefore not adequate, either (see 2p34-
2p35).
159
 Let us next explore the relevant properties - free, contingent and 
necessary - in order to better understand how adequate understanding of them can 
be harnessed for Spinoza’s therapeutical purposes. Of course, we have 
encountered necessity and contingency previously (in Chapter 4), but not so in 
                                                 
156
 The fatal consequences of our erroneous belief in freedom are described in 1app. 
157
 I cannot here discuss the plausibility of this psychological claim in abstraction from 
Spinoza’s overall philosophy. For a discussion, see Bennett (1984, pp. 337-45).  
158
 While Bennett (1984, pp. 335-42) and Lin (2009, pp. 270-2; pp. 279-82) take the 
“knowledge of the affects” to be one strategy whereby reason can overcome the affects, 
and “understanding things as necessary” to be another, thus construing them as two 
different strategies, I interpret them as one. This would help explain why Spinoza, as 
Bennett (1984, p. 337) and Lin (2009, p. 270) put it “oddly” passes over understanding 
things as necessary in his itemization of the power reason has over the passions in 5p20s. 
Colin Marshall follows Bennett-Lin in taking “understanding [things] as necessary” as a 
separate method for passion-control, irrelevant to the strategy of 5p3. He motivates this 
with the omission of 5p4 in the derivation of 5p6 where Spinoza first mentions the 
benefits of understanding things as necessary (2012, p. 144, n. 15). However, this 
omission cannot undermine the validity of the Affective Force Condition. 
159
 Spinoza intensionally distinguishes between a true idea, defined in terms of agreement 
(in 1a6), and an adequate idea, defined in terms of its genesis in the mind alone (2p11c). 
However, he also maintains that the classes of adequate and true ideas are co-extensional 
(see Letter 60, C. 432). 
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connection with the slavery of human beings. It is therefore worthwhile to 
approach these concepts again, from an existential or practical point of view. 
 
6.2. The role of infinity in necessity.  
 
In the world (as opposed to in its distorted mirror image in our passions) Spinoza 
maintains that things are either “necessary in reason of their cause” or “necessary 
in reason of their essence” (1p33s; see also CM, C. 306). I find it plausible that 
this disjunction is exhaustive.
160
 If all things are necessary because of either 
reason, there seems to be no room for contingency. 
 
As we saw in Chapter 4, in the Ethics Spinoza gives two alternative definitions of 
contingency, endorsing one and rejecting the other. At first, our belief in 
contingency - our belief that things could have been otherwise than they are - is 
seen as stemming from our ignorance of how the absolutely infinite substance 
renders things necessary (1p33s1). Later on (in 4def3 and 4def4), Spinoza 
distinguishes between contingency and possibility. In these passages, contingency 
belongs to everything whose essence does not involve existence - it is, in other 
words, equivalent with the property I in Chapter 4 called S-contingency, whereas 
possibility signifies what contingency did in 1p33s1 - the property of possibly 
having been otherwise, which we wrongly ascribe to things when we are ignorant 
of why they are necessary. Thus, things that are not necessary in virtue of their 
essence but only in virtue of their causes can be S-contingent, even though they 
are necessitated by their causes. Let me revisit which protagonists of Spinoza’s 
metaphysics assume these different roles.  
 
First, there is the thing necessary in virtue of its essence. The substance’s 
existence is necessary since it is “involved” in its essence (1d1). Since the 
existence of no other thing follows from its essence, everything else is S-
contingent in the sense specified above. Second, there are things which are 
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 Don Garrett (1991) supplies ample textual evidence in support of the interpretation 
that the whole series of causal relations in the universe must be necessary on Spinoza’s 
view. Cf. Curley (1988, pp. 48-50).  
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necessary by reason of their causes.
161
 As I mentioned in Chapter 5, it is Spinoza’s 
view that things are necessary by reason of their cause, and God uniquely free, 
because of the way God is necessary by reason of his nature. For God is necessary 
by reason of his nature since this nature is absolutely infinite (1d6). As Gueroult 
(1968, 172-3) has pointed out, the definition of God as absolutely infinite is 
intended to be genetic, that is, it is supposed to define God in such a way that all 
his properties may be deduced from the definition.
162
 From God’s absolutely 
infinite nature, we are, supposedly, able to deduce all of his properties, which 
significantly includes freedom.  
 
It is because God alone is absolutely infinite that he alone is free. By “free” 
Spinoza does not mean spontaneous or unconstrained but constrained by one’s 
nature alone (1d7). It is clear why freedom, thus conceived, follows from absolute 
infinity: absolute infinity implies that there is nothing that God is not. There is 
therefore nothing outside of God that could constrain him from without, and so he 




Moreover, as we saw in Chapter 1, this absolutely infinite nature of God’s is 
identified with God’s power (1p34). On my interpretation, this means that there is 
no difference between what God necessarily is and what he necessarily produces. 
God both necessarily is, and necessarily causes himself to be, the absolutely 
infinite totality of all there is. This identification of power and essence is crucial 
to Spinoza’s system. Nothing that is real can be denied of God, for this would 
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 God appears to be a curious member of this class, for he too is necessary in virtue of 
his cause - which he himself is (1d1). However, by “things necessary by reason of their 
cause” Spinoza presumably means “by reason of a cause other than themselves”, which 
excludes God. 
162
 It may be worth recalling that Spinoza’s borrowed his understanding of a “genetic” 
definition from geometrical procedures. In TIE, the definition of a created thing is good 
when it first, gives the proximate cause of the definiendum, and second, is such that all 
the properties of the thing in question may be deduced from it. Spinoza gives the follow-
ing example of such a definition: the circle “is the figure that is described by any line of 
which one end is fixed and the other is movable” (§ 98, C. 40). 
163
 However, as we have seen, there is a spurious category of being - beings of reasons 
(entia rationis), such as universals (2p40s1), or aids of the imagination, such as numbers 




deny him some reality - something that his absolute infinity does not allow (1p8s; 
Letter 35). Likewise, nothing real can remain non-caused by him. 
 
As we have seen, Spinoza’s metaphysics admits for there being a gradation of 
being. Now, each thing that exists, has a nature from which some effect follows 
(1p36). One is to judge which thing has less reality, and which more, on the basis 
of how causally efficacious the thing’s nature is (see 1p9 and 1p16d). This 
efficaciousness ranges from God, whose nature causes everything that is, to some 
finite thing that has only a minuscule effect on its surroundings. However, 
whatever has at least one effect, has a share in reality. Having some share in 
reality already qualifies something as a product of God’s activity, which by 
definition produces all and only reality (1p34 and 1p8s together yield this result). 
It is therefore necessary that whatever has some reality, no matter how little, 
should be produced by God. 
 
However, God cannot produce finite things directly. This is so since finite things, 
by definition, must “be limited by another of the same nature” (1d2). The 





thing is finite, in other words, if it is caused by, or can be explained by reference 
to, another thing that is like itself finite in kind, and so on ad infinitum. Hence it is 
clear that the very definition of finitude implies that all finite modes must coexist 
in mutual determination. If they are infinite - as they must be, given God’s 
infinitely productive nature - their inter-determination will unfold infinitely. 
 
The constraints the very definition of finitude places upon God’s creation of finite 
things explains why Spinoza supplies us with two different metaphysical 
descriptions of the causal determination of any singular thing. On the one hand, 
1p26 states that “[a] thing which has been determined to produce an effect has 
necessarily been determined in this way by God”. If something produces an effect, 
it is real, and everything that is real belongs both to God’s nature and to his range 
of causal efficacy, which, as per 1p34, come down to the same thing. This is so 
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 See Lin (2007, p. 282). 
165
 For Spinoza, as Della Rocca (1996, pp. 10-11) has argued, these coalesce. 
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since God’s absolute infinity implies that he is all there is - there is no reality 
which does not belong to God. 
 
On the other hand, consider 1p28, where Spinoza claims that:  
 
No singular thing, or any thing which is finite and has a 
determinate existence, can neither exist nor be determined to 
produce an effect unless it is determined to exist and produce an 
effect by another cause, which is also finite and has a 
determinate existence; and again […] to infinity. 
 
On the one hand, the finite causal agent is determined by God to produce its effect 
(1p26); on the other hand, it is determined by its position in a causal nexus where 
finite things serve as links (1p28). It is only our, on Spinoza’s view flawed, 
theological presumptions that make us assume that these two determinations must 
involve totally different and unrelated determinants. Spinoza’s goal is to 
undermine these presumptions. For it is, on my reading, through - or more 
accurately, insofar as it is - every link in the infinite chain (described in 1p28) that 
the substance determines each finite thing causally (as Spinoza states it does in 
1p26). In other words, God determines finite things by the means of an infinite 
mediation through their finite peers.  
  
This should suffice to clarify what Spinoza means by claiming that everything is 
necessary either by reason of its essence or by reason of its cause. Moreover, the 
concept of infinity is crucial in rendering things free in the Spinozist sense and 
necessary: while God is free in virtue of his absolutely infinite nature, finite things 
are “necessitated” by their causes in virtue of being inscribed in an infinitely 
unfolding causal nexus. I foresee that an objector may say that things can be 
determined by their causes without therefore being necessitated by them. Causal 
determinism holds when, if a cause is given, the effect must follow: but this does 
not yet show that each cause was necessary. However, the nexus itself is 
necessary because it is the only way God can produce an infinity of finite things, 
something which he, because of his absolutely infinite nature-cum-power, is 
necessitated to do. In Chapter 4, this peculiar necessity was treated under the 
rubric of Plenitude. Yet, it may be objected, although the nexus is necessarily 
infinite, other members could have constituted the nexus. I cannot answer this 
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objection at length here, and so the following sketchy answer will have to suffice. 
On Spinoza’s view, God acts because he is compelled to do so by his own nature, 
which is infinitely active and infinitely productive of effects. In order for the 
production of effects to be different, God’s nature would presumably have to be 
different too. To assume that things could have been different contradicts 
substance necessitarianism if substance is all there is. Let me now relate these 
insights drawn from previous chapters to Spinoza’s therapeutical project.  
 
Recall that according to Spinoza’s theory of the affects, the strength of an affect is 
positively proportional to the extent to which we consider the intentional object of 
the affect in question free. In order to be cured from our passions through 
cognitive therapy we should acquire adequate ideas whereby we conceive of finite 
things as necessary and discard inadequate ideas whereby we ascribe freedom to 
things other than what indeed possesses it - God. 
 
On Spinoza’s view, we can indeed come to know God as uniquely free if we 
refashion our concept of freedom as belonging uniquely to that which is 
absolutely infinite. Moreover, we can also come to think of things we previously 
held contingent as necessary. This transition is possible since no finite mode is 
conceivable exclusively as necessary. That this is Spinoza’s position becomes 
particularly evident in Letter 12, where he distinguishes between two principal 
ways in which we can conceive of finite things. As long as we consider the 
essences of finite things in isolation from “the order of nature” (ordo naturae), 
Spinoza claims, “we can determine their existence and duration as we please, 
conceive it as greater or less and divide it into parts - without this doing any harm 
to our concept of them” (C. 202).  
 
What does Spinoza mean by the order of nature? The phrase appears extensively 
in Spinoza’s oeuvre.
166
 In 2p7s Spinoza provides “the whole order of nature” with 
the helpful gloss “the connection of causes”. For present purposes, it suffices to 
note that according to 2p7, whenever a thing is conceived under the attribute of 
thought, its cause must also be so conceived, and so on to infinity. The whole 
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 For a fuller discussion of the phrase, see Don Garrett (1999). 
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order of nature thus signifies the total succession of causes. For finite modes, the 
succession of causal antecedents is infinite.  
 
In Letter 12, Spinoza thus maintains that when we consider finite things in 
isolation from the infinite causal order in which they are inscribed, we are free to 
conduct thought experiments on their “existence and duration”, neither of which 
we then consider as necessary. By contrast, when considered as part of the order 
of nature finite modes can “undergo none of these [thought operations] without 
our destroying at the same time the concept [conceptum] we have of them” (loc. 
cit. G. IV/55). When we (correctly: 1p28) consider finite things to be produced by 
an infinite array of causal connections among finite things, we cannot, on 
Spinoza's view, regard their “existence and duration” as being otherwise than they 
necessarily are. Only by taking into consideration the infinite causal history 
unfolding behind each finite mode can we adequately conceive of its existence as 
necessary (see 5p6d). But why is it that regarding things as locked in the embrace 
of an infinite causal nexus would allow us to establish their necessity? The answer 




Each finite thing must owe its necessity to its cause. Only if the causal series can 
be conceptualized as an actual infinity is it possible to think of each link in the 
chain as necessitated. If, by contrast, the series is construed as a potential infinity, 
the link last conjured up will not yet be necessitated.  
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 There is in addition an alternative answer to the question, which I noted in Chapter 4: 
if effects are not infinitely caused, their necessity could perhaps be, as it were, perceptible 
to the naked eye. For if there were only a finite series of causes, then the necessity of each 
thing in the series could be established by deducing it from the one ultimately necessary 
cause. A Humean would presumably balk at this proposal. But to comprehend any effect 
is, for Spinoza, exactly to understand why its cause necessitates it. Nonetheless, it is evi-
dent that we cannot accomplish this task in the case of any finite thing, for, in the realm 
of finite existents, no necessary causal connection is ever perceived or observed by us. 
But why can we not perceive the necessity which finite things nonetheless possess? The 
reason why can only be that if any finite existent is to be at all necessitated by its causes, 
the causes extending behind any finite thing must be infinite in such a way that we cannot 
successfully browse through them, which would allow us to (pace Hume) establish the 
necessity of the effect. (Of course, in theory, if we could accelerate after the manner of 
agents carrying out supertasks in philosophical thought-experiments, then we could com-
plete an infinite enumeration of causes in however short a time. But I doubt that accelera-
tion can be relevant to the issue at hand.) 
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This interpretation might rise the objection that by a concept [conceptum] Spinoza 
does not necessarily mean an adequate idea, or knowledge. However, in 2p44, 
Spinoza states that “[i]t is in the nature of Reason to regard things as necessary 
not as contingent”. As is well known, reason is the second kind of knowledge 
(2p40s2: III), and the first kind of knowledge is, on Spinoza’s view, “the only 
cause of falsity” (2p41). Since the sets of false and inadequate ideas are on my 
reading of Spinoza co-extensional, it follows that the idea we have of the 




In Letter 12 Spinoza affirms that we are at least capable of possessing a concept 
of things as necessary in virtue of issuing from an infinite order of nature, namely 
the concept that is destroyed when we consider the same things in isolation from 
their causal history. Arguably,
169
 then, we can know that a thing’s causal ancestry 
is infinite without knowing each individual causal relation in the chain. This latter 
knowledge Spinoza himself admits he does not possess - for it would amount to 
“knowing the whole of Nature and all of its parts” (Letter 32, C. II. 18).170  
 
The possibility of knowing a finite mode’s causal ancestry to be infinite without 
knowing each of the causal antecedents is analogous to the way we, on Spinoza’s 
view, can know an infinite God. For Spinoza’s insistence that he can have as 
“clear an idea of God as [he has] of a triangle” - and thus, by 1d6, of a God 
consisting of infinite attributes, without therefore being able to browse through all 
these attributes (Letter 56, C. II. 423). Although Spinoza may not have endorsed 
this example, the case may be illustrated by that one does not have to browse all 
natural numbers in order to establish their cardinality. (Instead, only a successor 
rule is required.) Since knowledge of the actual infinity of a series need not 
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 For an alternative view discussed in Chapter 4, see Newlands (2010). I agree with 
Newlands that necessity can only be ascribed to finite modes when the latter are consid-
ered in a maximally broad, indeed infinite, causal context, but find the claim that Spinoza 
is an anti-essentialist vis-à-vis the objective modality of these finite modes difficult to 
square with passages such as 2p44s, for reasons stated in the preceding chapter. 
169
 The exegetical reason why one would want to harmonize what Spinoza says in Letter 
12 with what he subsequently states in the Ethics is that he approved of the circulation of 
copies of the letter even after the completion of his magnum opus (see Melamed [2014, 
205], who refers to Letter 81 for a proof of this).  
170
 I thank an anonymous referee for highlighting this issue.  
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involve knowledge of each element in the series, Spinoza’s postulation of 
knowledge of a thing as necessarily existing in virtue of being inscribed in an 
infinite causal nexus need not violate the assumption that knowledge of actual 
infinity is infeasible for humans.  
 
This assumption has recently figured in Della Rocca (1996, p. 183, n. 29), 
Marshall (2013) and prior to these, Diane Steinberg (1981), all of whom 
emphasize that the fact that the causal ancestry of each idea, qua a finite mode, is 
infinite is prima facie problematic for Spinoza’s theory of adequacy. Marshall 
(2013, pp. 22-3) summarizes the problem thus: “(a) Having an adequate idea of x 
requires having ideas of all x’s causal antecedents; (b) Every finite mode has an 
infinite chain of causal antecedents; (c) No human mind can have ideas of an 
infinite chain of causal antecedents. […]; (d) Therefore, no human mind can have 
an adequate idea.”
171
 Both Steinberg (who submitted an account of Spinoza’s 
third kind of knowledge as a solution to the same problem prior to its articulation 
by Della Rocca) and Marshall argue that adequate knowledge is possible, since it 
is of eternal formal essences, elevated above the causal production of the finite 
things of which they are the essences (pace Kripke).
172
 Such knowledge need not 
involve infinite causal regresses. 
 
By contrast, the problem of the present chapter is how Spinoza’s cognitive 
therapy can be successful. My answer therefore concerns the existence of finite 
modes, not their formal and eternal essences. If someone is already contemplating 
the eternal essences of things instead of their messy generation and destruction, 
she is likely to be in little need of therapy. The subject of therapy needs a way to 
regard the object of her passive fixation which does not depart from indifference 
for its existence. (Such indifference may be the endpoint of therapy, but it cannot 
plausibly be its starting point.)  
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 Eugene Marshall does not defend (c), which he admits “might be controversial” (2013, 
p. 22 n. 6), but grants it for the sake for argument. 
172
 Koistinen (1998) similarly argues that the objects of true ideas are eternal. He however 
construes these objects as propositions and additional argument is required to show that 
for Spinoza formal essences are propositions rather than, for example, real entities. 
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Although we cannot have adequate knowledge of the existence of finite things in 
many respects, we can know that it is necessarily infinitely caused. What kind of 
knowledge is this? 
Spinoza maintains that, in the second kind of knowledge (2p40s2[III]), we know 
properties common to all modes (2p38), as they follow from the nature of the 
attribute of which they are modes (2p13l). Accounts of the second kind of 
knowledge tend to focus on properties that follow uniquely from one attribute, 
and it is indeed by referring to properties common to all modes within an attribute 
(namely extension) that Spinoza intends to demonstrate 2p38. However, 
regardless of the attribute under which a mode is considered, “it follows from the 
nature of the attribute” (to borrow the phrase from 2p13l), qua infinite, that it is 
infinitely rich in modes.
173
 To be necessitated by the means of an infinite causal 
nexus is a property common to all modes, under any attribute. Spinoza’s assertion 
that the knowledge of things as necessary is of the second kind (2p44) 
presupposes that we can have adequate knowledge not only of properties common 
to attributes considered under an attribute, but of properties common to modes 
considered under any attribute.
174
 
While knowledge of formal essences is clearly indispensable to the third kind of 
knowledge (2p40s), knowledge of the second kind of the necessary existence of 
finite modes allows us to weaken the reign of the passions by reason. And it has 
transpired that in order to regard finite things as necessary, we must see them as 
locked in an infinite network of causes. Attributions of necessity thus depend on 
the vertiginous condition that humans have the capacity to posit the infinity of the 
causal ancestry that renders a finite thing necessary. Let me now address the 
question of how we, on Spinoza’s view, should conceive of the infinite causal 
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 Della Rocca has suggested that there could be no sufficient reason for an infinitely 
creative attribute to create less than an infinity of finite modes (2008a, p. 71).  
174
 If common notions within an attribute are scientific in nature (belonging to physics in 
the case of extension, to science of mind in the case of thought), then notions common to 
all modes insofar as they are modes of any attribute at all, are ontological. Just as tran-
scendental terms were applied “transcategorically” in the late Scholastic science of being, 
predicates such as being infinitely caused apply to modes across attributes. Indeed, with-
out knowledge of trans-attribute properties, the Spinozist edifice crumbles. For proposi-
tions such as 1p28 are not attribute-specific, but rather purports to supply us with 
knowledge of how finite modes are caused in any attribute. 
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ancestry of each passion (or its intentional object) so as to be able to regard it 
adequately as necessary.  
 6.3. Perspectives on infinity. The twofold distinction. 
The two key texts where Spinoza discusses the capacity whereby we acquire 
adequate understanding of infinities are 1p15s and Letter 12 of July 1663, 
otherwise known as “The Letter on the Infinite”, addressed to the friend Lodewijk 
Meyer. In both these texts, Spinoza distinguishes the divisible infinity that we 
imagine from the indivisible infinity that the intellect alone can conceive.  
In 1p15s (as well as in Letter 12) Spinoza concedes that extension (in Letter 12, 
“extended substance”) cannot be considered as an infinitely divisible quantity 
without risking paradoxes à la Zenon. This, however, does not disprove that 
extension is indeed an attribute of God’s and as such infinite. Spinoza instead 
takes such difficulties to suggest that extension should not be thought of as 
divisible into or composed of parts. On his view, extension is an infinite and 
indivisible quantity. The intuitive objection to Spinoza’s claim is that while a 
quantity may of course be physically indivisible, any quantity seems to be 
conceptually divisible into lesser constituent parts. However, Spinoza denies that 
our human incapacity to imagine an indivisible quantity can be adduced as a 
ground against the existence of such a quantity. Spinoza maintains that our 
propensity for conceiving of quantity as divisible stems from our imagination 
(1p15s[V]), the source of error. In 1p15s there are thus two principal ways in 
which we conceive of an infinite quantity: either with the intellect as an 
indivisible whole or with the imagination as potentially infinitely divisible. 
This distinction recurs in Letter 12. Spinoza’s point in this letter is subtly 
different, as he here contends that we will successfully make the overarching 
distinction between infinities “that cannot be divided into any parts” and infinities 
that “can be divided into parts without any contradiction” (Letter 12, C. 201), on 
the condition that we first make three preliminary distinctions.
175
 One of these 
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 The other distinctions are causal and mathematical, respectively (Letter 12, C. 201). 
Concerning the former distinction, I agree with Gueroult (1966, pp. 387—90) that 




preliminary distinctions is nonetheless again drawn between the infinity which 
“we can only understand but not imagine and [the infinity which] we can also 
imagine” (Letter 12, C. 201). Significantly, the kind of infinities which the 
imagination can conceive are the ones that can be mathematically manipulated - 
Spinoza uses the dichotomy series as an example, and, in the vein of the 
Aristotelian tradition, construes it as a potential infinity (Letter 12, C. 203).  
In both these texts, Spinoza maintains that we can form adequate ideas of actually 
infinite wholes by the means of our intellect - even if we only succeed in this 
enterprise rarely, and with great difficulty (1p15s [V]; Letter 12, C. 202-3). But 
the imagination can only inadequately conceive of existing infinities. It is 
interesting, and certainly not arbitrary, that on Spinoza’s view necessity and 
contingency are also assigned separately by these capacities. For Spinoza, as 
previously stressed, holds that it “it depends only on the imagination that we 
regard things as contingent” (2p44c1).  
It is the intellect’s capacity of adequately conceiving of an indivisible and infinite 
whole that makes it the case that it can spot necessity. Only by realizing the actual 
infinity of the causal series can we realize the necessity of an effect. The infinity 
must be actual as each link must be necessitated by its cause and there must be 
infinite links in the chain.  
It is because of the imagination’s dual incapacity to conceive of a whole as 
infinite and indivisible that it can only see contingency. In Chapter 4 I discussed 
the notion of divisibility. Let us here focus on that of infinity. The imagination 
cannot adequately conceive of actual infinity. But by considering the causal 
ancestry of a finite thing as a potentially infinite succession of causes, we can 
never realize its necessity. For beyond the last link we have conceived as 
necessitated there remains another link, as yet not conceived as necessitated. 
Interestingly, on Spinoza’s view, the intellect’s adequate cognition of actual 
infinity is not mathematical. By contrast, the imagination’s inadequate perception 
of the whole as, temporally speaking, a potentially infinitely extending causal 
                                                                                                                                     
called infinite “by the force of [their] cause”. I will deal in more detail with Letter 12 in 
the following chapter. 
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nexus and, spatially speaking, an aggregate of separable parts, is mathematical, on 
Spinoza’s view. For when the imagination thus conceives of the whole it employs 
time and number: both of which are but imaginary constructs (2p44s; Letter 12, C. 
204).  
It is the actual infinity a parte ante of finite causes behind our passions that we are 
to conceive intellectually and cease to imagine, if we are to adequately regard 
finite modes as necessary. In order to suit Spinoza’s therapeutical regimen, we 
must be able to first, in a pre-healed state, imagine this infinity, and then cease to 
imagine it and conceive it with the intellect alone. In order to understand which 
infinity can be imagined as well as understood, and whether the infinite causal 
nexus of finite things qualifies as this kind of infinity, let us now turn to the 
different infinities Spinoza subscribes to in the Ethics. By discussing this 
taxonomy of infinities, I hope I will be able to suggest one way in which we can 
form an adequate idea of the infinite ancestry of our passions. 
 6.4. Species of infinity. The threefold distinction. 
Above I outlined for the two perspectives from which we can consider infinities, 
on Spinoza’s view. Independently of how we conceive them, however, Spinoza 
asserts that there are three different species of infinities instantiated in the world. 
In 1p16dem Spinoza summarizes the three infinities that exist in this way: “But 
since the divine nature has absolutely infinite attributes (by D6), each of which 
also expresses an essence infinite in its own kind, from its necessity there must 
follow infinitely many things in infinite ways (i.e., everything which can fall under 
an infinite intellect), q.e.d” (Emphases added; Translation modified). Here I will 
call these infinities absolute, qualitative and quantifiable, respectively.
176
 In this 
chapter I will not deal with all the intriguing difficulties this division poses, but 
merely state how these infinities relate to the perspectival distinction mentioned 
above, with the purpose of further elucidating Spinoza’s therapy.  
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 Following Leibniz (2001, p. 43), who, in a note on Spinoza’s Ethics, dating from 
around 1676, similarly distinguishes between three infinities. The infinities Leibniz 
distinguishes between are: “mere” infinity (tantum infinitum); infinity which is “greatest 
in its own kind” (maximum in suo […] genere) and infinity which is “everything”. 
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First, there is absolute infinity. This is the kind of infinity which belongs only to 
that whose essence involves existence, God or Nature. Spinoza maintains that 
God is such that we cannot imagine him, but only understand him with the help of 
the intellect (Letter 12, C. 203; Letter 56, C. II. 423). The potential infinity the 
imagination conceives by numerical measures therefore fails to represent the 
infinity of Nature. 
Second, there is infinity in kind, which I propose to call qualitative infinity.
177
 
Whereas things finite in kind are limited by other things that are like themselves 
finite in kind - the example Spinoza adduces in 1d2 is that of a body, for another 
body can always be conceived as greater than any body - things that are infinite in 
kind are not so limited. The most paradigmatic example of something that is 
qualitatively infinite are God’s attributes, notoriously defined as “what the 
intellect perceives as constituting the essence of a substance” (1d4). Suffice it here 
to state that since attributes are what we conceive of as constituting the essence of 
a substance, and since this essence must be self-sufficient, attributes cannot be 
conceived in terms of something other than themselves (1p10). Since composition 
involves some explanatory dependence, where the compound is explained by 
reference to its parts, attributes cannot be conceived of as composed of parts, or as 
divisible. On Spinoza’s view there is therefore no danger that qualitative infinity 
should be divisible into parts. Qualitative infinity comes, as it were, woven in one 
piece. Since only the intellect can conceive of indivisible and infinite wholes, only 
the intellect can conceive of qualitative infinity.  
Third, there is “quantifiable infinity”. By this I mean the kind of infinity that we 
can quantify. Outside of the abstract realm of mathematics, such quantification is 
illicit. For the imagination necessarily employs aids (auxilia) - number, measure 
and time - as it conceives of classes of modes, quantity and duration, respectively 
(Letter 12, C. 203, G. IV/57), tools that themselves have no reality outside of the 
imagination. Since modes, quantity and duration can all be quantified, the infinity 
of each of these may be called ‘quantifiable’. Clearly, the infinite nexus of finite 
modes causing each other belongs to this category, for they belong to the class of 
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 In Letter 36 to Hudde (June, 1666), Spinoza draws on the difference between infinity 
in kind and absolute infinity to illuminate his cosmological proof of God’s existence.  
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modes. Although there is an infinity we can understand but not imagine, there is 
none that we cannot understand (Letter 12, C. 201), and so we can conceive 
quantifiable infinity with our intellect as well as imagine it. 
This overview of the relation between perspectives on infinity and species of 
infinity can be summarized as follows: out of the three infinities that exist - 
whether they be instantiated in modes, attributes or substance -, only quantifiable 
infinity can be imagined. All infinities can be conceived by the intellect, or, which 
is the same, we can have adequate ideas of all these infinities. It should be 
emphasized that this reading is not without difficulties - but these difficulties are, 
as I believe, internal to Spinoza’s own texts. 
One widely debated difficulty concerns the infinity of the attributes. Although 
each attribute is as such qualitatively infinite (expressed more clearly, this 
property belongs distributively to the class of attributes), collectively the attributes 
are infinitely many: “By God I understand a being absolutely infinite, i.e., a 
substance consisting of an infinity of attributes, of which each one expresses an 
eternal and infinite essence” (1d6: Emphasis added).178  
The difficulty is this: if each attribute is, as Spinoza implies in Letter 9 (C. 195-6), 
a nature that the intellect correctly attributes to the substance, then how can 
something be asserted about the attributes - namely, that they are infinitely many - 
which does not pertain to the substance, which is unique? This seems to sin 
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 Bennett (1984, pp. 75-9) proposes that the the word ‘infinite’ could instead be con-
strued as ‘all', and that nothing of importance in Spinoza’s system demand that all the 
attributes should be more numerous than the two we know (extension and thought). This 
reading has been disputed by Arview (1990, however in response, not to Bennett, but to 
the same position as articulated by Abraham Wolf [1926, pp. 190-1] and Kline [1977, pp. 
341-7]). For a response to Bennett that exposes the untenability of his position, see Mel-
amed (see for example 2017). As Bennett himself admitted, that God should possess only 
two attributes is incompatible with passages such as 2p7s, Letters 63 and 65. Bennett 
formulates his interpretation not to explicate what Spinoza says, but to grant him only 
what he is obliged to to say in order for his system to hold strong, and on Bennett’s view 
the infinity of the attributes is so far from being a stronghold of the system that “in the 
Ethics it is idle” (1984, p. 79; see also 2001, pp. 115-6). Since my present purpose is to 
explore whether and how Spinoza can consistently grant us knowledge of the infinite 
ancestry of our passions, given his philosophical system as conceived in the Ethics, I 
grant that the set of attributes is, on Spinoza’s view, infinite.  
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against the transitivity of identity.
179
  I cannot resolve this difficulty here. Instead, 
I will address the limited issue of how absolute infinity in the substance can imply 
a quantifiable infinity of attributes. This will indicate one way in which the 
intellect can conceptualize quantifiable infinity without relying on the 
imagination. 
Although it does not follow from the claim that the substance possesses all the 
attributes that it possesses an actually infinite amount of attributes, it would follow 
from the claim that it possesses them perfectly, in the sense of unsurpassably. But, 
the way I read Spinoza, infinity in kind is what guarantees one to be 
unsurpassable. One is infinite in one’s kind when one could not even in principle 
be surpassed in one’s kind.  
This insight supplies us with the basic resources to explain how the attributes can 
be collectively many without therefore being quantifiable. On my reading, the 
substance is absolutely infinite since it possesses the qualitatively infinite 
attributes in an unsurpassable or qualitatively infinite way, that is, so that no 
possession of attributes could be greater or more perfect than that of the 
substance. Metaphorically put, absolute infinity can be understood as qualitative 
infinity raised to adverbial power.
180
 Arguably, if the substance just possessed all 
the attributes, and they amounted to any arbitrary number, it would then possess 
them in in the measurable and therefore surpassable way that Spinoza insists 
cannot pertain to the substance.
181
 Therefore it must possess them perfectly, and 
they must, as a consequence, be actually infinitely many. 
I suggest that conceiving of the quantifiable infinity of attributes as a qualitative 
infinity of the substance is one way in which the intellect can conceive of a 
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 That is, presupposing the objectivist reading of the attributes, which dominates 
contemporary Spinoza scholarship. For a helpful overview as well as criticism of the 
subjectivist/objectivist division in Spinoza studies, see Shein (2009). 
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 While absolute in the phrase natura divina infinita absolute attributa habeat qualifies 
the infinity of the attributes, not that of the divine nature (stylistically, the figure is a 
transgressio: I thank Josef Eskhult for discussion of the position of the adverb), I agree 
with Kline (1977, p. 344) that the adverb collectively characterizes the attributes when 
possessed by the substance. 
181
 Deleuze (1990, p. 35) also invokes the reasons stated in 1p15s, stating that: “[W]e 
cannot pass through just three or four attributes without bringing back into the absolute 
the same numerical distinction which we have just excluded from infinity”. 
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quantifiable infinity without resorting to the tools of the imagination. For 
qualitative infinity we conceive with the intellect alone. If we can indeed conceive 
of the quantifiable infinity of the attributes as a qualitative infinity of the 
substance - what one would traditionally call a “divine perfection” -, it seems we 
could similarly conceive of the infinity of causally related finite modes. The 
causal ancestry of each finite mode intended by a passion is infinite, since the web 
in which it is inscribed is a maximal manifestation of a perfectly productive God. 
In spite of the etymology of the word, this “perfection” is not teleological but 
ontological. But how is it possible for us to “model” our understanding of the 
infinity of the modes on our understanding of the infinity of the attributes? What 
justifies this move? In Chapter 7, I will present an answer to this question.  
Let me presently briefly sum up this count of infinities. There are three different 
ways in which things are infinite in Spinoza’s metaphysics: the modes - which are 
infinitely many - are quantifiably infinite, the attributes are both quantifiably and 
qualitatively infinite (collectively and distributively, respectively), and the 
substance is absolutely infinite, in the sense that it perfectly possesses the 
attributes. Out of these, only quantifiable infinity is imaginable. We habitually 
construe quantifiably infinite mathematically, as potentially infinite successions 
(in Letter 12, C. 203, Spinoza uses the division of time as an example). Yet 
potential infinity does not, on Spinoza’s view, correctly represent neither the 
infinity of extension nor the collective multiplicity of the attributes. Nor can we 
conceive of the causal ancestry of our passions as a potential infinity, if we want 
to regard finite things as necessary. On the contrary, to successfully combat our 
passions by realizing their necessity we should think of their causal ancestry in the 
intellect’s terms - as an actually infinite whole rather than as potential infinity.  
 Conclusion.  
In this chapter I have given the priority of the infinite in Spinoza’s philosophy a 
therapeutic twist. The cognitive therapy which is to cure us from our passions can 
succeed in doing so if we can think adequately of the infinite causal nexus in 
which the finite objects of our passions are situated. Of course, we cannot have 
adequate knowledge of each of the individual causes behind any finite mode, for 
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these are not common to all. Nonetheless, Spinoza insists, we can have adequate 
knowledge of the infinity of the series.  
But how is this possible? In this paper, I have suggested that we can conceptualize 
the infinite causal ancestry of our passions as a qualitative infinity. On this 
reading, I thus come to regard the object of my passion as part of nature more 
easily, to the extent that I accept the traditional definition of God as a “most 
perfect being” (to which Spinoza certainly subscribed, see e.g. KV II, 18; CM II, 
2, Letters 2 and 60, and 1p11d). For if I consider the whole infinite nexus of 
causes behind my passion as one qualitative infinity in which God’s necessarily 
infinite power-cum-essence manifests itself, I will be less inclined to terminate the 
blame arbitrarily at the object of my passion, or its cause, or the cause of its 
cause…  
By considering God, and not any seemingly contingent wretched old thing, as the 
ultimate cause of my sadness, I, in effect, “separate the affect” from the partially 
inadequate idea of infinite “external causes” (5p2d) and instead join the affect to 
the “true thought” of an object whose causes do not proliferate infinitely, namely 
the causa sui, or God. Spinoza emphasizes the emotional value of thus adequately 
blaming God for the passions we necessarily undergo in 5p18s: “as we understand 
the causes of Sadness, it ceases (by P3) to be Sadness. And so, insofar as we 
understand God to be the cause of Sadness, we rejoice”.  
By acquiring an adequate concept of the actual infinity of the causal series 
unfolding behind whatever passion we suffer from we can come to regard it as 
necessary and God as its cause. But for this reason, adequate conceptualization of 
the actually infinite is also the sine qua non of love of God (amor Dei). For in 
order to love God, we must be able to conceive of him as a cause (Def. Aff. VI; 
5p32s). But as long as we insist on thinking infinity through the imagination we 
are unable to see how God causes any finite mode. For then we can only pass 
along a seemingly contingent, potentially infinitely unfolding causal narrative, but 
never realize the infinite whole that he, qua all, freely causes, and by the means of 
which our passions are necessitated. Had we no different perspective on infinity to 
recourse to, we would not be able to ascend from believing in contingency to 
realizing the full extent God’s freedom, even as it is instantiated in our slavery. On 
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Spinoza view, there is a perspective that admits of this insight. But because it is so 
psychologically hard to acquire and sustain this perspective (1p15s [V]; Letter 12, 
C. 202-3), such insights are bound to be both rare and difficult, and perhaps, we 
might add, frustratingly transitory. 
In sum, it is by changing our perspective on infinity that we can acquire the 
concept of necessity of the kind required to combat our passions by cognitive 
means. But with what right can we model our understanding of the modes’ 

















Spinoza’s Inverse Analogy of the Infinite 
 
Che fa l'aria infinita, e quel profondo 
Infinito Seren? - Leopardi 
   
 Introduction.  
 
In the preceding chapter, infinity was, as it were, the lens that needed to be 
adjusted if we were to realize the necessity of things. More precisely, I argued that 
by conceiving the infinity of finite modes qualitatively, we could conceive of 
these modes as necessary. Fatalism, for Spinoza as well as for the Stoics, can then 
in turn be harnessed for therapeutic purposes. We are to conceive of the infinity of 
the modes qualitatively by conceptually modelling their infinity after that of the 
attributes. But how is this conceptual move possible? First of all, what are these 
attributes? It is difficult to provide a quick definition of the attributes that can be 
agreed upon by all interpreters of Spinoza, but I think the following should be 
acceptable to most: the attributes are fundamental ways of being. Importantly, 
they are ways in which God is and is conceived to be. But with what right can we 
speak of the way God is? 
 
Whether and if so in what sense we can use human language to describe God is a 
problem with a long history in Western thought. The intuition at the root of the 
problem is that God is a being so fundamentally different from us that perhaps our 




God - if he can be called a being at all - is not a being like any other, and 
according to influential theological traditions, this means that when attributes are 
predicated of God these attributes cannot retain the sense they have when they are 
predicated of other things. One of the reasons why theologians held this to be the 
case is the doctrine of divine simplicity, to be surveyed below.  
 
In section 1, I will present two traditional ways in which simplicity was squared 
with the multiplicity of names said of God in religious discourse: the via negativa 
of Maimonides and the via analogica of Aquinas. This will allow me to, in 
section 2, situate my reading of the Spinozist analogy of the infinite within a 
relevant historical context. 
 
 7.1. Comparative background.  
 
 7.1.1. Simplicity and the problem of the divine attributes.  
 
According to influential voices in Western theology, God - if at all a being - is not 
a being like any other. One of the reasons why theologians held this is the doctrine 
of divine simplicity. God is not only simple in the sense that he lacks parts. He is 
also simple in the sense that his way of being cannot be analyzed in terms of 
ontological categories or by the syntactical categories that (allegedly) map onto 
the former. More precisely, the difference between a property which inheres in a 
subject and the subject itself does not apply to the divine context. We often 
assume that beings other than God possess (or “substand”) their properties.
182
 The 
linguistic structure of Subject-Predicate is then thought to mimic the metaphysical 
structure of things. On the theological view under consideration, this schema does 
not apply to God. When we say, for instance, ‘God is good’, if this statement is to 
be true, it cannot be so because some property - goodness - inheres in a substance 
- God. God’s simplicity means that the syntactic difference between subject and 
predicate in a statement such as ‘God is good’ does not correspond to any 
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 In his survey of medieval to early modern metaphysics, Pasnau (2011, p. 103) selects 
two criteria something must meet in order to qualify as a substance: “[S]ubstances sub-
stand, which is to say that they serve as the subject of accidents, and they subsist, which 
is to say that they exist per se, on their own”. 
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metaphysical difference between substance and attribute in God. If one accepts 
the doctrine of divine simplicity, there is no difference between God and his 
goodness (say). As can be easily inferred, this position has controversial 
consequences. The two most serious appear to be the following.  
 
First, it seems that God must now be identical with exactly one of his properties - 
and that all predicates said of God express exactly one property - for 
characterizing God in terms of different properties would jeopardize his 
simplicity. 
 
Second, when truly predicated of God, attribute-names cannot pick out the same 
attribute as when they are truly predicated of things other than God. If ‘simplicity’ 
must express the same property as all other predicates truly said of God, then it is 
far from clear that we can make sense of what it means to call God simple. 
Doesn't this render the doctrine of divine simplicity self-refuting? Consider 
another example. When I claim that God is good I do not predicate a property of 
him that is in any way different from his essence. But when I claim that Socrates 
is good, I do not claim that he (Socrates) is God’s essence. Do the terms have 
anything in common at all? And if not, then what are we doing when we call God 
good? 
 
It should be added that many contemporary philosophers of religion reject divine 
simplicity as a result of puzzles like these.
183
 Yet, it may be conjectured that it 
was in part because of puzzles like these that theologians embraced the doctrine of 
simplicity. It served to remind them that human language cannot adequately say 
what God is. 
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 For instance, Oppy (2014, p. 22) calls the position that God has no non-relational 
properties “unintelligible” and moreover unintelligible regardless of one’s metaphysics of 
properties. For there is inevitably “an intrinsic, non-relational way that the monotheistic 
god is” (2014, p. 23). While Oppy is right that there is at least some way in which God is, 
the question is whether it is meaningful to call this way of being a property. From the 
identity of essence - and essential “properties” - and existence in God, it supposedly fol-
lows that God is fully the way in which he is. 
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For present purposes, I will put the first problem aside and focus on the second 
one. While there is much to be said about divine simplicity from a philosophical 
point of view, I will focus on the problems that arise from an aspect of that 
doctrine that I, for convenience, will refer to as Exhaustivity. Recall that if God is 
simple, then any attribute truly said of him will be no different from his essence, 
at least extensionally speaking. In other words, any attribute truly said of God will 
exhaust the divine essence. The condition that attributes truly said of God should 
exhaust the divine essence I will refer to as the Exhaustivity Condition. The 
Exhaustivity Condition - or something like it - shaped important segments of 
Western theological thought. By way of introduction, a historical vignette will be 
sufficient to illustrate the pedigree of the view.  
 
The Exhaustivity Condition is outlined by Dionysius Aeropagita in his treatise On 
the Divine Names.
184
 Dionysius influentially states that “anyone who denies that 
all that is said with respect to God is expressed indivisibly, absolutely, 
unreservedly, and totally” of God “may be said to have blasphemed” (DN 636C - 
637A).
185
 It might be added that Dionysius here intends only what, on his view, is 
said truly of God, such as the divine names in his treatise. Dionysius embraces the 
Exhaustivity Condition because of the demand of simplicity. The One is so 
intrinsically unified that any attribute that is truly predicated of it must pick out 
the divine essence as such. If good is an attribute that applies truly to the One, 
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 Dionysius Aeropagita is in the scholarship often, bizarrely, referred to as pseudo-
Dionysius. This is meant to signal that it the author of the Mystical Theology and the trea-
tise On the Divine Names could not have been the Dionysius of Acts 17:34, with whom 
the author of these treatises identified. (For a refutation of this self-identification, see 
Lossky, 1939, p. 209, n. 8). Although the non-identity of the author Dionysius with the 
Dionysius of the Acts is certain, however, it does not make sense to call him pseudo-
Dionysius, since he for all we know might well have been called Dionysius. If a pseudo 
need be included, it would be more sensible to call the author Dionysius pseudo-
Aeropagita instead. However, as Marion (1977) has shown, there is also an - admittedly 
evasive - sense in which Dionysius can truly be regarded as a “converted aeropagite”: by 
which he means a thinker steeped in Greek philosophy who renounces all concepts that 
threaten to reify God.  
185
 Schäfer (2006, p. 72) draws attention to the affinity of this principle with Plotinus 
(Enn. II, 9, I, I). Probably, the unity of essence and existence in God, which is a more 
limited case of ontological simplicity in God, is sufficient to yield the Exhaustivity Con-
dition. But this special form of simplicity is not applicable to Dionysius’ case, as he did 
not consider God as a being in the first place, and therefore not as a being convertible 




then its goodness cannot be one thing, and the One of which the goodness is said, 
another. Thus, on Dionysius’ view, in theological discourse, the attributes we 
ascribe to God - goodness, say - have a semantic role different from the one they 
have in ordinary discourse. The semantic contribution of the attribute ‘good’ as 
said of God is simply God. Differently put, the term ‘good’, when predicated of 
God, does not refer to a property of divine goodness, but to God himself. On my 
view, this helps explain why, for Dionysius, and in the tradition following him, 
attributes such as goodness or wisdom are names of God. Whereas property-
names pick out properties “in” things, names pick out the individual that they 
refer to. The names in Dionysius’ treatise - Wisdom, Love, and Light, for example 
- are like ordinary proper names in that they pick out the whole being - God -, and 
not some property of that being. For the sake of clarity, I will nonetheless speak of 
divine attributes and not divine names in what follows.  
 
Before I undertake the investigation proper, let me first note why we should 
acknowledge the Exhaustivity Condition as being of significance for Spinoza’s 
philosophy. The Exhaustivity Condition follows from the doctrine of divine 
simplicity. Spinoza considers simplicity a divine attribute in the CM II, 5. When it 
comes to his magnum opus, the Ethics, the issue of divine simplicity is more 
controversial. Spinoza clearly considers God’s nature mereologically simple, i.e. 
simple in the sense that it is neither constituted of nor divisible into parts (see 
1p12; 1p13; 1p15s). But this does not entail that God’s nature is ontologically 
simple. The issue of divine simplicity in the Ethics has therefore been hotly 
debated in the scholarship.
186
 In this chapter, I will not take up the issue of 
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 Some commentators, and most influentially Gueroult (1969, part I: Dieu, p. 232) and 
Curley (1969, p. 16) take the fact that God’s essence is nonetheless characterized as con-
stituted by an infinity of attributes to mean that God should be called complex, yet com-
plex in a way that does not imply divisibility. The question is of course intimately con-
nected with how one interprets the attributes. If the attributes render truly the essence of 
the substance and the attributes are entirely conceptually isolated from each other, they 
must necessarily each present a different description of the substance. In that case, they 
diversify it in some manner and it is not entirely simple. If, on the other hand, as Wolfson 
famously maintained (1962, vol. I, pp. 151-6) the attributes are what the intellect mistak-
enly perceives as if constituting the essence of the substance, then the substance may be 
simple and the attributes do not really diversify it. Fraenkel (2006) explores the doctrine 




whether and in what sense Spinoza endorsed the doctrine of divine simplicity 
directly. 
 
For present purposes, it is enough to note that the unity of essence and existence 
in God is a crucial aspect of divine simplicity. It is crucial because it was this 
aspect of divine simplicity which motivated theologians to consider language 
about God to be sui generis. More precisely, the Exhaustivity Condition was 
considered to follow specifically from the unity of existence and essence in God. 
Aquinas, for one, deduces the non-univocity of terms said of creatures and God, 
respectively, from the unity of essence and existence in God. Consider, for 
instance, his response to the question whether names are said of God and creatures 
univocally (ST, 1, 13, 5, c). When predicated of a human being, the predicate 
‘wise’ signifies a property distinct from the essence of the subject. For that reason, 
the term “as it were circumscribes and comprehends” [circumscribit et 
comprehendit] the thing signified. By contrast, when predicated of God, ‘wise’ is 
extensionally no different from God’s “essence, power or being”. It is for this 
reason that no names can be said univocally of God and other things: in other 
words, all language, when predicated of God, is sui generis.
187
 (Of course, 
                                                                                                                                     
existence it implies as its historical roots in a Neo-Platonized account of Aristotle’s con-
ception of the active intellect.  
187
 For examples of similar argumentative moves, where Aquinas deduces non-univocity 
from the unity of essence and existence in God, see De Potentia, q. 7, ar. 6, co. “Deus 
autem alio modo se habet ad esse quam aliqua alia creatura: nam ipse est suum esse, quod 
nulli alii creaturae competit. Unde nullo modo univoce de Deo creatura dicitur” (1980c , 
p. 244). See also In I Sent., ds. 35, q. 1, art. 4, c (1980a, p. 92): “Et ideo cum omnium 
quae dicuntur de Deo natura vel forma sit ipsum esse, quia suum esse est sua natura, 
propter quod dicitur a quibusdam philosophis, quod est ens non in essentia, et sciens non 
per scientiam, et sic de aliis, ut intelligatur essentia non esse aliud ab esse, et sic de aliis: 
ideo nihil de Deo et creaturis univoce dici potest” (Emphasis added) and De Veritate, q. 
2, art. 11, c. In the latter passage, Aquinas states that it is impossible to predicate anything 
univocally of creatures and God, since univocation presupposes a commonality, but that 
commonality is precluded because of God’s unique relation to his being, i.e. by the fact 
that God is his own being (est suum proprium esse) (1980c, p. 16). 
 Of course, that names cannot be said of God and creatures in the same sense as a 
result of his simplicity did not originate with Aquinas. For a predecessor, see Albinus’ 
Didaskalikos (as cited in Lyttkens, 1952, pp. 102-3).  
 It may be useful to bear in mind, as Montagnes emphasizes, that divine simplicity 
would not in and of itself have resulted in non-univocity, if being (esse) had not first been 
non-univocal : “Puisque l'esse est ce par quoi les êtres de même nature diffèrent les uns 
des autres, il s’ensuit que l'esse n’est jamais univoquement commun et que l'être (ens) 




Aquinas does not take this to exclude an analogical commonality of names, as will 
be discussed below.) 
 
Spinoza too held that essence and existence are one in God (1p20). Yet, it is 
evident from Spinoza’s philosophico-theological practice that the unity of essence 
and existence in God does not have the same consequences, on his view, for the 
semantics of theological language as it has for his predecessors. In section 2, I will 
argue that for Spinoza the analogy proceeds in a direction opposite to how 
Scholastic authors conceived it. But in order to see the historical importance of 
this claim, it is necessary to first introduce alternative solutions to the problem of 
the sui generis nature of religious language. 
 
7.1.2. Two solutions to the problems engendered by the Exhaustivity 
Condition.  
 
Among all the traditional divine attributes, simplicity is arguably the hardest to 
understand. In this section, I will focus on some especially noteworthy 
consequences of that doctrine for the semantics of theological discourse in two 
traditions preceding and influencing Spinoza.  
 
In providing this context, my goal is not to collate all passages Spinoza could in 
principle have drawn from - such a reconstruction of the intersection of Spinoza’s 
reasoning, on the one hand, and the philosophical and theological lore preceding 
him, on the other, has already been carried out by Wolfson (1962, pp. 6-10), and, 
in the specific context of scholasticism, by Freudenthal (1887, pp. 85-138). Nor is 
my intention to establish which sources he actually did draw from (the task of 
Quellenforschung). The present study is more concerned with the systematic 
relationships between ideas than with their historical lines of transmittance. 
Accordingly, my purpose in writing this background is to set the stage for the 
                                                                                                                                     
rien avoir d’univoquement commun avec le créé. L'argument se présente comme une 
conséquence noétique de la distinction métaphysique [i.e. the distinction between esse 
and quiddity] empruntée à Avicenna” (2008, p. 68). An investigation potentially of great 
interest would undertake to establish a line of influence running from Arab philosophy to 
Spinoza. I am not competent to say anything about this connection.  
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subsequent investigation into Spinoza’s position on the meaning of the term 
‘infinite’. Since the intellectual stage across which the debate over the divine 
attributes unfolded is vast - spanning several centuries and three world religions 
(Judaism, Christianity, Islam) - I do not claim that the following exposition will 
be truly representative, much less exhaustive. Instead, I have selected a limited 
sample of texts that especially clearly and influentially raise issues whose depth 
and significance reverberate in Spinoza’s thinking on divine infinity. These texts 
are The Guide for the Perplexed by Maimonides and Thomas Aquinas’ ST I, q. 13 
on the names of God, and In I Sent., ds. 2. q. 1, art. 3, as well as other, related, 
texts in the Thomist corpus. 
 
 7.1.2.1. Introduction to the problem of the divine attributes.  
 
By divine attributes (or, as these are called in the Dionysian tradition, “names”) 
are meant predicates that are truly said of God. Examples of non-symbolical 
attributes in the monotheistic, Abrahamitic religions are wise, merciful or good. 
The problem concerning the divine attribute consisted in how attributes belonging 
to human language can be true of a being so utterly different from everything else 
we characterize in our language. 
 
Of course, it is possible to take propositions about God at face value. On such an 
approach, an attribute may be applied to God in the same sense as it is applied to 
human beings or things in the world. In subscribing to such a view, one assumes 
that the proposition that an utterance about God expresses is exactly the 
proposition that it seems to express. For instance, when God is gendered in  
the Bible, he is often described as male. When one assumes that this description of 
God implies that God is male, in more or less the same sense as creatures are 
male, one presupposes that the word ‘male’ is used univocally in these contexts. 
Although univocity is assumed in many contemporary critiques of religion, this 
kind of literal exegesis seems to have been very uncommon in the traditional 
debate on divine attributes.  
 
To combat such literal (mis-)understandings of the Torah, Maimonides composed 
his Guide for the Perplexed around the year 1190, a treatise originally composed 
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in Judeo-Arabic and then translated to Hebrew. Its Latin translation Dux 
Neutrorum exerted significant influence in the scholastic tradition of the West. 
Spinoza was demonstrably well acquainted with this work (which he criticizes 




In his Guide, Maimonides frequently cites the Talmud saying that the “Torah 
speaks in the language of men” (see for instance Part I, Ch. XXVI, p. 34-5). The 
language of the Bible, especially when it speaks of God, is not to be taken at face 
value. Instead, Maimonides maintains, all attributes that are predicated of God 
(including not only attributes such as male [for this specific example, see Part I, 
Ch. XIX, pp. 28-29], which imply corporeality and therefore, on Maimonides’ 
view, are evidently metaphorical,
189
 but also abstract attributes such as good, wise 
or merciful) are polysemous homonyms; whenever these words are used as divine 
attributes, their sound (and, one may add, their written representation) is in all 
respects identical with the homonymous words applied to worldly things, but their 
significance is entirely altered. By asserting that what appear to be two tokens of 
the same word are merely homonyms, Maimonides aims to rule out the possibility 
of a qualified guess concerning the meaning of a divine attribute on the basis of 
what the same word means in other contexts. Given that mere homonyms have 
only their sound in common, there is no intensional common denominator 
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 I do not claim to provide here a systematic exploration of the Spinoza-Maimonides 
connection. For a bibliography on the issue, see Dienstag (1986, pp. 375-416). For a more 
recent study linking Spinoza’s conception of God to Maimonides (and challenging 
Wolfson’s thesis that Spinozas’ radical originality lay in his equation of God with Na-
ture), see Fraenkel (2006, pp. 169-215). 
189
 One might object to the applicability of metaphors in this context. What purpose can 
metaphors serve if there is no way of possibly understanding that for which the metaphor 
stands proxy? I cannot elaborate on an answer to this question here. One way of reconcil-
ing divine inconceivability with the applicability of metaphors within religious language 
would be to insist that “good” metaphors stand for inconceivability itself. It is in this 
vein, it seems, that Marion develops the concept of an “icon”. In his work L'idole et la 
distance, Marion (1977, p. 27) distinguishes between an idol and an icon. An idol, on 
Marion’s view, reifies the concept of God. The idol to which Marion devotes special 
scrutiny is the concept of God crystallized in Western philosophy. As Marion writes: 
“Ainsi pourrait-on intérpreter […] les concepts de ‘dieu’ comme des idoles, ou plutôt 
comme des opérateurs de ce que l'idole, pour sa part, opère aussi - la mise à disposition 
du divin dans un visage, qu‘on nomme le Dieu”. The icon differs from the idol in that 
whereas the idol masks the existential distance that authenticates the divine (p. 30), the 
icon manifests that distance: it is an image of the invisible itself (cf. p. 35). Likewise, 
“good” metaphors could perhaps similarly stand for inconceivability itself. 
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between the meaning of goodness, as applied to God, and the meaning of 
goodness when predicated of, for instance, a human being. If theological language 
is to be true, then even predicates such as existence or (being in possession of an) 
intellect are to be used equivocally of God and other things (Ch. XXXV, p. 49; 
Ch. XLVII, p. 64), or in Maimonides’ words, the attributes of existence and 
intellect have “no relation” to the way these words are applied to other things.190 
There is no principled way of extending one’s knowledge of God by the means of 
exploring the meaning of the homonymous words as these are applied to things 
other than God. We can’t really say anything about God. Or, to more exactly 
render Maimonides’ view, to affirm attributes of God does not make us advance 
in theological knowledge. The only way in which one can advance in the science 
of the divine, Maimonides maintains, is by negative theology, for by successively 
negating purported attributes of God one gradually becomes aware of one’s 
unknowing. However, Maimonides emphasizes, such negations must proceed by 
proof; that is, one must rationally convince oneself that a given attribute is to be 
negated of God in order to truly advance in theology. The “proof” in question 
must be based on the theological insight that one’s mundane categories fail to 
apply to God. To proceed by rational means to realize the full extent of one’s 
ignorance of God is the best knowledge of God there is (for Maimonides’ view 
concerning the admissibility of negative attributes as opposed to positive ones, see 
Part I, Ch. LVIII-LX). 
 
However, Maimonides also sanctions another theological practice, which ascribes 
attributes to God by regarding God through the lens of his acts. Considering God 
through the intermediary of his acts does not yield knowledge of his essence, 
however, and is therefore labeled as “the seeing of the back” (Maimonides is 
drawing on Moses’ encounter with God in Exod. 33, 23) in contradistinction to 
“the perception of the Divine face” (Part I, Ch. XXI, p. 34). Insofar as God is the 
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 For Maimonides’ view on relation, see Part I, Ch. LII. In this chapter, Maimonides 
maintains that “whenever we speak of a relation between two things, these belong to the 
same kind; but when two things belong to different kinds though of the same class there 
is no relation between them” (p. 71). The example Maimonides adduces - that we cannot 
compare the intensity of a red color with that of a green - fails to prove his point, as it is 
entirely possible to compare the intensities between different colors (how otherwise 
would Da Vinci’s “rational” colouring system be possible?). 
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cause of goodness (and other perfections) we call God good. However, it is clear 
that Maimonides does not consider the method of ascribing attributes to God on 
the basis of his causality as being as helpful a theological tool as the via negativa.  
 
In the Latin West, by contrast, Thomas Aquinas elaborated the analogical 
“method” -  a way of conceiving how non-symbolical attributes (e.g., goodness or 
the good itself [bonitas ipsa]) can be truly predicated of God.
191
 This “method” 
can be seen as an attempt to forge a middle path between univocity (the position 
that names are predicated of God in the same sense as they are predicated of other 
things) and equivocity (the position that they are fundamentally unrelated) (see ST 
I, 13, 5). Although the significations of terms such as ‘goodness’ are diverse when 
applied to God and his creatures, the significations of these terms are nonetheless 
related, and it is the relation of creation that makes intensional commonality 
possible. 
 
 7.1.2.2. Multiplicity of attributes, simplicity of God.  
 
One may distinguish between divine names, or attributes, said of God in scriptural 
traditions, such as - taking Dionysian theonyms as example, Light, Beauty, Love - 
and the philosophical justification theologians provided for this traditional 
characterization of God. One difficulty consisted in reconciling the apparent 
multiplicity of God’s attributes in tradition, and the demand that God be 
supremely one and simple, a demand common to the monotheist belief systems of 
Judaism, Islam, and, with some modification, Christianity. If, however, 
predication works in the divine context in the way that I have described, then to 
demand that the divine nature be simple doesn’t amount to demanding much. 
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 For three comprehensive studies of analogy in Aquinas, see Klubertanz (1960); Mon-
tagnes (2008) and Lyttkens (1952). Since Lyttken’s study focuses mainly on Greek philo-
sophical and then pre-Thomist Christian sources, Wolfson’s “The Amphibolous Terms in 
Aristotle, Arabic Philosophy and Maimonides”, (1938, pp. 151-73), complements its 
historical background.  
 It may be worth to emphasize, in this context, that one contemporary scholarly 
view with regards to Aquinas’ doctrine of analogy is that Aquinas had no “theory” of 
analogical predication at all. On this view, rather than being a doctrine asserted about 
being (an analogia entis), analogical predication is a form of theological practice. This 
reading has been advanced by Etienne Gilson (1956). Such a theological reading stands in 
in contradistinction to the heavily metaphysical reading of Aquinas by Karl Barth. 
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Because whatever ‘simple’ means when predicated of God it either has no link to 
the meaning of the word we use in daily discourse, or else it has only an 
analogical link. This one might want to take as a reason for rejecting any 
meaningful form of divine simplicity. However, the doctrine of simplicity need 
not be refuted on the grounds that ‘simple’, if truly said of God, cannot mean what 
our dictionary says it does. Divine simplicity will be true, not if ‘simple’ means 
what it does when we call things other than God simple, but rather if it means 
something - perhaps something unknown -, and there are no attributes that when 
truly said of God fail to mean the same thing. 
 
This appears to be the way in which Maimonides attempted to resolve the tension. 
He concedes that if God possessed diverse attributes - attributes such as unity, 
omnipotence or wisdom - he, having many attributes, would be characterized by a 
kind of plurality that is incompatible with the demand that God be simple.  
 
Since my purpose is to be illustrative rather than exhaustive, I only mention one 
passage from Maimonides in support of this view. In Part I, Ch. LXIII of his 
Guide, Maimonides summarizes his philosophical interpretation of the Biblical 
passage in which God says “I am what I am” (Exod. 3:14) as follows: “The 
principal point in this phrase is that the same word which denotes ‘existence’ is 
repeated as an attribute” (p. 94). In other words, whenever an attribute is 
predicated of God, “the object [i.e. God] and the attribute by which it is described 
are necessarily identical” (p. 95).192  
 
Since simplicity is therefore not negotiable God cannot, for Maimonides, be said 
to have any of these attributes. Yet Maimonides also maintains that God is indeed 
simple, omnipotent and wise. These appear to be positive attributes. How does he, 
then, square these seemingly contradictory claims?  
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 For an alternative to this ontological reading of Exodus, see Manaranche (1980, pp. 
12-17); Mascall (1949). According to Manaranche, the episode with the burning bush 
does not make a highly sophisticated philosophical statement, but instead expresses a 
refusal to answer. Manaranche provides some other biblical samples of similar locutions 
to the same effect. Marion (1977, p. 186) comments on the duality of the traditions in the 
following words: “Rien de plus faux que d‘opposer les deux traductions et traditions. 




Recall that, when simplicity is endorsed, the fact that God is P, does not imply 
that God possesses the property expressed by P (cf. Part I, Ch. LVII), as one 
would perhaps expect to be the case were the subject something other than God. 
While other things have attributes that are accidental and therefore distinct from 
their essence, such as existence or tattooed-ness, God’s essence is identical with 
each and every one of his attributes.
193
 The statement ‘God is simple’ therefore 
accomplishes just as much (or just as little) as the statement that ‘God is one’. 
Indeed, ‘God is one’ accomplishes just as much (or just as little) as the statement 
that ‘God is God’. One may wonder what the Maimonidean view implies for the 
meaning of statements about God. It is tempting to say that, given that there is no 
difference between subject and predicate in God, when ‘is’ appears to accomplish 
a predication (of, say, goodness to God) what it actually accomplishes is simply 
an identity statement (God is God). But perhaps it would be more faithful to think 
of the ‘is’ in true statements about God as expressing neither predication nor 
identity but rather something that is proper to the divine sphere.  
 
In any case, it is clear that, for Maimonides, each and every attribute that can be 
truly predicated of God merely restates his unknowable essence. Since the 
meaning of all divine attributes converge, be their point of convergence beyond 
the horizon of human knowledge, it is, on Maimonides’ view, false to think that 
God is characterized by an inner plurality. To be accurate, it is false to think that 
God is characterized by an inner plurality, if we take the predicate of ‘being 
characterized by an inner plurality’ to mean something different from ‘being 
simple’.  
 
The apparent multiplicity of divine attributes is an illusion, generated by the 
multiple meanings of the mundane words homonymous with the divine attributes. 
The diverse significations of words such as ‘goodness’ and ‘wisdom’ do not 
testify to any difference between the divine attributes of goodness and wisdom, as 
                                                 
193
 An exception to this rule is the tetragrammaton (the Jewish letters Yod He Waw He), 
which is not an attribute but the “proper name” of God. See Part I, ch. LXI, pp. 98-91. I 
will not discuss this exception. 
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the relation between these two classes of words (attributes non-divine and divine, 
respectively) is one of equivocity.  
 
Aquinas takes issue with the Maimonidean position on the relation between 
attributes said of God and creatures on three grounds (ST I, q. 13, art. 2, co 
[1980b, p. 202]). First, the Maimonidean way of construing attributes as true of 
God merely by because God is their cause does not allow us to say why certain 
attributes are said of God and others not. Why do we call God good because he is 
the cause of goodness but not a body because he is the cause of bodies? Second, if 
we call God good merely because he causes goodness, then God’s goodness will 
be secondary to that which he causes. (Below, I will return to in what sense 
attributes are on Aquinas’ view secondarily predicated of God). Third, and 
interestingly, Aquinas appeals to speaker intention: it is contrary to the intention 
of the speakers (contra intentionem loquentium de deo) to assume that in calling 





By subscribing to analogical predication Aquinas instead hoped to establish a 
relation between divine and non-divine attributes.  
 
While in Maimonides the signification of non-divine attributes is irrelevant for the 
(inscrutable) meaning of their divine counterparts, for Aquinas the meaning of 
words attributed analogically to God stands in some relation to the meaning of the 
same word even as it is used in mundane parlance. In other words, we do not 
arbitrarily apply the term ‘goodness’ to both humans and God. There is some 
similarity between what is picked out by the predicate when it is applied to God 
and when it is applied to humans (for instance). When I say (truly) that Caesar is 
good and when I say (truly) that God is good, this predicate picks out a property 
of Caesar’s, whereas it picks out something different in the case of God - 
presumably, his essence. But nonetheless the property in Caesar and whatever 
feature about God that makes it the case that the predicate can be truly attributed 
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 For a comment on this, as well as collation with other passages in the Thomist corpus, 
see Ashworth (1991, p. 59). 
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of him do have something in common. Since there is something in common 
between God and Caesar’s goodness, the two types of the predicate ‘good’, as 
applied of God and humans, are related by their meaning, even if their meaning 
isn’t the same. We may think of this as similarity in meaning which is nonetheless 
not an identity of meaning: a kind of intensional commonality. Aquinas, of 
course, calls it analogy. The reason why analogy holds is divine preeminence: 
creatures can enjoy whatever perfections they have, because these perfections 
“preexist” in God (see for instance ST I, q. 13, art. 2. co; see also how Aquinas 
himself qualifies the position of Dionysius as one based on the logic of 




But if there is some link between what the words ‘goodness’ and ‘wisdom’ 
signify when attributed of, say, a human being and God, respectively, does this 
not mean that the attributes, insofar as they are truly predicated of God, must also 
retain some of the difference they have when predicated of humans? Must not 
Aquinas introduce something like difference in God to distinguish between 
whatever it is about him that ‘goodness’ and ‘wisdom’ pick out, respectively? For 
if goodness in God is linked to goodness in humans, and wisdom in God is linked 
to wisdom in humans, then it appears that the same kind of difference that obtains 
between these two properties in humans must apply to God as well. How, 
otherwise, are we to account for the fact that ‘goodness’ said of God (whatever 
that is) preserves an intensional link with ‘goodness’ said of humans but not with 
‘wisdom’ said of humans?  
 
For Aquinas, ‘goodness’ and ‘wisdom’ are clearly terms with different meanings. 
Yet, when said of God, they pick out the same thing. It may be objected that, 
being predicates, ‘goodness’ and ‘wisdom’ don’t pick out any thing at all. While 
the role of proper names is to pick out things, the semantic contribution of 
predicates is different. Informally, a proposition which assigns a predicate to an 
individual is true just in case the individual belongs to the set of things possessing 
the property expressed by the predicate. But, as already suggested, the truth of 
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 “cum igitur dicitur deus est bonus, non est sensus, deus est causa bonitatis vel deus 
non est malus, sed est sensus, id quod bonitatem dicimus in creaturis, praeexistit in deo, 
et hoc quidem secundum modum altiorem” (1980b, p. 202).  
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‘God is good’ and similar statements cannot be conditional upon God’s 
possessing the property in question. It is important to realize that simplicity bars 
that possibility. Whatever the statement ‘God is good’ accomplishes, assuming it 
to be true, it cannot be to assert that goodness is one property that inheres in God. 
But then exactly what does the statement accomplish? Perhaps we are acquainted 
with God’s goodness as if it were a property inhering in God. So, by attributing 
goodness to God we can come to know God under a new guise, in spite of the fact 
that our perception of a diversity - the one between subject and predicate - does 
not track any real diversity. What I am suggesting is that in spite of the fact that 
God is no different from his goodness, we can know him under different guises: 
for instance, we can come to know him as good or wise. 
 
Such intensional differences between co-extensional or co-referential terms is not 
itself problematic. One might want to suggest that, just as Hesperus and 
Phosphorus signify the same planet under different guises, so the statements ‘God 
is good’ and ‘God is God’ differ only in their cognitive significance. However, 
while ordinarily two terms can plainly be co-referential or co-extensional and yet 
differ in cognitive significance without difficulty, the doctrine of divine simplicity 
makes it problematic whether this can be the case with God. Being the brightest 
evening-star and the being the brightest morning-star are two descriptions that 
happen to pick out to the same object. Venus can be known under these two 
different guises since the planet can be truly characterized in two different ways. 
There are two separate facts about Venus that explain why each description is 
true. But the doctrine of divine simplicity says that there can’t be some fact about 
God F1 that explains why some predicate P1 is true of him that is in any way 
different from another fact F2 that explains why another predicate P2 is true of 
him. Of course, if the situation is such that any true statement about God, such as, 
presumably ‘God is good’ is, in spite of its grammatical form, an identity 
statement, we are not dealing with any predicates at all. But the point can easily 
be modified to accommodate for that. In that case, it seems that if X and Y are 
two different names for God, and X and Y are co-referential terms that intend God 
under different guises, then there must be one fact about God which explains why 
can be known under the guise of X and another fact which explains why he can be 
known under the guise of Y. In other words, even if simplicity entails that real 
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predication is impossible, there must, it seems, still be at least two different facts 
about God that explain why he can be truly referred to under different guises, in 
the same way as the fact that grounds the co-reference of ‘Venus’ and ’the 
evening-star’ is the fact that Venus is the brightest celestial body visible on the 
sky in the evening, while the fact that grounds the co-reference of ‘Venus’ and 
’the morning-star’ is the fact that Venus is also the brightest celestial body in the 
morning. However, we construe the semantics of statements about God, simplicity 
entails that F1 and F2 must ultimately be the same fact: God himself.  
 
The question of whether the multiplicity of meanings testifies to a multiplicity in 
God’s nature and thereby thwarts simplicity is directly addressed by Aquinas in In 
I Sent., ds. 2. q. 1, art. 3 as well as in ST, q. 13, art. 4. The title of I Sent., ds. 2. q. 
1, art. 3 is “Whether the diversity of rationes, by which attributes differ, is only in 
the intellect or also in God” (Utrum pluralitas rationum, quibus attributa 
differunt, sit tantum in intellectu, vel etiam in Deo)
196
 and the title of ST, q. 13, 
art. 4 is “Whether the names of God are synonymous”. The word ratio figures in 
one of the titles. What is a ratio? In I Sent., ds. 2. q. 1, art. 3, co (1980a, p. 8) 
Aquinas rejects that this concept is to be understood as the mind’s conception 
(conceptio) of the meaning (intentio); it is rather the meaning (intentio) itself, in 
abstraction from any perceiving mind (“nec tamen hoc nomen [sc. ratio] significat 
ipsam conceptionem […] sed significat intentionem hujus conceptionis"). The 
ratio can therefore be understood as the meaning of a term. If the intensional 
diversity between the divine attributes can be resolved by appealing to the human 
intellect, then the divergence between these attributes has nothing to do with God 
but is entirely due to facts about human psychology and language, which would 
be a retreat to the Maimonidean position. Contrariwise, if the meanings of the 
attributes differ not only in the intellect’s perception [in intellectu], but also in the 
divine reality [in re], then, it seems, the divine reality must be internally 
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 For a detailed study of the history of the composition of this I Sent., ds. 2. q. 1, art. 3, 
as well as the testimony this history bears to Aquinas’ evolving relation to Maimonides’ 
work, see Rubio (2006). For the purposes of this chapter I have availed myself of the 
English translation included as an appendix in Rubio’s study. 
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characterized by multiplicity. The manifoldness of scriptural attributes would thus 




In the arguments contrary to the position he holds, Aquinas offers various reasons 
- rational as well as traditional - in favor of the origin of the diverse meanings in 
the intellect. The arguably most central defence of the merely [tantum] intellectual 
locus of these meanings is the fact that God is “one and simple” [unus et simplex] 
(In I Sent., ds. 2, q. 1, art. 3, ag. 4 [1980, p. 7]), and that his essence, qua 
“supremely one” [summe una] “cannot be the root of a multiplicity existing 
within itself” [non potest esse radix alicujus multitudinis in ea existentis] (In I 
Sent., d. 2, q. 1, art. 3, ag. 5 [loc. cit.]). This is the familiar Maimonidean position 
that Aquinas will attempt to abandon.  
 
In the third argument to the contrary (In I Sent., ds. 2, q. 1, art. 3, ad. 3 [1980a, p. 
8]), Aquinas claims that the multiplicity of attributes is not posited in God as if he 
were a complex thing, but rather “according to his simple perfection” (secundum 
suam simplicem perfectionem).
198
 The traditional attributes - wisdom, goodness, 
and so on - are indeed perfections, but God possesses them so to speak in a simple 
way. But the way that God can comprehend a multiplicity of perfections in such a 
way that they are one is hidden from us. Whereas the intension of each attribute is 
grounded in God’s nature, the fact that a human (or indeed angelic) intellect 
conceives of these meanings as not involving each other is due to the fact that our 
intellect cannot in one conception [una conceptione] take in different modes of 
perfection (In I Sent. ds. 2. q. 1. art. 3. co. [1980, p. 8]).
199
 This means, as far as I 
can see, that the attributes are not flawed in what they signify (e.g., the goodness 
of God), but inaccurate in that they, for a limited intellect, fail to signify the other 
                                                 
197
 For Aquinas’ view on divine simplicity, see ST I, q. 3. Just like Maimonides, he held 
perfect simplicity to entail the unity of essence and existence in God, ST I, q. 3, art. 3 
(1980b, p. 188). 
198
 Aquinas discusses the authority of the Dionysian text in the two first answers to the 
contrary. However, the notion of perfection may be of Dionysian inspiration as well. For 
among the many theonyms Dionysius deals with, perfection is particularly important. For 
instance, Dionysius labels God the “principle of perfection for those who are being per-
fected” (τῶν τελουμένων τελεταρχία: 589C [1990, p. 112]).  
199
 Aquinas approvingly cites Chrysostomos view that even the angels fail to see God in a 
“comprehensive vision”, since even they fail to address him with one name (In I Sent. ds. 
2. q. 1. art. 3. co. [1980, p. 8]). 
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attributes that equally pertain to God (e.g., his wisdom). Divine attributes such as 
goodness succeed in being true about God, but their way of doing so is flawed (or 
as Aquinas puts it, imperfect: see ST I, q. 13, art. 2, co), for in spite of being 
identical in God, we fail to see that they are identical with each other. In In I Sent. 
ds. 2. q. 1. art. 3. co, Aquinas contrasts this partial understanding of God with the 
unified comprehension of which the prophet Zechariah speaks of in these words: 
“In that Day the Lord shall be one and His name one”. Were we to enjoy the 
vision the prophet speaks of, Aquinas implies, we would be able to see how 
intensionally diverse attributes can be grounded in a simple nature. But as things 




Aquinas thus by fiat attempts to reconcile two seemingly incompatible 
requirements. That is, he acknowledges that both of the following conditions must 
be met. On the one hand, any truly predicated attributes, for instance wisdom and 
goodness, must be really one, or “absolutely and really one in God” (omnino 
unum re in Deo: In I Sent., ds. 2, q. 1, art. 3, co [1980a, p. 8]), lest the simplicity 
of the divine nature be compromised. On the other hand, their meanings must 
differ, and this difference must stem not only from the intellect, but also from “the 
quality of the thing itself” [ex proprietate ipsius rei], that is, the diversity of 
attributes must be genuinely grounded in God’s simple nature. How does this 
grounding take place? In order to answer this question Aquinas appeals to the 
attribute of simple perfection which is the feature about God which is supposed to 
explain how intensionally diverse attributes can be true of God in such a way that 
his simplicity isn’t compromised. Simple perfection is a meta-attribute, namely the 
attribute of being able to possess attributes in such a way that one’s simplicity 
isn’t compromised.
201
 Whether it has explanatory value is doubtful.  
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 Aquinas also appears to say that this unified vision will belong to the blessed in the 
“homeland” (patria) (In I Sent. ds. 2. q. 1. art 3. co). Whether or not Aquinas actually 
thought that the beatific vision would involve such a comprehensive view of God is a 
question with which I am not concerned. 
201
 Aquinas’ position is meant to defend simultaneously the simplicity of God, and the 
possibility of adequately applying attributes to God whose meanings differ. However, for 
the sake of completeness, it may be noted that Aquinas’ solution to the dilemma is not 
absolute. This is so since the condition of divine simplicity is not itself absolute. Aquinas, 
subscribing to the Christian doctrine of trinitarianism, asserts that “in God everything is 





 7.1.3. Two comparative remarks.  
 
Before investigating how Spinoza considers predication to work across divine and 
non-divine contexts, let me first contrast his view on the attributes with the 
traditional debate. Let me first briefly address the question whether such a 
comparison can be justified. While in an early text, Spinoza considers any 
property truly said of God an attribute (CM II), in the Ethics, Spinoza’s use of the 
word is more technical. In his magnum opus, he notoriously defines an attribute as 
“what the intellect perceives of a substance, as constituting its essence” (1d4) and 
treats extension and thought as the only two attributes to which human beings 
have access. Of course, extension and thought are not attributes on a par with 
wisdom and goodness.
202
 Yet, the cited definition of ‘attribute’, along with his 
adherence to the unity of essence and existence in God (1p20), clearly makes a 
comparison interesting. For, together they imply that an attribute must (at the very 
least from the intellect’s point of view) meet the Exhaustivity Condition: each 
attribute must be (thought of as) identical with God’s essence and hence (as per 
1p20) with his existence. Although I cannot here explore the relation between 
Spinozist attributes and traditional ones in further detail, allow me to make two 
comparative observations.  
 
First, while for Aquinas we cannot in this life perceive the many different divine 
perfections in one conception, for Spinoza such a unified perception would not be 
                                                                                                                                     
(In I Sent., ds. 2, q. 1, art. 3, ad. 6, [1980, p. 9]). These abstracta signify the three divine 
persons. Aquinas’ solution of the difficulty of the other divine attributes does not apply to 
these persons, who differ not only because the ratio we conceive of each fails to encom-
pass the other two, but also because they are really [re] different. This position naturally 
leads to the question: what about God’s nature justifies the real co-existence of these 
three divine persons as different “hypostases”? What makes the three persons different 
from all other attributes? There is no philosophically justifiable answer to this question: 
the trinity is a datum of faith, such that not only its truth, but also its logical possibility, 
can never be validated by reason alone. 
202
 This does not mean that Spinoza was the first to consider extension (or space) and 
thought divine attributes. Thinking had long been considered a divine attribute in the 
Western tradition. And, more remarkably, extension, space, or place was considered a 
divine attribute in Jewish thought and by thinkers under the influence of Jewish philoso-
phy. For a historical introduction to the view of space as a divine attribute, see Jammer 
(1954, pp. 26-34). For a more detailed comparison, see Fraenkel (2009, pp. 77-111). 
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possible even in an afterlife. For on Spinoza’s view, the attributes are 
conceptually and causally self-contained (see 1p10 and 1a4). By postulating that 
the attributes are causally and conceptually self-contained, Spinoza presents a 
Gordian resolution to the problem of the intensional diversity of the attributes. 
The attributes are intensionally diverse because they are fundamentally unique 
ways of being and of being conceived. But why are they fundamentally unique? 
The attributes’ property of being such that they, or any one of their modes, cannot 
even in principle be explained by reference to another attribute or any one of its 
modes, is their infinity, and more precisely, their infinity in kind, the kind of 
infinity I above called qualitative infinity. By claiming that the attributes are 
infinite in kind Spinoza thus extricates himself from the problem of how many 
intensionally different attributes can be said of a God in whom essence and 
existence are one. 
 
Second, we find a rarely noted parallel between Aquinas’ concept of simple 
perfection and Spinoza’s concept of absolute infinity. Simple perfection is what 
makes it necessary for a simple God to be truly characterized by several 
intensionally diverse, yet co-extensional, attributes. Likewise, absolute infinity is 
what makes it necessary for God to be truly characterized by several intensionally 
diverse, yet co-extensional, attributes (in 1d6). The attributes are co-extensional 
since whether one conceives a thing under extension or thought (or any other 
attribute), it remains “one and the same thing” [una eademque res] (2p7s). Of 
course, the substance’s absolute infinity is itself rooted in Spinoza’s ontological 
principle that maximal being (reality or perfection) requires a maximal amount of 
eternal and infinite attributes (1p10s). 
 
These two observations indicate that it is worthwhile to further explore the inquiry 
of the meaning of Spinoza’s theological statements in the specific context of 
divine infinity.  
 
 7.2. Infinity in Spinoza’s system.  
 
Let me now treat the question of how infinity in Spinoza’s philosophy can be 
predicated of God as well as of modes. In light of the summary above, it seems 
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most illuminating, from a historical point of view, to ask this question in the 
following way: (i) Is the word ‘infinite’, in Spinoza’s system, used of God and 
other beings univocally, equivocally or analogically? My response to this question 
is structured as follows. In order to bring Spinoza’s position into relief, I first (2.1) 
briefly present Aquinas’ view regarding the primacy of names predicated of God. 
(2.2) I defend the thesis that the word ‘infinite’ functions analogically in 
Spinoza’s philosophy. More precisely, I show that whereas ‘infinite’ is predicated 
of modes and substances according to an analogy of attribution (2.2.1), it is 
predicated of substance and attributes, on the one hand, and attributes and modes, 
on the other, according to an analogy of proportionality (2.2.2). My ultimate goal 
is however not to classify Spinoza’s uses of analogy according to scholastic 
taxonomies, but rather to identify the (arguably original) way in which an analogy 
of the infinite operates in Spinoza’s system, in order to localize the place of this 
analogy in his ethical and soteriological project. In doing so, I will be able to 
nuance an influential reading of Spinoza as presenting an entirely univocal model 
for predication across divine and non-divine contexts. For instance, Jean-Luc 
Marion writes about a “tendency toward univocity” which characterizes Spinoza, 
Malebranche and Leibniz.
203
 More radically still, Marion also hypothesizes that 
after Descartes, all analogies disappear.
204
 By contrast, I will show that Spinoza’s 
tendency towards univocity does not envelop the infinite, and that there is, as a 
consequence, at least one post-Cartesian analogy. 
 
In answering question (i), I aim to highlight a controversial and arguably original 
feature of Spinoza’s analogy: it proceeds from God’s nature, which is the first 
analogate, metaphysically as well as epistemically speaking, and is only 
derivatively true of other beings. In other words, for Spinoza we know God before 
we know ourselves. But this epistemic primacy of divine infinity may be 
questioned on experiential grounds. Surely, we don’t know this infinite being - or 
at least we don’t know it as well - as Spinoza says we do…? This leads to the final 
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 Marion (1981, p. 18): “la tendance à l'univocité qui caractérise, en ses sens différents, 
Spinoza, Malebranche et Leibniz, et qui leur oppose à la tension cartésienne vers l'équi-
vocité, s‘inscrit dans une problématique propre à la théologie révélée.” 
204
 “On pourrait même risquer qu’à partir de Descartes, [le] déploiement [de la métaphy-
sique moderne] tire d‘abord les conséquences de la disparition de toute analogie, même 
en esquisse”: Ibid., p. 453, see also conclusions VI and VII, pp. 453-4. 
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question to be dealt with in this chapter, namely: (ii) How can Spinoza maintain 
an epistemic priority of divine infinity in spite of the fact that appearances suggest 
otherwise? In other words, is it defensible to claim that God’s essence is first 
known, when few would admit of having such knowledge? In response, (2.3) I 
suggest that in order to make sense of the epistemic priority which God enjoys we 
must distinguish between two different senses (veiled and unveiled) in which God 
is known to us. To pass from merely veiled to unveiled knowledge of God is an 
epistemic as well as an ethical ascension. Lastly, I conclude the chapter by 
commenting on how my reading deals with the puzzle mentioned at the end of 
Chapter 6.  
 
 7.2.1. Different ways in which analogates may be primary.  
 
Roughly, an analogy is a relation between a term and what it signifies or between 
one term and its signified, on the one hand, and another term and its signified, on 





The analogy I will discuss is the analogy which corresponds to a category of 
predication identified and developed most importantly by Aquinas. As we saw, he 
considered analogy a useful theological tool, as it is a way of conceiving of 
(limited) sameness in (infinite) difference, allowing us to use the same terms 
when speaking of God and creatures. However, the issue of what exactly analogy 
means is a convoluted one.  
 
There are several dimensions to the problem, among which the principal ones are 
as follows: (a) Which different kinds of analogies did Aquinas define? (b) Which 
of these analogies holds between God and creatures? (c) Is such and such a 
commentator right in interpreting Aquinas’ doctrine of analogy in such and such a 
way? The latter two questions ultimately depend on (a). (a) is a difficult problem, 
for Aquinas wrote no independent treatise on analogy: instead, his views on that 
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 See Klubertanz (1960, pp. 6-7).  
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concept are to be found throughout his impressive corpus.
206
 The response to (a) 
and (b) has often been seen through the lens of one’s response to (c); that is, 
medieval and early modern commentators of Aquinas’ texts have significantly 




Given these difficulties and the limited scope of this chapter, it is clear that I 
cannot here purport to provide an independent answer to any of these questions. 
Instead of pronouncing a verdict on how Thomist analogy is to be interpreted, 
either in the whole of his corpus or in one specific text, I will introduce here the 
key feature that will prove relevant in my analysis of Spinoza. This feature is the 
relative priority and posteriority of the analogates.  
 
As we saw, the names that are predicated analogically of God and creatures 
designate traditional divine perfections such as goodness.
208
 In this theological 
context, Aquinas’ view on analogy can be characterized in terms of two opposite 
relations of priority and posteriority.
209
 On the one hand, God is metaphysically 
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 In addition, passages that seem to topically and generally treat analogy as such are, as 
a rule, tailored to suit the specific question Aquinas is dealing with (Klubertanz, 1960, pp. 
35-8). Hence, it would be unwise to take Aquinas’ treatment of analogy in any one key 
text as representative for his views overall.  
207
 There are several contemporary systematic treatments of Aquinas’ understanding of 
analogy that attempt to settle the question on the basis of the Thomist corpus alone. See 
for instance Lyttkens (1952), Klubertanz (1960), Zimmermann (1964), Montagne (2008). 
Lyttkens argues that all analogy in Aquinas’ works is based upon the similarity of causes 
to effects and identifies three cases:  ”(a) an analogy of attribution in which a concept is 
drawn from God and used to designate creation extrinsically; (b) an analogy in which the 
image is designated from its archetype, because of an analogous perfection which exists 
perfectly in God, imperfectly in creatures; and (c) an analogy in which the first Cause is 
designated from its effects, the perfections of which exist in a higher way in its cause.” 
According to Klubertanz (1960, p. 16), this “tripartite division represents an oversimplifi-
cation of the texts”. Zimmermann (1964), in turn, criticizes Lyttkens as well as Kluber-
tanz for their assumption that there is in Aquinas only one kind of properly metaphysical 
analogy.  
208
 More precisely, the names which, apart from trinitarian ones, are true of God are those 
which absolutely designate perfections without any defect (see SCG, I, cap. 30, n. 2 
[1975, p. 140]).  
209
 It should be acknowledged that De Veritate Aquinas considers the analogy of propor-
tionality to be the only that can adequately describe the relation between meanings of 
words said of God and creatures. Since the analogy of proportionality is a quaternary 
relation, which - when employed in theology - relates two unknown terms to two known 
terms (such as, for instance, in the analogy God’s goodness is to God’s essence as a crea-
ture’s goodness is to its essence) it may be argued that, within this framework, it does not 




prior to creatures, and the goodness of God is the cause of the goodness in 
creatures (more precisely, God’s goodness is the efficient and final cause of 
creaturely goodness, as well as its exemplary principle: see ST I, q. 6, art. 4, c 
[1980b, p. 193]). Metaphysically speaking, goodness is therefore true of God prior 
to its being true of creatures. On the other hand, this priority is not epistemic. For 
we come to know what goodness means only by familiarizing ourselves with the 
goodness exhibited by created things. Goodness is said of God in a 
metaphysically prior, but epistemically posterior, manner; likewise, the same 
name is said of creatures when metaphysically posterior but epistemically prior.  
 
Aquinas articulates this difference in different ways, and this brief survey is not 
intended to be exhaustive. Sometimes he distinguishes between a name being said 
antecedently of something according to the imposition of the name (quantum ad 
nominis impositionem) and a name being said antecedently of something 
according to the nature of the thing in question (quantum ad rei naturam) (De 
Malo q. 1, art. 5, ad 19 [1980c, p. 275]). Sometimes he distinguishes between a 
name’s way of signifying (modo significandi) and that which is signified by the 
name (res significata) (e.g. in De Potentia, q. 7, art. 2 ad. 7 [1980c, p. 241]). In I 
Sent., ds. 25, q. 1, art. 2, co., Aquinas in applying this distinction to the 
denomination ‘person’, writes that, as far as the signified thing is concerned, the 
denomination is in God prior to its being in creatures, but conversely, as far as the 




Likewise, the same distinction is drawn between a name’s way of signifying its 
signified and that in order to signify which the name was imposed (illud ad quod 
significandum nomen fuit impositum: SCG 1, cap. 30, n. 3 [1980b , p. 9]). The 
name was imposed to signify a pure perfection and it is therefore antecedently 
                                                                                                                                     
physical or epistemic) priority. What must be compared in this analogy is instead the 
priority of the relations whose similarity the analogy asserts. I will not elaborate on this 
proposal here. A propos De Veritate, Klubertanz, pace Cajetan, has convincingly argued 
that this view is to be regarded as a hypothesis Aquinas entertained early on in his career 
and then rejected.  
210
 “Respondeo dicendum quod persona dicitur de Deo et creaturis non univioce,  sed 
secundum analogiam; et quantum ad rem significatam per prius est in Deo quam in crea-
turis, sed quantum ad modum signfiicandi est converso, sicut est etiam de omnibus aliis 
nomniibus quae de Deo et creaturis analogice dicuntur” (1980a, p. 69). 
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true of God in this respect. Yet, the name’s way of signifying is inevitably 
mundane, and the name is therefore antecedently true of creatures in this respect. 
Aquinas adds that, as a result, we are theologically justified in both affirming and 
negating names of God. For we are justified in affirming that in order to signify 
which the name was imposed and also justified in negating the name’s way of 
signifying. 
 
In SCG 1, cap. 34, n. 1 (1980a, p. 10), Aquinas interestingly contrasts this 
priority-and-posteriority of names said of God with the term being (ens) which is 
said antecedently of substance and consequently of accident in both these 
respects. This is exactly the position that I will argue that Spinoza occupies with 
respect to the term ‘infinite’. If one accepts that Spinoza assimilates the relation 
that holds between God and finite things to the metaphysical relation between a 
substance and its accidents, one should find this reading plausible.
211
   
 
In sum, analogical commonality between names said of God and creatures is 
possible because despite a name’s lowly origin in the evolution of our languages, 
we can use it in theological discourse to signify something that we know 
transcends the perfection the name as we know it signifies. In other words, the 
origin of language in human experience does not compromise the metaphysical 
primacy of names insofar as they refer to God. When I, in what follows, 
emphasize that for Spinoza God is the primary analogate, I therefore mean to 
highlight that this is so epistemically.
212
 As we have seen, this is a position 
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 Montagnes, in his study of Thomist analogy, claims that the analogy of being is real-
ized along two axes: one horizontal - that of categorical being, and the other vertical - that 
of the degrees of being constituted by the substances themselves. The analogy situated on 
the horizontal axis Montagne calls “predicamental analogy”, the one on the vertical axis 
“transcendental analogy” (2008, pp. 33; 65-6; 72-7; 80-1; 95 et passim). Since Spinoza, 
on my reading, assimilates the vertical analogy between God and creatures to that which 
holds between a substance and its accidents, the distinction between predicamental analo-
gy and transcendental analogy, on my reading, collapses in his philosophy.  
212
 It is important to bear this distinction in mind. When Marion, in his pathbreaking study 
of Descartes, writes on the topic of causa sui in the first and fourth Responses by Des-
cartes, that “l'analogie fonctionne ici à l'envers de l'analogie théologique. Au lieu de pen-
ser la causalité efficiente à partir de Dieu, elle pense Dieu à partir de la causalité effi-
ciente” (1981, p. 429), the primacy Marion intends is metaphysical. It is interesting to 
note, as Marion has done before us (Ibid., p. 452) that Spinoza is in this respect more 




Aquinas would not endorse, and so it is arguably an original feature of the 
analogy Spinoza tacitly elaborates in his writings on the infinite.   
 
 7.2.2. The analogy of the infinite. 
  
As I noted in Chapter 6, Spinoza considered God’s essence to be unconditionally 
accessible to all.
213
 In his own words: “the human Mind has adequate knowledge 
[cognitionem] of God’s eternal and infinite essence” (2p47). In maintaining this 
radical viewpoint, Spinoza departs not only from the tradition of negative 
theology - as we saw embraced by Maimonides, for whom knowledge of God’s 
essence is unquestionably out of reach for all, but also from the more optimistic 
position of Aquinas. For in maintaining that we can have adequate knowledge of 
God’s essence, Spinoza is more radically optimistic about our epistemic situation 
vis-à-vis the divine object than Aquinas, who would reject the claim that our 
knowledge of God adequately represents God’s essence.
214
 For this reason, 
                                                                                                                                     
said of God is antecedently (per prius) in God. Yet, Marion does not go so far as to treat 
any name truly said of God in Spinoza’s theology as a primary analogate.  
213
 Spinoza was of the opinion that knowledge of God’s existence is available a priori 
already at the time when the KV was written. See KV, I, 7. 
214
 On Aquinas’ view, while we can know propositions about God, or his essence, to be 
true - propositions such as “There is a God” (ST I, q. 2, art. 3 [2011, pp. 170-171] or even 
“God’s essence is identical to his being [esse]” (ST I, q. 3, art. 3 [2011, pp. 176-177]), we 
cannot, in this life, know who God himself is, or what God’s essence is really like.  
 Aquinas distinguishes between things which are known in themselves [nota in se] 
according to themselves and for us [secundum se et quoad nos] and things which are only 
known in themselves according to themselves [nota secundum se, non quoad nos] ( ST I, 
q. 2. art. 1, co. [2011, p. 170; 1980b, p. 187]). Since we do not know exactly what God is, 
propositions about God are not known in themselves to us. The following epistemic situa-
tion emerges. We know God to be truly wise, good and so on, but we do not know what 
divine wisdom and goodness are truly like, for we only gain knowledge of such attributes 
by familiarizing ourselves with creaturely perfections. While these perfections are indica-
tive of a preeminent perfection in God (for perfections are predicated analogously of God 
and creatures), they do not express (exprimat: ST I, q. 13, art. 1, co. [1980b, p. 202]) or 
represent (repraesentant: ST I, q. 13, art. 2 [1980b, p. 202]) the divine essence. Perhaps 
one could say that they point at it or refer to it without explaining it.  
 But, importantly, for Spinoza, to have adequate knowledge of x is exactly to be 
able to explain x. (Such explanation is paradigmatically given by providing a cause for x.) 
Hence, whatever knowledge we have of God’s essence in the Thomist picture, it is not 
adequate by Spinoza’s standards. Nor is it adequate by Aquinas’ own standards. For if it 
were, the highest knowledge of God (for humans in this life) would not be knowledge of 
God as being unknown, that is, knowledge of a God who does not perfectly correspond to 
any way we may characterize him in this life. 
 Étienne Gilson (2007, pp. 71—85) helpfully situates the meaning of Aquinas’ 




Spinoza’s optimism as regards knowledge of God breaks with tradition by 
overstepping the boundaries within which theological knowledge was generally 
confined. And, even more surprisingly, Spinoza’s mature position is that we have 
a better grasp of God than of ourselves. Indeed, he claims that even inadequate 
knowledge of any singular thing involves “adequate and perfect” knowledge of 
God’s essence.
215
 This essence is repeatedly described as infinite. Therefore, it 
makes sense to ask how the word ‘infinite’ works when predicated of substance, 
on the one hand, and of modes, on the other.  
 
For us to predicate ‘infinity’ equivocally (after the via negativa of Maimonides) in 
the two contexts would mean for us to project the term beyond our grasp into the 
unknown when we use it of God. But for Spinoza, God’s nature is a privileged 
object of knowledge in the sense that we can know it “adequately and perfectly” 
(2p46). And we know it as such (as it is essentially), we know it to be infinite. 
This means that Spinoza does not think that discourse about God’s nature can 
proceed by equivocating on words whose meanings are only known when they are 
                                                                                                                                     
practice. In Gilson’s words (p. 83) : “[A]près avoir fait effort, comme il se doit, pour at-
tribuer à Dieu l'essence la plus parfaite qui se puisse concevoir, le théologien doit encore 
s’imposer une deuxième série d'efforts, incomparablement plus difficile, pour s’interdire 
de se représenter Dieu sous l'aspect d’aucune de ses créatures, si noble soit-elle. En 
somme, après s’être efforcé de concevoir Dieu à partir de ses créatures, il faut s’efforcer 
plus encore de ne pas le concevoir comme l'une quelconque de ses créatures, les seuls 
êtres pourtant que nous concevions vraiment. […] [C]’est cela même que Saint Thomas 
nomme, avec Denis, la ’théologie négative’. Celle-ci n’a pas la théologie en moins, car si 
l'on n’affirmait rien de Dieu, qu’aurait-on à nier pour le transcender ?” (One common 
reference for Aquinas’ claim that our best knowledge of God consists in knowing God as 
he is unknown is In Boeth. De Trin. q. 1. art. 2. ad. 1 [1980d, p. 521].) 
 Although the mainstream position in contemporary scholarship on Aquinas’ work 
is that we cannot know of God what he is (or differently put his “quiddity”), this was not 
always so. As Igor Agostini (2009, pp. 245—281) has shown, Thomists within the Do-
minican order (Caproeolus, Durand de Saint-Pourçain, Hervé Nédellec, Cajetan and Fer-
rarese) sought to provide an interpretation of Aquinas’ philosophy such that it does not 
appear equivalent with one of the propositions condemned by bishop Temper in 1277. 
According to these Dominican interpreters of Aquinas’ thought, Aquinas did not maintain 
that we can only know of God that he is, but not what he is. Agostini (Ibid., p. 259) neatly 
distinguishes their position from that of contemporary scholars. 
215
 On Spinoza’s own estimation of his philosophy, his method breaks with tradition in 
taking God as the point of departure, rather than as the terminus of inquiry. That Spinoza 
himself regarded his own philosophy in this light is implied by Tschirnaus report to Leib-
niz, according to which Spinoza had said that: “vulgus philosophicum [to which circle 
Aquinas must here be classified] incipere a creaturis, Cartesium incepisse a mente, se 
incipere a Deo”. See Stein (1890, pp. 282-3).  
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predicated of things that are not God. For if God is to be an entity we can know 
adequately and perfectly, then we should not know his essence to be infinite by 
equivocation. For by knowing it to be infinite only by equivocation, we would not 
know its infinity in an adequate, let alone perfect, way.  
 
A natural conjecture would then be that the sense of the word is the same - 
whether it is predicated of the substance, its modes or abstract objects such as 
numbers. If the meaning of the word ‘infinite’ is exactly the same when it is justly 
predicated of substance, attributes and modes, Spinoza’s use of religious language 
would (in this important context) be entirely univocal. Let us here revisit the 
Letter on the Infinite (Letter 12) to show more clearly why this is not so. In what 
follows, I will argue, on the basis of this letter, that the infinite is not predicated 
univocally of substance, modes and beings of reason. Instead, I will suggest, it is 
predicated analogically of substance, attributes and modes. That is, the term 
‘infinite’ is predicated across these different metaphysical categories in a way that 
is not univocal, but where the meanings are nonetheless connected. I will also 
suggest that infinity is said of beings of reason in a completely different sense 
than it is (adequately) predicated of substance, attributes and modes.  
 
 7.2.2.1. Letter 12 and the analogy of attribution between substance and  
  modes. 
 
In the beginning of Letter 12, Spinoza claims that:  
 
 Everyone has always found the problem of the Infinite very 
difficult, indeed insoluble. This is because they have not always 
distinguished between [i][a] what is infinite as a consequence of its 
own nature, or by the force of its definition, and [i][b] what has no 
bounds, not indeed by the force of its essence, but by the force of 
its cause. And also, because they have not distinguished between 
[ii][a] what is called infinite because it has no limits and [ii][b] that 
whose parts we cannot explain or equate with any number, though 
we know its maximum and minimum. Finally, they have not 
distinguished between [iii][a] what we can only understand, but not 
imagine and [iii][b] what we can also imagine (C. 201: 




Making these distinctions, Spinoza claims, will allow us to discern which infinity 
is divisible and which is not, and which infinity can be conceived as being greater 
or lesser than another infinity, and which cannot be so conceived (C. 201-202). In 
order to make the distinctions [i]-[iii] Spinoza deploys four key concepts: 
substance, mode, eternity and duration. Substance is that whose essence involves 
existence and which therefore cannot be understood unless as eternal and infinite. 
It should be recalled that the existence of something that exists in virtue of its 
essence is called eternity (see 1d8). A mode is something whose existence does 
not so follow from its essence. An existing thing that does not exist in virtue of its 
essence has duration. 
 
All modes inhere in the substance which causes them. Yet, since a mode’s essence 
does not involve existence any mode can be conceived in abstraction from its 
necessitating ground. When it is considered abstractly, it can be conceived as 
either existing or as not existing. When we consider modes in abstraction from the 
substance we are considering them as they appear: as contingently existing 
singular things. To consider modes in abstraction from their necessity is a way of 




As mentioned in previous chapters, in order to imagine modes more easily and 
exactly, we employ aids of the imagination. Spinoza enumerates three aids. In 
order to “determine quantity so as to imagine it more easily”, we use the aid of 
Measure. (Extension, when conceived concretely, is indivisible and 
immeasurable, on Spinoza’s view.)
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 In order to “determine” the duration of 
modes, we use another aid of the imagination: Time. And lastly, we employ 
Number, whereby we can more easily consider classes of modes (C. 203). 
Although I cannot dwell on this matter here, it is interesting that for Spinoza the 
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 Spinoza’s account of the imagination is based on the idea that things appear to our 
sensual apparatus and imprint their images on this apparatus, images which we retain 
even when the thing in question is no longer in contact with our bodies. The imagination 
is then the faculty which cognizes with the help of such images, and its proper tools, 
alone. For a similar “sensualist” account of the imagination in one of Spinoza’s predeces-
sors, see the Sixth Meditation of Descartes (AT 57-8). For a lucid treatment of the imagi-
nation in Spinoza’s oeuvre, see de Deugd (1966). 
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 Indeed, Spinoza considered Descartes’ to have erred in thinking that he could infer 
divisibility from extension. See Stein (1890, p. 283). See also Chapter 4, section 3.1. 
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imagination is our faculty for abstract thinking: it alone enables formal 
manipulations of numbers and the like. Mathematical thinking would not be 




I would like to suggest that ‘infinity’ means different things when predicated of 
substance, modes and aids of the imagination. These three different senses 
correspond to the distinction made by Spinoza at the onset of the letter in the 
following way. The infinity of substance corresponds to [i][a] and [iii][a]. The 
infinity of modes corresponds to [i][b] and [iii][b]. 
 
[ii][a] is the kind of infinity that obtains when something lacks either an upper or 
a lower bound, whereas Spinoza in [ii][b] is thinking of bounded infinities. It is 
true of the substance, being essentially infinite, that it has no limits and one may 
therefore think that [ii][a] accurately describes it as well. However, a closer 
inspection of the text indicates that Spinoza does not consider either [ii][a] or 
[ii][b] to be applicable to the substance. The substance’s nature is unbounded in 
an ontological sense. Its infinity means that no reality can be denied of it (see 
1p8s). However, on my reading, the different kinds of unboundedness Spinoza is 
distinguishing between in [ii] are both formal in character. On my reading, it is 
since [ii][a] and [ii][b] are both formally, rather than ontologically, established 
infinities that Spinoza hesitates to call both [ii][a] as well as [ii][b] infinite. 
 
First, Spinoza hesitates to call [ii][a] (and probably [ii][b] as well) infinite as he 
introduces the distinction between them. For there he distinguishes between “what 
is called infinite [infinitum dicitur] because it has no limits and that whose parts 
we cannot explain or equate [NS: determine or express] with any number, though 
we know the maximum and minimum” (C. 201; G. IV/53: Emphasis added). 
Toward the end of the letter, Spinoza again indicates that infinity is duly 
predicated both of what is infinite in virtue of its nature and what is infinite in 
virtue of its cause, while “others” - presumably mathematical infinities “are called 
infinite - or if you prefer, indefinite - because they cannot be equated with any 
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 This would perhaps make for an interesting comparison between Spinoza and contem-
porary constructivist accounts of mathematics. 
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number though they can be conceived to be greater or lesser” (C. 205: Emphasis 
added). Here, Spinoza is clearly thinking of [ii][b]. Spinoza’s hesitation about 
whether to characterize [ii][a] and [ii][b] as infinite or indefinite indicates that he 
considered the infinities we can establish formally as infinite only in name. 
 
This is natural given his metamathematical views. For Spinoza, numbers are aids 
of the imagination and that whose infinity is established in numerical or similarly 
formal ways is thus a construct of the imagination. Regardless of whether it is 
bounded or unbounded, a formally established infinity would always be 
imaginary, on Spinoza’s view. For this reason the nominal “infinity” of aids of the 
imagination corresponds to [ii][a] as well as to [ii][b]. Since judgments made 
entirely in terms of the imagination cannot truly be said of the substance,
219
 
formally established “infinities” cannot truly be said of the substance. The word 
‘infinity’ is applied equivocally to formally established infinities and real infinite 
things. Since for Spinoza the imagination - our faculty for mathematical thinking - 
cannot be employed to undertake theological or metaphysical investigations, 
neither [ii][a] nor [ii][b] need be discussed in this context. Let me instead present 
the other two senses of ‘infinite’ as said of substance and modes, and then see 
whether they have anything in common, which would justify attributing an 
analogical use of ‘infinity’ to Spinoza.  
 
In brief, on Spinoza’s view, once one understands what it means to be substance, 
one will realize that any substance is necessarily infinite (1p7). In the Ethics, 
Spinoza presents two defences of the infinity of substance, only one of which 
relies on the premise that substances cannot share attributes. The first 
demonstration (1p8d) can be broken down as follows:  
 
P1: A substance must exist either as infinite or finite.  
P2: If it exists as finite, this can only be because it is limited by something of the 
same attribute.  
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 The imagination is for Spinoza the complement of intellectual perception: “what is 
perceived with a true mind, without words and images, is understood” (TTP, IV, [32], C. 
133; cf. 2p40s). Knowledge of God, which must always be intellectual and never imagi-
nary (Letter 12, C. 203; Letter 56, C. II. 423).  
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P3: In order for a thing to be limited by something of the same attribute, the thing 
to be limited must share an attribute with the limiting thing.  
P4: Substances cannot share attributes (as per 1p5).  
C: The substance must exist as infinite.  
 
In the first scholium to this proposition, Spinoza adds that this hypothetico-
deductive syllogism is, at bottom, redundant; the infinity of substance, Spinoza 
here claims, “follows from eternity alone” (1p8s1). 
 
Spinoza’s rather elliptical argument in 1p8s1 is as follows: 
 
Since being finite is really, in part, a negation, and being infinite 
is an absolute affirmation of the existence of some nature, it 
follows from P7 alone that every substance must be infinite.  
 
I will attempt to break down Spinoza’s reasoning. At first glance, it appears to be 
the following: 
 
P1) The substance is eternal (1p7).  
P2) When something is eternal its essence is unreservedly affirmed in existence. 
That is, whatever perfections/realities are included in the essence of the eternal 
thing, are actualized in existence. 
P3) If an essence is finite, it negates some perfection. 
C) Something that is finite (i.e. negates perfection) cannot be eternal.  
 
This inference is clearly invalid. For, on Spinoza’s view, a thing is eternal when 
the perfections that characterize it essentially are unconditionally actualized in 
existence. But why could the eternal thing’s essence not negate those perfections 
that do not belong to it? Of course, the conclusion would follow on the 
assumption that anything eternal has all perfections (i.e. all its perfections are 
“affirmed” by its essence). But to have all perfections is exactly to negate no 
perfections, and thus be infinite. So, if this is supposed to be an argument, it 
should not assume that anything eternal is infinite, since this is exactly the 
conclusion Spinoza draws from the argument. Nonetheless, it is not clear that 
1p8s1 really provides an argument. Perhaps Spinoza is instead spelling out certain 
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relations among concepts. By attending to the concept of eternity, we will realize 
that in order for something to be eternal, it will have to possess all perfections. 
Indeed, this has to be the case if the limitation of finite things by other finite 
things (1d2) is always infringing upon how the essences of such things are 
“expressed” in existence: that is, on to what extent such things are able to produce 
their essential effects. If an essence can only be absolutely affirmed in existence 
by being infinite, and if having an essence absolutely affirmed in existence is 
something that is required for one to be eternal, then one would have to be infinite 
in order to be eternal.  
 
Another way for the premises to entail the conclusion would be by means of the 
supplementary premise of perfection monism:  
 
P*: There is one and only one thing whose essence includes all perfections. 
 
If P* can be accepted, then the following reasoning seems valid: if the thing to be 
judged eternal is to negate any perfection, it cannot have any perfection 
essentially. But then it cannot be eternal. In order to have a nature that essentially 
possesses perfection - which it must have if it is to be eternal -, the eternal thing 
must be infinite.  
 
The following objection immediately arises: Does this not entail that finite things 
such as ourselves are not, in our own right, proper subjects of perfection? 
However, this objection assumes exactly that infinity and perfection cannot be 
predicated analogically. On my interpretation, the perfection of finite things is 
God’s perfection. As we saw in the preceding Part of this thesis, the perfection of 
finite things is to be modes of a substance that necessarily possesses all 
perfections. That the perfection of finite things is thus parasitic upon God’s 
perfection appears to be supported by 1p11s, where Spinoza states: “For things 
that come from external causes - whether they consist of many parts or of a few - 
owe all the perfection or reality they have to the power of the external cause”. 
Although Spinoza maintains perfection monism, he is nonetheless in position to 
articulate and defend a sophisticated ideal of perfection for humans. The problem 
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of how to square perfection monism with human perfectionism will be treated 
further in the following chapter.  
 
At any rate, it is clear that, on Spinoza’s view, infinity is predicated of the 
substance by a conceptual necessity. Modes, by contrast, are infinite not in virtue 
of their natures, but in virtue of “the causes in which they inhere” (C. 205).  
 
Before we look at the more specific features of Spinoza’s system, it is worth 
noting the general schemas of predication that, on my reading, are available in 
Spinozism. Some predicates can be truly said only of the substance but not of its 
modes (for instance, that it is essentially one of a kind, or absolutely infinite). 
Some predicates can be truly said of the modes but do not ripple down to the 
cause in which they inhere. These are the predicates that express exclusively 
extrinsic properties, such as evil. For on Spinoza’s view, evil is a negation, and 
more specifically, the negation of a subjectively erected standard (see Chapter 
2).
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 By contrast, some predicates can be truly said of the modes because they are 
true of the substance. Such predicates I have proposed to call transcendental. In 
Chapter 1 I argued that perfection is the paradigmatic example of such a property 
in Spinozism. Transcendental predicates cut across substance-attribute-modes 
distinctions: that is, they transcend the basic categories of Spinoza’s metaphysics. 
But as we have seen, in Letter 12 Spinoza argues that modes can truly be said to 
be infinite because their immanent cause is infinite. The mere fact that infinity is 
said of modes because it is true of the cause in which they inhere - the substance, 
that is - indicates that infinity operates analogically. Let me in what follows 
specify more exactly the analogical relation that holds between substance and 
modes with respect to the term ‘infinite’.  
 
The modes are infinite either collectively (the finite ones) or distributively (the 
infinite ones). Finite modes can be conceived in abstraction from the substance as 
well as concretely and then as necessarily inhering in it: a finite mode can clearly 
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 This is contrary to one of the principal grounds for Bayle’s description of Spinoza’s 
philosophical system as “the most monstrous hypothesis that could be imagined” in his 
Dictionary (2014, p. 91). On Bayle’s interpretation of Spinoza, God is the ultimate sub-
ject of inherence of all the properties of his modes (see Ibid., pp. 92-105). 
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be conceived without one integrating it into an infinite causal chain. That is, 
presumably, how we most often conceive of singular things, even on Spinoza’s 
view. But it must be admitted that this principle does not apply as neatly in the 
case of the infinite modes. Motion and rest is for Spinoza an infinite mode. Could 
one think of motion and rest as being only partially applicable to some place in 
space? If extension is unified (a universe), this situation does not even appear to 
be conceivable. No matter how this difficulty is to be resolved, infinity is clearly 
predicated of finite modes mediately (upon the acknowledgement of the infinity 
of that in which they inhere) and by a metaphysical, but not a conceptual, 
necessity.  
 
When the mode is adequately conceived as inhering in an infinite cause - the 
substance - infinity as predicated of the substance and infinity as predicated of the 
totality of the finite modes is not identical in sense, but they are not infinite in two 
senses that are completely unrelated, either. For this reason, the (adequate) 
predication of infinity of the substance and its modes may be called analogical.  
 
As we saw previously, Aquinas appealed to the analogy of perfections in order to 
explain how there could be some commonality between goodness (say) as said of 
God and human beings, in spite of the fact that God and human beings are 
infinitely different. As a mean between terms predicated in totally different senses 
(equivocation) and terms predicated in the very same sense (univocation), 
analogical predication retains both some limited - but crucial - similarity as well 




But does it make sense to speak of an analogy in the context of substance and 
modes in Spinoza’s philosophy? Let me first consider one major objection against 
the possibility that the word ‘infinite’ may be predicated analogically of the 
substance and its modes. This objection is structural in nature and depends on the 
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 As Mascall (1949, p. 100) points out in commenting on the (Thomist) formula sim-
pliciter diversa et eadem secundum quid: “[analogy] is the application of a concept to 
different beings in ways that are simply diverse from each other and are only the same in 
a certain respect”. 
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distinction between naturing and natured nature. This key
222
 distinction appears 
first in the KV I, 8-9, and reappears in the Ethics (1p29s). In the latter text, it 
reads as follows:  
 
[B]y Natura naturans we must understand what is in itself and is 
conceived through itself, or such attributes of substance as express 
an eternal and infinite essence, i.e. (by P14C1 and P17C2), God, 
insofar as he is considered as a free cause. But by Natura naturata 
I understand whatever follows from the necessity of God’s nature, 
or from any attributes, i.e., all the modes of God’s attributes insofar 
as they are considered as things which are in God and can neither 
be nor be conceived without God.  
 
If there is to be any analogy across ontological realms in Spinozism, this analogy 
will not connect what is God with what isn’t God. For God is all there is. Instead, 
any analogy that shoulders the role of connecting the divine with the not-so-divine 
in Spinozism will connect the totality of what God is with partial aspects of God, 
with things that are not identical with all there is to God. The totality of God is 
naturing nature, for only that which is all there is is perpetually shielded from 
influence from without, and so a “free cause”, in the Spinozist sense of ’free’. 
That which is not wholly God, but nonetheless is, is a mode of God. (Although I 
cannot comment on this further here, it is interesting that in 1p29s, the attributes 
are treated as identical with the totality of what God is.) 
 
Thus, against the possibility that the predication could be analogical, one may 
object that as a result of the distinction just cited, the preeminence on which 
analogical predication is founded, crumbles. For analogical predication 
presupposes that all perfections exist “preeminently” in God. Yet, nothing that we 
traditionally consider a perfection or virtue in modes such as humans - goodness, 
wisdom, charity, courage - could conceivably apply to what Spinoza calls 
naturing nature. Because all these characteristics pertain to the intellect or to the 
will, and Spinoza does not consider naturing nature to be characterizable in terms 
of modes such as intellect or will. Instead, such things are exactly “modes of 
God’s attributes” that follow from these “insofar as they are in God”.  
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 For an alternative approach which dismisses the significance of the distinction, see 




Indeed, Spinoza explicitly states that, even if God’s nature could be adequately 
spoken of as possessing will and intellect, our will and God’s will would differ 
from each other as much as the barking dog differs from the celestial composition 
(1p17s). In other words, if one employed terms that primarily characterize natured 
nature (such as terms which characterize the modes of intellect or will: wisdom or 
goodness, say) to naturing nature, there could only be a superficial agreement 
between these terms.
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 If such predicates could be applied jointly to naturing and 
natured nature, Spinoza maintains that they would be said equivocally in the 
contexts of these two ontological realms.  
 
In essence, on Aquinas’ view, analogy proceeds by (1) identifying creaturely 
perfections through experience; (2) realizing that these perfections exist 
“preeminently” in God and (3) analogically predicating said perfections of God. 
Spinoza would dispute (2)
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 and hence he could not possibly endorse that words 
predicated jointly of God and finite beings are predicated of God in this way.  
 
In this respect, Spinoza’s position is like that of Maimonides, and opposed to that 
of Aquinas. That is, like Maimonides but unlike Aquinas, Spinoza denies that one 
can begin with what necessarily belongs to something which is caused and 
conceived by something other than itself (natured nature) and proceed by analogy 
to expand one’s knowledge of that which is self-caused and self-conceived 
(naturing nature). 
 
Nonetheless, I would suggest that the analogy of attribution (also known as the 
analogy of relation) fits the relation between infinity as predicated of substance 
and modes.
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 Of course, the taxonomy of analogies originates with Aquinas and 
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 Following the reading of Koyré (1950, pp. 50-9). 
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 For Spinoza would dispute that our traditional virtues are real perfections, in the sense 
of “affirmations or realities or that which can be [sc. adequately] conceived (My transla-
tion)”: Stein, (1890, p. 283). See Chapters 1 and 2 for this issue.  
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 The term ‘attribution’ comes, in this context, from the Arabo-Latin translation of Aris-
totle’s Metaphysics, (i.e., a Latin translation of an Arabic translation of the Greek text). 
See Montagnes (2008, Annexe I).  
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his commentators (and most notably Cajetan, in De Analogia Nominum).
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Nonetheless I hope that the description of the analogy of attribution which I 
provide here is sufficiently elemental to be acceptable to all, regardless of their 
position on which sort of analogy Aquinas held to be properly theological. 
 
In the analogy of attribution (analogia attributionis) there is a prime analogate 
which has the sense of the term primarily. The other analogate(s) has the sense of 
the term only secondarily, by being in some way related to the first term. One 
canonical (Aristotelian) example is health.
227 ‘Healthy’ is said of an animal, 
medicine and urine - but it is primarily said of the animal, and secondarily said of 
medicine and urine. We call medicine healthy when it stands in a causal relation 
to the health of an animal; we call urine healthy when it stands in a symptomatic 
relation to the health of an animal. This kind of analogy is applicable when we 
know the meaning of the word as predicated of the secondary analogate(s) only 
because we are familiar with the meaning of the word as predicated of the primary 
analogate. In order for this to be the case we must naturally first know what the 
word in question means when predicated of the primary analogate. If this 
description is to straightforwardly fit the case of infinity when said of the divine 
nature and modes in Spinoza’s philosophy, Spinoza must diverge from Aquinas 
on a crucial point.  
 
As already stated, for Aquinas, a name is predicated of God antecedently insofar 
as the thing signified is concerned, but consequently insofar as the way of 
signification is concerned. That God has the perfection a name expresses is a 
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 Klubertanz maintains that Aquinas’ thinking on the matter evolved and that Aquinas’ 
view that the analogy of attribution is inapplicable to the context of God and creatures 
was rejected in his later works. Likewise, Montagnes (2008, pp. 65-81) submits that 
Aquinas’ texts on analogy divides into two groups: In I Sent. ds. 35, q. 1. art. 4 and De 
Veritate, q. 2, a. 11, on the one hand, and SCG 1, cap. 34; Comp. theol. I c. 27, De po-
tentia q. 7. art. 7 and ST I, q. 13, art. 5 on the other. Both groups of texts agree that names 
are said of God and creatures neither univocally, nor equivocally, but analogically. They 
differ in which analogy is admissible and which is not: in the former group, but not in the 
latter group, the analogy of attribution is inadmissible. 
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‘medical' and ‘healthy’ as examples of names predicated not by analogy, but πρὸς ἕν. 




metaphysically prior fact, but it is epistemically posterior to our knowledge of the 
same perfection as realized in things other than God. For Spinoza, by contrast, 
God’s infinity is both a metaphysically prior fact and an epistemically prior 
object of knowledge. In other words, when infinity is said of God’s nature and 
things which are different from this nature, God’s nature is the primary analogate, 
metaphysically as well as epistemically.  
 
Indeed, for Spinoza, in Letter 12, we know what the word ‘infinite’ means when 
predicated of modes because we first know what it means when it is predicated of 
the substance. The substance cannot be conceived unless as infinite. Once we 
have acquired the proper concept of a substance, we can predicate infinity 
mediately of its modes as well. We predicate infinity of modes in order to express 
that they are the immanent effects of an infinite cause. The substance is the prime 
analogate - that is, infinity as said of the substance has epistemic priority. Infinity 
is then derivatively predicated of modes which are therefore the secondary 
analogates.  
 
This is the significant difference between Spinoza and the Thomist tradition that I 
aimed to highlight. For Spinoza as well as for tradition analogy is a tool that 
enables one to use the same language to speak of beings that are infinitely 
different. But whereas for Aquinas (and others) we approach God’s nature - which 
nonetheless remains ultimately and absolutely unknown - by the means of 
analogical predication of terms with which we are familiar through experience, for 
Spinoza, the analogy, as it were, goes the other way. For Aquinas, analogy will 
allow us to say that God is F without claiming to know exactly what F means 
when said of God. For Spinoza, by contrast, we know perfectly well what we 
mean by calling God’s nature infinite. What we do not yet know - the sense in 
which the modes can be said to be infinite - we come to know by analogical 
predication. It is not God’s nature that needs to be elucidated by the help of 
analogy. In Letter 12, Spinoza predicates infinity analogously of substance and 





 7.2.2.2. The analogy of proportionality between substance and attributes,  
  on the one hand, and attributes and modes, on the other.  
 
How about the infinity predicated of the attributes? In Letter 12 Spinoza does not 
mention the attributes. But on the basis of his statements elsewhere, it may be 
asked if the predication of infinity is analogous also with respect to the attributes. 
If the infinity in kind of the attributes entails the collective infinity of the modes 
(that is, if the view I have called Plenitude holds), then the infinity of the 
attributes and that of the modes can be considered to stand in a relation 
corresponding to that of the infinity of substance and attributes. In order to see 
that this is so, let us revisit the key passage: 1p16d. Here, Spinoza states that:   
 
since the divine nature has absolutely infinite attributes (by D6), 
each of which also expresses an essence infinite in its own kind, 
from its necessity there must follow infinitely many things in 
infinite modes.  
 
The modes are thus infinite because the attributes are infinite in kind. This shows 
that, if infinity in kind is the complement of finitude in kind, the limitation of 
which 1d2 speaks cannot be purely conceptual. 1d2 reads:  
 
That thing is said to be finite in its own kind that can be limited 
by another of the same nature. For example, a body is called 
finite because we always conceive of another that is greater. 
Thus, a thought is limited by another thought. But a body is not 
limited by a thought nor a thought by a body.  
 
In order for the infinite productivity of each attribute to follow from its being 
infinite in kind, Spinoza’s definition of finitude in kind must entail that something 
is finite in kind when another thing can limit it and hinder it from producing an 
effect that the thing would otherwise have produced, and infinite in kind when this 
condition fails to obtain. Although Spinoza does not use the term ‘finite’ in this 
context it is useful to consider the first (and only) axiom of the Fourth Part of the 
Ethics. Here Spinoza writes: “There is no singular thing in nature than which there 
is not another more powerful and stronger. Whatever one is given, there is another 




If something is finite in kind it can be surpassed by something else. If it can be 
surpassed by something else in some respect, it is inferior to that thing in this 
respect. Importantly, as 4a1 indicates, Spinoza sees this relation of superiority and 
inferiority through the lens of a power dynamics. If something is finite in kind (as 
all singular things and a fortiori all human beings are) then that which is superior 
has the power to destroy that which is inferior. As we saw, Spinoza uses the 
example of comparative size in 1d2. But a body that is greater than another is not 
only superior to it in the respect of size: more importantly, it has the power to 
destroy the momentum of another body and take it along with it on its trajectory, 
and so on. That which is weaker can be deprived of the exercise of its power by 
that which is stronger. That the attributes are infinite in kind entails not only that 
the attributes cannot be conceived as inferior to things like themselves but also 
that there is nothing that can interfere with them producing infinite effects. This 
shows that the meaning of infinity in kind cannot be simply that which is not 
subject to any conceptual limitation. That the attributes are infinite in kind 
additionally means that nothing can rein in their infinite productivity.  
 
It transpires that just as there are collectively infinite attributes on account of the 
substance’s absolute infinity, so there are collectively infinite modes on account 
of the attribute’s distributive infinity. Absolute infinity by definition (1d6) entails 
the possession of collectively and distributively infinite attributes and similarly, 
infinity in kind entails possession of collectively infinite modes. Evidently, there 
is a similarity between the infinity of the substance and the infinity of the 
attributes: each entails the collective infinity of something. But that whose 
collective infinity their infinity entails differ enormously in the two cases. For 
unlike attributes, modes are not infinite in kind. Hence, one may say that the 
absolute infinity of the substance stands in the same relation to the collective 
infinity of the attributes as the distributive infinity of the attributes stands to the 
collective infinity of the modes. Formally, this four-term relation corresponds to 
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The analogy of proportionality is not a proportion between two terms but a 
similarity between two relations. It says that a stands to b as c stands to d. The 
example Aquinas uses in De Veritate is that vision is said of corporeal vision as 
well as of intellectual vision. More precisely, vision stands in the same relation to 
the eye as understanding (intellectus) to the mind (“nomen visus dicitur de visu 
corporali et intellectu eo quod sicut visus est in oculo ita intellectus in mente” [De 




One major difference between Spinoza and the Thomist outlook (on one 
widespread interpretation at least) on this analogy is worth noting. Mascall (1949, 
pp.109-10) describes the Thomist analogy of proportionality as consisting in the 
assertion of a sameness of proportion between two relations, one of which is 
constituted by unknown relata.
230
 For instance, the goodness of God stands in the 
same relation to the being of God as the goodness of Caligula stands to the being 
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 Marion writes, à propos the analogy of proportionality, (1981, p. 83) that this quater-
nary relation was the only analogy for which the Greeks reserved the term ἀναλογία. The 
specific taxonomical divide between an analogy of attribution and the analogy of propor-
tionality (assimilated with the type Aquinas elsewhere calls calls analogia secundum esse 
et secundum intentionem) - only one of which is properly theological - in Aquinas’ 
thought was popularized by Cajetan in his De Analogia Nominorum. (Cajetan also con-
sidered some other species of impure or disingenuous analogies.) Cajetan’s reading of 
Aquinas has been widely questioned, see Klubertanz (1960). Marion (1981, pp. 93-5) 
helpfully explains the rationale behind Cajetan’s rejection of the applicability of the ana-
logy of attribution for theological purposes, and the difference between his position and 
Aquinas’, in the following words: “Saint Thomas (en termes cajétaniens) pense que la 
perfection est intrinsèquement constitutive de la créature, parce que, sans la moindre con-
tradiction, elle appartient per prius à Dieu; bref parce que la déficence de la particpation 
résume l'essence la plus intime de la créature, la créature elle-même se réfère ontiquement 
à Dieu. Cajetan (en langage thomiste) suppose que, entre l'attribution per prius de la per-
fection à Dieu et sa participation réelle, puisque déficiente, par la créaure, il faut choisir : 
ainsi, avant toute critique et toute réintérpreation se trouve manqué le sens profond de la 
doctrine de saint Thomas: que le plus constitutif de la créature s’inscrit par avance et de 
plein droit en Dieu” (pp. 94-5). For an introduction to Cajetan’s position in the context of 
his polemics against Duns Scotus and Henri le Grand, see Montagnes (2008, pp. 115-50). 
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 For a comment of the presence of this analogy in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics 
(1096 b 29f), see Lyttkens (1952, p. 49).  
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 The practice of relating relata, at least one of which is unknown, by the means of anal-
ogy, thereby expanding one’s knowledge of an unknown sphere of reality, originates with 
Plato and Aristotle: see Lyttkens (1952, pp. 97-8). 
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of Caligula. Although we know neither the goodness of God or the being of God, 
we can nonetheless somehow assert that there is a relation between them, and that 
this relation is similar to that between the goodness of Caligula and his being. For 
Spinoza, the absolute infinity of the substance stands in the same relation to the 
collective infinity of the attributes as the distributive infinity of the attributes stand 
to the infinity of the modes. But it is not the case that the relata in either relation 
are unknown. We know primarily God’s nature. Indeed, it is since we know this 
nature to be infinite that we can infer the infinity of the modes. In this respect, 
then, it is not the case that predication of the term ‘infinite’ in Spinozism 
corresponds to the analogy of proportionality as this analogy was defined by the 
scholastic tradition (on this interpretation of the analogy in question). However, 
that this is so does not defeat my interpretation. My purpose with investigating 
whether Spinoza’s predication of infinity can be considered analogical was not to 
fit Spinoza’s predications of the infinite into a straightjacket of medieval 
metalinguistic classification schemes but rather to explore the surprising role an 
anonymous analogy - namely that of the infinite - shoulders within his system.  
 
In sum, infinity is predicated of the substance as well as the attributes by a 
conceptual necessity. But infinity is not predicated in the same sense of substance 
and attributes: for substance, infinity means possession of all conceivable 
attributes, whereas for attributes it entails that all the modes that an infinite 
intellect can conceive are actualized in them. In each case, Spinoza’s analogical 
practice with respect to the term ‘infinity’ in Letter 12 presupposes that God’s 
infinity is known primarily. But this fundamental claim - that God’s infinity is 
apparent to us - seems exceedingly difficult to justify. In what follows I will 
discuss in what sense God’s nature can enjoy epistemic priority. 
 
 7.2.3. The epistemic priority of God.  
 
We can come to know the modes’ infinity by taking as our point of departure 
God’s infinity. But in order to acquire a concept of the modes’ infinity by 
analogy, one must first have acquired knowledge of God insofar as he is 
absolutely infinite. To know God insofar as he is absolutely infinite is to know 
God as he specified in 1d6. But, as the deductive ancestry of 1p16 shows, Spinoza 
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takes this absolute infinity to entail plenitude. And it is because reality must be 
plenary that there are infinitely many modes. Unlike knowledge of God tout court, 
knowledge of God insofar as he is absolutely infinite is not inevitable.  
 
Spinoza certainly claims that since human beings have ideas of singular things 
(their own bodies as well as other bodies), they know God’s eternal and infinite 
essence (2p45). Yet one is to differentiate between the knowledge of an attribute 
(say, of extension) which is presupposed by any knowledge of an extended mode, 
and the knowledge of an attribute qua an attribute - that is, qua an essence of 
God.
231
 I will call the former knowledge veiled, the latter unveiled. (The two 
different ways in which God may be known could also be called extensional and 
intensional, since in the former what is known is indeed God, but one does not 
recognize him as God. However, since these technical terms are used elsewhere in 
this thesis, I will not apply them to this case.) 
 
The knowledge of a divine, infinite and eternal essence that knowledge of any 
mode involves (as per 2p45) is not knowledge of the fact that what is known is 
indeed a divine, infinite or eternal essence. It is not knowledge of God’s nature as 
God’s nature. Spinoza’s claim that we inevitably possess knowledge of God (in 
2p47) is therefore more theologically modest than it might appear at first sight. It 
only says that in order to know an actually existing singular thing I must have 
preliminary knowledge of the attribute of which that thing is a mode. That claim 
is a transcendental claim; it is about what conditions the possibility of knowledge 
of singular things. On Spinoza’s view (as on Kant’s), extension is a prerequisite 
for knowledge of individual bodies (on Kant’s view, space is an intuitional form; 
Spinoza is nowhere as explicit concerning the status of our “transcendental” 
knowledge of the attributes).
232
 But presumably, unless we had some preliminary 
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 Relatedly, commentators have pointed out that the knowledge of God’s essence which 
an idea of a singular thing involves (in 2p45) is knowledge of the attribute under which 
the singular thing in question is conceived, not God’s essence defined as constituted by 
infinitely many attributes. On this issue, Curley C. 481 n. 68 refers to Gueroult (1969, 
part 1, p. 54).  
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 Kant (1998) discusses intuitional forms in the Transcendental Aesthetic - I do not pre-
tend that I am here contributing in any significant way neither to the scholarship on Kant 
nor to that concerning the Spinoza-Kant connection. My present purpose is only to distin-
guish veiled knowledge of God from its unveiled counterpart. 
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notion or intuition about extension we could not form ideas of bodies. Of course, 
however, we can have the requisite spatial notion or intuition without equating 
extension with one of God’s infinite and eternal essences.  
 
Nor do we know, on account of our knowledge of a body (say), that extension is 
infinite and eternal. Nothing about our daily experience of bodies speaks for an 
interpretation of space as infinite. This does not exclude, of course, that physics 
may speak in favor of the infinity of space. I am merely emphasizing that 
extension is not such that by merely perceiving objects in it (or, more accurately, 
modified as it)
233
 we necessarily conceive of it as infinite. It is instead Spinoza’s 
definition of God as absolutely infinite which speaks in favor of infinitizing 
extension. Since extension can be conceived as infinite and eternal, it is a 
candidate for an attribute of God. And since God is absolutely infinite he, as it 
were, appropriates all attributes. Hence, we know extension (for example) to be an 
attribute of God, to be infinite and to be eternal only if we first know God to be 
absolutely infinite.  
 
In the scholium to 2p47, Spinoza adds: “From this we see that God’s infinite 
essence and his eternity are known to all.” But we can now rephrase this as 
follows: Whether they know that they know it or not, God’s eternity and infinite 




In order to be able to refer to these distinct ways of knowing x (knowing x without 
knowing x to fit the essential description of ’x’ and knowing x while knowing that 
x fits that description), I have called former veiled knowledge and the unveiled 
knowledge. In unqualified form, knowledge of God’s infinite and eternal essence 
is inevitable for any knowing subject - yet unveiled knowledge of the same 
essence is manifestly not inevitable. Indeed, it is possible for me to be directly 
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 Spinoza did not hold a container view of space, and so the last way of phrasing his 
view on the relation between extension and extended bodies is more accurate. See Ben-
nett (1984, pp. 81-110), who has given the so-called “field metaphysic” reading of the 
relation between extension and what is extended its most rigorous presentation. For other, 
similar, accounts, see the bibliography in Valtteri Viljanen (2007, p. 397, n. 7). 
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 This problematizes Spinoza’s characterization of the knowledge as “adequate and 
perfect”. If we know x adequately and perfectly, should we not thereby know what x is?  
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acquainted with someone or something without being able to describe that thing 
as it is essentially. It is, it transpires, likewise possible for me to be acquainted 
with an essence of God without thereby realizing that it is indeed an essence of 
God and as such eternal and infinite. 
 
Knowledge of God is epistemically prior in that mere acquaintance with an 
attribute of God functions as a transcendental (in the Kantian sense) condition 
placed upon any form of knowledge of singular things. But knowledge of God as 
God is not such a condition, transcendental in the Kantian sense. Differently put, 
in order to know modes we must be familiar with the attribute of which they are 
modes. But this acquaintance does not require of us that we know that they are 
indeed attributes of God. Nonetheless such knowledge is epistemically prior to 
our predication of infinity of the modes.  
 
In addition, unveiled knowledge of God is also, as I will discuss more in detail in 
the following chapter, normatively prioritized: it, and not veiled knowledge of the 
same object, is the human activity valued most highly in Spinoza’s system. On my 
reading, the epistemic ascension from knowledge of God tout court to knowledge 
of God as God is to be framed in an ethical and soteriological context.
235
 Let me 
presently draw the basic contours of what may be called Spinoza’s perspectival 
soteriology by the means of a comparison.  
 
In the metaphor of the cave, Plato famously describes how we ascend from the 
sensible world of mutable objects to the intelligible world of forms. The 
intelligible world of forms is that which admits of knowledge in the proper sense 
(episteme). It is the permanence of the forms which make them qualify as solid 
objects of knowledge. By contrast, of that which is and is not - the changeable 
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 It follows that I do not agree with commentators who argue that what I have called 
veiled knowledge of God is the highest good for Spinoza. See for instance Curley’s inter-
pretation (1988, p. 125): “I should stress that when Spinoza speaks of the knowledge of 
God as the summum bonum, I take him to be understanding that phrase very broadly, not 
as limited to the kind of knowledge which would more conventionally be thought of as 
knowledge of God. Any kind of scientific understanding of any subject matter will count 
as knowledge of God (5p24; 30). So for example, Freudian psychology, if it genuinely 
provided a scientific understanding of man, would be knowledge of God.”   
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objects of our senses - we can only have opinions (doxa), but never solid 
knowledge. Plato enjoins us to undertake the spiritual process that will open the 
eye of the intellect to the world of the forms not only because we thereby gain in 
epistemic status. The contemplation of forms is also ethically and aesthetically 
enjoined.  
 
For Spinoza too, knowledge of an immutable object - God - is the highest good, 
and our sole beatitude. 
 
But there is an important difference between Spinoza and Plato.  
 
For Plato we have to abandon the object of opinion for the object of knowledge. 
These are numerically distinct objects. For Spinoza, that object in knowledge of 
which our blessedness consists is an object that we always already know: God’s 
nature. However, our knowledge of this nature is more often than not veiled: 
although we are acquainted with it, we do not recognize it for what it is. In order 
to come to know wholly that object that we must know in order to become 
blessed, we must not abandon the object that we sensually perceive or imagine. 
Instead, we must change our way of attending to it; we must regard it through a 
different lens and come to know it under a different aspect. The individual's 
journey towards beatitude consists in coming to know that with which one is 
inevitably acquainted as God. In the following chapter, I will discuss this process 
more in detail.  
 
 Conclusion.  
 
In Chapter 6, I indicated how changing one’s perspective on infinity can be 
pivotal in construing the object of one’s passions as necessary and thereby also in 
weakening these passions. In this chapter I have motivated why, for Spinoza, it is 
possible to model one’s knowledge of the modes’ infinity after that of the 
attributes in the first place. It is possible because, for Spinoza, God’s infinity is 
first known and the modes’ infinity is intellectually cognizable by means of an 
analogy. Unlike in traditional accounts, this analogy proceeds from God’s nature 
to finite things. In other words, it is because we first know God’s infinity that we 
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are in position to predicate infinity analogously of his modes. But, it was objected, 
certainly God’s infinity is not known by all the way it should be, if it is to be 
epistemically primary in the required sense. In order to deal with this difficulty, I 
distinguished between veiled and unveiled knowledge of God. One realizes the 
infinity of any attribute of which one has an idea of a mode as soon as one has 
unveiled knowledge of God. For, if God is absolutely infinite he must be in 
possession of all attributes, and hence it suffices to understand that extension, for 
instance, could be conceived of as an attribute of God in order to consider it as 
such. If it is conceivably an attribute of God and God is absolutely infinite, it must 
be an attribute of God. But one need not realize this in order to have adequate, yet 
unveiled, knowledge of the attribute in question.  
 
The fact that one comes to know the modes’ infinity only by analogy indicates an 
unexpected limit to Spinoza’s rationalism, if rationalism is equated with the claim 
that reality is entirely penetrable tor reason. If reality is to be penetrable to reason 
it is often assumed that its basic structure can be mathematically described. For 
the epitome of reason consists in such abstract (mathematical, or at least logical) 
thinking. But for Spinoza, oddly, the infinity of the modes cannot be established 
by any formal procedure. As such, in abstraction from the infinity of the 
substance, the infinity of the modes cannot be known. Finite things such as 
ourselves (at least with respect to the property of infinity) thus occupy the 
epistemically inferior position that was traditionally reserved for God. Just as in 
the Thomist account, God’s goodness (say) could only be (imperfectly) known by 
relating it to creaturely goodness, so on Spinoza’s view the infinity of finite things 
can only be (adequately) known by relating it to divine infinity. Thus Spinoza 
tackles the puzzle of Chapter 6 - how the infinity of the modes can be known by 
conceptually modelling it after the infinity of the attributes - by inverting the 









Beyond Passivity and Activity: Spinoza on Love of God  
 
Twixt Thee and me an “I am” is, o‘ercrowding me:  
Take, by Thine own “I am,” mine from between us  
- Al Hallaj 
 Introduction.  
In this chapter I treat Spinoza’s notion of the third kind of knowledge. The 
question I am interested in is why this kind of knowledge is affectively superior to 
all other forms of (human) mental activity. On the reading I advance, the third 
kind of knowledge is thus superior not because it is knowledge of something 
different but because it is knowledge as something different. By analyzing 
Spinoza’s concept of intellectual love of God I reach the conclusion that in the 
third kind of knowledge the subject knows herself as God (albeit God modified in 
a certain way). I argue that this aspect of intellectual love of God is of importance 
for Spinoza’s ethics for two reasons. First, it explains the already mentioned 
controversial superiority of the third kind of knowledge over knowledge of the 
second kind. Second, it helps us to discover how Spinoza, on my reading, 
proposes to square perfection monism - the view that all perfection is ultimately 
predicated only of God - with human perfectionism. More precisely, my thesis is 
that Spinoza accomplishes the reconciliation of these two apparently incompatible 
positions by having us renegotiate, through the third kind of knowledge, our 
concepts of activity and passivity. On my reading the “transition from passivity to 
activity” - often judged problematic in the scholarship236 - takes place exactly by 
the means of this reevaluation. 
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 The most profound theory of activity in Spinoza’s metaphysics is probably Viljanen 
(2011). Yet, Viljanen studies dynamic essentialism as a Spinozist action theory solely 





The chapter is structured as follows. (1) I introduce the problem. (2.1) I present 
the link between knowledge and perfection. Having established that, on Spinoza’s 
view, perfection is activity and that to have adequate knowledge is to be active, it 
is necessary to explore the concept of adequacy. (2.2) I unpack the Spinozist 
notion of adequacy. Intellectual love of God necessarily accompanies the third 
kind of knowledge. (3) I analyze passages where Spinoza describes intellectual 
love of God in order to examine what these passages reveal about the third kind of 
knowledge. I suggest that the collapse of objective and subjective genitive in love 
of God reveals that in the third, but not in the second, kind of knowledge, God is 
the subject reflexively known. (4) I delineate some consequences of my reading 
for Spinoza’s philosophy of human perfection. On my interpretation, by allowing 
for human passivity to be converted into divine activity through the process of 
reflection, Spinoza is able to present an ideal of human perfection that is 
compatible with perfection monism. I conclude by briefly contrasting my reading 
of Spinoza with a contemporary account of human perfectionism (due to Thomas 
Hurka) and a reading of Spinoza in an “activist” spirit akin to Hurka (due to 
Matthias Kisner).  
 
 8.1. The problem.  
 
For Spinoza, the mind’s perfection is greater to the extent that it acts, it acts 
whenever it is internally determined, and then it has adequate, clear and distinct 
ideas, as opposed to confused ones (see 2p29s).
237
 Indeed, a man free from 
                                                                                                                                     
this “transition from passivity to activity”. It is exactly this transition - wherein the secret 
of human perfectibility lies - that the present chapter undertakes to investigate. My thesis 
is that it takes place at the cost of human autonomy and is thus incompatible with human 
beings being agents in any robust sense.  
237
 It is noteworthy that Spinoza in 2p29 treats confusion as the complement of adequacy 
and clarity and distinctness. Spinoza’s use of the phrase “clear and distinct” has not yet 
been thoroughly investigated, but it is remarkable that while Descartes (Regulae I-XII and 
Discours de la méthode, II) and Leibniz (Discours de métaphysique, article 24) both, for 
all their differences, considered clarity to be the complement of obscurity and distinctness 
the complement of confusion, Spinoza speaks only of confused ideas as what appears to 
be the complement of adequate (and hence clear and distinct ideas) as well. My under-




passions would, on Spinoza’s view, be lead only by reason, that is, he would act 
on nothing but adequate ideas (see 4p66s). It should be noted that as human 
beings are finite, it is impossible that they should never be affected by external 
objects in such a way that they form passions and inadequate ideas (cf. 4p4), and 
so any striving towards such an ideal must be asymptotic. Since passions are 
inadequate ideas (3p3), it transpires that Spinoza’s cognitive therapeutical 
program to (as far as possible) regiment the passions by the means of adequate 
ideas (surveyed in Chapter 6) is also an ontological program designed at gaining 
in perfection (and thus in reality: 2d6).  
 
It is noteworthy that this ontological perfectionist program aimed at allowing one 
to (asymptotically) approach freedom does not only consist in the formation of 
adequate knowledge tout court, but in the formation of two different kinds of 
knowledge, one of which is described as being of far greater utility for relative 
freedom than the other. For it is not the case that all adequate ideas are equally 
powerful in the combat against passions. More specifically, Spinoza claims that 
knowledge of the third kind is superior to knowledge of the second kind in this 
regard. Before we can investigate why knowledge of the third kind is superior to 
knowledge of the second kind, it is necessary to briefly introduce what is meant 
by this distinction.  
 
Spinoza makes the distinction between different kinds of cognition in TIE (see 
especially [19], C. 12-13), in Chapters 1 and 2 of Part 2 of his KV, as well as in 
the Ethics.
238
 Let me here focus on the latter text. In the Ethics, Spinoza first 
draws the distinction in 2p40s2, where he distinguishes between things known by 
the (i) imagination, that is, through the senses or by report, (ii) by reason (ratio) 
through “common notions and adequate ideas of the properties of things” and (iii) 
by intuitive knowledge, which “proceeds from adequate ideas of the formal 
essences of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the [NS: 
formal] essences of things”. These are the first, second and third kind of 
                                                                                                                                     
nett (2001, p. 74) has suggested that Descartes “erred in thinking he had a useful notion 
of “clear and distinct, although in no way adequate”. 
238
 For an analysis of the differences between the three texts, see Mignini (1990).  
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knowledge, respectively. All adequate ideas are either of the second or the third 
kind, and these ideas, and these ideas only, are necessarily true (cf. 2p41).  
 
Since virtue is the same thing as power (4p8), and more specifically, the power to 
bring about those effects which follow from one’s essence (see 3p7; 4d8), it is to 
be expected that the virtue of the mind will consist in thinking adequate ideas. For 
the essence of the human mind consists solely in understanding (see 5p36c), and 
we understand things solely by the means of adequate ideas. Somewhat 
surprisingly, however, one’s virtue is not solely determined by the proportion of 
adequate ideas to inadequate ideas in one’s mind. Instead, one’s virtue is greater 
the more one knows things by the subset of adequate ideas belonging to the third 
kind of knowledge. In 5p27, Spinoza writes: “The greatest virtue of the mind is to 
know God (4p28) or to understand things by the third kind of knowledge”. In 
5p36c, Spinoza comments on this superiority of the third kind of knowledge, that 
is, its conductivity to greater perfection, in these words:  
 
 I thought this worth the trouble of noting here, in order to show by 
this example how much the knowledge of singular things I have 
called intuitive or knowledge of the third kind can accomplish and 
how much more powerful it is than the universal knowledge I have 
called knowledge of the second kind. For although I have shown 
generally in Part I that all things (and consequently the human 
Mind also) depend on God both for their essence and their 
existence, nevertheless, that demonstration, though legitimate and 
put beyond all chance of doubt, still does not affect our Mind as 
much when this is inferred from the very essence of a singular thing 
which we say depends on God [Emphases added]. 
 
The issue of what accounts for the difference between the second and the third 
kind of knowledge is hotly debated in the literature. Many different accounts have 
been proposed. On a widespread reading, the two kinds of knowledge are to be 
distinguished on the basis of a difference in their objects proper: while knowledge 
of the second kind intends common notions and properties, knowledge of the third 
kind intends (formal) essences.
239
 By contrast, some interpreters propose that the 
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 See for instance, Soyarslan (2016); Wilson (1996, p. 118); Curley (1973, pp. 54-9). 
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third kind of knowledge presents the same content differently.
240
 While I favour 
the second interpretation, I will not directly address the issue of whether there are 
objects proper to each kind of cognition in this chapter. Instead, I will present an 
alternative reading where the superiority of the third kind of knowledge is 
accounted for by the knowing subject’s knowing herself differently. Such a 
reading is compatible both with the theory of there being objects proper to each 
kind of cognition and with the negation of this theory. If my reading is right, 
however, no difference in the object of knowledge need be appealed to in order to 
explain the superiority of the third kind of knowledge. 
 
But if the knowing subject knows herself differently in the third kind of 
knowledge, is she not hereby also knowing a different object? Not necessarily. 
For Spinoza, all true (and, as I pointed out in Chapter 3, conscious) ideas are 
accompanied by indubitable knowledge of oneself having true ideas (2p43). 
Hence, for any true idea x, to know x is to know that I know x. The view I am 
defending is, more precisely, that in the third kind of knowledge it is not only the 
case that I know x and hence know that I know x, I know and experience in 
addition that the I to which the reflexive knowledge refers, is ultimately God’s, 
and that this, in turn, accounts for the superiority of this knowledge. It is 
important to realize that the I which accompanies the third kind of knowledge 
does not refer to an I different from the I which accompanies all my true 
knowledge. This is so since the human mind is always part of God’s infinite 
intellect (2p11c), so in coming to know that my mind as embedded in God’s 
intellect I do not change the I I identify with, I merely come to cognize it under a 
different guise. More clearly, “I know x” and “I, as God, know x” do not 
necessarily differ in the information they convey about x. Instead, they differ in 
that the first-person perspective is different in each case.
241
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 See for instance, Carr (1978), Sandler (2005); Primus (2017). On Primus’ view, I take 
it, the object of scientia intuitiva is the same as the object of reason, but as additionally 
furnished with formal reality.  
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 Perhaps one could express the view I am defending by saying that in the third kind of 
knowledge the true idea comes to be known under a different character. Kaplan (1989) 
introduces character as a way of squaring beliefs in prima facie incompatible proposi-
tions. (Kaplan speaks of believing a proposition, not an idea, under different characters. 
Since I am not sure that for Spinoza all ideas are propositional, I would not attribute that 





On my reading, coming to know things adequately in the second kind of 
knowledge is already to come to know them as God knows them, but only in 
coming to know them as God knows them as God, can one reach the pinnacle of 
human perfection.
242
 (As we have seen, Spinoza explicitly specifies that to know 
things by the third kind of knowledge is to acquire the “greatest human 
perfection” [5p27d].) Shortly, I will defend this thesis. But let me first comment 
more in detail on the link between knowledge and perfection.  
 
 8.2. Knowledge. 
 
  8.2.1. Knowledge, perfection, activity. 
On Spinoza’s view, perfection co-varies with the possession of (adequate) 
knowledge. This is because perfection and activity are the same (see 5p40), and 
knowledge or understanding by the means of adequate ideas, is the activity of the 
mind (3p1). Let me first unpack the equivalence of perfection and activity by 
showing how it follows from two other equivalencies.  
 
                                                                                                                                     
counts of how we come to know propositions under different characters (or “roles”) and 
Spinoza is that in believing the proposition that “Her hair is on fire” under the character 
“That woman’s hair is on fire” (to use the popular example) and under the character “My 
hair is on fire” differ in a way that “I know x” and “I, as God, know x” evidently do not. 
There is no shift from the third person perspective to a first-person perspective. Instead, 
what happens in the third kind of knowledge (or so I suggest) is that one’s understanding 
of what it means to have a first-person perspective at all is fundamentally deepened. Be-
cause of this difference, I will in what follows not further contaminate this reading of 
Spinoza with references to the functioning of indexicals in belief states.  
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 In general, I thus agree with Melamed (2013b) about the intimate link between God’s 
knowledge and the third kind of knowledge possessed by humans. It may also be noted 
that Melamed also calls our attention to Spinoza’s statements in CM II 7. From this it 
follows, according to Melamed (2013b, p. 102) that God does not have knowledge of 
universals. Melamed’s theory that second knowledge is knowledge of universals is con-
sistent with how it is described, and nonetheless ideas of universals are confused and 
inadequate (2p40s1), while knowledge of the second kind is supposedly adequate. Hence, 
unless we have to admit an inconsistency, knowledge of the second kind cannot be 
knowledge of universals as these are commonly understood, even though Spinoza uses 
the word ’universal' to describe it. How to square knowledge of the second kind can be of 
“common notions and properties” without being of universals is a serious problem: see 




The first equivalence obtains between perfection and being or reality (for the 
equivalence of esse and realitas see 1p9). It is rooted in Spinoza’s transcendental 
understanding of being discussed in Part 1 of this thesis. Being is, for Spinoza, 
everywhere characterized by a co-extensional yet intensionally different property, 
namely perfection (see 2d6). Moreover, reality or being co-varies with power or 
causal efficacy. There is thus nothing - no being -, which does not cause some 
effect (see 1p36). 
 
The second equivalence obtains between activity and causal efficacy. This 
equivalence requires explanation. If a hostage is forced at gunpoint to read aloud a 
script prepared by his kidnappers, the hostage is the cause of the script being read 
aloud. But is the declamation of the script a manifestation of his own activity? In 
one sense, yes. But if activity is to be understood along the lines of adequate 
causation, this cannot be so. Spinoza defines adequate causation, and its 
complement, in 3d1 and 3d2. When the effect can be “clearly and distinctly 
perceived” through the cause, it is adequate; if not, it is inadequate. The 
declamation of the script cannot be adequately understood through the hostage: in 
order to understand the content of the script (which, I should mention, the 
kidnappers have composed) as well as its declamation, reference to the kidnappers 
must also be made. Interpreters of Spinoza must choose: is perfection/activity 
identical with causal production tout court or identical with the production of 
those effects of which the thing in question is the adequate cause? It is the 
thinking of adequate ideas which is the activity of the mind - and not the thinking 
of ideas tout court. This indicates that activity is, plausibly, adequate causation, 
i.e., the causation of those effects which can be conceived or understood through 
the causal agent bringing them about. This naturally raises the exegetical question 
whether Spinoza’s picture allows for things such as finite modes to ever be 
adequate causes. Does not all causation among finite things propagate infinitely 
(as per 1p28)?
243
 I cannot enter this discussion directly here. However, by 
analyzing Spinoza’s notion of love of God I hope to be able to shed new light on 
the kind of mental activity that Spinoza, on my reading, considers to be the 
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 This question has been raised previously: see Chapter 6, section 2. For a more com-
plete bibliography collating responses to the issue, see Sangiacomo and Nachtomy (2018, 
p. 102. n. 1).  
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supreme one available to humans. It is, to be precise, the activity which consists in 
acknowledging that one’s “own” activity belongs to God. 
  
For Spinoza, any reflexive judgment is a sign of an increase in power. In 3p53d 
Spinoza makes the point that when a mind has reached such a degree of power of 
thinking that it can “consider itself [se ipsam contemplari]”, this signifies that it 
has undergone a parallel transition toward greater bodily power of action as well. 
A mind’s reflection upon its own power of thinking is accompanied by joy since 
to reach a state where one is able to self-reflect in this way signifies that one has 





Since true ideas are self-evidentially true in the sense that one cannot consciously 
have a true idea and be ignorant of its truth, consciously having a true idea 
necessarily implies a certain measure of reflexivity: the reflexivity that is involved 
in always being able to move from “x is true” to “I know that x is true”. And, 
since all possession of true ideas signifies an increase in one’s power of acting, so 
does all reflexivity. According to Spinoza’s epistemology, a mind invariably 
knows when it (consciously) possesses a true idea (2p43), and since adequacy is 
what, in abstraction from the object of any idea, indicates its truth (2d4), all true 
ideas are also adequate. If the activity of knowledge is the perfection of the mind, 
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 The view that self-awareness is essentially joyful can easily be called into question. 
Does not anxiety and similar moods indicate that to be aware of oneself can be painful 
and sometimes unbearable? In order to respond to this obvious objection, it is necessary 
to bring in some of Spinoza’s definitional machinery. 3p53 reads: “When the mind con-
siders itself and its power of acting, it rejoices…” What is the mind’s self, what is its 
power of acting and how are they linked? One way of reading the passage, which has the 
benefit of evading the difficult question of how they are linked, is to think of the mind as 
being such that when it considers itself it cannot but consider its power of acting. This 
would be the case if a mind in truly considering itself considered its essence. When the 
mind truly considers or contemplates its essence, it considers only its (essential) activity 
and none of the passivity the body undergoes as a consequence of being in the world. For, 
as I mentioned in the Chapter 5, section 3, essences are “affirmative”. For Spinoza, sad-
ness detracts from perfection or being (see his Gen.Def.Aff). But because essences are 
affirmative, no such detraction from perfection or being can be contained in the essence 
of a thing. For that reason, the consideration of one’s essential self can never inspire sad-
ness. Although this is not a full-fledged defence of Spinoza’s theory that self-awareness is 
intrinsically a matter of joy, it at least gestures towards a solution.  
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then self-reflexivity too is an infallible indicator of perfection. For the former 
entails the latter.  
 
Knowledge is considered to obtain once one possesses adequate ideas. Given the 
central position of truth and adequacy - the evidence of truth which an idea carries 
on its sleeve - for perfection, it is necessary to present these concepts in some 
more detail. 
 
 8.2.2. Truth and adequacy.  
 
As I mentioned in Chapter 3, an idea is true when it corresponds with its object 
(ideatum: 1a6; see further 1p30d for the minimum requirement of 
correspondence). But since truth is self-evidential, it is not necessary to examine 
reality in order to judge an idea true. It is sufficient to examine the idea itself. An 
idea is evidentially true even in abstraction from its object when it is adequate: 
that is, when it possesses all the “intrinsic denominations” of a true idea (2d4). 
Spinoza specifies that by “intrinsic denominations” he means those properties that 




But what is adequacy? Several commentators have pointed out that for Spinoza, 
adequacy is a context-sensitive or mind-relative notion.
246
 An idea is adequate 
with respect to a mind. All ideas are true in God’s intellect (2p32) and 
consequently also adequate there. Ideas adequate in a human mind - whether these 
are known by the second or the third kind of knowledge - are also adequate in 
God’s intellect. 
 
More precisely, ideas are adequate in a human mind H when the idea of x is in 
God’s intellect G insofar as (quatenus ut) he is affected by the idea of H alone, 
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 What kind of properties are these “intrinsic denominations” on the basis of which we 
can judge truth to obtain even without checking with reality? On a plausible reading ar-
ticulated by Schmid, these are “denominations” that fit that idea into a greater body of 
knowledge (2008, p. 216). Here, I will not deal with this “phenomenal” question of what 
constitutes adequacy - that is, with the question of why adequate ideas appear as such to 
us -, but rather with the metaphysical ground of adequacy.  
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 Schmid (2008); Della Rocca (1996, p. 109).  
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and otherwise it is inadequate in H. If x is not adequate in G insofar as he is 
affected by the idea of H alone, then the idea of H does not involve adequate 
knowledge of x. This reasoning is explicitly stated in 2p11c, and at play in for 
instance 2p25d and 2p28d, where Spinoza uses these formulas to explain why our 
sensual knowledge of external bodies and our own body parts is inadequate in us. 
But can he really maintain such a view? Even when one puts aside the pressing 
question of plausibility, a question of internal consistency remains.  
 
Can God be affected by the idea of the human mind alone? Is it possible for 
anyone to entertain a thought of the human mind without thinking about anything 
else? This could perhaps be possible if the human mind was construed as 
something independently existing (historically this would be as a substantial form, 
say, or a soul). But Spinoza appears to deny himself this option.  
 
For Spinoza, the human mind is the idea of its body (2p13) and the body is a 
singular thing. Being a singular thing, it is tributary to infinite arrays of finite 
causes (2p9) none of which constitute the essence of the body. Moreover, the 
body is a composite thing, whose parts are continuously affected, composed and 
decomposed by other bodies (see Part 2, Postulates I, III, IV). For that reason, 
God exists as the human body neither by being himself qua God nor even by 
simply being the body as such, but by being influenced by the entire flux of 
external bodies which affect the body. Likewise, God exists as the human mind by 
forming an idea of a body undergoing influences from without: “this idea [of the 
human mind] will be in God insofar as he is considered to be affected by the ideas 
of great many singular things [sc. apart from the mind itself]” (2p19d). This is an 
interesting claim. The claim is, to be precise, that the human mind exists not in 
virtue of God’s intellect containing the idea of it tout court, but by him thinking of 
it as influenced from without, victimized by myriad external forces. God’s self-
passivation at the hands of entities arising through innumerable other divine self-
passivations is what makes the body exist. The mind, being the idea of the body, 
inevitably references this passivity vis-à-vis the world.  
 
It is indeed Spinoza’s professed view that the human mind does not possess 
adequate knowledge of its body (2p19) and accordingly not of itself, either (but 
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only inadequate knowledge of the body’s many affections: 2p23; 2p28). But if 
there is no such thing as a thought of the human body alone, of the human body 
shielded from external influences, then it appears that no human mind can ever 
entertain an adequate idea. 
 
Let me summarize the difficulty. Spinoza’s argumentative moves in 2p25d and 
2p28d indicate that exactly those ideas are adequate in a human mind H that 
follow from H independently of how its body is produced (and “reduced”) by 
external forces. But given Spinoza’s account of how the body is produced, it 
seems that no ideas can follow from the human mind alone. Yet we cannot evince 
mental perfection unless there is a way for some ideas to so follow. 
 
Fortunately for the prospect of human perfection in Spinozism, there is a way for 
ideas to so follow. The reason why ideas can so follow is that, in addition to 
believing in the body as existing in virtue of innumerable external factors, 
Spinoza also espouses a doctrine of affirmative essences. I briefly covered the 
Spinozist notion of essence in Chapter 5, section 3. As we saw in that section, 
essences are “affirmative” in the sense that no thing can undergo any form of 
passivity - any detraction from being - as a consequence of its essence. Why is 
this so? Previously, I mentioned the admirably fast answer to this question 
provided by Martin Lin. On Lin’s reading, a self-negating essence is a 
contradiction in terms. But it is worth to linger for a while on the prima facie 
inconsistency that arises from Spinoza’s postulation that essences be eternal. 
 
Essences - even the essences of finite things - are eternal (see 1p17s, where 
Spinoza speaks of the essence of man as an “eternal truth”). Eternity is, as 
previously stated, the existence-cum-essence of that whose existence and essence 
are one (1d8; cf. 1p20). But the essence of a human being does not involve 
existence (see, for example, 1p8s2). So, by definition, it appears it cannot be 




Spinoza’s doctrine of the eternity of an aspect of the human mind is notoriously 
difficult and circles around the crucial proposition of 5p23. I cannot here provide 
a complete interpretation of that doctrine.
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 But judging from 5p23d, Spinoza’s 
reasoning is that to the extent that there is in God an idea of the human mind 
insofar as it is unimpeded by external forces - what I take to be the essence of the 
human mind - that essence must also have formal being. This follows from the 
parallelism Spinoza espouses in 2p7 and its scholium. In terms of the two sole 
attributes that Spinoza claims that human beings have access to, that doctrine is 
essentially the claim that things cannot have objective being in God’s intellect 
without also having formal being in God’s attributes. This means that God cannot 
entertain an idea of anything without that thing also having being in addition to 
the being it enjoys as an idea. 
 
The idea of the human mind’s essence does not owe its explanation to any 
external forces. The being of that idea - the essence of the human mind - is 
entirely grounded in the fact that God entertains it as an object of one of his ideas. 
But, as Spinoza indicates in 5p23d, whatever exists objectively by being intended 
by God’s intellect also exists formally in an attribute of God. Spinoza can then 
infer that essence’s eternity from the fact that if something has being (“formally”) 
in an attribute of God, it is eternal. But why should things be eternal merely 
because they have their being in God’s attributes? Recall that things are eternal to 
the extent that they “follow directly” from the absolute nature of God’s attributes 
(1p20-1p21). If the essence of the human mind has its ground solely in one of 
God’s attributes, it appears that it should follow directly from its “absolute 
nature”, and so be eternal.  
 
Although this may not be a full resolution of the puzzle of how finite things can 
aspire to eternity within the confines of Spinoza’s system, I hope that the 
following, at least, has been established. In order for ideas to follow from the 
human mind alone, they must follow from the eternal essence of that mind. We 
can thus restate the previously given account of adequacy in these words: an idea 
x is adequate in a human intellect H when x is in the divine intellect G because G 
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 For a convincing account, see Don Garrett (2009).  
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Which ideas follow in this way? In this chapter, I will suggest that one such idea 
is the idea that God entertains all of one’s adequate ideas - in terms of thought, or, 
in purely ontological terms, that God is all one is, or again, in “transcendental” 
terms, that God possesses the very perfections one possesses through one’s 
possession of them. When accompanied by the reflexive awareness that one’s idea 
is thought by God (or that one’s being is God’s) and that one hence thinks (or is) 
only as God, I will argue, such ideas constitute the third kind of knowledge. 
 
That perfection is positively proportional to the amount of adequate ideas we 
possess is easily inferred from the two equivalencies between the mind’s activity 
and understanding, on the one hand, and (causal) activity and perfection, on the 
other. But if knowledge of the second as well as the third kind are both adequate, 
then the question arises what accounts for their difference in force.  
I would like to propose that the difference in force can be explained by a 
difference in the subject reflexively involved in the two kinds of knowledge. Only 
in the third kind of knowledge, or so I suggest, does one reflexively acknowledge 
or experience that God thinks one’s ideas. But why should the third kind of 
knowledge be different in terms of the subject it reflexively intends?  
 
Before I demonstrate this by analyzing the notion of love of God, I would like to 
indicate that my reading is at least compatible with another, rarely noted, feature 
of scientia intuitiva. This feature consists in how this knowledge is related to the 
notion just discussed - the eternal essence of the mind. Since we have just treated 
the eternal mind, it is worth exploring that feature here.  
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 This account of adequacy at least goes some way towards explaining why adequacy is 
the self-evidence of truth. If an idea x is in G because of what H is essentially and so 
eternally, then this does seem to imply that the resources to explain x are always available 
to the mind H for whom x is adequate. I do not claim I respond to this phenomenological 
question in this chapter.  
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The intellect is for Spinoza the deposit of adequate ideas, and this part of the mind 
is eternal (5p40c). Ideas known by the second and the third kind of knowledge, 
respectively, are all adequate, and so they should be equally eternal. Therefore, it 
is interesting to note that not only do the second and the third kind of knowledge 
differ in terms of their force, their respective eternity is also differently described.  
 
Spinoza says of reason (the “faculty” for conceiving ideas by the second kind of 
knowledge, cf. 2p40s), that it is in its nature to conceive things under a certain 
species of eternity (2p44c). 5p24 supplies an explanation concerning what it 
means to conceive things under a species of eternity: it appears it means not being 
preoccupied with the actual existence of things so much as with their eternal 
essences.
249
 What is known by reason is eternal. As is familiar to readers of 
Spinoza, what is known by intuitive science is eternal as well (5p33; 5p36). 
 
Interestingly, however, the eternity characterizing the third kind of knowledge is 
also given a unique description: “The third kind of knowledge “depends on the 
mind, as on a formal cause, insofar as the mind itself is eternal” (Emphasis added: 
5p31). It is important to note that the second kind of knowledge is not described in 
this way. But what does it mean for a piece of knowledge to depend upon a mind, 
insofar as it is eternal, as on a formal cause? It must first of all be noted, that in 
the demonstration of 5p31, Spinoza glosses “formal cause” as “adequate cause”. 
By calling the eternal mind the formal cause of some knowledge, Spinoza means 
that that knowledge can be “clearly and distinctly perceived” through the eternal 
mind alone (cf. 3d1). 
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 This is problematic, since, in 2p40s, knowledge by reason is said to consist in 
knowledge of common properties. But if knowledge by reason is of things under a spe-
cies of eternity and knowledge of things under a species of eternity is knowledge of es-
sences, then knowledge by reason should be knowledge of essences and not knowledge of 
common properties. This seems to indicate that knowledge of these two objects of 
knowledge (common properties versus essences) that one may suppose could distinguish 
the two kinds of adequate knowledge (the second and the third, respectively) is in some 
way, at least, overlapping. And this, in turn, may speak against distinguishing between 




The question of how this can be a distinctive feature of the third kind of 
knowledge seems at first irresolvable. This is because all (adequate) knowledge 
depends upon the eternal mind as on an adequate cause. Consider the way we just 
defined adequacy: an idea x is adequate in a human intellect H when x is in the 
divine intellect G because G is affected only by the (idea of) the eternal essence of 
H, and otherwise it is inadequate. This applies to all adequate ideas, whether they 
belong to the second or the third kind of knowledge. For any adequate idea, it 
depends on the eternal mind as on an adequate cause because we can know why 
that idea is in God’s intellect simply by knowing the eternal mind. Is Spinoza’s 
characterization of the third kind of knowledge in this passage too generic? Why 
would he characterize all adequate knowledge in a passage specifically devoted to 
knowledge of the third kind?  
 
One way of dealing with this question is by paying closer attention to the locution 
“insofar as the mind itself is eternal [quatenus mens ipsa aeterna est]” (5p31: G. 
II/229). All knowledge depends on the eternal mind as on an adequate cause. But 
all knowledge does not depend on the eternal mind, insofar as it is eternal, as on 
an adequate cause. Simply put, my suggestion is that we can have adequate 
knowledge without realizing or experiencing the eternity of the mind. In order to 
know by the third kind of knowledge, by contrast, one must know that one’s mind 
is eternal. In this sense, this knowledge depends on the mind insofar as it is 
eternal, or, modified after the manner I suggest, insofar as it is known to be 
eternal. To justify my modification, it may be noted that “insofar as” shifts not 
what an expression refers to, but the guise under which the thing is known or 
conceived. For example, God insofar as he is extended can be the cause of an 
extended thing, but not God insofar as he is thinking - and this in spite of the 
numerical identity between the thinking and extended substance. When I 
understand “insofar as it is eternal” as meaning “insofar as it is conceived or 
known to be eternal” I follow the way Spinoza often uses the locution.  
 
This reading meets the minimum requirement of being compatible with the way 
Spinoza qualifies the third kind of knowledge in 2p40s2. In that scholium, he says 
that the third kind of knowledge “proceeds from adequate ideas of the formal 
essences of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the [NS: 
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formal] essences of things”. Knowledge of the “formal essence of a certain 
attributes of God” is knowledge of those features of God which explain why all 
conceivable things have formal being - viz. his infinity (see Chapter 5, section 1). 
Knowledge of the “(formal) essence of a thing” is, in the most salient case, 
knowledge of my mind’s being inscribed in God’s attribute. But by so knowing 
one’s own mind, one comes to regard oneself differently. God’s essence is the 
same as his causal activity (1p34). Attributes are ways God is and thus ways in 
which he is causally active. So, to know that one has being in some attribute of 
God is to know that one is an instance of God’s causal activity as it is conceived 
under that attribute. So, to know that one’s mind is in God’s attribute of thought is 
simply to know that God is the one thinking one’s thoughts.  
 
If the third kind of knowledge is essentially knowledge as God and, by Spinoza’s 
reflexivity principle, knowledge of the fact that one has such knowledge as God, 
then Spinoza’s claim that it depends on the eternal mind as on its adequate cause 
becomes easier to grasp. In saying that the third kind of knowledge depends on 
the mind as on an adequate cause insofar as the mind is eternal Spinoza implies 
(or so I suggest) that what distinguishes the third kind of knowledge is that the 
mind insofar as it knows itself to have being only in God is the self-conscious 
subject of that knowledge. In the second as well as in the third kind of knowledge, 
the object is known as it is eternally, but in the third kind of knowledge the 
subject knows herself to be eternal too. 
 
This is not to be taken as a compelling argument - I do not pretend that Spinoza 
can be convicted for conflating human and divine subjectivity on the evidence 
presented above. Above, I presented only a suggestion of how the third kind of 
knowledge may be said to depend on the mind “insofar as it is eternal” - but that 
claim is to be further substantiated by interpretation of other passages. In what 
follows, I present a reading of the collapse of objective and subjective genitive in 




8.3. Love of God. 
 
The question posed at the onset of this chapter was what explains the difference in 
force over affects between knowledge of the second and the third kind. 
Intellectual love of God is what explains the superior force over affects 
characterizing the third, but not the second kind of knowledge. For, from the third 
kind of knowledge, intellectual love of God “necessarily arises” (5p32c).250 But 
what, in turn, explains that this love is so strong, and necessarily stronger than any 
human affect? The two kinds of knowledge, I suggest, are different with their 
respect to power over affects because they are consciously entertained by subjects 
reflexively known under different guises. I will explain that statement more in 
detail by exploring what Spinoza’s notion of love of God reveals. 
 
Let me first note, once more, that, strictly speaking, love of God is not an affect 
(see Chapter 3, section 2.1).
251
 Love is defined as joy accompanied by the idea of 
an external cause (Gen.Def.Aff.VI), and joy is defined as a transition to greater 
perfection (Gen.Def.Aff.II). Since the third kind of knowledge, and the love that 
necessarily accompanies it, are supposed to be constant, intellectual love of God 
cannot be accurately described only in terms of a transition to greater perfection. 
Spinoza cautions the reader who would take him at his words in the following 
way: 
 
 Although this [intellectual] love toward God has had no beginning 
[by 5p33] it still has all the perfections of Love, just as if it had 
come to be (as we feigned in 5p32c). There is no difference here, 
except that the Mind has had eternally the same perfection which, 
in our fiction, now came to it, and that it is accompanied by the 
idea of God as an eternal cause. If Joy then consists in the passage 
to a greater perfection, blessedness must surely consist in the fact 
that the Mind is endowed with perfection itself (5p33s: Emphasis 
added).  
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 See also KV, 2 II [3].  
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 This has not always been appreciated in the secondary literature. See for instance 
Frankena (1977). According to Frankena, divine self-love is “inconsistent” with 5p35, 
and Frankena argues, on this basis, that God must be subject to affects (p. 40).  
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Intellectual love of God is like love in that it is perfection accompanied by the 
idea of a cause (God), but it is unlike any affect (including love) in that it does not 
signify a fluctuation in one’s perfection, but rather the perfection with which one 
is already endowed. For this reason, intellectual love of God can be attributed to 
God, in spite of the fact that God is not subject to affects.
252
 Not only does God 
love himself with intellectual love, any finite mind’s love of God is part of the 
infinite intellectual love which God has for himself (5p36). (It should be added 
that although love of God is not an affect proper since it does not consist in a 
transition toward a greater or lesser perfection, there is a transition toward the 
perfection involved in coming to know that one eternally loves God in this way. 
Such instances of coming to know perfection one inevitably has, I have called 
instances of speculative perfection.) 
 
Spinoza makes a point concerning the conditions under which “modes of 
thinking” can exist in 2a3. Here, he states that “there are no modes of thinking, 
such as love […], unless there is in the same Individual the idea of the thing 
loved. But there can be an idea even though there is no other mode of thinking.” 
For example, I can entertain the thought of a triangle and I can entertain the affect 
of love for that triangle. But while I can entertain the thought of a triangle without 
being emotionally attached to it in anyway (unless I suffer from some severe 
paraphilia), I cannot love the triangle unless I entertain the idea of the triangle. 
The intentionality of love is thus determined by the idea that the love in question 
accompanies. Although love of God may not be an affect proper, it is clearly a 
mode of thinking. So, what love is directed at in love of God is dictated by the 
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 It is worth pointing out that Spinoza’s attribution of intellectual love of God to God is 
not to be confused with the Christian tradition of a God who is love (1 John 4:7-21). In 
the theological tradition surveyed in Chapter 7, the dogma of divine simplicity demanded 
that there be no difference between God’s essence and his love. For Spinoza, by contrast, 
God loves himself with infinite intellectual love because his nature enjoys infinite perfec-
tion and because there is necessarily in God’s intellect an idea of this nature (see 5p35, 
which I here summarize). If God were identical with his love for himself, he would not 
enjoy infinite perfection. Love, being a mode of thought, could not be absolutely infinite 
(i.e. possess infinite attributes each of which is infinite), since it is attribute-specific. 
God’s infinite intellectual love of himself is as it were a mere side-effect of his nature 
being what it is. God would not love himself if he were not infinitely greater than his love 
for himself. (It may be added that God’s love of himself appears to be entirely incompati-
ble with the naturalistic reading of Spinoza proposed by Nadler (2008).) 
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idea known by the third kind of knowledge which love of God accompanies. It is 
of crucial importance for the reading I advance that the peculiar intentional 
structure of love of God reveals something about the intentional structure of any 
idea known by the third kind of knowledge. Why the fuzz? Isn’t love of God 
simply directed at God? Interestingly, love of God is not simply so directed. 
 
To see the that the structure of ideas known by the third kind of knowledge is 
reflexive in a peculiar way, consider that Spinoza in demonstrating 5p36, writes: 
“Love of God is an action by which the mind contemplates itself” (Emphasis 
added). In love, what is contemplated is what is loved, and so it is to be expected 
that the mind that loves God would contemplate God and not itself. The fact that 
in intellectual love of God, any mind contemplates itself can only mean, I submit, 
that any mind contemplates itself as God. But what does that mean?  
 
One could think of various senses in which “I, as x” could operate. In a legal 
context, “I, as a judge” may have the authority to pass a legally binding sentence 
on you, something which “I, as a layperson” do not. Thus understood, the formula 
“I, as x” can specify which societal role the subject in question is undertaking at 
that moment. However, whatever my societal role, it is conferred upon me from 
without and extrinsic to my nature.
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 Even for Spinoza, who would (arguably) 
reject any modal contingency, you could not infer someone’s career from his 
essence; some account need to be taken of factors of existence not included in the 
definition of the individual in question in order to see why he ended up a grinder 
of lenses (for example). By contrast, by knowing as God I don’t assume a role 
that could have been any different. When I come to know x as God, I come to 
know that I know x in the only way I could ever have known x: as God. Yet, only 
in the third kind of knowledge, or so I suggest, is this experienced. 
 
Consider the following analogy: let us postulate that corporeality is (as it would 
seem) of the human essence. Having falsely believed myself to be a brain in a vat 
throughout my life, I for some reason suddenly change perspective on myself. I 
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 Lacan’s famous definition of a fool as a king who thinks he is king captures the ab-
surdity of a subject’s believing that his societal role is essential to him.  
 
258 
could now, for the first time, say that “I, as an embodied being” desire to touch 
the body of another person. My perspective on myself has shifted and come to 
encompass an essential, but hitherto overlooked, dimension of myself: my 
corporeality.
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 Something akin, I suggest, is involved in the third kind of 
knowledge. On my reading, through the third kind of knowledge one knows one’s 
intellect to be fused with God’s. It is for this reason that the third kind of 
knowledge allows for one’s intellectual activities to gain in force, and 
consequently supremely capable of quenching passions.  
 
But exactly how is this increase in forcefulness to be understood? As I 
emphasized in Chapter 6, passive affects are quenched by affective means only. 
One’s emotional life is impenetrable to reason as such. For true ideas cannot 
affectively outmaneuver false ones simply in virtue of being true - they need also 
be accompanied by affects stronger than the ones they are to outmaneuver (4p7; 
cf. 4p14: in the latter proposition, however, Spinoza speaks specifically about the 
powerlessness of “true knowledge of good and evil” insofar as it is true).  
 
Passions (or passive affects) are passive because they are inextricably tied to 
inadequate ideas (3p3). On Spinoza’s view, inadequacy is passive in a literal 
sense. For it arises from a literal passivity of the mind vis-à-vis the world, where 
the mind is tributary to external forces. (In 3p3s, Spinoza mentions that the mind 
and other individual things - meaning bodies - are passive in the very same sense.)  
 
                                                 
254
 I thank Peter Myrdal for valuable discussion on this topic and for pointing out to me 
the following parallel in Descartes. In the Sixth Meditation, Descartes writes: “Et aussi, 
de ce qu‘entre ces diverses perceptions des sens, les unes me sont agréables, et les autres 
désagréables, je puis tirer une conséquence tout à fait certaine, que mon corps (ou plutôt 
moi-même tout entier, en tant que je suis composé du corps et de l'âme: [meum corpus, 
sive potius me totum, quatenus et corpore & mente sum compositus]) peut recevoir di-
verses commodités ou incommodités des autres corps qui l'environnent” (AT, 65). By 
employing the phrase “my whole self, insofar as I am composed of the body and the 
soul”, Descartes again deepens a first-person perspective which methodic doubt has pro-
visorily emasculated. In the case of Descartes, the human being qua a soul-body compo-
site can refer to itself either under the guise of the soul alone or under the guise of the 
soul-body complex. For Spinoza, a mind necessarily embedded in God’s intellect, can 
refer to itself either as an autonomous agent, or, more truthfully, as necessarily embedded 
in God.  
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To know things by the third kind of knowledge and thus to love God is the 
summit of human perfection. But perfection is coextensive with activity. So that 
love of God is the most perfect state entails (and is entailed by) its being the most 
active one. The kind of outmaneuvering of affects by other affects that the third 
kind of knowledge makes possible is thus the outmaneuvering of relatively 
weaker passive affects by relatively stronger active modes of thought. In what 
follows, I will refer to the passivity or activity of an affect as its quality. (As 
already noted, strictly speaking, love of God is not an affect. However, if the idea 
of God as a cause which accompanies it is adequate, this mode of thinking can 
still accurately be called active. For that reason, it can be treated in the same way 
as other affects for the purpose of discussing the qualities of these modes of 
thinking.) 
 
To state that the third kind of knowledge is superior to that of the second kind on 
my interpretation amounts to stating both that human knowledge which somehow 
reflexively encompasses God is stronger than any knowledge which fails to so 
encompass God and that it is more active. How come the third kind of knowledge 
is always superiorly active? A clue to this question is present in the important 
proposition 5p18, and more precisely, in its scholium. Because of the crucial 
importance of 5p18 for my interpretation, I will here cite its demonstration, 
corollary and scholium.  
 
 Dem.: The idea of God which is in us is adequate and perfect (by 
2p46, 2p45). So insofar as we consider God, we act (by 3p3). 
Consequently (by 3p59), there can be no Sadness accompanied by 
the idea of God, i.e. (by Def. Aff. VII), no one can hate God, q.e.d. 
 Cor.: Love toward God cannot be turned into hate. Schol.: But, it 
can be objected, while we understand God to be the cause of all 
things, we thereby consider God to be the cause of Sadness. To this 
I reply that insofar as we understand the causes of Sadness, it 
ceases (by 3p3) to be a passion, i.e. (by 3p59), to that extent it 
ceases to be a Sadness. And so, insofar as we understand God to be 
the cause of Sadness, we rejoice (Emphasis added).  
 
In 5p18s the quality of sadness is said to change when it is seen to be caused by 
God: sadness then becomes a matter of rejoicing. In this passage, the quality of an 




Clearly a perspectival shift on the object of an emotion can transform the emotion 
in question. Consider, for example, the literary topos where a lover is grateful for 
being showered with stones as long as these are thrown by the beloved. It is easy 
to imagine a (romantic) lover wounded by a stone, whose initial infuriation is 
transformed into gratitude when he realizes that it is his beloved who has thrown 
the stone. No one would presumably want to take issue with this kind of affective 
alchemy. The problem arises when one assumes that for Spinoza the quality of an 
affect always reports accurately on its causal origin. That an affect was passive 
would then mean for it to have been caused in a certain way. No way of 





Yet, in the case we are considering, the origin of sadness was mistakenly thought 
to be something other than God. But, within the confines of Spinoza’s system, 
that is manifestly false - as per 1p15, everything that is, is within God and 
immanently caused by God. When we understand our sadness to be caused by 
God, this does not mean that the causal origin of the affect itself changes. It is our 
perspective on the affect that changes. But how can a shift in perspective change 
the quality of the affect in the question?  
 
The reading I propose can help resolve this puzzle. If, through the third kind of 
knowledge, the identity of one’s mind with (a part of) God’s intellect is 
experienced, then the realization that the sadness was caused by God does indeed 
change the quality of the affect. Prior to the third kind of knowledge, the affect 
was caused by something that I was not. It was thus a passion. After the 
realization of the third kind of knowledge, the affect was caused by something 
that is me. In this way, it becomes active.  
 
Against this suggestion, the most natural objection is that finite things are not 
God. God has several properties - infinity, for example - that finite things clearly 
lack. In response to this objection, it must be noted that Spinoza often speaks of 
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 This problem is raised by for example Bennett (1984, pp 335-7). 
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God conceived under different guises - God insofar as (quatenus ut) he is indeed 
certain things - some of which are clearly finite. 
 
If perfection monism is true, then all being/perfection is to be predicated of God. 
By contrast, all being/perfection is not predicated of me. It follows that whatever 
being I have, it is to be predicated of God, but the converse clearly does not hold: 
whatever being God has is not predicated of me. Instead I am merely a 
modification of God: God insofar as he is modified as me. But how are we to 
understand the relation between God and his modes? If there is no way for things 
to be unless their being is predicated of God, is tempting to say that God is them. 
But since God’s being is not predicated of them tout court, but only his being 
insofar as he is modified as them, the relation is not symmetrical. Someone may 
want to raise the objection that if this relation is not symmetrical, then surely the 
‘is’ in ‘God is me’ cannot express identity at all. For I am not God tout court. Yet, 
identity is the paradigmatic equivalence relation and as such symmetrical.
256
 I 
grant that we probably ought to opt for a relation different from standard identity 
to formulate the relation whereby God is qua each one of his modes. For no mode 
is identical with God tout court. In order to stringently suggest a better candidate, 
however, one would have to present a full formalization of the various relations 
resembling identity in which substance, attributes and modes stand to each other, 
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 However, given that Spinoza holds that there are different ways or aspects of being, it 
is not apparent that all kinds of identity relations that are needed to model his system are 
symmetrical. Bledin and Melamed (2019) distinguish between three genuine identity 
relations in Spinozism, only two of which are symmetrical. There is, on their view, first 
standard identity, an equivalence relation. Second, there is the cross-attribute identity of 
things as conceived under different attributes. Third, however, there is what they call the 
“projective identity of a multifaceted being” with that being as conceived under each of 
its attributes (its “facets”). The latter relation is not symmetrical, and the absence of 
symmetry holds for the same reason that the absence of symmetry holds in the case dis-
cussed here: namely, that there is simply more to God than his being under any specific 
attribute or as any specific mode. Of course, there is a difference between the projective 
identity, on the one hand, and the identity between God (insofar as he is me) and me, on 
the other: whereas there is, on one interpretation at least, nothing to the substance over 
and above all of its attributes with which he is “projectively” identical, there is arguably 
something to God over and above all of his modes, with which he is identical, insofar as 
he is them. I am thus not claiming that these two non-symmetrical “identities” are the 
same relation, merely pointing at how Spinoza’s metaphysics can allow for more com-
plex relations than the simple word ‘is’ may invite us to think.  
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and I cannot undertake the task to thus model Spinoza’s system here.
257
 Hence, I 
will continue to use the word that can best express the relation x has to y when all 
of y’s being can be predicated of x: that word is ‘is’.  
 
It is important to realize Spinoza’s picture of causality needs the “insofar as” -
locution. Whenever we are considering some limited manifestation of activity, 
God must be both the subject of that activity (as per his absolute infinity) and the 
cause that some of his activity is limited. But he cannot be the cause of a 
limitation in his own activity unless he can cause it “insofar as” he is a finite 
thing. The “insofar as”-locution makes it possible for God to be the subject of all 
activity and some activity nonetheless being limited: God tout court is the subject 
of all activity, God insofar as he is a finite thing is the subject of some specific 
activity and God insofar as he is some other finite thing is the cause of that 
specific activity being limited.
258
 God is thus globally (or infinitely) active at the 
expense of being locally (or finitely) passive. In the case of my suffering, it so 
happened that God was globally active by being locally passive where it, for me, 
matters most: where I am. But so long as I conceive of my true self as God (or, 
more modestly, as subsisting inextricably united with God) I will rejoice in this, 
since God, who is (or subsists through) me, could not be active or perfect without 
me being passive. We find, again, that the normativity of perfection asserts itself 
here. Why should the fact that God is infinitely active and thus perfect through the 
suffering of innumerable passivations justify these passivations? Only if 
perfection as such commands a positive evaluation on my part, can I prefer a 
situation where I can have God’s infinite activity at the expense of my finite 
passivity to a situation where there are only finite expressions of causal power but 
where I am not necessitated to suffer. What makes this preference possible is that 
infinite causal activity and perfection is to be valued most high of all. 
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 For an attempt at this task, see Bledin and Melamed (2019).  
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 God simpliciter does not cause some body to undergo some change. Instead he causes 
that body to undergo some change insofar as he is himself another body, acting upon it. 
But where did that body get its impetus from? From God, insofar as he is some third 




In sum, on my reading, sadness can be “activated” in two steps: by (i) identifying 
(in some way) with God; and (ii) construing God as the cause of that sadness. 
 
One can grasp the metaphysical picture involved in the steps (i)-(ii) by the second 
kind of knowledge as well as the third. But what distinguishes the third kind of 
knowledge is the immediate experience of (i). In the third kind of knowledge, the 
knowing subject reflexively identifies with God. And it does not seem all that 
surprising that such an experience should be affectively transformative. For by 
undergoing a kind of apotheosis, one’s emotional state should be transformed.  
 
If this language appears too strong, consider that Spinoza, in 5p36s, approves of 
the biblical qualification of love of God as “glory”. Spinoza adapts biblical glory 
for his own purposes and assimilates it with the meaning the word has in his own 
nomenclature. According to Spinoza, “gloria est acquiescentia in se ipso”: glory is 
esteem of oneself or perhaps rather coming to rest in oneself (acquiescentia is 
etymologically derived from quies, which means rest or silence), and occurrences 
of it can be rationally justified (4p59). On my reading, one estimates one’s mind 
most reasonably, within the framework of the Spinozist metaphysics, when one 
acknowledges that for any true or adequate idea, it belongs to one’s mind insofar 
as God is modified as it. It is, in short, only by partaking of God’s intellectual 
activity that a human being can know anything at all. If one can esteem oneself as 
God, one will attain the greatest possible self-esteem, for there can be no greater 
self to glory in than God’s. It is, I suggest, because the self that one acquiesces in, 
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 One can compare the affective force of this knowledge, accompanied by the greatest 
possible self-esteem, with how reason can curb passions. An understanding of Spinoza’s 
account of rational self-therapy is provided by Marshall (2012). On Marshall's reading, 
Spinoza’s program for passion control consists in uprooting passionate impulses by prac-
tising focused rational activities - e.g. doing metaphysics in order to contain one’s amo-
rous obsession. The problem is that in order for metaphysics to “kill the mood” of amo-
rous obsessions, it must be affectively stronger than these moods (according to 4p7). On 
my reading, any rational activity, whatever it may be, accompanied by divine reflexivity 
is more forceful than the same activity divested of this perspective on the self.  
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Importantly, this reading of the third kind of knowledge is vindicated by the 
collapse of subjective and objective genitive in the phrase intellectual love of 
God. By subjective genitive I mean God’s love for x. By objective genitive I mean 
x’s love of God. The Latin amor Dei admits of both possibilities. Crucially, the 
only way in which subjective and objective genitive can collapse is in (reflexive) 
self-love. And in 5p36c, they do collapse. In this corollary, Spinoza writes that 
“insofar as God loves himself, he loves men, and consequently […] God’s love of 
men and the Mind’s love of God are one and the same”. In 5p36s, Spinoza then 
states that: “From this we clearly understand wherein our salvation, or 
blessedness, or Freedom, consists, viz. in a constant and eternal Love of God, or 
in God’s Love of men.” But if the love God entertains for x (subjective) is the 
same as x’s love of God (objective), then it follows that in experiencing love of 
God, x also reflexively experiences what it is like to be God (modified as x). In 
other words, the collapse of subjective and objective genitive in love of God 
shows that the subject reflexively involved in the third kind of knowledge is 
transformed: it no longer regards itself as something that God is not. In 
intellectual love of God, divine reflexivity modifies the subjectivity of the 
knower.  
 
This reading additionally goes some way toward explaining why Spinoza 
considers the third kind of knowledge to be intuitive and not discursive. I as a 
knowing subject become intuited under a new guise in the third kind of 
knowledge. Fundamentally, the third kind of knowledge is not about coming to 
know something different but in coming to know as something different.  
 
One cannot escape that there is a sense in which I, on this reading, through the 
third kind of knowledge, surrender some of my autonomy. Because it is likely that 
I thought I was thinking my own thoughts, while all along I was God, modified as 
me, thinking God’s thoughts. This reading thus raises the following questions: can 
the highest perfection and, as a consequence, the highest activity of the mind 
really consist in the mind’s yielding its “own” activity to God? Does not this 
reading deny any mental autonomy on the part of humans? Is it not an ideal of 
perfection which presents the ultimate passivity (yielding one’s subjectivity to a 
global and overarching subject) as the ultimate activity? 
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8.4. The perfection of necessity and the activity of passivity. 
 
In order to begin to formulate an answer to the cluster of questions just posed I 
will attempt to carve out a space for human autonomy in the indivisible bloc of 
divine activity. That space, however, is not so much a space for us to exert our 
own agency as a space for us to cease not to exert God’s. 
 
Ontological perfection comes in degrees, and everything that is possesses at least 
some perfection. The reason things are perfect or real is that they follow 
“necessarily from a given most perfect nature” (1p33s2). As I have insisted 
throughout this thesis, the equation of being with perfection is not axiologically 
innocent. For being, and more specifically, necessary being is supposed to exert a 
normative pull on us. This becomes explicit in Spinoza’s surprising claim that 
“insofar as we understand we want nothing but what is necessary” (4app G. 
II/276). The passage is important as it shows that ontological perfection is also 
normative for Spinoza: for rational agents, x’s being necessarily caused by God 
for some reason also invests it with value, and more precisely with the kind of 
value that should make us want for it to obtain. This clearly indicates that the fact 
that being is necessitated does not, or at least is not intended to, destroy all value. 
On my reading, the reason why we ought to want what is necessary is that only 
what is necessitated can be perfect and perfection, even though it is ontological, 
exerts a normative pull on us when we are rational. For Spinoza, the dimension of 
value is not erected on the fundament of things possibly having been otherwise. 
Consider again that the perfection/activity of our mind consists in understanding. 
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 There is an interesting loop here that deserves to be mentioned. The way I read Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra, that book is about overcoming the thought of the eternal return. Zara-
thustra overcomes that thought by affirming it (a task he accomplishes in the Nacht-
Wanderer Lied). But this means affirming eternally recurring affirmation, too. Similarly, 
Spinoza encourages us to want what is necessary at all costs. This includes wanting to 
necessarily want what is necessary. On the Nietzschean picture, to bend one’s will in such 
a way that it aligns perfectly with what necessarily recurs, requires a will-power of super-
human magnitude. Similarly, it seems, to want what is necessary - even necessarily - 
would appear to be possible at best only for a chosen few. Spinoza does not explicitly 
discuss this loop. 
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Not only is the perfection of the things we contemplate rooted in God’s nature, so 
also is the contemplation itself. Spinoza’s perfectionist program consists in giving 
humans the theoretical means to reflexively acknowledge God’s perfection: and in 
acknowledging that their intellectual enjoyment of things is his, their freedom and 
perfection is maximized (for the alignment of freedom and perfection, see 5p36s). 
This is because, by consciously identifying with God, I can as it were appropriate 
God’s activity. When I am passive - when I suffer from God’s self-passivation - 
as God, this passivity is seen as a manifestation of activity. For God is infinitely 
active not only by being so simpliciter, but by suffering infinite passivations at his 
own hands. Since I remain a thing limited in space and time, I continue to undergo 
passions. But I now see them in a different light. Let me explain more clearly how 
this is possible.  
 
The highest form of human perfection consists in love of God. On my 
interpretation, God is infinitely worthy of love because he is infinitely perfect. But 
God cannot be infinitely perfect without also being infinitely active. According to 
Spinoza’s picture of causality, God cannot be infinitely active without being 
finitely passive and I am one of these finite things. For this reason, the highest 
form of human activity may be said to consist in a reflected or informed kind of 
passivity. The passive state is the finite human condition. It is converted into 
activity by the third kind of knowledge where the mind reflects upon itself as 
God. Whatever the third kind of knowledge may contain in addition, it contains at 
least an adequate idea of God as a cause of one’s activity being limited. One’s 
passivity vis-à-vis the world is the inevitable outcome of divine activity. But by 
coming to love God as oneself, one can convert that passivity into activity.  
 
Interestingly, this is the sole space which is reserved for strictly human autonomy. 
 
In thinking adequate ideas, my ideas are God’s. When I am deluded, however, I 
am something that God is not. But since there is no being which God does not, as 
it were, appropriate, this means that to the extent that I have inadequate ideas, I 
am not. In ontological terms, to the extent that I am not God, I am nothing at all. 
In terms of activity, if I do not carry out God’s actions in acting, I do not act at all. 
If there is to be any space for human and non-divine mental agency it can 
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therefore only consist in the phasing out of ideas inadequate in myself, whereby 
nothing changes in the global deposit of ideas in God’s intellect.
261
 In sum, while 
there is only divine agency, there is also human passivity. But when properly 
reflected, human passivity can become divine agency. 
 
 Polemical conclusion. 
 
That the distinction between subjective and objective genitive is abolished in the 
phrase of “God’s love” is a stock theme in various mystic traditions. “According 
to the mystics, God alone can say ‘I’”, as Cioran (1995) wrote. Spinoza’s account 
of love of God shows that he, too, subscribed to this view: man’s love for God is 
nothing but God’s love, modified as that man, for himself. To merely observe this 
similarity would be of little philosophical interest. The collapse of subjective and 
objective genitive in Spinoza’s concept of intellectual love of God is of 
importance for this thesis since that mental state is also described as the apex of 
human perfection. 
 
Let me end this chapter by pointing out how my reading of Spinoza is different 
from a prevalent interpretation. Even in the absence of a dominant religious 
mainstream demanding genuine human freedom as a necessary condition for the 
salvation of souls, contemporary philosophers are more anxious than ever to 
safeguard human agency and “robust” human activity, even in the realm of 
Spinoza studies.
262
 This is related, of course, to the fact that human perfectionism, 
outside the realm of Spinoza studies, is commonly defined in solely active terms.  
                                                 
261
 In this, agree with the reading of Spinoza’s ontology presented in Della Rocca 
(2008b), but would like emphasize to a greater extent than he does the paradoxical conse-
quences for Spinoza’s ethics. 
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 See, for instance, Sangiacomo and Nachtomy (2018). On the view of Sangiacomo and 
Nachtomy, activity (and hence perfection) can be predicated of finite modes “in a robust 
sense” because finite modes can be the adequate causes of effects. I disagree with their 
reading on two counts, and would like to comment on a, crucial, third point. First, San-
giacomo and Nachtomy present the two stages of Spinoza’s development as follows: 
“instead of viewing the activity of finite modes as completely subordinate to God’s im-
manent activity [as Spinoza did in the KV] he presents [in the Ethics] God’s own activity 
as fully expressed by the activity of finite modes” (2018, p. 113). As these two alterna-
tives stand they appear not to be mutually exclusive at all, and Sangiacomo and 





Whereas a contemplative ideal of human perfection was enjoined in Book X of 
Aristotle’s Nicohmachean Ethics, Hurka’s modified Aristotelian account - typical 
for our time - emphasizes the active development of one’s talents as the primary 
intrinsic good that one has a self-regarding duty to aim at. These talents consist in 
a capacity for physical or mental perfection, whether the latter be the capacity for 
theoretical or practical rationality. Hurka (1993, p. 56) does not consider 
contemplative virtues as even partially constitutive of theoretical rationality.  
 
In a similar vein, Spinoza is sometimes read as someone carving out an enormous 
space for human activity and expansion. This is natural given Spinoza’s apparent 
celebration of perfection as human activity. One example of such a reading is to 
                                                                                                                                     
my activity, then the activity of what fully expresses my activity cannot do anything con-
trary to my design. Consider for example the activity of, say, an artificially intelligent 
robot that I have designed to carry out my own activity. This robot, it seems, must be 
“completely subordinate” to my activity in order to “express” it. Second, Sangiacomo and 
Nachtomy nowhere define what they mean by ‘active in a robust sense’. But unless activ-
ity can be predicated of modes without also being predicated of substance, the activity of 
the modes will always supervene on the activity of the substance. Since activity cannot be 
predicated of modes unless it is also being predicated of substance, it is far from clear that 
modes can be active in a robust sense, if one takes that to mean the subjects of an activity 
exclusively theirs. Third, and most importantly, Sangiacomo and Nachtomy suggest that 
“[i]n the Ethics, what makes finite modes active (in the sense of being ‘adequate cause’ 
[sic]) is the connection between their own essence and the effects they produce. This 
apparently subtle change suggests that finite modes can be active in a more robust sense 
than the one presented in the KV”. I grant that this is true. But importantly, as I have 
sought to show in this chapter, human beings can be the adequate cause of an idea of 
their utter ontological dependence on God. This idea reveals to them that their activity is 
not theirs. In this way, Spinoza’s philosophy of activity in the Ethics is more two-edged 
than commentators who only emphasize the “robust” sense in which finite things are 
active tend to acknowledge.  
 In general, I agree with Koistinen’s observation (2009, p. 154) that the problem 
of “how can there be, in such a system, where all actions are of God, a multitude of freely 
acting agents?” takes as its point of departure a difference between God and others which 
Spinoza’s monism does not quite admit. Yet, the question is if Koistinen’s own interpre-
tation does not relapse into this difference when he formulates his assignment as follows: 
“It should be explicated how is it possible, as it were, that God thinks A by my thinking 
of A, so that both I and God are genuine thinkers of that thought” (2009, p. 157: Empha-
sis added). The just emphasised sentence shows that Koistinen’s concern, as Sangiaco-
mo’s and Nachtomy’s, is to defend some robust form of human agency in Spinozism. 
Yet, the divide between naturing nature and natured nature indicates that for Spinoza, my 
mind belongs to the same ontological category as any one thought (or idea). At the risk of 
muddling the waters further, I would venture to say that genuine doer of some deed 
should not belong to the same ontological category as the deed. If this principle is accu-
rate, then God alone is the genuine thinker of all thoughts. 
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be found in Kisner (2011, p. 5), who claims that human perfection, for Spinoza, is 
for us to “stamp our causal footprint on the world”. Of course, Kisner is right: 
because of the equivalence between causal activity and perfection, what he says 
follows rigorously. The production of effects is entailed by all existence, and 
(ontological) perfection is by definition co-extensive with such activity. I am 
therefore not claiming that Kisner is simply wrong.  
 
In this chapter, however, I hope I have shown that Spinoza’s celebration of human 
activity is more two-edged than is acknowledged by readings such as Kisner’s. 
Spinoza does not merely enjoin us to “stamp our causal footprint on the world”: if 
the normative dimension of Spinoza’s perfectionism came down only to this, there 
would be too little difference between him and the most common among career 
advice manuals. I have defended a view of Spinoza’s perfectionism as ultimately 
speculative in the sense that human perfection consists in consciously reflecting 
divine perfection and agency. Kisner’s reading of the human good in Spinoza is 
pluralistic and humanistic. My reading focalizes on the highest human good in 
Spinoza’s philosophy and since this good is unique, there is no pluralism in this 
regard.
263
 More interestingly, it is also, in a way, anti-humanistic. Spinoza’s 
perfectionism is, on my reading, anti-humanistic in that the ultimate human 
accomplishment, the self-fulfilment of what is properly human, comes by 
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 Kisner’s reading is pluralist in the sense that he maintains that for Spinoza, the “good 
life” consists in the exertion of many virtues, some of which are non-intellectual. See 
Kisner (2011, p. 5): “While Spinoza admittedly holds that our power is best served by 
leading a rational life (4app5), this does not imply a preference for intellectual activities. 
For he holds that rational ideas increase our activity not only in the abstract metaphysical 
sense of increasing our mental power, but also in a practical sense, by directing us to en-
gage actively in the world through the formation of friendship, treating others with kind-
ness and participation in the life of the state.”It should be noted that I do not claim that 
the previously cited statement is wrong. For Kisner to be wrong here would be for Spino-
za to hold that the exertion of reason would not be conducive to social harmony. But I am 
aware of no philosophers who have maintained the view that rationality as such is not 
conducive but instead harmful to social cohesion. Kisner thus defends a Spinoza who 
disagrees with none. And of course, it is not the case that Spinoza disagrees with us on 
exactly every score. But in this thesis I have been more preoccupied with the controver-
sial (and unfashionable) aspects of Spinoza’s philosophy - and Spinoza appears to be 
most in opposition to our contemporary sensitivities in his theory of ideal perfection. 
Human perfection is the enjoyment of a good. But the good in the enjoyment of which 
our highest perfection can consist is clearly intellectual in nature (and may, for this rea-
son, unlike other goods, be indiscriminately shared). See for instance TTP, IV [16], C. II. 
129: “This [sc. highest] good consists only in contemplation and a pure mind.” 
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identifying with what is not human. It may be worthwhile to linger for awhile on 
this observation.  
 
The reflexive idea of God’s thinking one’s “own” thought is adequate in the 
human mind. As previously stated, that it is adequate means that the essence of 
the human mind (as unimpeded by external forces) has within itself the resources 
to bring forth an idea about its own ontological dependence on God. For an idea is 
adequate in a mind when the essence of that mind has within itself the resources 
to produce that idea. But the ontological dependence in question is so extreme that 
all of the mind’s being, perfection and causal activity must be ultimately 
predicated of God, including the mind’s realization of its own dependence. On my 
reading, the human mind has thus within itself the resources to deconstruct its 
own apparent independence and contingency. For it can, by acquiring adequate 
understanding of God as absolutely infinite, infer that its activity is not properly 
speaking its own. Thus, in contrast with Kisner, I suggest that the highest human 
perfection for Spinoza consists in realizing that one’s causal footprint is not 





My reading has the advantage of savouring the strangeness of Spinoza’s system. 
However, in the eyes of contemporary perfectionists, it has the disadvantage of 
dethroning the active “stamping of one’s own footprint on the world” as the 
ultimate human accomplishment. But given the status of the world - I am thinking 
of the ecological crisis of our time - perhaps it would be more virtuous to begin 
with erasing our footprints, carbon and others. And indeed, in the third kind of 
knowledge, the first human mark of all - that of an autonomous self - is erased 
from a mind that thereby does not lose, but instead gains, its true identity. 
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 Conclusion   
 
In this dissertation, I have tried to accomplish two distinct tasks. First, I have 
presented a reading of Spinoza’s philosophy based on the normativity of his 
concept of ontological perfection (contrary to the reading of several other 
commentators).
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 That is, I have presented a theory of human perfection in 
Spinoza’s philosophy which strives to accommodate, rather than to bypass, an 
apparent absurdity at the heart of his system: his alignment of being and value. 
Second, I have sought to highlight the practical role divine infinity plays in the 
(speculative) perfection of humans in an attempt to reconcile perfection monism 
and human perfection.  
 
At first, I laid the groundwork by analyzing Spinoza’s different concepts of 
perfection, distinguishing ontological perfection from its teleological counterpart. 
Ontological perfection is for Spinoza the same as reality, being and causal power. 
I argued that, in spite of his statements to the contrary, ontological perfection in 
Spinoza’s philosophy plays the role of a transcendental. By a transcendental is 
meant a property that is coextensive yet not co-intensional with being. Such 
transcendentals were an important feature of the Scholastic thought landscape. 
This result is important to the historian of philosophy, since it shows how 
Spinoza, in this regard, breaks with tradition only by radically embracing it. More 
importantly, however, interpreting Spinoza’s ontological perfection as a 
transcendental allows us to appreciate how that property can shoulder a normative 
role. For, by considering being as co-extensive with perfection, Spinoza - after the 
manner of the Scholastics who considered it co-extensive with the good - arrives 
at a kind of justification of being. Yet the value that, on Spinoza’s view, redeems 
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being is incommensurable with the values that we in ordinary life appeal to and 
live by.  
 
If ethical progress is to be held against a standard with a solid basis in reality, it is 
not to be evaluated in terms that lack ontological grounding. On my reading, 
Spinoza’s ideal of human perfection is indeed ontologically grounded. Therefore, 
evaluations in terms of good and evil are tangential to the ontological ideal of 
human perfection that Spinoza advances. For such evaluations are teleological: 
they state one’s relative progress in developmental processes toward a merely 
subjective ideal and such subjectively perfective standards fail to express real 
properties of things. The fact that ontological perfection, in spite of being a value, 
is a value markedly different from the values that ordinarily function as 
motivators, results in an account of ethics that is very particular. Throughout this 
thesis, I have sought to highlight this by pointing at the oftentimes controversial 
consequences of transcendental perfection for Spinoza’s ethics. I will here only 
mention two such consequences, both of which appear prima facie paradoxical.  
 
The first consequence I would like to highlight is that human beings can, 
seemingly paradoxically, gain in perfection by (speculatively) acknowledging the 
perfection which is already theirs. Although human beings are ontologically 
perfect to the extent that they are, they are not aware of this perfection merely in 
virtue of being. On my reading, Spinoza’s ideal of human perfection consists 
exactly in the attainment of a perspective on the world and oneself from which 
ontological perfection may be spotted - my reading is thus significantly different 
from the humanistic and pluralistic one proposed by Kisner (2011). A sine qua 
non condition of attaining such knowledge is coming to know God, and more 
precisely to know him as God and consciously. For the transcendental perfection 
of being is grounded in the fact that all being is necessitated by an absolutely 
infinite and supremely perfect God. It is thus because (a) Spinoza’s account of 
human perfection is speculative, and because (b) one will be able to establish the 
(ontological) perfection of things only by deducing it from the divine essence, that 
(c) the absolute infinity of the divine essence plays a significant role in Spinoza’s 
account of human perfection. But how exactly can one come to regard the world 
and oneself in such a way as to become speculatively perfect? In this dissertation, 
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I have discussed three perspectival shifts constitutive of speculative perfection 
(though I admit there may be others). Each of them crucially involves the notion 
of infinity. 
 
By changing the lens through which we regard the actually infinite causal chain 
producing our chagrins, we can come to conceive of them as necessary. Thus 
conceiving them is a therapeutic measure against oversensitivity to suffering. But 
it is not only that. For the only way in which we can, on Spinoza’s view, 
conceptualize the infinite chain unfolding behind every chagrin of ours in order to 
realize the necessity of that chain, is by considering it as a qualitative infinity. The 
one qualitative infinity we paradigmatically know is that of the attributes. But 
how is one to conceptually model one’s understanding of one infinity (that of the 
modes) on one’s understanding of another infinity (that of the attributes)? I have 
argued that if such modelling is to be at all possible, our knowledge of the infinity 
of the attributes must, on Spinoza’s view, be epistemically prior to that of the 
modes. I have showed that in this context, we once more find a familiar medieval 
theory - analogy - applied in a radical way.  
 
It is by changing the lens through which we regard any potential attribute (any 
self-contained dimension in which causal chains unfold) that we come to regard 
the attributes under which we (know ourselves to) exist, as God. The 
conceptualization of our own existential milieus (extension and thought) as global 
ways God is, is obtained only from the definition of God as absolutely infinite. 
For it follows from Spinoza’s definition of God as absolutely infinite that 
anything that can be conceived as an attribute must be one. 
 
By changing, at last, the lens through which we regard ourselves we pass 
(speculatively) to the summit of perfection (which we ontologically have already 
attained). This transformed reflexivity is, on my reading, what distinguishes the 
third kind of knowledge from knowledge of the second kind and also what 
explains its superiority. This is the second paradox I would like to highlight. The 
third kind of knowledge is said to obtain when a human being is maximally 
endowed with perfection through the causation of an idea that stems from her 
nature. But that idea is about God as a cause. The way an absolutely infinite God 
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acts as a cause is by appropriating the causation of all effects and thus, by 
employment of the definitional machinery, all perfection. Crucially, in the third 
kind of knowledge, on my reading, the human subject knows that even her 
thinking of the idea of God as a cause is thought by God. So, the perfection with 
which she is endowed through thinking that thought is not, ultimately, hers. The 
paradox is that the maximal perfection and activity of a human being should 
consist in relinquishment of any perfection and activity that she can properly call 
her own. This reading goes against a recent trend in the scholarship - namely that 
of finding place for “robust” and “genuine” human agency in Spinozism.266   
 
In fact, this result was to be expected. For whereas the transcendental good on the 
scholastic view was true of all being because all being was created by God, for 
Spinoza, the grounding of transcendental perfection in God is more intimate. 
More precisely, the reason why things are perfect to the extent that they are, is 
that to the extent that they are, they are God (modified as those things) and God is 
supremely perfect. Speculative perfection can only obtain when this is realized. 
For it is only by judging their own perfection to consist in being necessarily 
brought forth by God that human beings can become conscious of already 
possessing ontological perfection. And things are necessarily brought forth by 
God because God is necessary and things are God existing in a certain way. It is 
worth lingering for a moment on how Spinoza, on this reading, seeks to reconcile 
necessity with perfectionism.  
 
Necessitarianism destroys contingency and thereby arguably also deep moral 
responsibility, which is founded on the former. Yet, on my reading, for Spinoza 
human perfection consists in speculatively acknowledging one’s ontological 
perfection. Everything is (ontologically) perfect since it is necessitated by a 
supremely perfect God. Hence, one cannot become (speculatively) perfect unless 
one can first appreciate the value of being necessitated by God. The very “fatal 
necessity” which is commonly thought to ruin morality thus becomes the vehicle 
for a new value which we must appreciate in order to become perfect in the 
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ultimate sense. In this way, necessity is a “principal foundation” not only for the 
TTP (as Spinoza acknowledges in Letter 75, C. II. 470) but for his philosophy of 
human perfection in the Ethics as well. 
 
By granting Spinoza that being is necessitated and arguing that for him being 
necessitated is in turn valuable, I have sought to integrate into one account the 
seemingly incompatible doctrines of necessitarianism and human perfectionism. 
Nonetheless, readers will have noticed that I have not dealt in any detail with the 
following question: what sense is there in treating speculative perfection as 
somehow normatively enjoined if all our actions, including all our thoughts, are 
necessitated (or even just, more modestly, determined)? This question is worth 
asking, but it is an objection that faces all determinism. To adapt any one 
compatibilism to suit Spinoza’s purposes would not add much either to our 
understanding of the opposition between determinism and morality and its 
resolution, nor to our understanding of Spinoza’s thinking per se, which does not 
directly engage with that particular problem. For this reason, I have sought to 
articulate his theory of human perfection without proposing any independent 
solution to this age-old problem.  
 
Of course, further research is required. There are two areas of particular interest.  
 
First, there is the relevance of aspects of my work for environmental philosophy. 
One obvious objection to Spinoza’s philosophy of perfection is its apparent 
neglect of teleologically established values. One might suspect that this neglect of 
the human perspective would inspire attitudes of moral defeatism. Nonetheless, it 
is of potential interest to contemporary environmental thought. In traditional 
(Aristotelian) accounts of human perfection, what kind of perfection humans can 
aspire to has long been an issue dealt with by first inquiring into the human 
essence. By contrast, Spinoza’s overall philosophy of perfection can be 
interpreted as indicating a different, and less anthropocentric, approach to the 
issue. For Spinoza, no viable ideal of human perfection is forthcoming unless we 
ponder the whole of Nature to which we owe our existence, and our proper place 
in it. Of course, nature as we know it, our life-supporting system on this planet, 
does not meet Spinoza’s criteria for what counts as God or Nature. Nonetheless, 
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we still stand in the same relation to nature as Spinoza thought humankind did to 
God: we can neither be nor be conceived without it. To formulate an ethical 
perfectionism which takes nature as its starting point and only then strives to 
situate the role of human perfection within this larger scheme seems to be an 
intellectual obligation in our world of environmental crisis. 
 
Second, there is important work to be undertaken in the field of comparative 
philosophy. I have previously noted that there is a striking formal similarity 
between Spinoza and the accounts of human perfection given by Eastern 
traditions. For example, a noteworthy similarity obtains between the Buddhist 
Madhyamika understanding of nirvana and the philosophy of perfection which 
emerges from my analysis of Spinoza’s works. According to an idea expounded 
first and foremost by Nagarjuna, nirvana and samsara are different only from the 
point of view of samsara. From the point of view of nirvana, they are no longer 
different, but rather identical. (Samsara is the unenlightened state of continuous 
rebirth.) My interpretation of Spinoza’s philosophy can be similarly expressed in 
the following paradox: perfection and imperfection are different only from the 
point of view of imperfection. From the point of view of perfection, they are no 
longer different, but rather identical. The paradox is to be explicated thus: once 
one conceptualizes perfection as a transcendental rather than teleologically, one 
will recognize that things one previously judged imperfect are in fact perfect, to 
the extent that they are at all. One may want to say that the fact that there is such 
an explication - the one provided by this dissertation - only shows that there was 
no paradox there in the first place; it merely arose because one equivocated on the 
word ‘perfection’. The equivocation obtains since the overcome concept of 
perfection and the ultimate concept of perfection are expressed by the same word. 
But perhaps this is in itself significant. 
 
In this regard, the parallel to nirvana can help. One reason why samsara and 
nirvana are seen to be the same from the point of view of nirvana may be that 
nirvana is inherently a transitional concept. By this I mean that it is defined as the 
overcoming of a previous ethical stage, such that the two stages can only be 
thought of as different before the ultimate stage is reached. Likewise, for Spinoza, 
perfection is similarly transitional. Teleological perfection and imperfection can 
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only be thought of as ontologically different prior to one’s attainment of 
speculative perfection. Just as nirvana, when attained, renegotiates the difference 
between samsara and nirvana, so speculative perfection renegotiates the difference 
between (teleologically conceived) perfection and imperfection. My conjecture is 
that in other soteriologies too, one attains the ultimate state (whether it be 
salvation or liberation) when one abandons a misleading conceptualization of 
what such a state would amount to. An interesting task far beyond the scope of the 
present dissertation would be to comparatively explore this feature of 
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